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Abstract 
This socio-legal thesis explores the highly topical and underexplored issue of 
the legal regulation of gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting in England & 
Wales, drawing on British Columbia (Canada) as a jurisdiction where this issue 
has been considered in more detail. These families involve reproductive 
collaborations between single or partnered lesbians and gay men where a child 
is conceived through assisted reproduction and each of the adults remain 
involved in the child’s life. Collaborative co-parenting can take a variety of forms, 
each of which is distinguishable from gamete donation or surrogacy because 
each of the adults continues to exercise some sort of parental role in relation to 
the child. 
Since the adoption of the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, it 
has been possible for two female parents to appear on a child’s birth certificate 
following birth and for two male parents to be registered following a court 
parental order. The UK parliament has not, however, gone so far as to allow 
more than two parents to be legally recognised. This contrasts with the 
approach in British Columbia, which allows three parents to be registered on 
the birth certificate in cases of same-sex parenting involving assisted 
reproduction. In both Canada and the UK, however, courts have struggled to 
balance the interests of those involved in these collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements with varying degrees of success. 
This thesis combines detailed, comparative doctrinal analysis with a series of 
case studies of collaborative co-parenting families gathered from in-depth 
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interviews with co-parents and legal professionals in Canada and the UK. In 
doing this, a typology of collaborative co-parenting families is advanced. The 
conclusion the thesis draws from this is that gay and lesbian collaborative co-
parents are not an homogenous group and the law’s adherence, in England & 
Wales, to a one-size-fits-all, dyadic approach to parenthood based on the 
intimate couple does not adequately reflect the needs of the adults in this 
situation nor what is in the best interests of the child.   
One of the key findings to emerge from this study and the typology of 
collaborative co-parenting it advances is that the legal framework in England & 
Wales risks overlooking the interests of gay men who are involved in 
collaborative co-parenting in its attempt to protect women-led homonuclear 
families, even where this is not consistent with their agreed role in the child’s 
life. Therefore, a central recommendation is that any reform to this area of law 
should move away from a prescribed dyadic parenting model as the basis for 
regulating parent-child relationships in collaborative co-parenting families.  
Instead, it should require a careful consideration of pre-conception intentions, 
recorded where possible in a parenting solidarity agreement.  
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... 2 
LIST OF CASES ...................................................................................................................... 8 
LIST OF STATUTES .............................................................................................................. 11 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... 13 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ 14 
THESIS OUTLINE ................................................................................................................. 15 
PART ONE: SETTING THE SCENE .......................................................................................... 17 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 18 
AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................................................................................... 26 
GENERAL APPROACH TO THE RESEARCH .......................................................................................... 26 
SITUATING THE RESEARCH ............................................................................................................. 30 
Legal Context in Brief .......................................................................................................... 31 
Situating the Study’s Theoretical Focus .............................................................................. 33 
Socially Locating the Research ........................................................................................... 35 
Research Context ................................................................................................................ 39 
(Gay) Men and Reproduction ............................................................................................. 44 
Recognising Diversity through Law .................................................................................... 47 
CHAPTER TWO: DOING THE RESEARCH ............................................................................... 53 
CHOICE OF RESEARCH TOPIC AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................... 53 
RESEARCH APPROACH .................................................................................................................. 55 
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 55 
Adopting a Socio-Legal Perspective .................................................................................... 56 
 
 
5 
Comparative Approach ....................................................................................................... 60 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 69 
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 69 
Research Design and Strategy ............................................................................................ 70 
Participant Recruitment and Sampling ............................................................................... 73 
Participant Overview .......................................................................................................... 77 
Data Collection ................................................................................................................... 80 
Data Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 87 
Ethical Considerations ........................................................................................................ 92 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 93 
PART TWO: COMPARATIVE LEGAL INSIGHTS ....................................................................... 94 
CHAPTER THREE: COLLABORATIVE CO-PARENTING AND THE HIERARCHY OF FAMILIES - 
NAVIGATING LEGISLATIVE TENSIONS ................................................................................. 96 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 96 
LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN ENGLAND & WALES ................................................................................... 96 
PROVINCIAL VS. FEDERAL LEGISLATION IN CANADA ......................................................................... 106 
PARENTAL PROJECTS IN QUEBEC’S CIVIL LAW ................................................................................. 108 
FILLING THE LEGISLATIVE GAP IN ONTARIO .................................................................................... 122 
THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF FORMER PARTNERS IN ALBERTA ........................................................... 129 
LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF POLY-PARENTING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA ............................................. 133 
INSIGHTS FROM PRACTICE ........................................................................................................... 138 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 142 
CHAPTER FOUR: NORMATIVITY AND VULNERABILITY – JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF 
COLLABORATIVE CO-PARENTING DISPUTES ...................................................................... 144 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 144 
CHARACTERISING THE (COLLABORATIVE CO-PARENTING?) CASES ...................................................... 145 
 
 
6 
THE VARIOUS MANIFESTATIONS OF HETERONORMATIVITY ............................................................... 152 
THE VULNERABILITY OF FEMALE PARENTS, BIOLOGICAL FATHERS AND THEIR PARTNERS ........................ 162 
TROUBLING TERMINOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 189 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 196 
CHAPTER FIVE: VALUING AUTONOMY – INDETERMINATE INTENTIONS AND COLLABORATIVE 
PARENTHOOD ................................................................................................................. 198 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 198 
PARENTHOOD AND PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY: SECTION 8 ORDERS AS BADGES OF STATUS ................... 199 
POST-SEPARATION DIFFERENT-SEX PARENTING: UNCRITICALLY ADOPTING SIMILAR APPROACHES .......... 207 
MAKING INTENTIONS CLEAR ........................................................................................................ 221 
CONTRACTING CONTACT ............................................................................................................ 238 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 254 
PART THREE: THE VIEWPOINT OF LAW’S FAMILIES ............................................................ 256 
CHAPTER SIX: FAMILY PORTRAITS AND PARENTING JOURNEYS ......................................... 259 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 259 
POLY-PARENTING FAMILY PORTRAITS ........................................................................................... 260 
Betty, Eliza and Lenny ....................................................................................................... 260 
Chris, Callum and Camilla ................................................................................................. 261 
Colin, Joel, Lisa and Rosalind ............................................................................................ 263 
Sally, Rachel, Casey and Rich ............................................................................................ 265 
Delilah ............................................................................................................................... 266 
KNOWN DONOR FAMILY PORTRAITS ............................................................................................. 268 
Angela, Ruth and Rob ....................................................................................................... 268 
Frieda and Calvin .............................................................................................................. 269 
PARENTING JOURNEYS ................................................................................................................ 271 
Why Do People Engage in Collaborative Co-Parenting? .................................................. 271 
 
 
7 
CONTINUUM OF RELATEDNESS: A TYPOLOGY OF COLLABORATIVE CO-PARENTING ............................... 277 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 284 
CHAPTER SEVEN: WOMEN-LED FAMILIES, MALE-LED FAMILIES AND POLY-PARENTING ...... 286 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 286 
ASSISTING REPRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 287 
REAFFIRMING SAME-SEX PARENTING ........................................................................................... 292 
THE ROLE OF MEN IN WOMEN-LED FAMILIES ................................................................................ 297 
MOTIVATIONS FOR INVOLVING A KNOWN BIOLOGICAL FATHER ......................................................... 302 
GAY MEN AND PARENTHOOD ...................................................................................................... 310 
GAY MEN AND COLLABORATIVE REPRODUCTION ............................................................................ 324 
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF GAY MALE PARENTING ........................................................................ 335 
STRUGGLE FOR COHERENCE ........................................................................................................ 345 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 349 
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION - COLLABORATIVE CO-PARENTING AS A CALL TO REFORM 
LAW’S FAMILIES .............................................................................................................. 351 
WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF LEGALLY RECOGNISING COLLABORATIVE CO-PARENTING ............................... 362 
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE (PARENTS) ...................................................................... 366 
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE (PROFESSIONALS) ........................................................... 369 
APPENDIX 3: CONSENT FORM .......................................................................................... 372 
APPENDIX 4: ETHICS APPROVAL ....................................................................................... 376 
APPENDIX 4: DATA NAMING CONVENTION ...................................................................... 379 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 380 
  
 
 
8 
List of Cases 
England and Wales 
A v B and C [2012] EWCA Civ 285 
AB v CD [2013] EWHC 1418  
Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] AC 547 
B v B (minors) (custody: care and control) [1991] 1 FLR 402 
B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption) [2015] EWFC 17 
C v C (A Minor) (Custody: Appeal) [1991] 1 FLR 223 
G v F (Contact and Shared Residence: Applications for Leave) [1998] 2 FLR 
799 
H v S (Disputed Surrogacy Arrangements) [2015] EWFC 36 
ML, AR v RW, SW [2011] EWHC 2455 (Fam) 
P&L Minors [2011] EWHC 3431 
R v E and F (Female Parents: Known Father) [2010] EWHC 417 (Fam) 
Re A (a Child) (Joint Residence: Parental Responsibility) [2008] EWCA Civ 867 
Re B (Role of Biological Father) [2007] EWHC 1952 (Fam) 
Re D (An Infant) Adoption: Parents Consent 1977] AC 602 HL 
Re D [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam) 
 
 
9 
Re G (A Minor); Re Z (A Minor) [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam) 
Re G (Children) (Residence : Same-sex Partner) [2006] UKHL 43 
Re H (Minors) (Local Authority: Parental Rights) (No 3) [1991] 1 FLR 214 
Re H (Parental Responsibility) [1998] 1 FLR 855 
Re H (Shared Residence: Parental Responsibility) [1995] 2 FLR 883 
Re M (Sperm Donor Father) [2001] Fam Law. 94 
Re R (A Child) (IVF: Paternity of Child) [2005] UKHL 33 
Re S (Parental Responsibility) [1995] 2 FLR 648 
T v B [2010] EWHC 1444 (Fam) 
T v T [2010] EWCA Civ 1366 
Canada 
AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2 
A v. B, C and X, 2007 Q.J. No. 1895 
C (MA) v K (M), 2009 ONCJ 18 
D (KG) v P (CA), 2004 CarswellOnt 8819 (SCJ) 
F. (T.) v. D. (A.) 2013 BCPC 205 
H (DW) v R (DJ), 2013 ABCA 240 
L.O. v. S.J., 2006 J.Q. No. 450 
Rashtian v. Baraghoush 2013 BCSC 994 
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2010 SCC 61 
 
 
10 
Rutherford v Ontario 2006 CarswellOnt 3463 
SG v LC (2004) Q.J. No. 6915 (S.C.) 
Other Jurisdictions 
Re Patrick (An Application Concerning Contact) (2002) 218 Family Law Reports 
579 (Australia) 
Schalk v Austria (30141/04) 3 June 2010 2010 (ECHR) 
  
 
 
11 
List of Statutes 
England and Wales 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 
Children Act 1989 
Children and Families Act 2014 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 
Disclosure of Donor Information Regulations 2004 
Family Law Reform Act 1969 
Family Law Reform Act 1987 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 
Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 
Canada 
Alberta Domestic Relations Act 2000 
Alberta Family Law Act 2003 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2006 
British Columbia Adoption Act 1996 
 
 
12 
British Columbia Family Law Act 2011 
British Columbia Family Relations Act 1996 
British Columbia Law and Equity Act 1996 
Canadian Constitution Act 1987 
Ontario Children Law Reform Act 1990 
Ontario Family Law Reform Act 1969 
Ontario Family Law Reform Act 1987 
Ontario Vital Statistics Act 1990 
Quebec Act Establishing Civil Unions and Establishing New Rules of Filiation 
2002 
Quebec Civil Code 1991 
Quebec Interpretation Act 1985 
Uniform Child Status Act 2010  
Other 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 (European Convention on Human Rights) 
European Convention on the Legal Status of  Children Born Out of Wedlock 
1978 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 
  
 
 
13 
 
List of Abbreviations 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 2008) 
British Columbia Family Law Act 2011 (FLA 2011) 
England & Wales (E&W) 
British Columbia (BC) 
 
 
  
 
 
14 
Acknowledgments 
My sincere thanks go to my first supervisor Professor Anne Barlow, without 
whose patience and encouragement this would not have been possible, as well 
as my second supervisor Dr Janet Smithson who provided invaluable feedback 
on a number of aspects of my thesis. I would like to take this opportunity to thank 
my sponsors during my time at UBC, Professor Fiona Kelly and Professor Susan 
Boyd, who were very welcoming and supportive during my time in Canada. I am 
also very grateful to the ESRC and the University of British Columbia’s 
International Research Mobility Fund for funding this research.  
A number of other people deserve thanks including my fellow PhD students and 
the members of faculty at Exeter Law School, who have supported me in various 
ways over the years, the staff and faculty at the Allard School of Law, UBC and 
my current academic colleagues at Sussex Law School who have been very 
accommodating while I have been finishing off this thesis. In particular, Craig Lind 
deserves special mention for his willingness to get involved with this project in 
numerous ways, from piloting the empirical study to commenting on an earlier 
draft, and for the many engaging discussions we have had about this. I would 
also like to extend a special thank you to everyone who participated in my study 
for giving up their time and being willing to share their stories with me. 
Finally, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my friends and family, 
especially my parents, for their continuing love and support.   
 
 
15 
Thesis Outline 
In the first part of the thesis, Chapter One outlines the study’s research questions 
and how they will be addressed, as well as highlighting the significance of the 
research and situating it within the existing literature. Chapter Two goes on to 
justify the methodological choices made in terms of research design and the 
specific research methods decisions that were made.  
The three chapters of Part Two engage in a detailed comparative doctrinal 
analysis of the legal framework surrounding collaborative co-parenting drawing 
on critical perspectives that emerge from the socio-legal literature, as well as 
participant data from legal professionals. In doing this, Chapter Three focuses on 
the way legislation in a number of jurisdictions privileges a heteronormative 
understanding of the family; Chapter Four considers how this influences judicial 
reasoning when resolving collaborative co-parenting disputes in these 
jurisdictions and Chapter Five examines the role of pre-conception intentions in 
regulating parent-child relationships in these families. 
Part Three of this thesis presents the collaborative co-parenting case studies 
gathered in this study and examines what insights these provide in terms of legal 
regulation. Chapter Six introduces the families involved in this study and 
advances a typology of collaborative co-parenting arrangements based on this. 
Chapter Seven draws on the theoretical framework of procreative consciousness1 
to explore the extent to which gay men and lesbians have complementary and 
competing interests in the context of collaborative co-parenting. Finally, Chapter 
                                            
1 W Marsiglio, “Male Procreative Consciousness and Responsibility: A Conceptual Analysis and 
Research Agenda” (1991) 12 Journal of Family Issues 268. 
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Eight links together the doctrinal, empirical and theoretical insights of the previous 
chapters as each challenging from a different perspective the rigidity and implicit 
heteronormativity of existing legal frameworks around parenthood and parenting.  
The argument that this thesis pursues is that detailed consideration of the legal 
regulation of gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting, set alongside an in-
depth examination of empirical case studies, commends a model of family law 
and policy predicated on valuing difference within family life rather than the 
promotion of a homogeneous ideal family form against which other families are 
measured. It is only in this way that the often overlooked interests of gay men in 
collaborative co-parenting can be recognised alongside those of single 
women/female couples in a way that is consistent with the best interests of the 
child.   
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Part One: Setting the Scene 
Part One comprises the first two chapters of this thesis, which lay the foundation 
for the research project as a whole. ‘Chapter One: Introduction’ highlights the 
importance and timeliness of research into gay and lesbian collaborative co-
parenting arrangements, while also delineating the focus of the project. It sets the 
scene for the rest of the thesis by outlining the study’s theoretical focus and the 
contribution it makes to existing studies and the academic literature. 
‘Chapter Two: Doing the Research,’ expands on the overall aim of and general 
approach to the research. This chapter explores the methodological decisions 
made during the research in more detail as well as justifying the adoption of a 
comparative, socio-legal approach. Finally, it discusses how the empirical data 
were collected and analysed in order to address the study’s research questions.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The increasing number of planned families formed through the use 
of assisted reproduction technologies requires an expanded 
concept of family to reflect the reality of the myriad forms that exist, 
and to ensure that children’s interests are adequately 
protected…Assisted reproduction is used by heterosexual couples 
experiencing infertility, including those who are concerned about 
genetic issues or are unable to carry a fetus to term, and by lesbian 
couples, gay male couples, persons intending to become single 
parents and persons intending to form families with more than two 
parents. They may use anonymous or known donor sperm, ova or 
embryos, or some combination of donor genetic material and 
surrogacy. The families that result are varied and diverse, and each 
has a unique and distinct network of social and extended family 
relationships.2 
Gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting arrangements are part of the variety 
and diversity referred to in the quote above. Such families, for the purposes of 
this thesis, are defined as - 
families, usually created through assisted reproduction, where 
children are being raised by a gay/lesbian individual or couple and 
the other biological parent3  is involved too (plus often their (same-
sex) partner).  
These families can involve a variety of parenting arrangements.  These range 
from a situation where a same-sex couple is primarily responsible for raising the 
child and the other biological parent is somewhat involved at one end of the 
                                            
2 Manitoba Law Reform Commission, ‘Assisted Reproduction: Legal Parentage and Birth 
Registration’, 2014, 2 – 4. 
3 This thesis employs the terms biological father and birth mother in an attempt to neutrally 
denote the male progenitor and woman who gives birth to the child. In some ways, this would 
seem to give priority to biological discourses and the centrality of the reproductive relationship 
over other claims to parenthood. However, this is not the intention. Donor and surrogate seems 
appropriate in a clinical context where either anonymous sperm donation occurs or the birth 
mother essentially relinquishes the child for adoption. However, when discussing a ‘known 
donor’ or ‘surrogate’ who is going to be involved in the child’s life to some extent, these terms 
could convey a somewhat misleading impression. Therefore, the terms ‘biological father’ and 
‘birth mother’ seems preferable, on the understanding that it is not an attempt to privilege 
biological discourses but merely as descriptive nomenclature. 
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spectrum, to a full poly-parenting situation where everyone is a fully involved 
parent at the other, with a further diversity of parenting arrangements and family 
configurations existing in-between.  
 The legal recognition of collaborative co-parenting arrangements has been 
discussed, and has resulted in legislative reforms, in a number of jurisdictions. 
Yet in England & Wales (hereafter E&W) the issue of whether these parenting 
arrangements should be legally recognised as families has not been addressed 
through legislation but has been left to the courts to resolve in a piecemeal 
fashion. While this approach has also been adopted in a number of Canadian 
provinces, such as Ontario, it stands in contrast to the approach in British 
Columbia (hereafter BC), which legislatively recognises a range of collaborative 
co-parenting families. 
The intention of this thesis is to compare the approaches of BC and E&W to the 
legal recognition of collaborative co-parenting, drawing on other jurisdictions as 
appropriate.  In doing this, this thesis argues that these families are not currently 
afforded the legal recognition they deserve in E&W, largely because collaborative 
co-parenting is not contemplated by the legislation governing parenthood 
following assisted reproduction. As a result, the courts are having to make the 
best use they can of legal concepts that were not designed for this purpose to 
achieve some sort of recognition for these families. This contrast between the 
approaches in BC and E&W suggests there needs to be greater legislative clarity 
about the legal recognition of collaborative co-parenting families in order to guide 
the courts in this jurisdiction. 
However, this does not necessarily involve a wholesale adoption of the reforms 
in BC, which are predicated on legally enforceable intentions with respect to a 
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narrow range of collaborative co-parenting families. This thesis argues for a more 
flexible approach to legal parenthood, which can accommodate a range of legally 
recognised parental figures in a child’s life, not all of whom necessarily have the 
full status of legal parent. By adopting a flexible legislative approach, it is possible 
to reach a more nuanced understanding of legal parenthood and afford an 
appropriate level of legal recognition to the adults in a child’s life. 
A key aspect of the legal regulation of parent/child relationships in collaborative 
co-parenting arrangements, as with other parenting situations, is the discretion 
that courts have to decide what is in the best interests of the child. One concern 
about the case law in E&W relating to collaborative co-parenting is that the courts 
use the best interests of the child less as a genuine assessment of child welfare 
and more as a disguised means of inscribing a particular family form. In arguing 
for a more flexible legislative approach to legal parenthood, the hope is that this 
would also translate to a more flexible exercise of the courts’ discretion in 
recognising a range of family forms, while also being sensitive to the impact of 
gendered power dynamics on child welfare.4     
Family law and policy in the UK and Canada have undergone considerable 
changes in recent years as reproductive technologies have facilitated the creation 
of alternative parenting structures.5 These changes have occurred against the 
                                            
4 See Alison Diduck, Law’s Families (Butterworths 2003) 142; See also Jonathan Herring, ‘Why 
Financial Orders on Divorce Should Be Unfair’ (2005) 19 International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family 218, 221; Lisa Glennon, ‘Obligations between Adult Partners : Moving from Form 
to Function ?’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, Policy and the 
Family 1. 
5 See for example, Caroline Jones, Why Donor Insemination Requires Developments in Family 
Law: The Need for New Definitions of Parenthood (Edwin Mellen Press 2007). For an insightful 
summary of such developments and how these issues are having to be addressed in practice 
see Natalie Gamble and Louisa Ghevaert, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: 
Revolution or Evolution?’ (2009) August Family Law 730; Sophie Pryor, ‘HFEA Launches Public 
Consultation on Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques’ (2012) 673 BioNews. 
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background of debates surrounding the recognition of same-sex marriages and 
alternative families more generally. The normative paradigm of parenthood (and 
to a lesser extent parenting)6 in today’s society, however, remains firmly 
embedded as occurring within the context of an ongoing, sexually intimate, dyadic 
relationship between a man and a woman. Despite this, the normative paradigm 
is continually being challenged on a number of fronts including in relation to post-
separation social parenting, single parenting, gay and lesbian parenting and 
parenting following assisted reproduction.  
It is beyond the scope of this PhD thesis to consider, in-depth, the legal 
implications of the ‘myriad’ of family forms that are being created through assisted 
reproduction because of the different complexities each of the types of families 
mentioned in the opening quote raises.7 However, the ill-suited fit between the 
normative model underpinning the legal archetype of the family and parenting 
reality in a number of modern families is brought into stark relief by an 
examination of the hidden narratives and largely unacknowledged legal needs of 
some families, which are intentionally created through the rejection of the intimate 
couple two-parent norm. 
This thesis is interested in gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting as an 
example of families that challenge both the need for parents to be in an intimate 
relationship and the limitation to two parents. Planned gay and lesbian families, 
created through assisted reproduction, involving (often more than two) parents, 
not all of whom are in a sexually intimate relationship with each other, is an 
                                            
6 Although parenting is separate from parenthood and arguably more flexible because of the 
way parental responsibility has been used, parenthood and parenting are closely interwoven, 
particularly in the context of collaborative co-parenting. 
7 For a consideration of the legal response to a variety of family forms see Machteld Vonk, 
Children and their parents (Intersentia 2007). 
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increasingly visible example of such a challenge to traditional notions of the 
family.8 It is more and more the case, for example, that same-sex couples and 
single people are choosing to conceive and raise children with someone they are 
not in an intimate relationship with. As a result, law and policy makers in a number 
of jurisdictions are gradually becoming more aware of the need to address the 
legal implications of families where there are children, intentionally conceived 
with more than two parents.9 Despite this, the sexually intimate, heteronormative 
couple ideal continues to exert considerable influence on the legal imagination in 
relation to parenthood, if not also parenting (as discussed further below). 
At this early stage, it is worth highlighting that this thesis refers to heteronormative 
notions of the family throughout. However, it is important to acknowledge that 
heteronormativity is a contested theoretical concept that cannot straightforwardly 
and uncritically be applied to legal norms. While this thesis implicitly identifies the 
tensions inherent in its application when critiquing the legal framework and 
acknowledges it is not an unproblematic descriptor, it principally uses the term 
‘heteronormative’ here to denote the ideal parenting model which requires a 
sexually intimate couple relationship even in the same-sex context. Nevertheless, 
this thesis adopts Wiegman and Wilson’s recent challenge to queer theory by not 
‘assuming a position of antinormativity from the outset.’10 In this way, this thesis 
challenges some of the existing readings of the case law that arguably too readily 
identify judicial thinking as ‘heteronormative’. 
                                            
8 As an example of this increasing social visibility see Charlie Condou, ‘The Three of Us’ The 
Guardian (July 2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/series/the-three-of-us> accessed 
2 October 2015. 
9 See for example New Zealand Law Commission, ‘New Issues in Legal Parenthood’ (2005) 88 
10 For an insightful discussion of the implications of rendering queer theory’s commitment to 
antinormativity less secure see Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth S. Wilson, ‘Introduction: 
Antinormativity’s Queer Conventions’ (2015) 26(1) Differences 1 – 25. 
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Different collaborative co-parenting families may challenge different aspects of 
the normative paradigm. An example of a collaborative co-parenting family that 
challenges the intimate couple as the ideal basis for parenting is a single woman 
and a male friend, who have reached a stage in their lives where they are not in 
an intimate relationship but wish to care for a child of their own. This arrangement 
would challenge the idea that parenting should occur within the context of an 
intimate couple relationship but not the limitation to two parents. By contrast, 
where two (usually same-sex) couples or a couple and a single person 
collaborate to have a child, the arrangement further complicates the legal 
situation by challenging not only the need for an intimate relationship between 
(all) the parents but also the limitation to two parents.   
This thesis focuses on gay and lesbian ‘collaborative co-parenting’ 
arrangements, which some commentators refer to as ‘poly-parenting 
arrangements’ or the ‘multiple-parent model’,11 as these families often involve 
more than two parents. The characteristic feature of gay and lesbian collaborative 
co-parenting is that the birth mother, typically a single or partnered lesbian, is not 
in an intimate relationship with the biological father, typically a single or partnered 
gay man. Nevertheless, they collaborate to conceive a child, which they, together 
with their respective partners, if they are not single, will co-parent. This might be 
contrasted with the homonuclear family,12 where the child is being parented by a 
same-sex couple without the involvement of the biological father, if it is a female 
couple, or the birth mother (and genetic mother if different), if it is a male couple. 
                                            
11 Aleardo Zanghellini, ‘Lesbian and Gay Parents and Reproductive Technologies: The 2008 
Australian and UK Reforms’ (2010) 18 Feminist Legal Studies 227–251; Fiona Kelly, ‘Nuclear 
Norms or Fluid Families - Incorporating Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children into 
Canadian Family Law’ (2004) 21 Canadian Journal of Family Law 133–178 
12 This term is referred to in the Australian case of Re Patrick (An Application Concerning 
Contact) (2002) 218 Family Law reports 579. 
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The reason for narrowing the focus of the thesis in this way is that research 
evidence suggests that collaborative co-parenting is an established practice 
within this community and yet this is very rarely reflected in parenthood laws.13  
Gay and lesbian parenthood and innovative parenting frameworks have also 
been the focus of recent legislative reform in a number of jurisdictions, each of 
which deals with the issues involved somewhat differently.14 An increasing 
number of jurisdictions are beginning to question the limitation to two parents and 
exploring options for recognising collaborative co-parenting, while others are 
reluctant to move away from the heteronormative model of parenthood/parenting. 
Given this divergence, the time is right to question whether the approach in E&W 
adequately meets the evolving needs of the full range of same-sex parenting 
arrangements. Therefore, the present study aims to make a very timely 
contribution to discussions surrounding gay and lesbian collaborative co-
parenting, which, as evidenced by new approaches within case law and 
legislation in a number of jurisdictions, is currently of sufficient moment to warrant 
further investigation. While a heteronormative approach to reform in this area 
underpinned by equality and non-discrimination arguments has prompted 
significant legal reform, this thesis will consider whether the law should now be 
looking to encapsulate a pluralistic response to the divergent needs of the 
regulation of parenthood and parenting within the same-sex community. 
The difficulty with setting up ‘homonuclear’ and ‘collaborative co-parenting’ as 
distinct categories of same-sex family is that, in reality, there is a continuum of 
                                            
13 See for example Deborah Dempsey, ‘Conceiving and Neogtiating Reproductive 
Relationships: Lesbians and Gay Men Forming Families with Children’ (2010) 44 Sociology 
1145 
14 For more on this see Aleardo Zanghellini, “Lesbian and Gay Parents and Reproductive 
Technologies: The 2008 Australian and UK Reforms” (2010) 18 Feminist Legal Studies 227. 
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family and relatedness practices that exists between what we might think of as 
the archetype of these two categories. This thesis is premised on the idea that 
there is significant value in identifying that these different models of family life 
exist so that they can be accommodated within a more flexible system of legal 
recognition of parent-child relationships. This does not mean, however, that the 
diversity of parenting arrangements that exists within same-sex families’ needs 
to be shoehorned into mutually exclusive, binary categories. Family life is fluid 
and the legal system, which is ostensibly there to serve all families, needs to be 
flexible enough to respond to the creative parenting practices that same-sex 
families engage in. Part of this flexibility involves recognising that collaborative 
co-parenting arrangements may raise different issues in terms of legal 
recognition than homonuclear families do and that many family practices may fall 
somewhere between these two camps.      
By exploring, both empirically and doctrinally, how the law regulates gay and 
lesbian collaborative co-parenting arrangements, this thesis questions the 
assumptions on which the current law in E&W in relation to parenthood and 
parenting is predicated and argues for a more nuanced approach. This has 
implications not only for gay and lesbian parenting but also potentially post-
separation parenting, step-parenting and single parenting because gay and 
lesbian collaborative co-parenting both exposes and represents a challenge to 
the heteronormative assumptions underpinning the dyadic nature of parenting 
law. In other words, an analysis of the legal regulation of gay and lesbian 
collaborative co-parenting arrangements poses questions for the legal regulation 
of parenthood and parenting beyond that specific context. The opportunity this 
provides for us to fundamentally question the function of family law in terms of 
regulating parenthood and parenting relationships, therefore, should be seized. 
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Aim and Research Questions 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore, within a comparative context, how well 
the law regulating parenthood and parenting following assisted reproduction in 
E&W, balances the interests of those involved in gay and lesbian collaborative 
co-parenting arrangements and to consider any wider implications for family law. 
This involves answering three discrete research questions (RQs):  
 RQ1: How well does the legal framework in E&W reflect and accommodate 
the procreative autonomy of gay men and lesbians engaging in or 
considering collaborative co-parenting?  
 RQ2: How well should and could the legal framework respond to the needs 
of such collaborative co-parents, taking account of developments in other 
jurisdictions such as Canada? 
 RQ3: What are the potential implications, if any, for the wider legal 
regulation of gay and lesbian parenting and family life of expanding a legal 
response to gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting beyond the 
heteronormative model?  
General Approach to the Research 
The nature of this topic lends itself to socio-legal inquiry because in assessing 
how well the law balances the various interests involved in the legal recognition 
of collaborative co-parenting, it is necessary to adopt a fairly broad approach that 
takes into account both family law and family policy considerations. This may be 
informed by a number of other disciplines, notably sociology and psychology, 
both of which the thesis draws on at various points. The socio-legal approach this 
thesis adopts is broadly one that aims to set the legal framework in its societal 
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context and to bring to bear theoretically-informed critique and empirical insights 
in order to complement doctrinal analyses of case law and legislation.15 
Furthermore, given the growing global nature of the need for law and policy to 
respond to the phenomenon of collaborative co-parenting, a study within one 
jurisdiction was not thought sufficient. As a result, the comparative element of the 
study allows differing approaches to the issue to be contrasted when considering 
law reform options.16 Such an analysis would seem both timely and apposite 
given the increasing number of jurisdictions that are engaging with these issues 
either legislatively or through the courts.17   
Therefore, adopting a comparative approach with a jurisdiction taking a quite 
different approach (i.e. BC), the starting point for the legal analysis of how well 
the law in E&W is currently responding (RQ1), is an examination of the legislative 
regulation and judicial resolution of what are often referred to as ‘known (sperm) 
donor disputes’ involving female couples, in E&W and the relatively few other 
jurisdictions where they have been dealt with.18 Characteristic of ‘known donor 
disputes’ is the tension between the birth mother’s female partner and the 
biological father, both of whom are vying for some sort of parental recognition. 
This tension is exacerbated by the inability, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, to 
simultaneously recognise the status of all three parties due to the limitation to two 
legal parents and the unavailability of any alternative legal status in relation to the 
child. The exception to this is BC in Canada, the main comparator jurisdiction for 
                                            
15 See page 56 for more details. 
16 See page 61 for more details. 
17 In addition to the UK and Canadian legislation and case law discussed in Part Two of this 
thesis, see also Manitoba Law Reform Commission; New Zealand Law Commission, ‘New 
Issues in Legal Parenthood Report’ (2005); Kalsbeek Commissie, ‘Rapport Lesbisch 
Ouderschap’ (2007). 
18 This is the focus of Part Two: Comparative Legal Insights. 
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this study, which recognises three legal parents in certain circumstances, such 
as ‘known donor’ situations where a pre-conception agreement exists. This 
stands in contrast to the recently reformed legal framework in E&W, which failed 
to consider the needs of such families during the reform process.19 
The general methodological choices, including the adoption of a comparative 
socio-legal approach, and research methods decisions underpinning the 
empirical aspect of the project are set out in more detail in the next chapter. 
However, it is worth noting at this stage that this thesis also draws on a 
comparative, qualitative empirical study, which involved the thematic analysis of 
twenty-five in-depth, semi-structured interviews with parents engaged in 
collaborative co-parenting, potential parents and legal professionals who have 
worked with such families, in E&W and BC. In relation to this topic, qualitative 
inquiry allows us to socially locate family law. It also provides the most effective 
way of exploring in depth the interests and values of those engaged in 
collaborative co-parenting.20 Furthermore, the thematic analysis of the interviews 
allows for the exploration of themes emerging from the data in relation to those 
present in the literature and case law.21 This also provides a basis for 
investigating the relationship between legal recognition, and the expectations and 
lived experiences of these families, which provides insights not otherwise 
available when assessing the fairness of current frameworks of legal recognition.  
In term of theoretical influences, which are discussed more in the following 
section, the project is broadly speaking influenced by theorising around the 
                                            
19 See Seamus Burns, The Law of Assisted Reproduction (Bloomsbury Professional 2012) Part 
5. 
20 For a more detailed discussion of the decision to use a qualitative research strategy see page 
70.  
21 For a more detailed discussion of the data analysis process see page 87.  
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procreative consciousness22 and autonomy of the adults involved in collaborative 
co-parenting, set alongside the ubiquitous child welfare standard employed by 
courts and legislation. Furthermore, this study draws on the ‘diversity model’ of 
parenthood,23 which recognises value in the diversity of family relationships and 
focuses on the quality of these relationships rather than their form.24 Considered 
through this theoretical lens, a critical examination of the legislation, case law and 
empirical data in the two jurisdictions reveals different degrees of willingness to 
engage with the needs of families involved in collaborative co-parenting rather 
than attempting to assimilate them into pre-existing legal models of parental 
recognition.         
Thus, the thesis adopts a comparative approach in terms of both the doctrinal 
analysis and the empirical study. The main comparator jurisdiction is BC, Canada 
because there have been recent legislative amendments recognising the 
possibility of having more than two parents in the context of gay and lesbian 
collaborative co-parenting. This is the focus of the comparative doctrinal and 
empirical investigation, which combines to addresses RQ2. However, the thesis 
draws on insights from a number of other jurisdictions where relevant, given the 
sporadic nature of reform in this area across jurisdictions. 
The cases that have come before the courts in E&W in recent years indicate that 
many gay and lesbian co-parenting arrangements involve conception at home 
and would, therefore, fall outside the legislative framework unless the women 
were in a civil partnership/same-sex marriage. This begs the question whether 
                                            
22 For more on this see W Marsiglio, “Male Procreative Consciousness and Responsibility: A 
Conceptual Analysis and Research Agenda” (1991) 12 Journal of Family Issues 268.  
23 Linda McClain, ‘A Diversity Approach to Parenthood in Family Life and Family Law’ in Linda 
McClain and Daniel Cere (eds), What is Parenthood? Contemporary Debates About the Family 
(New York University Press 2013). 
24 This is discussed further at page 51. 
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the current law in E&W on this issue is fit for purpose and is, in fact, able to 
represent the interests of families that may fall outside the legal framework. In 
exploring this question, the project hopes to make a timely contribution to the 
policy debate over how the law regulates these families. In common with recent 
critiques of the legal recognition of adult same-sex relationships, the argument 
this thesis advances is that the interests of the adults and children in these 
relationships might be better protected by a legal model of parenting that is 
sensitive to the potentially different requirements, in terms of legal recognition, 
that these families may have. 
Situating the Research 
The aim of this section is to situate the current study in relation to existing 
doctrinal, theoretical and empirical socio-legal scholarship that may be relevant. 
Importantly, this section does not attempt to summarise the current state of 
knowledge of family studies/law and policy as it relates to same-sex parenting. 
Such a task would certainly be beyond the scope of this thesis.25 Instead, I treat 
this section as an opportunity to ‘claim, locate and defend’26 my overall thesis 
while critiquing and entering into a dialogue with existing research. 
                                            
25 For a recent overview of the law relating to same-sex parenting see Anthony Hayden, Marisa 
Allman, Sarah Greenan, Elina Nhinda-Latvio, and Jai Penna, Children and Same Sex Families 
A Legal Handbook (Jordan Publishing 2012) For a recent discussion of same-sex parenting 
from a family studies/family sociology perspective see Stephen Hicks, Lesbian, Gay and Queer 
Parenting: Families, Intimacies, Genealogies (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 
26 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory (Sage 2006) 163. 
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Legal Context in Brief 
As gay and lesbian planned co-parenting arrangements generally involve 
assisted reproduction, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 200827 is 
a key piece of legislation in terms of determining legal parenthood. Part Two of 
HFEA 2008 allows two female partners to be automatically recognised as the 
legal parents of a child, born through artificial conception, from birth.28 Mr Justice 
Baker, sitting in the High Court observed in a recent case that parliament’s 
intention in enacting this legislative reform was ‘to put lesbian couples and their 
children in exactly the same legal position as other types of parent and children.’29 
While recognising the progressive nature of some aspects of the reforms, a 
number of commentators have remarked on their limited scope, given that they 
do not apply to female couples conceiving at home unless they are in a civil 
partnership/same-sex marriage and, what is more, they do not countenance the 
legal recognition of the biological father alongside the female couple.30 This 
stands in contrast to Part Three of the BC Family Law Act 2011 which does not 
make legal recognition dependent on the existence of a formal partnership and 
also allows for the legal recognition of the biological father as a parent alongside 
the female couple, provided all parties agree.31 
In terms of male-led families, neither the E&W provisions nor those in BC allow 
for the automatic recognition of two men as the sole parents of a child because 
                                            
27 Hereafter referred to as HFEA 2008. For a more detailed discussion of the UK legislative 
context see page 96. 
28 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 ss. 42 – 44. 
29  Re G (A Minor); Re Z (A Minor) [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam) [114].  
30 Julie Wallbank, ‘Channelling the Messiness of Diverse Family Lives: Resisting the Calls to 
Order and De-Centring the Hetero-Normative Family’ (2010) 32 Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 353, 354; Julie McCandless and Sally Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 
175, 191. 
31 For a more detailed discussion of the Canadian legislative position see page 106. 
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the gestational mother is always considered to be one of the child’s parents on 
birth. However, section 54 of the HFEA 2008 allows male partners, who are either 
civil-partnered/married or living in an ‘enduring family relationship’ and one 
partner is the child’s biological father, to apply for a parental order, between six 
weeks and six months after birth, making them and not the gestational mother 
(provided she consents) the legal parents. However, as with women-led families, 
it is not possible for the gestational mother to remain an additional parent. By 
contrast, it is possible under the BC Family Law Act 2011 for the gestational 
mother to remain as a third parent or have the two men as the sole parents, 
provided there is an agreement prior to conception and another one after birth.   
This divergence of approach in different jurisdictions makes it particularly 
unsatisfactory that issues surrounding who should be recognised as a parent 
were not fully considered in the UK reform process.  The approach in E&W 
evidences a heteronormative dyadic model that underpins the legislation and 
excludes families that do not conform to the dominant and legally privileged two-
parent model based on a formalised, sexually intimate union. As Wallbank puts 
it, ‘mimicry of the legally sanctioned heterosexual two-parent family is 
rewarded’.32  This has the implicit effect of delegitimising families that do not 
conform because, as Pickford notes, ‘it is not possible to favour one particular 
form of family without undermining others'.33 
                                            
32 Wallbank, ‘Channelling the Messiness of Diverse Family Lives: Resisting the Calls to Order 
and De-Centring the Hetero-Normative Family’ (n 29) 354. 
33 Ros Pickford, ‘Unmarried Fathers and the Law’ in Andrew Bainham and others (eds), What is 
a Parent? : a Socio-Legal Analysis (Hart Publishing 1999) 45. 
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Situating the Study’s Theoretical Focus 
Recent critiques of same-sex marriage have focused on the tension between 
formal equality, which in many jurisdictions has resulted in the opening up of 
marriage to same-sex couples, and substantive equality, which suggests a 
marriage regime that is more sensitive to the different needs of same-sex couples 
might be more appropriate.34 This argument has also been extended to the legal 
recognition of parent-child relationships within same-sex families. As Boyd 
argues: 
Family law generally, and laws on parenthood in particular, have 
moved over the past three decades towards enhancing the formal 
legal equality of mothers and fathers. This trend, while reflecting 
important initiatives to undermine the sexual division of labour and 
to encourage engaged fatherhood, has had unintended 
consequences for mothers who take primary responsibility for the 
care of their children, for same sex partners who wish to co-parent, 
and for women who attempt to parent autonomously of a genetic 
father.35 
Of particular interest in this study is the fact that, despite considerable progress 
having been made, the legal recognition of parenthood ‘remains wedded to the 
problematic aspects of the sexual family’36 and, what has been termed, ‘parental 
dimorphism’37. Monk argues for the need to ‘draw attention to potentially “hidden 
stories” of contemporary gay and lesbian connections with children within legal 
frameworks premised on equality’ as ‘[these] experiences take place outside of 
                                            
34 Robert Leckey, ‘Must equal mean identical? Same-sex couples and marriage’ (2014) 10 
International Journal of Law in Context 5–25. 
35 Susan B Boyd, ‘Equality: An Uncomfortable Fit in Parenting Law’ in Robert Leckey (ed), After 
legal equality: family, sex, kinship (Routledge 2014) 55. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Parent dimorphism refers to the fact a child can only legally have one mother and either one 
father or one second female parent. See Julie McCandless and Sally Sheldon, “The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family” (2010) 73 Modern 
Law Review 175, 188. 
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statutory reform agendas and litigation strategies’.38 Given that legal recognition 
may be lagging behind social practices, therefore, it is important to identify 
whether the legal framework does justice to the family members involved.   
Building on Monk’s call for increased scrutiny of these legal frameworks, this 
thesis aims to draw out the narratives of those involved in gay and lesbian 
collaborative co-parenting arrangements, as an example of the type of 
contemporary connections with children that he describes. The legal frameworks 
are viewed through a theoretical lens drawing on the diversity model of 
parenthood,39 which challenges the idea that legal equality means assimilating 
same-sex families on the basis of heteronormative standards. The original 
combination of this theoretical framework, which is discussed further in a 
subsequent section,40 and qualitative data on the experiences of gay and lesbian 
collaborative co-parenting families in two jurisdictions, provides a strong basis for 
critiquing legislative and judicial approaches to parenting structures that 
challenge current normative assumptions.  
The significance of this project lies in the fact that it is important, from children’s 
and adults’ point of view, that the law has a settled understanding of who a child’s 
parents are. Therefore, it is important to explicitly consider the nascent 
collaborative co-parenting family form in order to determine how to appropriately 
recognise potentially competing claims to parenthood. In addition to this, previous 
research has largely considered collaborative co-parenting only incidentally as 
                                            
38 Daniel Monk, ‘Sexuality and Children Post-Equality’ in Robert Leckey (ed), After legal equality: 
family, sex, kinship (Routledge 2014) 201. 
39 McClain (n 22). 
40 See page 4752. 
 
 
35 
part of a focus on lesbian parenting.41 The current project fills a gap in the 
research through its sustained focus on a broader range of collaborative co-
parenting families and explicit consideration of how gay men are positioned in 
relation to parenthood and parenting. It encompasses not only lesbians’ and 
female couples’ perspectives but also the perspectives of gay men and male 
couples who are involved in collaborative co-parenting and are underrepresented 
in the research, as Chapter Seven indicates. 
Socially Locating the Research 
When discussing same-sex families, it is important to consider what we mean by 
family because it is such a ubiquitous term. Family values are said to underpin 
our society; family law purports to regulate our intimate relationships with others; 
and family studies tries to explain and understand the way we order our intimate 
and personal lives. An awareness of how same-sex partners engage in family life 
has seeped into the public consciousness through US TV shows such as Brothers 
and Sisters,42 The New Normal43 and Modern Family44 as well as plotlines 
portraying same-sex relationships in British soaps such as Coronation Street,45 
Emmerdale46 and Hollyoaks.47 Despite this, there is still some reluctance to 
recognise same-sex partners (with or without children) as being families. 
                                            
41 See for example Gillian Dunne, ‘Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries 
and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship’ (2000) 14 Gender & Society 11; 
Leanne Smith, ‘Is Three a Crowd: Lesbian Mothers’ Perspectives on Parental Status in Law’ 
(2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 231; Fiona J Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family the 
Legal Recognition of Planned Lesbian Motherhood (UBC Press 2011).. 
42 Jon Robin Baitz [Creator] Brothers & Sisters (ABC Network 2006 – 2011). 
43 Ali Adler, Ryan Murphy and Katherine Shaffer [Creators] The New Normal (NBC Network 
2012 – 2013). 
44 Steven Levitan and Christopher Lloyd [Creators] Modern Family (ABC Network 2009 – 
Present). 
45 Tony Warren [Creator] Coronation Street (ITV 1960 – Present). 
46 Kevin Laffan [Creator] Emmerdale (ITV 1972 – Present). 
47 Phil Redmond [Creator] Hollyoaks (Channel 4 1995 – Present). 
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This thesis focuses on families that are created within the LGBTQ community as 
contrasted with the traditional nuclear family, which consists of a married 
heterosexual couple and children. These families may differ from the traditional 
family in that they do not necessarily involve a formalised legal union, may involve 
a limited degree of cohabitation and may include members who have been 
chosen to be part of the family and who are not traditionally considered as such.48 
The families that exist within the LGBTQ community are not homogenous. 
Therefore, a one-size-fits-all approach might fail to appreciate the varying needs 
of different families. As a result, this thesis challenges the apparent 
heteronormative ordering of LGBTQ families that seems to underpin the legal 
framework in the majority of jurisdictions. 
The law’s response to same-sex families, although highly relevant in itself, also 
raises broader questions within family law and policy about the meaning of family 
and how the law should regulate the way people structure their personal/intimate 
lives. In arguing for greater legal recognition of these families, therefore, the 
thesis discusses the implications of this on the legal regulation of gay and lesbian 
parenting and family life more generally (RQ 3). In particular the thesis advances 
the argument that the law continues to embody heteronormative assumptions, 
which fail to do justice to the lived experiences of a growing number of families 
that challenge normative expectations.   
Law does not exist in a vacuum but operates within a given social context that 
comprises governmental and social policy as well as societal attitudes. Therefore, 
when discussing legal reform in relation to alternative families, it is necessary to 
                                            
48 See Kath Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship (Columbia University Press 
1991); Jeffrey Weeks, Brian Heaphy and Catherine Donovan, Same Sex Intimacies: Families of 
Choice and Other Life Experiments (Routledge 2001)   
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at least acknowledge the views of society and the policy orientation of 
Government towards these issues. Same-sex couples openly having children is 
more common nowadays than it has been in the past, with a number of high 
profile (and less high profile)49 cases being reported in the media.50 There is also 
considerably more support in society at large for same-sex parenting than there 
has been in the past.51 However, the view continues to exist in some quarters 
(perhaps to a more extreme degree in the US than the UK)52 that the traditional 
nuclear family is the most suitable environment for raising children and, therefore, 
same-sex couples should not have children.53 This view persists despite the 
widespread reporting in the media of studies that appear to contradict it.54 There 
are even suggestions that proponents of this view have drawn on 
methodologically unsound studies in an attempt to support their opinion.55 The 
view that same-sex parenting is inferior to different-sex parenting emanates not 
only from religious groups56 but also within the LGBTQ community itself.57 
                                            
49 Shekhar Bhatia, ‘India surrogacy industry: we could never have imagined we’d be parents’ 
The Sunday Telegraph (26 May 2012). 
50 Angela Pertusini, ‘Pioneering gay fathers set up advice service on surrogacy’ The Times (1 
January 2011). 
51 A Park, C Bryson, E Clery, J Curtice, and M Phillips, ‘British Social Attitudes : the 30th 
Report’, (NatCen Social Research 2013) ix. Steve Doughty, ‘Gays Make Fine Parents Says 
Barnardo's Boss’ Daily Mail (London, 31 January 2011). 
52 Walter Olson, ‘The New Campaign Against Gay Parenting’ Huffington Post (10 August 2012) 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-olson/gay-parenting_b_1758633.html> accessed 8 
August 2015.  
53 Letters, ‘We Should Be Protecting Children Not Gay Parents’ The Sunday Times (18 July 
2010). 
54 Shahesta Shaitly, ‘Lesbian Mothers: My Two Mums’ The Observer (12 December 2010). 
55 Stephanie Pappas, ‘Gay Parents Study Suggesting Downside For Kids Draws Fire From 
Social Scientists’ Huffington Post (6 December 2012) 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/12/gay-parents-study-kids-social-
scientists_n_1589177.html> accessed 8 August 2015.  
56 Riazat Butt, ‘Bishop hits out at adoption agency over gay couples rule’ The Guardian (21 
December 2008) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/21/catholicism-gay-
rights?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 8 August 2015.  
57 Rupert Everett, ‘There’s Nothing Worse Than Gay Parents’ The Telegraph (16 September 
2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/relationships/9546091/Rupert-Everett-Theres-nothing-worse-
than-gay-parents.html> accessed 8 August 2015.  
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The polarisation of views in relation to same-sex parenting needs to be 
understood in the context of the broader societal response to alternative families 
and in particular in relation to the gay marriage debate. Alongside the increasing 
recognition of same-sex unions between adults,58 in E&W and other jurisdictions 
around the world, same-sex parenting is becoming more visible and increasingly 
recognised.59 Gradually, legislators and courts in various countries are making 
progress towards facilitating the creation of same-sex families and recognising 
the parent-child relationships in these families.  
At the time of the passage of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, society's acceptance 
of such relationships was still quite tentative.60 Since then, there have been some 
considerable advances in the promotion of same-sex relationships, not least of 
which has been the introduction of same-sex marriage in E&W, and even the 
legal recognition of same-sex parenting. Now in E&W same-sex couples are able 
to foster and adopt,61 female couples can be automatically recognised as the 
parents of a child born through artificial conception,62 and male couples can be 
declared the parents of a child born through surrogacy shortly after the birth 
provided the birth mother consents.63 Much of this advancement has been made 
through legislative reform, some of which has actually led the way in terms of 
social attitudes. Despite this progress, the legislative framework continues to 
                                            
58 See for example Katharina Boele-Woelki and Angelika Fuchs (eds), Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Relationships in Europe: National, Cross-border and European Perspectives 
(Intersentia 2012). 
59 See for example David Hill, ‘The Recognition of Homosexual Parents in the United Kingdom’ 
in Katharina Boele-Woelki and Tone Sverdrup (eds), European Challenges in Contemporary 
Family Law (Intersentia 2008). 
60 See the discussion of the parliamentary debates that led to the passage of the Civil 
Partnership Act in Carl Stychin, ‘Not (Quite) A Horse And Carriage’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal 
Studies 79, 80-81. 
61 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s.144 (4). 
62 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 ss.42-44. 
63 Ibid. s.54.  
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automatically assume a heteronormative approach, which may not appropriately 
recognise the relationships that exist in collaborative co-parenting arrangements.  
Research Context 
This research is being conducted against the background of dramatic changes in 
family life and family law over many years. These changes have been extensively 
documented and discussed elsewhere.64 Therefore, it is not necessary to 
rehearse them in full here. Instead this section intends to highlight some of the 
key developments in our thinking about family life and family law that are 
particularly pertinent for this study. After discussing some general ideas from 
family sociology and family law scholarship, this section narrows the focus to the 
recognition of men’s involvement in the reproductive process and how we 
recognise family diversity, each of which are important considerations in the 
recognition of collaborative co-parenting.  
The notion of the family, traditionally, has been closely circumscribed to conform 
to a heterosexually-dominated ideal form based on child rearing within the context 
of dyadic conjugality. In the past fifty years, this conception of the family has faced 
challenge from a number of different quarters, to the extent that it has not been 
uncritically accepted, at least within academic discourse, for some time.65 In 
                                            
64 See for example John Eekelaar and Ronald Thandabantu Nhlapo, The Changing Family : 
International Perspectives on the Family and Family Law (John Eekelaar and Ronald 
Thandabantu Nhlapo eds, Hart 1998); Mavis Maclean, Family Law and Family Values (Mavis 
Maclean ed, Hart 2005); Alison Diduck, ‘Shifting Familiarity’ (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 
235; Elizabeth B Silva and Carol Smart, The New Family? (Sage 1999); Carol Smart, ‘Close 
Relationships and Personal Life’ in Vanessa May (ed), Sociology of Personal Life (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2011); Jones, Why Donor Insemination Requires Developments in Family Law: The 
Need for New Definitions of Parenthood (n 5). 
65 See for example the debates surrounding social parenting and the acquisition of parental 
responsibility under the Children Act 1989. In particular see: John Eekelaar and Petar Sarcevic, 
Parenthood in Modern Society: Legal and Social Issues for the Twenty-First Century (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1993); John Eekelaar, ‘Parental Responsibility - a New Legal Status ?’ (1996) 
112 Law Quarterly Review 233; Andrew Bainham, ‘Parentage, Parenthood and Parental 
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recent decades, diminishing the social and legal prominence of such a conception 
of the family has been a theoretical and philosophical focus of some, particularly 
feminist, family theorists.66 A particular instantiation of this ongoing challenge to 
the hegemony of traditional conceptions of the family is the theorising that has 
taken place around same-sex families.67 
It is worth acknowledging the broader scholarship that surrounds this area of 
work, particularly if researchers are ‘not only creators of new knowledge, but 
protectors and transmitters of old knowledge’.68 An often-quoted definitional 
starting point in family studies is the American anthropologist George Murdock’s 
definition of the family: 
The family is a social group characterized by common residence, 
economic co-operation and reproduction. It includes adults of both 
sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual 
relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the 
sexually cohabiting adults.69 
It is not my intention to comment on or critique this dated definition of the family, 
although there are many feminist critiques of traditional conceptions of the 
family.70 It is worth noting, however, the centrality of dyadic conjugality in terms 
of parenting under this definition of the family, which will be discussed in relation 
to law’s involvement with the family later on in this section. 
                                            
Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive Yet Important Distinctions’ in Andrew Bainham and others (eds), 
What is a parent? : a socio-legal analysis (Hart Pub. 1999). 
66 See in particular Carol Smart, The ties that bind : law, marriage and the reproduction of 
patriarchal relations (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984); Carol Smart and Bren Neale, ‘Rethinking 
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Before turning to examine how the family is conceived of in law, it is instructive to 
consider how conceptions of the family have changed in family sociology since 
George Murdock’s early contribution on this topic. Anthony Giddens and Ulrich 
Beck/Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim are often cited in this regard. Giddens argues 
that rather than being based on biological imperatives, or ‘a socially approved 
sexual relationship’ in Murdock’s words, intimate relationships are more 
democratic and based on ongoing negotiation. Giddens’ idea of the ‘pure 
relationship’ is ‘where a social relation is entered into for its own sake, for what 
can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and 
which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough 
satisfactions for each individual to stay within it’.71 Smart criticises Giddens’ 
conception of intimate life based on individual agency because of its failure, 
amongst other things, to engage with enduring relationships between parents and 
children.72 Nevertheless, Smart and Neale acknowledge the utility of Giddens’ 
arguments as a means of adding to our (perhaps still incomplete) understanding 
of family life.73  
While Giddens’ comments mainly focus on the nature of romantic relationships 
between adults, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim highlight the centrality of 
relationships with children.  
…traditional bonds play only a minor role and the love between men 
and women has likewise proved vulnerable and prone to failure. 
What remains is the child. It promises a tie which is more elemental, 
profound and durable than any other in this society.74       
                                            
71 Anthony Giddens, The transformation of intimacy : sexuality, love and eroticism in modern 
societies (Polity 1992) 58 
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It seems to be well accepted, therefore, that since Murdock proposed his 
definition of the family, there has been a shift in how the family is conceived of 
sociologically. While an enduring sexually intimate relationship has traditionally 
been thought of as the defining feature of the family, the account of the family 
suggested by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim implies a greater focus on the parent-
child relationship. 
In addition to this, traditional conceptions of the family have been challenged by 
the early seminal research on same-sex families.75 Stacey has even gone so far 
as to suggest that same-sex parenthood is ‘the pioneer outpost of the post-
modern family condition, confronting most directly its features of improvisation, 
ambiguity, diversity, contradiction and flux’.76 In a related way, our traditional 
understandings of kinship have also been challenged by assisted reproductive 
technologies.77 The impact of this is that reproduction is no longer inextricably 
tied to sexuality.78 Consequently, the link between parenting and biology is 
weakened despite the continuing influence of biological essentialism and 
conjugality in laws concerning parenthood.79  
These developments in family sociology attempt to elucidate how ‘family 
practices’80 have changed to reduce the once pervasive significance of the 
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sexually intimate dyad as the basis of the traditional, essentialised notion of the 
family. By contrast, socio-legal scholars81 have demonstrated the ‘tenacious 
hold’82 that the sexually intimate couple still has as the central organising concept 
of law’s regulation of the family. Martha Fineman has notably argued that: 
the shared assumption is that the appropriate family is founded on 
the heterosexual couple – a reproductive, biological pairing that is 
designated as divinely ordained in religion, crucial in social policy, 
and a normative imperative in ideology.83 
Echoing Beck and Beck-Gernsheim emphasis on parent-child relationships, 
Fineman argues that the sexually intimate couple should be replaced by the 
mother-child dyad as the legal foundation of the family. It is noteworthy here that 
Fineman argues in favour of the mother-child dyad rather than Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim’s gender-neutral formulation. This is no doubt partly based on the 
notion that it appears to continue to be largely women rather than men who care 
for children in our society despite attempts to achieve gender equality.84  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in a discussion of this social 
phenomenon and critique Fineman’s argument. However, importantly for the 
purposes of this thesis, her focus on the mother-child dyad highlights the 
gendered nature of reproduction and caring for children. McCandless and 
Sheldon have recently developed this line of thinking to reveal the 
heteronormative bias implicit in recently reformed legislation regulating 
                                            
81 Some notable socio-legal discussions of the family include Smart and Neale (n 64); Diduck, 
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82 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth 
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parenthood following assisted reproduction in the UK, which will be discussed in 
more detail when the legal framework is considered.85 
(Gay) Men and Reproduction 
Traditionally, arguments about the gendered nature of reproduction and caring 
for children relate to how a disproportionate burden of caring duties fall on women 
because it is somehow seen as natural that it should be women who care for 
children. As Smart and Neale comment, 
Feminists have long striven to challenge the myth of motherhood in 
which it has been assumed that the birthing process gives rise to 
love and bonding and that mothers and children unambiguously 
love one another.86 
However, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim stress that the gendered nature of 
reproduction can cut both ways, with men now feeling at a disadvantage in 
relation to reproduction. As Beck highlights, ‘... fathers become aware of their 
disadvantage, partially naturally and partially legally. The woman has possession 
of the child as a product of her womb, which we all know does belong to her, 
biologically and legally...’87 This insight, that men may feel somewhat 
disenfranchised and disempowered in terms of reproduction is one that this thesis 
builds on in relation to gay men’s involvement in collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements. 
In order to explore how men, particularly gay men, can feel at a disadvantage in 
the procreative realm, this thesis draws on William Marsiglio’s notion of men’s 
‘procreative consciousness’. For Marsiglio, men’s procreative consciousness 
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refers to ‘men’s cognitive and affective activity within the reproductive realm’.88 
There is a considerable body of feminist scholarship about women’s experiences 
of reproduction and having children.89 However, there is a lack of theorising 
around men’s participation in the procreative realm. As Marsiglio has recently 
highlighted: 
Every day, all over the world, men think about having babies, 
imagine themselves as parents, struggle with infertility, donate 
gametes, hear of unintended pregnancies, receive news of fetal 
abnormalities, make decisions about abortions, and become 
parents. Although feminist scholarship has centred these 
experiences in women’s lives, it has inadequately explored their 
meanings in men’s lives.90 
As this section will go on to explore, much of the scholarship on same-sex 
parenting has focused on the autonomy of single women and female couples with 
the experiences of men being situated in relation to female reproductive 
autonomy. However, as Inhorn et al. argue, ‘men need to be considered 
reproductive in their own right’.91  
An aspect of men’s procreative consciousness, given biological and gender 
differences in relation to reproduction, is, Marsiglio contends, that ‘at various 
times during their lives men are likely to feel as though many or all of the aspects 
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of the reproductive realm are not relevant to them’.92 Writing in the US context, 
Marsiglio makes the point that males:  
have seldom had a phenomenological experience comparable, or 
even remotely similar, to what females have experienced during 
gestation and labor. Although it is impossible to determine the 
extent to which these factors have shaped and suppressed males’ 
procreative consciousness and sense of responsibility, it appears 
that these physiological and cultural forces, in combination with 
more structural conditions associated with males’ relationship to the 
economic and family/household spheres of social activity, have had 
a significant impact.93 
How these physiological and structural differences impact on heterosexual 
partners’ experiences in the reproductive realm is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Therefore, the thesis focuses on the impact of the gendered nature of 
reproduction on collaborative co-parenting arrangements within the gay and 
lesbian community. 
While much of the sociological work discussed above is aimed at critiquing and 
explaining heterosexual families, the implications of this work are relevant to 
same-sex families too. As Alison Diduck notes, Giddens’ work ‘has vast 
implications for heterosexually active women, but also has profound 
consequences for male heterosexuality and for gay men and lesbian women’.94 
Smart and Neale also highlight the salience of Giddens’ work to gay and lesbian 
relationships, which, in line with Giddens’ notion of the pure relationship, are 
‘more likely to be based on negotiations between individuals than simple 
adherence to social norms which govern marital relations’.95 The idea of the 
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negotiated nature of gay and lesbian families is revisited in Part Two when 
discussing the legal framework that governs parenting within them. 
Berkowitz and Marsiglio have explicitly applied the conceptual framework of 
men’s procreative consciousness, developed in the context of heterosexual men, 
to gay men who are negotiating their procreative identities.96 Gay men have 
arguably been conceived of as reproductive beings in their own right to an even 
lesser degree than heterosexual men. Historically, gay male identity has been 
seen as inconsistent with conceiving and raising children. Mallon notes that: 
Many people, including some child welfare professionals, are more 
than a little uncomfortable discussing gay men who are the primary 
parents raising children…the enduring belief in our society that 
parenting is the natural and sole domain of women…The concepts 
of heterosexuality and parenthood are so inextricably intertwined in 
our culture that the suggestion of gay fatherhood appears alien, 
unnatural, even impossible.97 
There have been a number of qualitative empirical studies, including the current 
one as discussed in Chapter Seven, where the gay male participants seem to 
have internalised and echoed these sentiments.98 Therefore, the parenting 
journeys contained in Chapter Six of the gay men who have overcome this and 
pursued parenthood through involvement in collaborative co-parenting are of 
particular interest.  
Recognising Diversity through Law 
The final research question in this study asks about the potential implications (if 
any) for the wider legal regulation of family life of expanding a legal response to 
gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting beyond the heteronormative model. 
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This implies that law reform has some potential for affecting social change (in this 
case recognising collaborative co-parenting arrangements as families) but it may 
be limited in what it can achieve. Despite the considerable progress made in 
many jurisdictions throughout the world, there are arguably still gaps between the 
needs of same-sex families and the rights and responsibilities UK legislation is 
willing to confer on them, which still bears the hallmarks of heteronormative 
assumptions about adult relationships and parenting. 
Historically, ‘family’ has been a problematic notion for gay and lesbian individuals, 
particularly in relation to raising children. Since the gay and lesbian rights 
movement in the 1970s and 1980s, gay and lesbian individuals have had to 
position themselves in relation to a heterosexually dominated conception of 
raising children and the family, from which they had largely been excluded. As 
Kelly notes, ‘law plays a significant role in the lives of marginalized communities, 
not only because it is capable of extending concrete rights to them, but also 
because of the symbolic content of that action.’ Therefore, it is understandable 
that ‘the power of law’99 takes on a special significance for same-sex parents. 
However, it is important to recognise that law reform is not necessarily a complete 
solution. A number of commentators have highlighted the fact that law reform 
does not always lead to the desired social change.100 As Kelly highlights, ‘one 
cannot presume that broad-based social transformation will simply flow from the 
legal recognition of lesbian motherhood’.101 These comments could apply equally 
to collaborative co-parenting: just because the legal system recognises 
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collaborative co-parenting does not mean this will lead to greater social 
recognition of these parenting arrangements. Nevertheless, legal advocacy and 
activism can be a key motivator for social change.102 In Brickey and Comack’s 
words, law ‘offers and important (although by no means the sole) source for 
realizing substantive social change’.103 What is more in relation to this project, 
law can play an important, although not necessarily determinative, role in 
deciding who qualifies as a parent, which in itself is a socially constructed idea.104 
Recognising this and as a reaction to historic exclusion, LGBTQ activists have 
long argued for legal recognition on the basis of equality between same-sex and 
different-sex families. Considerable progress has been made towards achieving 
at least formal legal equality. However, equal treatment in the statute books does 
not always result in a practical outcome that is consistent with substantive 
equality.105 Furthermore, those seeking formal legal equality may see this as the 
sole desired outcome without challenging the institution, in this case legal 
parenthood, they wish to be included in. As Leckey comments: 
Groups seeking equality sometimes take a legal victory as the end 
of the line. Once judgment is granted, or a law is passed, coalitions 
disband, and life goes on in a new state of equality. For their part, 
policymakers may assume a troublesome file is now closed.106    
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The campaign for marriage equality, particularly in the United States, is a notable 
example of this.107  
Despite this, early contributions to the same-sex marriage debate demonstrated 
different approaches within the gay and lesbian community in terms of advocacy 
and resistance.108 Alongside mainstream voices in the gay and lesbian 
community arguing for same-sex marriage on the basis of equality, more radical 
commentators highlighted that ‘the equality model that seeks a right to marry on 
equal terms with heterosexuals, and the incantation of "choice," as in "lesbians 
and gay men should have the choice to marry," fail to envision a truly 
transformative model of family for all people’.109 This idea of the potential of gay 
and lesbian relationships to transform the marriage model has been built on both 
in relation to same-sex and different-sex marriage, to argue for greater 
recognition of a diverse range of adult relationships.110   
Some scholars, although still relatively few, have also echoed these arguments 
in relation to same-sex parenting.111 As Kelly notes: 
While an equivalency approach, typically grounded in formal 
equality, may be adopted because of the strategic advantages it 
presents in the courtroom, the risk is that it will underplay the 
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differences between lesbian and heterosexual parenting 
relationships and thus limit reform to that which can be understood 
within the existing normative framework.112 
These concerns are engaged by the reforms instituted by the UK Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. It is commendable that female parents 
can be automatically recognised as a child’s legal parents from birth. However, it 
is not necessarily the case that in each of these families the intention is for the 
biological father to be a legal stranger to the child. This is premised on a 
heteronormative approach to parenthood, to which some same-sex couples do 
conform. However, in taking this as the basis for including same-sex parents 
rather than asking whether the existing approach is suitable for their needs, the 
law limits the possibilities for recognising the range of same-sex families. As 
Leckey highlights, ‘[r]edrawing the lines of legal ‘family’ might also further 
marginalize non-normative caring kinship networks.113 
As an alternative to a legal model of parenthood premised on formal equality and 
the inclusion of same-sex parents within a heteronormative conception of legal 
parenthood, McClain, writing in the US context, advocates a ‘diversity model’ of 
parenthood. As McClain explains ‘[t]he diversity model captures the diverse 
pathways to parenthood in social practice. It also fits changes in family law giving 
legal protection to these pathways.’114 Her conception of the diversity model is 
based on a ‘continuum approach to mapping parenthood,’115 which 
‘acknowledges various pathways to parenthood’ and ‘often includes a normative 
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judgment that this diversity has value’.116 Similar to the substantive equality 
approach that Kelly advocates, this model ‘is much more likely to produce laws 
that cater to families of difference, whether they include three parents, non-
conjugal co-parents or involved known donors’.117 
This section has aimed to demonstrate some of the fundamental changes in 
family life and family law in so far as they may have an impact upon the legal 
recognition of collaborative co-parenting. The intention has been to build up a 
picture of sociological and socio-legal scholarship in relation to the family and 
how a diversity model of parenthood on which this study is based fits in with that. 
In particular it was important to demonstrate that the appearance of formal 
equality between same-sex and different-sex couples may in fact obscure the 
exclusion from the legal framework of parenting arrangements that do not 
conform to the heteronormative ideal of parenthood based on the intimate couple 
relationship. In this way, the present study of collaborative co-parenting not only 
considers these specific parenting arrangements but also contributes to wider 
debates surrounding the regulation and recognition of family diversity more 
generally.     
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Chapter Two: Doing the Research   
Choice of Research Topic and Research Questions 
Having introduced the broad aims and research context of the project in the 
previous chapter, this chapter considers the study’s research questions in more 
detail and reflects on the research methodology and research methods employed 
to address them. The impetus for this project was an awareness during my 
previous studies of a judicial decision in Ontario, Canada in 2007 that recognised 
a five-year-old child as having three legal parents: two female partners, one of 
whom was the child’s birth and biological mother, and a single gay man, who was 
the child’s biological father.118 This legal decision led me to reflect upon the 
options open to same-sex attracted individuals for having children. Immediately, 
the gendered nature of reproduction presented itself, which is reflected in the 
different options that are open to female same-sex attracted individuals as 
compared to male same-sex attracted individuals. In addition to this, the options 
open to single men and women, as well as same-sex couples, who wanted to 
have a child came to mind.  
This led me to explore these issues further through the research questions that 
guide this study, as set out in the introduction and for ease of reference are 
repeated below: 
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 RQ1: How well does the legal framework in E&W reflect and accommodate 
the procreative autonomy of gay men and lesbians engaging in or 
considering collaborative co-parenting? 
This question is primarily addressed in Chapters, Three, Four and Five and 
involves an analysis of legislation and case law in E&W relating to collaborative 
co-parenting as well as a discussion of data collected through semi-structured 
interviews with legal professionals about how the law might meet the needs of 
these families. These issues are also reflected on in light of participants’ views of 
the legal framework in E&W in Chapter Seven.  
 RQ2: How well should and could the legal framework respond to the needs 
of such collaborative co-parents, taking account of developments in other 
jurisdictions such as Canada? 
This question is addressed through the incorporation of a comparative 
perspective again in Chapters Three, Four and Five, drawing on the analysis of 
case law and legislation in a number of Canadian provinces. This is 
complemented by analysis of participants’ parenting journeys and the typology of 
collaborative co-parenting discussed in Chapter Six. 
 RQ3: What are the potential implications, if any, for the wider legal 
regulation of gay and lesbian parenting and family life of expanding a legal 
response to gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting beyond the 
heteronormative model? 
This question is addressed in Chapters Six and Seven primarily from a theoretical 
perspective drawing on empirical insights from the interviews with collaborative 
co-parents in this study as well as on data from other empirical studies.   
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Research Approach 
Overview 
The observed difference in approach in BC, Ontario and E&W led me to consider 
how well the law regulating parenthood and parenting following assisted 
reproduction in E&W balances the interests of those involved in gay and lesbian 
collaborative co-parenting arrangements and whether there are any broader 
implications of this for family law. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this 
thesis, an exploration of these issues is the overall aim of the project. The thesis, 
therefore, adopts a comparative doctrinal approach, comparing the laws of E&W, 
BC and Ontario. Empirical approaches are also well suited to exploring how well 
legal frameworks operate in practice.119 Consequently, a comparative empirical 
study in the UK and Canada complements the comparative doctrinal analysis. 
This is set within a socio-legal framework because a more contextual approach 
that takes into account social and policy variations in the respective jurisdictions 
may be helpful when interpreting differences in the legal frameworks and 
empirical data.120 
In assessing the importance of legal recognition for poly-parenting families, this 
study draws on insights from a number of different disciplines and discourses 
including UK and Canadian family law and policy, psychology, sociology, and 
LGBTQ family studies. The nature of this topic lends itself well to socio-legal 
enquiry because, in addressing the issues raised, it is necessary to take into 
account both family law and family policy considerations, which may be informed 
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by these other disciplines. In addition to this, the project draws on empirical 
evidence in order to investigate the relationship between legal recognition and 
the expectations and lived experiences of these families, which can provide some 
insights when assessing the fairness of legal recognition. Furthermore, this 
project will adopt a comparative approach, which seems appropriate because this 
is a developing area of law (and of family life) and different jurisdictions approach 
the issue differently. The project will compare the law of E&W with that of BC 
(drawing, to a limited extent, on the experiences of other Canadian and 
international jurisdictions as points of comparison) because in each of these 
jurisdictions there has been recent legislative or judicial reform which has taken 
divergent approaches to the issue, despite their shared heritage as common-law 
jurisdictions.  
Adopting a Socio-Legal Perspective 
Doctrinal legal scholarship rarely acknowledges the disciplinary assumptions that 
underpin the work of legal scholars.121 Legal scholarship tends to claim objectivity 
about a positivist conception of a largely self-contained legal framework.122 
Furthermore, much doctrinal legal research clarifies and evaluates the internal 
coherency of this legal framework without reference to extra-legal influences.123 
Despite the largely self-referential nature of doctrinal legal scholarship, Stychin 
and Herman recognise the continuing importance of the ‘traditional doctrinal 
approach’ (alongside more contextual and theoretical approaches) when 
discussing the legal interests of lesbians and gay men.124 Building on this, the 
                                            
121 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations (Pearson Longman 2007) 46. 
122 Leslie J Moran, ‘Legal Studies after the Cultural Turn: A Case Study of Judicial Research’ in 
Sasha Roseneil and Stephen Frosh (eds), Social Research After the Cultural Turn (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2012) 124. 
123 William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (Stevens 1994) 104. 
124 D Herman and Carl Stychin, Legal Inversions : Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Politics of Law 
(Temple University Press 1995) x. 
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present study comprises a significant element of legal doctrinal analysis, which 
examines how consistent judicial decisions in this area in each of the jurisdictions 
are with previous decisions and legislative frameworks.  
However, the legal recognition of parenthood, and perhaps family law more 
generally,125 lends itself particularly well to a more contextually-sensitive socio-
legal approach.126 While doctrinal legal research tends to view law as a self-
contained system governed by distinctively legal rather than sociological 
concerns, the socio-legal approach that this study adopts considers the social 
contexts that the legal rules operate within in each of the jurisdictions. In addition 
to this, the study incorporates critical jurisprudential and theoretical perspectives, 
which broadly relate to social exclusion based on difference.127  
This contextual, socio-legal approach is arguably more suitable for examining the 
legal recognition of same-sex parenting than a purely doctrinal legal approach for 
a number of reasons. The, at least historically, contentious nature of same-sex 
parenting within society means that social attitudes are more deeply implicated 
in this area of law than might be the case in other more technical areas. 
Furthermore, law’s regulation of family life can have a very personal impact and 
is closely related to a person’s identity and ability to seek fulfilment in life. This 
indicates that not only a critical and contextual approach to legal research, as 
described above, would be appropriate but also an empirical one that allows a 
                                            
125 Simon Jolly, ‘Family Law’ in Philip Thomas (ed), Socio-legal studies, vol Leeds (Dartmouth 
1997); Rebecca Probert, Family Life and the Law: Under One Roof (Ashgate Publishing 2007) 
3. 
126 Richard Collier and Sally Sheldon, Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 23. 
127 See the discussion of the theoretical framework that underpins this study in the previous 
chapter at page 50. 
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degree of insight into the lived experiences of families affected by legal regulation, 
which will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.128  
A doctrinal approach to this topic might consider the extent to which the revised 
parenthood provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 are 
consistent with the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of gender and 
sexual orientation contained within the ECHR, as well as the right to respect for 
private and family life. Such an analysis may reveal that the legislation has 
removed any difference in terms of the legal recognition of parenthood for female 
same-sex couples and heterosexual couples which have conceived through 
donor conception. While recognising female same-sex parents is a progressive 
step, the doctrinal analysis does not reveal the complete picture. A doctrinal legal 
analysis would proceed on the basis that providing the same legal recognition for 
female same-sex couples as for heterosexual couples means the legislation no 
longer discriminates and would not necessarily go any deeper than this. However, 
by empirically examining the needs of same-sex parents in terms of legal 
recognition, it becomes apparent that some of the family practices of same-sex 
parents differ from their heterosexual counter-parts. This reveals that, by 
emulating the current legal recognition of parenthood for different-sex couples, 
the law does not fully recognise the families that LGBTQ individuals create. The 
insight that a number of same-sex families are falling outside the scope of legal 
recognition is one that an empirical, socio-legal rather than doctrinal, black-letter 
approach reveals. 
Similarly, a doctrinal approach to the case law in this area might seek to ensure 
that the right to private and family life of the individuals involved, as well as child 
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welfare, are being protected. The majority of the case law in this area concerns 
disputes between a female same-sex couple, who are the resident carers of a 
child, and a non-resident biological father who seeks contact and perhaps 
parental responsibility. On the one hand, a doctrinal analysis might seek to 
demonstrate that the family life of the same-sex couple should be protected from 
interference from the biological father. Alternatively, it might suggest that it is in 
the best interests of the child to be able to develop a relationship with his or her 
biological father. Although arguments relating to child welfare and the right to 
private and family life could be marshalled in either direction, these would 
invariably be the primary focus of any doctrinal analysis. However, such a formal 
legal analysis would fail to address the reasons why such tensions emerge and 
whether alternative forms of legal recognition might be appropriate. This is the 
type of insight that can be derived from a theoretically driven, empirical socio-
legal project. 
Socio-legal research can encompass a broad range of approaches, such that it 
resists a unitary definition.129 One common element of socio-legal research is that 
it goes beyond a purely doctrinal legal analysis. That is to say that socio-legal 
approaches may take into account policy factors, law's social context and 
empirical perspectives on the impact of law in society. Salter and Mason argue 
that ‘a central goal of black-letter analysis is to reveal the presence of a series of 
rules based upon a smaller number of general legal principles’. According to 
Salter and Mason, ‘the central assumption is that the detailed rules give effect to, 
and specify, certain underlying and more general legal principles’.130 This 
                                            
129 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies’ 
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suggests that doctrinal legal research’s focus is on the internal coherency of legal 
rules and principles without necessarily engaging in an in-depth consideration of 
extra-legal factors.  
By contrast, Phil Thomas emphasises the way that socio-legal research 
contextualises the law in society rather than treats it merely as a self-referential 
system when he states: 
Empirically, law is a component part of the wider social and political 
structure, is inextricably related to it in an infinite variety of ways, 
and can therefore only be properly understood if studied in that 
context.131 
In advocating a more contextually sensitive approach to researching the law, it 
is, however, not necessary to adopt a full-blown sociology of law approach, which 
brings the disciplinary perspective of sociology to bear in the examination of law 
as a sociological phenomenon.132 This theoretically-driven sociological approach 
could be conceived of as lying at one end of the spectrum of socio-legal research 
with a very policy-orientated, empirical approach at the other end. The current 
project lies somewhere in between. This research draws on mid-range theoretical 
concerns emanating from critical legal perspectives on the legal framework and 
explores them empirically in relation to the extent to which this legal framework 
is consistent with certain family practices in society.   
Comparative Approach 
The change in social attitudes, and accompanying legislative reform, surrounding 
non-traditional families and same-sex parenting has been observed in quite a 
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number of western jurisdictions.133 Each of these jurisdictions has approached 
the regulation of same-sex families in different ways, affording varying degrees 
of recognition. Broadly speaking, there is a divide between the way in which civil 
law systems have achieved reform through top-down legislation, on the one hand, 
and the common-law's combination of legislative and judge-led reform, on the 
other. While Scandinavian and civil law systems such as Sweden and the 
Netherlands may have been at the forefront of recognising same-sex adult 
relationships, the common law jurisdictions seem to be leading the way in 
recognising, through a separate legal framework, the relationships between 
same-sex parents and the children born into such couple relationships. However, 
this has also thrown up difficulties for and challenges to thinking based on 
traditional family notions. While notions of equality between same-sex and 
different-sex parents may have driven reforms in a number of jurisdictions, the 
degree to which the needs of same-sex families are being met varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some of these reforms may not be sufficient to meet 
the potentially different needs of such families and perhaps more flexible 
approaches to legal parenthood may be appropriate.  
As outlined in the introduction,134 the overall aim of the thesis is to explore, within 
a comparative context, how well the law regulating parenthood and parenting 
following assisted reproduction in E&W, balances the interests of those involved 
                                            
133 ‘More and more countries have changed their laws, and this tendency appears to be on the 
rise. The Netherlands in 2000, Belgium in February 2003, Spain and Canada in July 2005, 
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debate is raging in Mexico, Argentina and several other countries, with legal battles and “rogue” 
marriages being performed in order to bring about change in the law by calling more attention to 
the issue’. Hugues Fulchiron, ‘18th Annual Congress of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law; National Report: France’ (2011) 19 American University Journal of Gender, 
Social Policy & the Law 123. 
134 See page 25. 
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in gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting arrangements and to consider any 
wider implications for family law. Given this, insights from other jurisdictions 
undergoing similar reforms are highly relevant. Therefore, the changing legal 
landscape in a number of countries means that this research question lends itself 
to and would benefit considerably from a comparative approach.135  
The focus of this project, namely the legal recognition of LGBTQ poly-parenting, 
has been subject to recent judicial consideration in a number of common-law 
jurisdictions. As mentioned previously, recent legislative amendments and 
judicial decisions in BC, Ontario and E&W are noteworthy in this regard as they 
have paved the way for recognising that more than two adults may, in effect, be 
thought of as a child's parents. These three jurisdictions stand out as particularly 
forward thinking in relation to multiple-parent families. However, each has 
approached the issue of legal recognition in a different way.  
One of the functions of comparative law can be ‘for considering the desirability of 
introducing forms of legal recognition that have been successfully introduced in 
other jurisdictions as a response to analogous issues’.136 BC and Ontario, through 
legislative amendment and judicial decisions respectively, have recognised the 
possibility of having more than two legal parents in a same-sex poly-parenting 
situation. While the courts of E&W have afforded some legal recognition for 
multiple adults in this type of situation, legal parenthood remains limited to two 
adults regardless of their gender. Therefore, in considering the type of legal 
recognition which should be afforded to same-sex poly-parenting families in 
                                            
135 For more on comparative family law research see D Bradley ‘A note on comparative family 
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E&W, these jurisdictions seem well suited as research sites for the comparative 
doctrinal (and empirical) element of this project.  
Furthermore, Canada and the UK were chosen as sites for the research because 
of the similar yet distinctive ways in which the laws of each country have dealt 
with multiple-parent families. Both countries consist of a number of different 
jurisdictions and in both countries the co-existence of the common law and civil 
law can be seen in differing degrees. Although within the UK Scotland's mixed 
legal system follows the same approach to parentage law as E&W, in Canada, 
Quebec's civil law system provides a distinctive take on filiation compared to the 
other Canadian common-law provinces.137 
In addition to the different approaches of the civil-law and common-law within 
Canada, there are also important distinctions between how UK and Canadian 
legislation and courts address the issue of multiple parents. In Canada the issue 
of parentage following assisted reproduction is dealt with at the provincial level, 
whereas in the UK it is addressed in a piece of national legislation.138 As a result, 
the Supreme Court of a given province in Canada is entitled to rule that a piece 
of legislation is incompatible with the Canadian Charter of Fundamental rights 
and reach a different outcome than that stated in the legislation. This can be seen 
in the case of AA v BB and CC139 where the Ontario Supreme Court ruled that 
the Ontario Legislation that limited the number of parents to two did not apply in 
the case before it. The case concerned a lesbian couple and gay friend who were 
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raising a child together. In that case, the court used their inherent jurisdiction to 
hold that all three adults were parents of the child. 
In contrast to the Canadian courts, the UK courts do not have a similar power to 
deviate from the legislation in that way. Instead, the UK courts have, to an extent, 
compensated for the limitation to two parents in UK legislation through a flexible 
use of parental responsibility. In the case of T v T,140 for example, the Court of 
Appeal granted each partner in a lesbian couple and the biological father parental 
responsibility. In the father's case, the parental responsibility was essentially a 
badge of status in recognition of the limited role he played in the child's life, while 
the lesbian couple were the primary caregivers.141 The tenor of these two cases 
are different because in the Canadian case a declaration of parentage was 
sought with all parties consenting, whereas in the UK case the court had to 
resolve a dispute about parental responsibility. Nevertheless, it will be instructive 
to compare these distinctive judicial approaches, as well as their respective 
legislative frameworks, when considering the type of legal recognition that should 
be afforded multiple-parent families.  
In addition to their distinctive legal frameworks, each country’s social context 
provides a background for legal reform and therefore needs to be considered. As 
Khan-Freund highlights, the comparative method ‘requires a knowledge not only 
of the foreign law, but also of its social, and above all its political, context’.142 In 
relation to the present study, legal comparisons need to be set alongside a social 
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context where research indicates that lesbian women in Canada143 and the UK144 
are quite likely to use a known donor (e.g. gay male friend) which contrasts with 
the U.S. where using an unknown donor is the preferred option.145 Furthermore, 
since these studies were conducted, the law in the UK was reformed to allow the 
automatic recognition of a lesbian couple as the parents of a child born using an 
unknown donor through a clinic.146  
This possibility does not exist in many provinces in Canada, with the non-
biological mother having to formally adopt the child. However, the courts in 
Canada have been more progressive in this regard than the legislature in order 
to ensure their decisions are in line with the Canadian Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. In addition to this, Canada has traditionally been more progressive in 
terms of social attitudes and legal recognition of same-sex families, with the UK 
following suit. In the UK, legislative reform relating to same-sex families has often 
led social attitudes rather than the other way around.147 Therefore, the similarities 
and differences in terms of the political and social contexts in each of these 
jurisdictions will be instructive when considering the possibilities of law reform in 
the UK. 
The relationship, outlined above, between these two, predominantly common-
law, countries make the comparison between Canada and the UK highly suitable 
for exploring how the law should respond to the issue of multiple parents. In 
addition, the collection of empirical data from LGBTQ parents in each country will 
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add to the discussion of the impact that the socio-legal context has had on law 
reform in each jurisdiction. Given that a number of different legal frameworks exist 
within the various Canadian provinces, it is necessary to focus on the provinces 
that will be particularly useful in relation to this project, namely BC because of its 
recently reformed, progressive legislative approach148 to the issue of multiple 
parents and Ontario because of its recent judicial reforms. 
The comparative approach adopted in this thesis sits well within the context of a 
broader socio-legal approach. As the UK Economic and Social Research Council 
noted in its review of socio-legal studies, ‘[s]ocio-legal studies may also embrace 
a significant comparative methodology, investigating the social scientific context 
of law across and between legal systems, both spatially and temporally, including 
supra national developments’.149 Some have gone further to argue that 
comparative law should not treat legal rules and institutions as abstract, self-
contained entities but as being culturally embedded.150 Geoffrey Samuel has 
identified this as ‘a paradigm dichotomy…between a ‘natural’ and a ‘cultural’ 
approach,’ each of which Samuel argues ‘brings with it a number of 
methodological approaches and attitudes.151  
                                            
148 In British Columbia, for example, it is possible for child to have more than two legal parents 
in the context of assisted reproduction. See British Columbia Family Law Act 2011 s. 29. 
149 Cited in Salter and Mason, Writing Law Dissertations (n 119) 184. See also Annelise Riles, 
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150 See for example Roger Cotterrell, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Culture’ in Mathias Reimann 
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Zweigert and Kötz advocate a more functionalist approach to comparative law 
that is mainly concerned with comparing legal outcomes.152 Operating within this 
framework, Kamba has suggested a practical approach to conducting 
comparative legal research that has been influential in this study.153 Kamba 
suggests that comparative law research comprises three key stages: description 
of the relevant norms and institutions, identification of similarities and differences 
and an explanation of why these exist. De Cruz has built on this to set out an 
eight-stage blueprint as a method of engaging in comparative law.154 The eight 
stages are as follows: frame the legal problem; identify the comparator 
jurisdictions; identify the key sources of law; assemble the relevant material 
including legal commentary; organise this material thematically according to the 
guiding principles of the legal system; formulate provisional answers to the legal 
problem; critically analyse the legal principles with reference to the legal system 
they operate in and finally present the conclusion of the comparative analysis 
relating it back to the initial purpose of the enquiry. This type of approach sits well 
alongside the qualitative empirical element of this study, which relies on a 
framework of thematic analysis, with which there are notable areas of overlap.155   
While there is a significant element of this functional comparative law analysis in 
the present study (in this case who is considered equivalent to a legal parent), it 
is also important to consider the symbolic impact of legal rules, which Zweigert 
and Kötz have been criticised for overlooking.156 Given its commitment to 
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adopting a socio-legal rather than purely doctrinal approach, the present study 
does not treat a given legal rule or institution as ‘an objective phenomenon in 
itself and thus one that transcends any particular state’ as Samuel cautions 
against.157 However, nor does it try to engage in what some have termed ‘deep 
level comparative law’.158 This relies on a hermeneutical approach, which, in 
Pierre Legrand’s words focuses ‘on the cognitive structure of a given legal culture 
and, more specifically, on the epistemological foundations of that cognitive 
structure’.159 Such in-depth comparative inquiry is beyond the scope of this PhD 
thesis and is not required in order to achieve the types of insights implied by the 
research questions that guide this study. 
Instead, this thesis combines the comparison of socially located legal approaches 
to collaborative co-parenting within the comparator jurisdictions with an in-depth 
empirical investigation. A number of commentators have noted the utility of 
combining comparative law approaches with empirical research, especially when 
considering law reform options.160 Therefore, in a project such as this which is 
considering domestic law reform options by comparing two legal systems 
operating within the same legal tradition it is not necessary to engage in a detailed 
comparison of legal cultures as some might advocate.161 What is more, Örücü 
advances a view of law reform as relying on ‘transpositions’ from other legal 
                                            
157 Samuel, ‘Comparative Law and its Methodology’ (n 148) 102. 
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systems as sources of inspiration, which are subsequently fine-tuned.162 
However, this study recognises the importance of being sensitive to the context 
in which legal rules operate,163 which is why the comparative analysis of legal 
rules and cases is combined with empirical data from legal professionals and 
parents on the operation of the law.    
Empirical Research Methodology 
Overview 
Drawing on her extensive experience of researching families and relationships, 
Jennifer Mason adopts an approach to research that assumes that ‘it is useful 
and possible to frame intellectual puzzles about the social world, and that these 
can be answered or addressed through empirical research rather than simply 
through abstract theorising’.164 In a similar vein, this research project is predicated 
on the idea that empirical research adds to our understanding of legal rules and 
their impact in society, building on a well-established tradition of empirical socio-
legal research in the UK.165 Moreover, an empirical study is well suited to 
exploring how well the law regulates parenthood and parenting in collaborative 
co-parenting families because a significant element of assessing that involves 
investigating the lived experiences of those who are affected by the law. 
In explicating this thesis’s approach to the empirical element of the study, it is 
important to distinguish between the overall empirical research 
methodology/methodological strategy and the research methods employed to 
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carry out the research, intertwined as they are. Mason reminds us that ‘[t]he 
concept of methodological strategy should be distinguished from that of 
method…your methodological strategy is the logic by which you go about 
answering your research questions,’ which, Mason contends, express the type of 
intellectual puzzle under investigation.166  
The present study is aimed at exploring what Mason terms a ‘comparative 
puzzle… [which] could involve comparing legal or social institutions 
internationally…’167 This is reflected in the overall aim of the study, which sets the 
legal regulation of collaborative co-parenting in a comparative context,168 as well 
as more specifically in the second research question (repeated above),169 which 
takes into account developments in other jurisdictions such as Canada. The 
methodological strategy that underpins this research is, therefore, closely 
connected to the type of enquiry implied by the research questions and the 
comparative legal puzzle being explored.  
Research Design and Strategy 
Given that the research questions are aimed at exploring comparative legal 
responses to a specific social phenomenon, namely collaborative co-parenting, 
within a fairly small segment of the population, i.e. the LGBTQ community, a case 
study approach is well suited to this type of inquiry. Keith Punch characterises 
the case study approach as being one where ‘one case (or perhaps a small 
number of cases) will be studied in detail, using whatever methods seem 
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appropriate…to develop as full an understanding of that case as possible’.170 The 
type of case study the present research is concerned with is what Robert Stake 
refers to as the instrumental case study, in which ‘a particular case is examined 
mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization’.171 In this 
thesis, the case study of LGBTQ collaborative co-parenting is examined in order 
to question the heteronormative generalisation, on the basis of which the law of 
parenthood operates, that parenting ideally occurs within the context of an 
intimate couple relationship.    
Furthermore, the types of research questions that are under consideration lend 
themselves particularly well to qualitative inquiry. In discussing how the rights and 
interests of various parties should be balanced and how legal parenthood and 
parental responsibility should operate in poly-parenting situations, the study aims 
to explore the law’s impact on these families in-depth. In this way, the study is 
trying to capture a snapshot of collaborative co-parenting/poly-parenting family 
practices and arrangements and how this relates to legal recognition. Although 
the study also canvasses the attitudes of these families towards legal recognition, 
this requires the opportunity for participants to expand on these complex issues 
at length, as the participants’ detailed responses indicate. Qualitative inquiry, 
therefore, is an appropriate approach, which was informed by the research 
questions.  
At an earlier stage in the process a mixed methods approach combining 
qualitative and quantitative modes of inquiry was considered. As Bryman notes, 
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a mixed methods approach can be a useful way of corroborating or triangulating 
data in a way that may be seen as increasing its validity.172 Upon further 
reflection, however, the epistemological orientation that underpins quantitative 
research did not seem consistent with the aims of this research project as 
reflected in the research questions. Bryman comments that the preoccupations 
of quantitative research, which ‘reflect epistemologically grounded beliefs about 
what constitutes acceptable knowledge’, are ‘measurement, causality, 
generalization and replication’.173 However, this thesis is not trying to measure 
instances of collaborative co-parenting in order to reflect causal relationships in 
a generalizable way. Instead, the thesis aims to reflect on the lived experiences 
of individuals affected by the legal framework in a way that ‘shows an interest in 
subjectivity and the authenticity of human experience,’ which Silverman 
describes as ‘a strong feature of some qualitative research’.174       
The qualitative approach aims to ensure coherence through an approach to the 
research that ‘meaningfully interconnects literature, research questions/foci, 
findings, and interpretations with each other’.175 The way this thesis has sought 
to achieve this is through integrating comparative doctrinal analysis, insights from 
the literature and empirical analysis in each of the chapters that comprise parts 
two and three of the thesis. Moreover, this approach to structuring the thesis is 
also an attempt to ensure the credibility of the research through a form of 
triangulation, which Tracy advocates as a means of demonstrating a study’s 
credibility.176 The study did not adopt a mixed methods approach combining 
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qualitative and quantitative inquiry, largely because the types of research 
questions the study is exploring do not lend themselves well to quantitative 
enquiry, which can be viewed as quite reductive. Therefore, little would have been 
gained by triangulation of the empirical data in the context of this study. In addition 
to this, the hard-to-access nature and limited size of the target population makes 
quantitative enquiry less feasible. The study does, however, adopt a triangulation 
of sorts between the doctrinal/socio-legal analysis and the empirical study. This 
is advanced in the way the thematic chapters of parts two and three are structured 
to integrate insights from different modes of inquiry. 
Participant Recruitment and Sampling  
The empirical element of this project involved a small-scale qualitative study 
consisting of twenty-five semi-structured interviews in total, twelve of which were 
in the UK and thirteen in Canada. The UK sample comprised six (prospective and 
current) collaborative co-parents and six (mainly legal with one health) 
professionals who have been involved with LGBTQ collaborative co-parenting. 
The Canadian sample included six collaborative co-parents and seven (mainly 
legal with one third sector) professionals who have been involved with LGBTQ 
collaborative co-parenting.177  
The sample recruitment strategy relied on, in common with other studies with gay 
and lesbian participants,178 was targeted convenience sampling. This largely 
involved advertising for participants in the gay and lesbian press, through online 
mailing lists and by placing adverts in various physical locations where potential 
                                            
177 See table at page 77. 
178 See for example, James M Donovan, ‘Homosexual, Gay and Lesbian: Defining the Words 
and Sampling the Populations’ in Henry Minton (ed), Gay and Lesbian Studies (Haworth Press 
1992). 
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participants might see them. This was complemented by snowball sampling 
whereby details of the study were passed on by current participants to contacts 
who might be interested in participating.179 One of the criticisms of convenience 
sampling is that it can produce skewed samples, for example, in terms of 
participants with particularly strong opinions.180 Despite having to rely to an extent 
on which participants initially responded, a successful attempt was then made in 
snowballing to purposively select participants into the sample to ensure that a 
diverse range of collaborative co-parenting arrangements was represented. 
Previous studies have mainly focused on lesbian parenting and have only 
incidentally come across instances of collaborative co-parenting.181 The present 
study is distinctive from those earlier projects because of its sustained focus on 
recruiting participants who are collaboratively co-parenting. Even studies that 
might be thought of as largely focused on collaborative co-parenting such as 
Dempsey’s 2006 study182 did not directly attempt to recruit participants that were 
actively engaged in poly-parenting where everyone is fully involved in the co-
parenting but sought to investigate more typical ‘known donor’ arrangements. 
This study succeeded in recruiting a number of participants involved in a range 
of different types of collaborative co-parenting. 
Therefore, the aim in terms of participant recruitment was to include a range of 
parenting arrangements that could be loosely considered as collaborative co-
parenting, so as to explore the experiences and views of people engaged in 
different types of poly-parenting arrangements. One of the sampling objectives 
                                            
179 Mason, Qualitative researching (n 161) 140. 
180  Robert Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research (Allen & Unwin 1984) 57. 
181 See for example  Fiona J Kelly, Transforming law’s family the legal recognition of planned 
lesbian motherhood (UBC Press 2011); Leanne Smith, ‘Is Three a Crowd: Lesbian Mothers’ 
Perspectives on Parental Status in Law’ (2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 231. 
182 Deborah Dempsey, ‘Beyond Choice Family and Kinship in the Australian Lesbian and Gay 
“baby Boom”’ (La Trobe University 2006). 
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was to recruit men and women engaged in a range of roles. This included the 
more typical female couple and single male donor, a female couple and a male 
couple, and also a male couple and a single female. Although the sample 
recruitment strategy was one of targeted convenience rather than purposive 
sampling at the outset, this diverse range of parenting arrangements were 
reflected in the final sample.183 
In addition to this, legal (and two other) professionals were recruited as elite 
interviewees because of their extensive experience working with collaborative co-
parenting families. These interviews with legal professionals were included on the 
basis that they allowed access to the experiences of a wider range of 
collaborative co-parenting families and complemented the data gathered from the 
co-parenting sample. As Tansey notes:  
as well as serving a corroborative purpose, elite interviews can also 
be used for additive purposes—to provide new information that will 
advance the research process…One such additive function is to 
establish what people think—what their “attitudes, values, and 
beliefs” are.184 
In line with this, the data gathered from interviews with lawyers in E&W, alongside 
the doctrinal analysis, were invaluable in answering the first research question 
(how the legal system regulates the issue), as well as contributing to the second 
research question (how the legal system could and should regulate the issue), 
alongside interviews with lawyers in Canada. The interviews with collaborative 
co-parents were primarily drawn on in answering the third research question 
(implications of expanding legal regulation of parenthood beyond the 
                                            
183 For more details on the sample see 77. 
184 Oisín Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probablilty Sampling’ 
(2007) 40 PS: Political Science and Politics 765, 766. See also Joel D Aberbach and Bert A 
Rockman, ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews’ (2002) 35 PS: Political Science and Politics 
673. 
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heteronormative model) but also contributed to discussing the second research 
question. Therefore, the combined picture from lawyers and lay participants 
builds a good and original picture of the developing terrain around collaborative 
co-parenting in terms of decision making and changing attitudes.   
One of the limitations of this study was the difficulty of recruiting participants. 
Various strategies were employed to overcome this such as drawing on existing 
contacts through snowball sampling as well as other convenience sampling 
through online discussion forums, support groups and face-to-face recruitment. 
The sample was drawn from both individuals to whom this type of parenting is 
relevant and also professionals (such as lawyers and counsellors) who work with 
these families. In the end the sample that was achieved is suitable for the 
intended purpose of demonstrating the difficulties faced by collaborative co-
parents as a result of the legal framework through a selection of case studies, 
rather than by gathering data that can be generalised more broadly, which is 
beyond the remit of this thesis. 
Initial attempts at participant recruitment included posting online adverts on 
same-sex parenting and assisted reproduction discussion forums and support 
group websites. This was supplemented by asking the solicitors interviewed if 
they would be comfortable passing on details of the study to any clients/contacts 
they might have. An advert was also taken out on the website of a magazine 
targeted at the LGBTQ community. One of the most effective participant 
recruitment methods in the UK was attending the Alternative Parenting Show in 
London, which is designed as an educational and networking opportunity for 
prospective same-sex parents and included information sessions on collaborative 
co-parenting. One of the most effective recruitment methods in Canada was 
 
 
77 
posting an advert on a listserv mailing list, which served the same-sex parenting 
community in Vancouver and making contact with the LGBTQ Parenting Network 
based in Toronto. 
These recruitment strategies met with varying levels of success. It is well 
documented that representative samples of stigmatised groups such as lesbians 
and gay men are difficult to obtain.185 Same-sex parents, particularly those co-
parenting collaboratively, seem to be an even more hard-to-access group 
perhaps because of the small numbers involved. However, those that did 
participate had strongly held opinions and some of the participants were quite 
active within the same-sex parenting community.  
One of the hardest to access samples were male co-parents. It is generally the 
case that in social science research men are often less willing to participate than 
women. Furthermore, previous studies in this area have had considerable 
difficulty recruiting men in this situation.186 Despite that a number of men did 
volunteer to take part in the study and they provide an interesting perspective that 
has not previously been explored in great detail. The recruitment of legal 
professionals went well and a good number of solicitors and attorneys were 
willing to share their experiences. 
Participant Overview 
Table 1: Participant Breakdown 
 UK Canada 
Legal Professionals 5 6 
                                            
185 Judith Stacey and Timothy J Biblarz, ‘(How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?’ 
(2001) 66 American Sociological Review 159; Raymond M Lee, Doing Research on Sensitive 
Topics (Sage 1993). 
186 See Fiona Kelly, ‘Transforming Law’s Family: The Legal Recognition of Planned Lesbian 
Families’ (University of British Columbia 2007) 100. 
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Health/Third Sector  1 1 
Co-Parents 6 6 
 
The intention was to recruit a number of participants who were engaged in 
different forms of ‘plus two’187 parenting or who were considering/had considered 
this possibility, as well as legal and other professionals who had experience 
working with these families. Of the twenty-five participants, there were six 
parents/prospective parents in the UK, six parents/prospective parents in 
Canada, six solicitors/health professionals in the UK and seven legal/other 
professionals in Canada (see table 1 above). Although it was not possible to 
interview every member of each family, four families from the UK and three from 
Canada are represented. 
Table 2: Overview of Parenting Arrangements 
  
Single Male Partnered Male 
Separated 
Male 
Couple 
  Gay Straight Gay Straight  
Female couple 
-Betty, Eliza 
and Lenny 
(UK) 
 Colin 
(UK) 
 Sally and 
Rachael 
(Can) 
Separated Female 
Couple 
   Angela, 
Ruth and 
Rob (Can) 
 
Single 
Woman 
Gay 
Frieda 
(Canada) 
    
Straight 
 Delilah 
(UK) 
Chris 
(Can) 
 
Each of these families and the parenting arrangements they engaged in were 
unique. There are, however, various ways these families can be grouped 
                                            
187 For a definition of this term see Julie Wallbank and Chris Dietz, ‘Lesbian Mothers, Fathers 
and Other Animals: Is the Political Personal in Multiple Parent Families?’ [2013] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 451, 452. 
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together. In terms of family configuration, three broad set ups emerged. There 
were female couples that ‘co-parented’ with a gay man who may or may not have 
had a partner; there were male couples that co-parented with a woman who may 
or may not have had a partner; and there were female couples and single women 
who had a known donor with whom they did not co-parent. The sample, therefore, 
presents a series of case studies of different collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements (see Table 2 above) that fits in well with the project’s case study 
design described above.188  
Participant recruitment was mainly targeted at those families where the biological 
parents were involved to some extent with the child, particularly if that 
involvement tended towards co-parenting. It is unsurprising, therefore, that four 
of the seven families were intending to co-parent or were co-parenting to some 
extent. Two of the other families had what might be better described as a ‘known 
donor’ arrangement. There was also a single heterosexual woman who had 
considered co-parenting in the past but did not go down that route because she 
became pregnant with a partner. 
Although there were examples of male couples and female couples collaborating 
and male couples and single women collaborating there were no male 
participants, which had a ‘known surrogate’ arrangement where they were the 
primary parents and the birth mother only played a secondary role (as opposed 
to a full co-parent). This is compounded by the small size of the population of gay 
men who have had children through surrogacy and how difficult to access that 
sample is. Given the study’s focus on co-parenting, this is not surprising and this 
is not a group that was specifically targeted in terms of recruitment. However, in 
                                            
188 See page 70. 
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some senses it is the fourth family configuration that is missing from this data 
sample. As the focus of the study is on co-parenting, any discussion of known 
and potentially involved ‘surrogates’ is a tangential one. However, where it 
becomes relevant, perhaps as a point of contrast with arrangements involving 
known donors, insights from other studies and the reported experience of high 
profile male couples will be drawn on. The experiences of gay men having 
children with involved and more distant surrogates would be a fruitful topic of 
further research. 
Data Collection 
As described above,  twenty five in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with a mixture of parents and legal professionals in an attempt to 
explore experiences of engaging in collaborative co-parenting and the impact 
legal regulation has on this. As Strauss and Corbin note qualitative interviews are 
well suited to ‘research that attempts to uncover the nature of persons’ 
experiences with a phenomenon.’189 Mason build on this by suggesting that the 
aim of qualitative research is ‘to produce rounded understandings on the basis of 
rich, contextual and detailed data’ and on that basis ‘a qualitative interview is 
always and necessarily semi-structured or loosely structured.’190 Consequently, 
in order to encourage participants to answer expansively a ‘conversational 
style’191 was adopted. Some have described this as a ‘dialogical’ interview192 
because it tries to encourage ‘fluid conversations with a purpose’.193 Semi-
                                            
189 Juliet M Corbin and Anselm L Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research : Techniques and 
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (Sage 2008) 19. 
190 Mason, Qualitative researching (n 161) 39 – 41. 
191  Weeks, Brian Heaphy, and Catherine Donovan, Same sex intimacies: families of choice and 
other life experiments (Routledge 2001) 203. 
192 Gillian Dunne, Lesbian Lifestyles: Women’s Work and the Politics of Sexuality (MacMillan 
1997) 29. 
193 Kelly, ‘Transforming Law’s Family: The Legal Recognition of Planned Lesbian Families’ (n 
183) 108. 
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structured interviews were considered the most suitable method of data 
collection, therefore, because they provide a means of gaining deeper insights 
into the lived experiences of these collaborative co-parents and their relationship 
to the legal framework.  
Despite the difficulties in recruiting participants described above, interviews were 
conducted with participants engaged in a diverse range of co-parenting 
arrangements so as to be able to address the research questions in a meaningful 
way. Jennifer Mason suggests that what qualifies as a sufficient number of 
interviews depends on the phenomenon under investigation and what the 
research questions demand.194 Julia Brannen builds on this by saying ‘[f]or me, 
the most important issue in deciding how many qualitative interviews are enough 
concerns the purpose of the research – the type of research question to be 
addressed and the methodology it is proposed to adopt’.195  
In this study, therefore, the decision to include interviews with approximately six 
legal professionals and six collaborative co-parents in each jurisdiction stems 
partly from the case study approach of the research. Howard Becker notes that 
‘it may not take many interviews to show that something people have not thought 
about as taking a variety of forms in fact does take such a variety of forms’. Each 
of the interviews with collaborative co-parents could, therefore, be thought of as 
a case study in itself of a different form of collaborative co-parenting, as each 
family is configured slightly differently.196 When these are combined with the 
                                            
194 Sarah Elsie Baker and Rosalind Edwards, ‘How many qualitative interviews is enough ? 
Expert voices and early career reflections on sampling and cases in qualitative research’ 
National Centre for Research Methods Review Paper, 29. 
195 Ibid 16. 
196 See Chapter Six for more details. 
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broader range of experiences of the legal professionals, it provides an in-depth 
understanding of collaborative co-parenting from a number of different angles. 
The interview data consist of a mixture of telephone and face-to-face interviews 
in both Canada and the UK. The study was advertised to collaborative co-parents 
as involving telephone interviews in order to minimise any potential disruption to 
research participants or reluctance to participate that face-to-face interviews 
might engender. By contrast, legal professionals that were situated locally were 
interviewed in person at their place of work as it seemed less likely that face-to-
face interviewing might discourage participation. A number of legal professionals 
that were not situated locally were also interviewed via the telephone.  
Conducting telephone interviews with participants has a number of benefits, 
aside from being able to interview participants across a range of geographical 
locations. For example, Greenfield et al. have reported that telephone 
interviewing may facilitate the exploration of more sensitive topics due to the 
increased feeling of anonymity.197 While conducting the interviews in the present 
study it certainly felt that the fact that the conversations were over the telephone 
facilitated discussion of sensitive issues such as previous unsuccessful attempts 
to have children. As well as this it seemed to encourage participants to open up 
more about the concerns they had (as well as the hopes) about the parenting 
arrangement they had set up.  
What is more, Tausig and Freeman have observed that conducting the interviews 
over the telephone is a way to encourage participants to take part and overcome 
                                            
197 See for example Thomas Greenfield, Lorraine T Midanik and John D Rogers, ‘Effects of 
Telephone versus Face-to-Face Interview Modes on Reports of Alcohol Consumption’ (2000) 
95 Addiction 277. 
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participation reluctance.198 Conducting the interview via telephone notably 
facilitated the involvement of one key participant in this study whose interview 
was carried out during a twenty minute taxi ride while he was on his was to pick 
up his children from school. This occurred when the participant spontaneously 
phoned up after having to cancel several previously arranged appointments to 
conduct the interview. It is, nevertheless, fortunate to have been able to include 
this data, as the participant’s parenting arrangement was the only one of its type 
included in the study. Therefore, the combination of face-to-face and telephone 
interviews in this study has facilitated the data collection process. In addition to 
this, the quality of data produced by both methods has been similar, which has 
also been the experience of other researchers that have adopted a similar 
approach.199 
At an early stage it was decided that both the collaborative co-parenting 
participants and the legal professionals would be interviewed individually. Initially 
group interviews were considered for the co-parenting participants because they 
often formed part of a family unit that consisted of three, four and in one case six 
individuals. May argues that ‘we should also be sensitive to group and individual 
interviews producing different perspectives on the same issue’.200 Frey and 
Fontana note that ‘group interviewing will provide data on group interaction, on 
realities as defined in a group context, and on interpretations of events that reflect 
group input.’201 However, the research questions of this study are not primarily 
                                            
198 Jane E Tausig and Ellen W Freeman, ‘The Next Best Thing to Being There: Conducting the 
Clinical Research Interview by Telephone’ (1988) 58 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 418, 
420. 
199 JE Sturges and KJ Hanrahan, ‘Comparing Telephone and  Face-to-Face Qualitative 
Interviewing: A Research Note’ (2004) 4 Qualitative Research 107. 
200 Tim May, Social Research : Issues, Methods and Process, vol 3rd (Open University Press 
2011) 138. 
201 James H Frey and Andrea Fontana, ‘The Group Interview in Social Research’ (1991) 28 The 
Social Science Journal 175, 175. 
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concerned with investigating group dynamics in relation to this issue and as a 
result group interviews were ruled out.  
A number of studies on reproductive decision-making have used couple 
interviews about having children because this is a joint decision.202 However, 
given that collaborative co-parenting necessarily involves parenting relationships 
beyond the intimate couple relationship, this method did not seem appropriate. 
As Dempsey found in her study, ‘[i]ndividual interviews were sought for this study 
because varied relationship combinations beyond the couple are known to be 
relevant in the lesbian and gay planned parenthood context’.203 What is more, 
researchers have suggested that couple interviews might produce more limited 
data than individual interviews, as participants may be less willing to discuss 
sensitive issues or areas of conflict in front of their partner.204 Some researchers 
have interviewed couples together and separately on the basis that what the 
participant says in each interview can be compared.205 However, during the 
process of ethical review the potential psychological stress this might cause 
participants was considered and the idea was not pursued.  
The study focused on the subjective meanings that research participants assign 
relationships within their family as well as how this relates to legal recognition, 
which the interview schedule was designed to elicit. The interview schedule206 
was divided into two sections, each covering approximately half of the interview. 
                                            
202 See for example Gay Becker, The Elusive Embryo: How Women and Men Approach the 
New Reproductive Technologies (University of California Press 2000). 
203 Dempsey, ‘Beyond Choice Family and Kinship in the Australian lesbian and gay “baby 
boom”’ (n 179) 92. 
204 Jacqui Gabb, ‘Querying the Discourses of Love: An Analysis of Contemporary Patterns of 
Love and the Stratification of Intimacy within Lesbian Families’ (2001) 8 The European Journal 
of Women’s Studies 313. 
205 See for example Sara M Morris, ‘Joint and Individual Interviewing in the Context of Cancer’ 
(2001) 11 Qualitative Health Research 553; J Lindsay, ‘Coupling Up’ (La Trobe University, 
Melbourne 1997). 
206 Included in appendix 1. 
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The first section was described as biographical in that it asked about the families' 
journeys to parenthood. For the interviews with legal professionals, this section 
focused on the types of parenting arrangements they had encountered and the 
factors they picked up on as being important to these families. In this section of 
the interview, participants discussed the type of family they were creating and 
revealed the difficulties they had encountered in relation to co-parenting. The 
intention here was to elicit short, topical ‘life stories’207 about the participants’ 
parenting journeys. This allowed research participants to explain fully their 
family’s experiences while encouraging them to critically reflect on these.  
The second section of the interview asked questions relating to the participants’ 
thoughts on legal recognition, the role of written agreements and law reform. This 
section attempted to elicit responses in relation to certain themes, which had 
emerged from the doctrinal analysis such as the use of parental responsibility 
and the importance of legal parenthood. The data that resulted from these 
interviews, therefore, were not only participants’ biographical narratives but also 
their reasoned position in terms of some of the discourses within the literature 
and case law.  
However, unlike the first section of the interview, which concerned participants’ 
own parenting journeys, the second section may have explored issues that did 
not relate as closely to participants’ own experiences. For example, some 
participants made written agreements when setting up their parenting 
arrangement, whereas others did not. As well as exploring the reasons for this, it 
was also important to gauge participants’ views on the legal consequences of 
these agreements, regardless of whether they had one or not. Vignettes were 
                                            
207 Ken Plummer, Documents of Life 2 (Sage 2001). 
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useful in this regard because it allowed the legal framework to be contextualised 
in a way that participants could relate to. As Stets and Serp observe, through the 
use of vignettes ‘individuals typically are exposed to a hypothetical situation and 
asked to imagine how they would think, act, and feel as an actor or observer in 
the situation’.208 In this way the issues under discussion are made more concrete 
for the participants.209  
In addition to this, vignettes are particularly useful for exploring sensitive topics, 
which issues around parenthood and parenting are, because, as Hughes 
highlights, they present the question in a less direct and threatening way.210 As 
May stresses, vignettes also offer participants ‘a safe place where they can talk 
about an issue that has affected their lives without requiring them to disclose their 
own experiences’.211 Although participants were asked to discuss their own 
experiences in detail in the first section of the interviews, the second section 
probed further about potential conflict that might arise, which participants may not 
have wished to expand on too much in relation to their personal experience. 
Moreover, vignettes are advantageous in eliciting normative responses,212 which 
in this context took the form of ascertaining what rights and responsibilities the 
law should recognise each of the adults as having in a collaborative co-parenting 
situation.  
                                            
208 Jan E Stets and Richard T Serp, ‘Identity Theory’ in John Delamater and Amanda Ward 
(eds), Handbook of Social Psychology (Springer 2013) 39. 
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Data Analysis 
It is important to acknowledge that qualitative data analysis is a somewhat 
organic process that does not necessarily involve the straightforward application 
of a set of techniques to produce neat and tidy results.213 A crucial aspect of the 
data analysis process in qualitative research involves navigating ‘how to keep the 
participants’ voices and perspectives alive, while at the same time recognizing 
the researcher's role in shaping the research process and product.’214 It is 
especially important to accurately and respectfully represent what participants 
have communicated because of the level of trust involved when sharing these 
highly personal experiences.215 This can be a difficult undertaking given the large 
volume of material qualitative interviewing produces alongside other sources 
such as case law and secondary literature. Having said that, as other researchers 
have acknowledged, none of this ‘undermine[s] as futile the attempt to find out 
about social phenomena through the act of talking to, and writing about, real 
people. Instead, the aim is to maintain a degree of healthy scepticism about 
achieving a singular ‘truth’. The end result is best thought of as part of an ongoing 
conversation with a community of interested readers and fellow writers’.216 
Data analysis began concurrently with ongoing data collection as interviews were 
transcribed on a continuing basis shortly after each interview was conducted. A 
                                            
213 See for example, M Alvesson, Post Modernism and Social Research (Open University Press 
2002). 
214 Natasha Mauthner and Andrea Doucet, ‘Reflections on a Voice-Centred Relational Method: 
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number of the interviews were manually transcribed with the remainder being 
transcribed by a professional transcriber. The decision was taken to involve a 
professional transcriber because of the depth of the interviews and the time-
consuming nature of interviews, which other researchers have also noted.217 
Although engagement with and immersion in the data occurred while reading over 
these transcripts, it also important to be involved in the actual transcription 
process by manually transcribing some interviews, which some have argued is 
influenced by the values and theoretical framework of the transcriber.218   
During the transcription process/reading of the transcripts, any initial ideas about 
emerging themes were noted down. Initially potential codes and themes in the 
printed transcripts were identified manually. Other researchers have noted the 
repeated, thorough reading of transcripts and cross-referencing of themes that 
this method requires allows for greater immersion in the data.219 This stage of 
familiarisation with the data is the initial step in various methods of qualitative 
data analysis. Drawing on Dempsey’s 2006 study220 this study combines an 
interpretative case study approach to the data resulting from the biographical 
section of the co-parenting interviews with a thematic analysis of the interviews 
with legal professionals and the second part of the co-parenting interviews.   
The interpretative case study approach to the co-parenting interviews involved 
creating ‘family portraits’ based on the responses given by participants as the 
basis of the analysis. Where more than one participant was interviewed from one 
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poly-parenting family, the overall portrait provided a richer picture of family life but 
it was sometimes necessary to accommodate potentially conflicting viewpoints 
about how the family was created or the meaning attached to certain family 
practices. These conflicts were often very instructive as they spoke to the 
potential for disputes and how this had been resolved within the family. A 
summary version of these family portraits form the basis of Chapter Six. 
At an early stage in the project, grounded theory was considered as a potential 
approach to the data analysis (which would have inevitably informed other stages 
of the research). 221 However, the research questions of this study are primarily 
aimed at exploring concepts and themes present in the legal framework in relation 
to the lived experiences of collaborative co-parenting families. Given the way 
concepts and theory from the doctrinal analysis and literature review were drawn 
on to inform the empirical analysis of the second section of the interviews, 
thematic analysis was chosen, rather than a grounded theory approach.  
As a general proposition ‘thematic analysis involves the searching across a data 
set – be that a number of interviews or focus groups or a range of texts – to find 
repeated patterns of meaning.222 This accords with Pope et al.’s suggestion that 
‘[i]n most qualitative analyses the data are preserved in their textual form and 
“indexed” to generate or develop analytical categories and theoretical 
explanations’.223 Pope et al. go on to explain that:  
Qualitative research uses analytical categories to describe and 
explain social phenomena. These categories may be derived 
inductively—that is, obtained gradually from the data—or used 
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deductively, either at the beginning or part way through the analysis 
as a way of approaching the data. 
As discussed above the study does not adopt a primarily inductive approach as 
grounded theory would require. Instead categories and concepts derived from the 
doctrinal analysis were used to guide the analysis of the empirical data. Pope et 
al. note that such deductive analysis is being increasingly used particularly in the 
‘framework approach’ they describe.224  
The framework approach to qualitative analysis requires the identification of a 
thematic framework. As Pope et al. describe it, ‘[t]his is carried out by drawing on 
a priori issues and questions derived from the aims and objectives of the study 
as well as issues raised by the respondents themselves and views or experiences 
that recur’. Examples of a priori issues deriving from the aims of the present study 
would include implicit heteronormative bias in the legal framework and the 
privileging of the intimate couple relationship. This was reflected in the 
experiences of a number of participants in the interactions with officialdom such 
as at school or when trying to travel internationally with their child. In this way, 
the combination of inductive and deductive approaches to thematic analysis 
within the context of the framework approach could be seen as enhancing the 
rigour of the analysis.225  
The process of thematic analysis, broadly as outlined by Braun and Clark, was 
conducted on the case law in order to generate part of the thematic framework. 
This involved close in vivo coding of the judgments using NVivo 10 drawing on 
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participants’ own language to generate codes. These were then grouped together 
and refined into more abstract, theoretically-informed axial codes and then 
collated into broader themes.226 The interviews were then coded in a similar way 
using a paper-based approach. I found that this facilitated closer engagement 
with the empirical data where using NVivo might have created some distance.  
These codes were then combined with the themes generated from the case law 
analysis, in order to produce more refined themes, which formed the basis of the 
further analysis. Common themes between the case law and interview analysis 
were identified and this was used as the thematic framework in a process of 
‘indexing’, ‘charting’ and ‘mapping’ of the data in order to advance plausible 
arguments and interpretations based on this combined analysis in order to 
answer the research questions. As Pope et al. identify ‘[t]he process of mapping 
and interpretation is influenced by the original research objectives as well as by 
the themes that have emerged from the data themselves’.227  
The thematic analysis provides a plausible representation of the views of these 
alternative families, which may be transferrable to other families and is therefore 
relevant, but not decisive, for family law and policy. This is combined, in Chapter 
Seven with insights from the doctrinal analysis and review of the literature, in 
order to examine the different perspectives that emerge and contribute to our 
understanding of the impact of the law on these families. 
                                            
226 See the six stage approach outlined in Braun and Clarke, ‘Using thematic analysis in 
psychology’ (n 219) 87. 
227 Pope et al. (n 220) 116. 
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Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval for this project was obtained from the University of Exeter 
College of Social Science and International Studies Ethics Committee (Certificate 
Reference: 11.07.11-xxii).228 Ethics approval was also obtained for the overseas 
fieldwork from the University of BC Behavioural Research Ethics Board 
(Certificate Reference: H1300073).229 As part of the participant recruitment, 
participants were asked to complete a brief online form with their contact 
information and details of their family. It was at this point they were provided with 
information about the study and were asked to complete an online consent form, 
in order to ensure there was informed consent. Some of the salient information 
(such as issues around confidentiality, anonymity and right to withdraw at any 
time) were reiterated at the start of the interviews. Participants were asked if they 
were happy to proceed and whether they had any questions. 
Although the ethical review process determined that this was a low risk study, the 
interviews were exploring sensitive issues and it was, therefore, necessary to 
consider the risks associated with this in advance. Therefore, the researcher 
would have been able to refer participants to appropriate support services (and 
even legal services) had the interview caused any difficulties for any of the 
participants. In addition to this, everything participants said was treated as 
confidential. In order to ensure this, transcripts were anonymised, data were 
securely stored and pseudonyms were used in writing up the thesis.230  
                                            
228 See Appendix 4. 
229 See Appendix 4. 
230 This was done in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the University of Exeter, 
School of Law’s Ethical Checklist. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the combination of qualitative, socio-legal 
and comparative research methodologies has been a beneficial way of 
investigating the research questions set out in the introductory chapter. This 
chapter has also explained how the research was conducted and why particular 
decisions were made in relation to sample selection, participant recruitment, data 
collection and analysis. In addition to an explanation of the research 
methodology, the previous section has also outlined the composition of the 
sample.  
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Part Two: Comparative Legal 
Insights 
‘I believe very strongly that everybody should be entitled to have a family and 
that's really the basis upon which I and any other person in my situation should 
be worth their salt’. 
- Lizzie, Solicitor in E&W 
‘My views are that I would like to see or support any kind of parental unit and 
family unit that they want to create and see that there’s adequate support for 
what’s intended by them’. 
- David, Attorney in BC 
Part Two consists of three chapters, each of which explores a different facet of 
the legal regulation of collaborative co-parenting. As such, each of the chapters 
contains detailed doctrinal analysis so as to explore how well the legal framework 
in E&W, when set in a comparative context, reflects and accommodates the 
procreative autonomy of gay men and lesbians engaging in or considering 
collaborative co-parenting. Implicit in this approach is the inclusion, in each of the 
chapters, of comparative legal perspectives mainly from BC and Ontario but also 
drawing on a small number of other jurisdictions. Each of these chapters also 
draws on critical perspectives that emerge from the socio-legal literature as well 
as analysis of the interviews with legal professionals in Canada and the UK.  
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This allows for a detailed consideration, in ‘Chapter Three: Collaborative Co-
Parenting and the Hierarchy of Families – Navigating Legislative Tensions’, 
of how the legislative framework continues to perpetuate a hierarchy of families 
to the detriment of collaborative co-parenting families. ‘Chapter Four: 
Normativity and Vulnerability – Judicial Resolution of Collaborative Co-
Parenting Disputes’ then considers the case law in more depth and how a 
heteronormative conception of the family impacts upon the judicial resolution of 
collaborative co-parenting disputes. Finally, ‘Chapter Five: Valuing Autonomy 
– Indeterminate Intentions and Collaborative Parenthood’ considers the role 
that intentions do and should play when deciding issues of parental responsibility 
and contact.    
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Chapter Three: Collaborative Co-
Parenting and the Hierarchy of 
Families - Navigating Legislative 
Tensions 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the legislative frameworks that exists in England & Wales 
(E&W) and various provinces in Canada around parenthood in collaborative co-
parenting situations. In doing this, it explores the ways in which collaborative co-
parenting arrangements are excluded from the legal framework in E&W by the 
way it establishes a hierarchy of families through privileging those family forms 
that conform to a heteronormative understanding of the family. This chapter 
contrasts reforms instituted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
(HFEA 2008) with the more far reaching changes made in British Columbia (BC) 
by the Family Law Act 2013 (FLA 2013). The interaction between the legislatively 
prescribed concept of legal parenthood and the more flexible use of parental 
responsibility in E&W will also be considered.  
Legislative Reform in England & Wales 
Given the focus of the thesis on gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements it is important first to consider the legal recognition that the law 
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affords gay and lesbian parents, who conceive either as single parents or as a 
same-sex couple. Historically, recognition of parent-child relationships has been 
problematic in E&W (and internationally)231 in relation to non-traditional, and in 
particular same-sex, families. Social attitudes towards same-sex relationships 
have changed considerably in the period between the enactment of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004232 and the recognition of same-sex marriage in E&W233 and 
Scotland.234 Alongside the increasing recognition of same-sex unions between 
adults, in the UK and other countries around the world, same-sex parenting is 
becoming more visible and increasingly recognised.235 Gradually, legislators and 
courts in various countries are making progress towards facilitating the creation 
of same-sex families and recognising the parent-child relationships in these 
families.236 Despite this progress, there are arguably still gaps between the needs 
of same-sex families and the rights and responsibilities UK legislation is willing to 
confer on them, which still bears the hallmarks of hetero-normative assumptions 
about parenting.  
                                            
231 See for example Katharina Boele-Woelki and Angelika Fuchs (eds), Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Relationships in Europe: National, Cross-border and European Perspectives 
(Intersentia 2012).   
232 See the discussion of the parliamentary debates that led to the passage of the Civil 
Partnership Act in Carl Stychin, ‘Not (Quite) A Horse And Carriage’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal 
Studies 79, 80-81. 
233 ‘Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013.  
234 ‘Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014.  
235 See for example David Hill, ‘The Recognition of Homosexual Parents in the United Kingdom’ 
in Katharina Boele-woelki and Tone Sverdrup (eds), European challenges in contemporary 
family law (Intersentia 2008).. 
236 See for example Katharina Boele-Woelki and Angelika Fuchs (eds), Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Relationships in Europe: National, Cross-border and European Perspectives 
(Intersentia 2012); Machteld Vonk, Children and their parents (Intersentia 2007); Anna Singer, 
‘Equal Treatment of Same-Sex Couples in Sweden’ in Bill Atkin (ed), International Survey of 
Family Law, 2010; Bill Atkin and Fareda Banda (eds), ‘Family, Pluralism and Equality: Marriage 
and Sexual Orientation in Argentine Law’ in International Survey of Family Law, 2011; Bill Atkin 
and Fareda Banda (eds), ‘Homoaffective Parentage in Relation to Medically Assisted 
Reproduction: a Parallel between Brazil and Portugal’ in International Survey of Family Law, 
2011; Marianna Chaves, ‘Same-Sex Families in Brazil: An Overview after the Trial of ADI and 
ADPF 132 by the Supreme Court’ in Bill Atkins and Fareda Banda (eds), International Survey of 
Family Law, 2014. 
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In this regard, there is a distinction to be drawn between single women and 
female couples, on the one hand, and single men and male couples, on the other. 
In some circumstances, it is possible for a single woman or a female couple to be 
a child’s sole legal parent(s) from birth. However, although it may be possible for 
a single man to be one of the child’s legal parents at birth, both partners in a male 
couple will never be considered to be the child’s legal parents from birth. This 
distinction in terms of legal parenthood for men and women derives from the 
common law principle that parturition identifies a child’s mother.237 This position 
is enshrined in recently reformed legislation governing parenthood following 
assisted reproduction.238 Therefore, upon birth, one of the child’s, and perhaps 
his or her only, legal parent(s) will be his or her birth mother.239 
HFEA 2008 makes it clear that a child can only have one other legal parent in 
addition to the birth mother.240 However, who this second parent will be depends 
on the circumstances of conception. If the child is conceived through sexual 
intercourse then the common-law presumption of pater est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant will operate, which is rebuttable by DNA evidence. 241 The effect of 
this is that, on birth, the legal father of a child born through sexual intercourse will 
be the genetic father or, if no DNA tests have been conducted, the mother’s 
husband if she has one. Although conception through sexual intercourse could 
conceivably feature in collaborative co-parenting arrangements for a variety of 
                                            
237 Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] AC 547, 577.  
238 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 33(1). 
239 Compare the position in France where there is the possibility of having motherless children 
because women have the right to conceive anonymously. See Nadine Lefaucheur, ‘French 
Tradition of Anonymous Birth: The Lines of Argument’ (2004) 18 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 319. 
240 Human Fertilisation Act 2008 ss 36 and 42. 
241 Family Law Reform Act 1969 s 26. 
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reasons, the evidence from the case law and empirical studies is that some form 
of assisted reproduction is more common.242 
Even if conception occurs through assisted reproduction the law distinguishes 
between situations where single women and female couples not in a civil 
partnership/marriage conceive at home, on the one hand, as compared to single 
women and female couples who conceive at a licensed fertility clinic or female 
couples in a civil partnership/marriage who conceive at home, on the other. In the 
former situation, the common-law rules apply, whereas female civil 
partners/married couples are both treated as the child’s parents from birth, 
regardless of whether assisted conception occurs at a clinic or elsewhere, 
provided no absence of consent can be shown.243 In addition to this, where the 
appropriate consent forms have been signed,244 female couples who are not in a 
civil partnership/marriage can be the legal parents on birth provided they are 
treated at a licensed fertility clinic.245 In each of these cases, the biological father 
would not be considered one of the child’s legal parents.246 
The position in relation to male parents who conceive through assisted 
reproduction is different. Because the birth mother is always initially one of the 
child’s two legal parents, a male couple cannot be considered the child’s legal 
parents from birth. However, section 54 of the HFEA 2008 allows a male couple, 
who are either civil partners or living in an ‘enduring family relationship’ and one 
of whom is the child’s biological father, to apply for a parental order, between six 
                                            
242 See Fiona J Kelly, Transforming law’s family the legal recognition of planned lesbian 
motherhood (University of British Columbia Press 2011) 15 – 16.   
243 ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 42. 
244 For an example of where the appropriate consent forms had not been signed see AB v CD 
[2013] EWHC 1418 (Fam).  
245 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 ss 43 and 44. 
246 Ibid s 45(1). 
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weeks and six months after birth, making them and not the gestational mother 
(provided she consents) the legal parents. This option is not, however, available 
for single men.247 Therefore, even if the birth mother was happy for a man to be 
the sole legal parent, for example in a surrogacy situation, this would only be 
possible following adoption.   
While the legislative framework does facilitate the automatic legal recognition of 
female-led parenting and provides mechanisms for acquiring the legal recognition 
of male-led parenting, the restriction to two parents limits the possibilities open 
for the legal recognition of collaborative co-parenting arrangements involving 
more than two parents. The legislative provisions relating to legal parenthood, 
however, need to be considered in light of the separate legal concept of parental 
responsibility, which currently may be of more utility in terms of collaborative co-
parenting. 
Parental responsibility is defined in the Children Act 1989 as ‘all the rights, duties, 
powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in 
relation to the child and his property’.248 As well as automatically becoming a legal 
parent, a birth mother also acquires parental responsibility for her child upon birth. 
Thinking particularly about collaborative co-parenting situations involving a 
female couple, the mother’s female partner would acquire parental responsibility 
on birth if the mother’s partner was the child’s legal parent under HFEA 2008 and 
was either in a civil partnership with the mother at any time between conception 
and birth,249 was registered as the child’s second parent on the birth certificate or 
                                            
247 See for example B v C (Surrogacy: Adoption) [2015] EWFC 17. 
248 Children Act 1989  s 3. 
249 Family Law Reform Act 1987 s 1(3)(bb). 
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had entered into a parental responsibility agreement with the mother.250 The 
same would be true, mutatis mutandis, of the biological father.251  
In terms of acquiring parental responsibility, the Children Act makes a seemingly 
unwarranted distinction between unmarried fathers, on the one hand, and female 
partners who are not in a civil partnership/marriage, on the other. As mentioned 
above, unmarried fathers, such as the biological father in a collaborative co-
parenting arrangement, are able to acquire parental responsibility by making an 
agreement with the mother or by being registered on the birth certificate. These 
options are, however, only open to female partners who are considered legal 
parents under HFEA 2008. Therefore, as with legal parenthood, female partners 
who are not in a civil partnership and conceive at home are in a more precarious 
position. In that situation, the mother’s female partner would have to either enter 
into a civil partnership with the mother and make a parental responsibility 
agreement as a step-parent252 or be granted a child arrangements order naming 
her as one of the people the child is to live with, which also confers parental 
responsibility.253  
Unlike legal parenthood, it is possible for the court to make a child arrangements 
order in favour of more than two adults, including people who are not the child’s 
legal parents. Various adults are entitled to apply for a child arrangements order 
as a matter of right. These include the child’s parent, guardian or step-parent with 
parental responsibility;254 a spouse or civil partner where the child is treated as a 
child of the family; and someone with whom the child has lived for at least three 
                                            
250 Children Act 1989 s 4ZA. 
251 Ibid s 4. 
252 Ibid s 4A. 
253 Ibid s 12(1) and (2). 
254 Ibid s 10(4). 
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years.255 Other people such as a mother’s female partner where conception 
occurred at home and who is not in a civil partnership with the mother must apply 
to the court for leave to apply for a child arrangements order, which can confer 
parental responsibility. The biological father may also be in this position if he is 
not considered to be a legal parent.256    
The centrality of lesbian parenting as the type of same-sex parenting that is 
embedded in the legal imagination257 can be seen in the way the parenthood 
provisions in part two of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
focuses on the legal position of lesbian couples as parents without explicitly 
considering the position of male couples. This suggests that, rather than 
attempting to address the needs of same-sex parents generally, the legislation 
was focused primarily on the legal recognition of lesbian parenting. Mr Justice 
Baker expressed a similar understanding of the 2008 Act in the 2013 case of Re 
G; Re Z, where he stated that ‘the policy underpinning [the 2008 Act] reforms is 
an acknowledgement that alternative family forms without fathers are sufficient to 
meet a child's need.’258 
The sufficiency of women-led families without fathers, therefore, is primarily what 
underpins reform in this area. That is to say, that legal discourse purports to 
promote the equality of lesbian families and different sex families. Much of the 
commentary, consequently, is directed at the extent to which the law achieves 
this aim. However, this exists alongside fathers’ rights discourse in the context of 
                                            
255 Ibid s 10(5). 
256 For an example of this see Re G ( A Minor ); Re Z ( A Minor ) [2013] EWHC 134. 
257 For more on the limitations and assimilationist approach of the legal imagination in this 
regard see Caroline Jones, ‘The Impossible Parents in Law’ in Craig Lind and others (eds), 
Taking Responsibility, Law and the Changing Family (Ashgate Publishing 2011); Julie Wallbank 
and Chris Dietz, ‘Lesbian mothers, fathers and other animals: is the political personal in multiple 
parent families?’ [2013] Child and Family Law Quarterly 451, 459.  
258 Re G ( A Minor ); Re Z ( A Minor ) (n 253) [113]. 
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post-separation different sex parenting, which emphasizes the importance of 
fathers to children. Given this, it is a logical concern that fathers’ rights discourse 
may influence the judicial interpretation of legislation supposedly predicated on 
the sufficiency of lesbian families in such a way that may result in the father 
having a stronger legal relationship with the child than would otherwise be the 
case. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the broader social context in 
which these scholars are writing, which asserts the importance of fathers and 
biology.       
The central claim with respect to the heteronormativity of the legal regulation of 
parenthood is that it is wedded to the notion of dyadic gendered parenting.259 In 
relation to lesbian couples who become parents the dyadic or two-parent element 
is not necessarily problematic, particularly for those couples who wish to form a 
homonuclear family.260 However, the gendered element becomes problematic 
where the lesbian couple wish to form a homonuclear family without the 
involvement of the biological father. This type of family has garnered both 
legislative and judicial support and commentators (such as Harding)261 are 
particularly critical of judicial interventions that might jeopardise this. 
                                            
259 For more on this see Susan B Boyd, ‘Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, 
Intentionality and Responsibility’ (2007) 25 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 63–94; Julie 
McCandless and Sally Sheldon, “The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the 
Tenacity of the Sexual Family” (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 175. 
260 This phrase was used in the Australian case Re Patrick (An Application Concerning Contact) 
(2002) 218 Fam. L. R 579. Discussed in Fiona J Kelly, ‘Redfining Parenthood: Gay and Lesbian 
Families in the Family Court - the Case of Re Patrick’ (2002) 16 Australian Journal of Family 
Law 1. 
261 See for example Rosie Harding, ‘(Re)inscribing the Heteronormative Family’ in Robert 
Leckey (ed), After legal equality: family, sex, kinship, 2014; K Arnup and Susan B Boyd, 
‘Familial Disputes? Sperm Donors, Lesbian Mothers and Legal Parenthood’ in D Herman and 
Carl Stychin (eds), Legal Inversions (Temple University Press 1995); Nancy Polikoff, ‘Breaking 
the Link Between Biology and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Semen 
Donors are not Fathers’ (2000) 2 Georgetown Journal of Gender & the Law 57; Nancy Polikoff, 
‘The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is it an Option for Lesbian and 
Heterosexual Mothers?’ (1996) 36 Santa Clara Law review 375; Nancy Polikoff, ‘This Child 
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However, the parenting practices and families that lesbians form are not 
homogenous. While some lesbians wish to form homonuclear families others 
seek to challenge the traditional model of the family. For those lesbians who seek 
to engage in a form of collaborative co-parenting it is the two-parent rather than 
gendered element of the heteronormative legal framework that is problematic. 
Therefore, while some may perceive a legal framework that facilitates the 
involvement of the biological father alongside a lesbian couple as 
heteronormative because it promotes gendered parenting,262 others may 
perceive a legal framework that did not facilitate the involvement of the biological 
father alongside a lesbian couple as heteronormative because it promoted dyadic 
parenting based on conjugality.263  
Given that being dyadic, gendered and resulting from a conjugal relationship are 
each elements of heteronormative parenting, it is difficult to reconcile the different 
challenges to heteronormativity that commentators make based on only one of 
these. Therefore, it is suggested here that a somewhat more nuanced approach 
is required which recognises that legal provisions that are potentially 
heteronormative in one respect may in fact be necessary in order to resist 
heteronormativity in other ways. In doing this, however, it is important to make 
sure that the justifications behind legislative and judicial approaches are in line 
                                            
Does have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-
Mother and Other Nontraditional Families’ (1990) 78 Georgetown Law Journal 459. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Fred A Bernstein, ‘The Child Does Have Two Mothers...And a Sperm Donor with Visitation’ 
(1996) 22 New York University Review of Law & Social Change 1–58; Melanie B Jacobs, ‘Why 
Just Two - Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize 
Multiple Parents’ (2007) 9 Journal of Law & Family Studies 309–340; Leanne Smith, ‘Is Three a 
Crowd: Lesbian Mothers’ Perspectives on Parental Status in Law’ (2006) 18 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 231; McCandless and Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family’ (n 256). 
 
 
105 
with this way of thinking and are not merely disguised versions of 
heteronormativity.264 
The explanatory note to Part Two of the HFEA 2008 indicates one of its purposes 
is to bring the position of female couples ‘into line’ with that of different-sex 
couples through the enactment of legal provisions which are the same or at least 
substantially similar.265 This aim, predicated as it is on the sameness of different-
sex and same-sex couples is not uncontroversial, not least because it fails to 
accommodate potential differences in the types of families the two groups may 
wish to form. 
In some ways, the apparent tension within attempts to resist heteronormative 
conceptions of parenting relates to the long-standing tension, evident in the 
debates around same-sex marriage, between arguing for equality based on the 
sameness and assimilation of same-sex families to heterosexual norms or based 
on difference and resistance to the hegemonic conception of the family. In the 
same-sex marriage debate266 some radical feminist critiques have tried to 
demonstrate that marriage is not an institution that same-sex couples should buy 
into.267 Other commentators have focused on the heteronormative way marriage 
has been characterised rather than the intrinsically flawed nature of marriage as 
an institution.268 Harding, for example, argues in the context of E&W that, ‘[t]he 
parliamentary discourse about procreation as the foundation of marriage is, 
                                            
264 For more on this see page 152. 
265 Explanatory Note, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, C 22 [179] – [180]. 
266 See for example Rosemary Auchmuty, ‘Same-sex Marriage Revived: Feminist Critique and 
Legal Strategy’ (2004) 14 Feminism & Psychology 101 – 126; Rosie Harding, ‘Sir Mark Potter 
and the Protection of the Traditional Family: Why Same-Sex Marriage is (Still) a Feminist Issue’ 
(2007) 15 Feminist Legal Studies 223–34; Nicola Barker, Not the marrying kind : a feminist 
critique of same-sex marriage (Palgrave Macmillan 2012). 
267 Auchmuty (n 263). 
268 Harding, ‘(Re)inscribing the Heteronormative Family’ (n 263). 
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therefore, better read as another means of protecting (heteronormative) marriage 
from the threat of same-sex couples’.269 
Provincial vs. Federal Legislation in Canada 
One of the reasons that Canadian jurisdictions are useful comparators is that, in 
the words of one commentator, ‘Canada is a global leader in the worldwide civil 
rights movement for the equality of same-sex families’.270 However, the legal 
recognition of same-sex families is not uniform throughout Canada, with some 
jurisdictions affording a greater level of recognition than others. Therefore, the 
way that same-sex parenting and parenthood following assisted reproduction is 
regulated in the various Canadian provinces and territories provides an important 
backdrop to a discussion surrounding the possibilities that exist for recognising 
parent-child relationships in collaborative co-parenting situations. Of the thirteen 
provinces and territories, only Quebec,271 Alberta,272 and BC273 have a 
comprehensive framework to establish legal parenthood following assisted 
reproduction. Reforms in other provinces, such as Saskatchewan, have been 
piecemeal and have largely related to birth registration.274 This lacuna would have 
been addressed by the Uniform Child Status Act, which was drafted in 2010 but 
has not been implemented by the individual provinces and territories.275 
                                            
269 Ibid 191. 
270 Joanna Radbord, ‘Same-Sex Parents and the Law’ (2013) 33 Windsor Review of Legal and 
Social Issues 1, 22. 
271 Quebec Civil Code arts 538 – 542. 
272 Alberta Family Law Act s 8.1. 
273 British Columbia Family Law Act, Division 2. 
274 Wanda Wiegers, ‘Assisted Conception and Equality of Familial Status in Parentage Law’ 
(2012) 28 Canadian Journal of Family Law 147, 148. 
275 Civil Law Section of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, ‘Uniform Child Status Act’ 
(2010). 
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As a matter of constitutional law, legal parenthood on birth in Canada is dealt with 
at the provincial rather than federal level.276 The Canadian Federal Government 
attempted to regulate parenthood following assisted reproduction, amongst other 
things, in the 2006 Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA). However, the 
Quebec government successfully challenged the validity of these provisions 
before the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act277 on the basis that they exceeded the federal government’s 
constitutionally circumscribed legislative authority.  
In terms of same-sex parenting through ART, the Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act (AHRA) establishes that ‘persons who seek to undergo assisted reproduction 
procedures must not be discriminated against, including on the basis of their 
sexual orientation or marital status’.278 The provisions of the AHRA would not 
have been an unqualified success in this regard. Same-sex families would have 
been considerably disadvantaged by the restriction on the use of sperm from men 
who have had sex with men, for example.279 In addition to this, the act raises 
questions about the legality of home insemination, a practice which is wide 
spread in the creation of same-sex families.280 
However, what protection AHRA did afford is preferable to the absence of any 
regulation, other than where individual provinces and territories choose to 
legislate. As a result of Quebec’s constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court 
                                            
276 According to Canadian Constitution Act 1987, s 92 (13), property and civil rights fall within 
the purview of the provinces, except marriage and divorce, which, according to s 91(26) fall 
within the federal legislature’s remit. In practice the formalities surrounding marriage are dealt 
with at the provincial level, whereas the capacity to marry is determined at federal level. 
277 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2010 SCC 61. 
278 Assisted Human Reproduction Act S.C. 2004, c. 2, s 2 (e).  
279 Angela Cameron, ‘Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
Case Comment’ (2008) 24 Canadian Journal of Family Law 101, 110. 
280 Fiona Kelly, ‘An Alternative Conception: The Legality of Home Insemination under Canada’s 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act’ (2010) 26 Canadian Journal of Family Law 149. 
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struck out many of the provisions of the AHRA, leaving a lacuna in the regulation 
of assisted reproductive technologies in the majority of provinces apart from 
Quebec. As Cameron and Gruben highlight:  
[t]he best examples are in family law where provinces and territories 
hold clear jurisdiction. For example, while the AHRA protects the 
anonymity of gamete donors, the legal status of the donor remains 
undetermined in most provinces, despite the fact that legal 
parentage falls squarely within their domain.281 
Legal parentage following assisted reproduction has now been addressed 
through legislation in BC, Quebec and Alberta but this is not the case in many 
other provinces, such as Ontario, where ‘the rights and responsibilities of the 
donor vis a vis donor offspring are left undefined’.282 
Parental Projects in Quebec’s Civil Law 
It is worth considering the framework surrounding legal parentage following 
assisted reproduction in Quebec in some depth because it is one of the few 
jurisdictions to have such a legislative framework and it is also where many of the 
legal cases have been decided.283 The civil law jurisdiction of Quebec relies on 
the concept of filiation, which, while being a distinct concept, performs many of 
the functions of legal parenthood in common-law jurisdictions.284 The Quebec 
                                            
281 Angela Cameron and Vanessa Gruben, ‘Quebec’s Constitutional Challenge to the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act: Overlooking Women's Reproductive Autonomy’ in Stephanie 
Patterson and others (eds), Fertile Ground: Exploring Reproduction in Canada (Queen’s 
University Press 2011) 146. 
282 Ibid.  
283 For a more comprehensive discussion of the legal position in Quebec see Leckey Robert, 
“Where the Parents Are of the Same Sex: Quebec's Reforms to Filiation” (2009) 23 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 62; Robert Leckey, “The Practices of Lesbian Mothers 
and Quebec’s Reforms The Practices of Lesbian Mothers and Quebec ’ S Reforms” (2011) 23 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 579; Angela Campbell, “Conceiving Parents Through 
Law” (2007) 21 International Journal of Law , Policy and the Family 242. 
284 For a more detailed discussion of filiation see Robert Leckey, “‘ Where the Parents Are of the 
Same Sex ’: Quebec’s Reforms to Filiation” [2009] International Journal of Law , Policy and the 
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legislature amended Quebec’s Civil Code (CCQ) in 2002 to allow for the 
possibility of recognising two people of the same sex as the parents of a child 
from birth.285 In order for two women to be considered the parents of a child born 
through assisted reproduction, they must have been party to a parental project, 
which ‘exists from the moment a person alone decides or spouses by mutual 
consent decide, in order to have a child, to resort to the genetic material of a 
person who is not party to the parental project’.286 As the section will go on to 
discuss, the term spouse includes de facto spouses who live together. In such a 
situation, only the two women would be the child’s parents and not the biological 
father.287 
Two cases decided since the 2002 amendments to Quebec’s Civil Code are 
particularly relevant. SG v LC concerns three adults (SG, LC and KS) and the 
roles they play in the lives of a child, M. LC and KS are female partners who 
began their relationship in 1999, prior to which LC had dated SG, a man, for a 
year. It is worth highlighting at the outset that a media publication ban has meant 
that there is not an extensive record of the facts of this case. Therefore, it has 
been necessary to rely on the outline of the facts set out in the interim 
judgment.288 Furthermore, this judgment is largely based on the facts as set out 
in the plaintiff (SG)’s affidavit, which was not contested by the defendants (LC, 
KS and M)  
According to SG’s affidavit, in 2000, LC and SG began to talk about the possibility 
of having a child together. Following lengthy discussions and a number of visits 
to a fertility specialist, LC was inseminated with SG’s sperm in October 2002. 
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During this time LC and KS’s relationship continued and they entered into a civil 
union in July 2003. M was born shortly after this. SG asserts that throughout the 
discussions he had with LC, the agreement was that they would both be actively 
involved in the child’s life as mother and father. He contends that KS was, in fact, 
against the idea of having a child and threatened to end her relationship with LC. 
As LC and KS did not file affidavits, there is no basis for challenging SG’s version 
of events, unusual as it may seem. SG now seeks a considerable degree of 
access to M and recognition as M’s father. SG has never lived with M but has 
had regular and consistent contact with M since birth, which had been cut off 
shortly before commencing legal proceedings. Notwithstanding this, LC and KS 
argue that SG has no standing to apply for access to M under article 538.2 CCQ 
as conception did not occur through sexual intercourse. 
The court, in reviewing the applicable legal provisions, reiterated that the relevant 
provisions of Quebec’s civil code relating to filiation (articles 538 – 542) came into 
force in June 2002. As conception occurred in October 2002, these provisions 
consequently govern issues relating to filiation with respect to M. The court 
accepted that where article 538 CCQ applies such that a parental project exists 
between female partners, the birth mother’s spouse would be the second legal 
parent under article 538.2. However, the court emphasised that in order for this 
to be the case, the genetic material (i.e. the sperm) must come from a man who 
is not party to the parental project. In this case, however, the court held that a 
parental project existed between LC and SG, the birth mother and biological 
father, not LC and KS, the birth mother and her spouse who were raising the child 
together and, therefore, article 538 does not apply. This decision did not operate 
to confer legal parenthood on SG, as that matter was the subject of a different 
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application. However, the finding was sufficient to recognise that SG had standing 
to apply for access to M. Given that SG and M had been having regular contact, 
the court awarded interim access to SG, which was to increase over time. 
Some commentators, such as Kelly, have been critical of the court’s approach in 
this case. In particular Kelly finds the idea that SG, rather than KS, was part of 
the parental project ‘baffling’. In support of this, she highlights that ‘[t]he child was 
planned by a lesbian couple and born into a lesbian relationship that was later 
solemnized via a civil union. The two mothers had parented the child from birth 
within their nuclear family’.289 The case is unusual because the version of the 
facts relied on was provided entirely by the plaintiff. However, even this version 
of the facts, which portrays the plaintiff as being heavily involved in the decision 
to conceive the child, does not undermine the important role that KS played in 
M’s life. It is regrettable that the court did not make any attempt to emphasise this 
fact. Instead the court seemed to sympathise with the assertion in SG’s affidavit 
that LC and KS’s attitude to access was ‘totally destructive’ because it was 
‘depriving M’s rights to her father’.290 Kelly characterises the court’s approach as 
highlighting the judge’s ‘refusal to accept that lesbian families, like their 
heterosexual counterparts, are entitled to a degree of family autonomy’.291  
SG v LC illustrates the persistence of heteronormative standards in the legal 
recognition of family life, even when applying legislative provisions that purport to 
recognise same-sex parenting. The case revealed tensions between the weight 
afforded to biological connection and the rights of biological parents and the 
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weight afforded to social parenting and the autonomy of same-sex parenting 
units. In unpicking these issues, it is important not to obscure the vulnerability of 
historically disadvantaged and unrecognised same-sex families. It is also 
important not to underestimate the impact of fathers’ rights discourse in the 
context of post-separation, different-sex parenting and the potential this could 
have for undermining the autonomy of same-sex families. This is not something 
the court took into account, or even seemed to be cognisant of, in reaching its 
decision.  
Despite this, and perhaps because of it, a number of commentators have this 
issue at the forefront of their minds when discussing the case. Cameron, for 
example, notes that ‘Corteau J. relies on a biologically essentialist view of 
procreation in erroneously applying the Civil Code…Courteau J. also leans 
heavily on heteronormative notions of the importance of fatherhood in granting 
S.G. interim access to M, against the wishes of her mothers’.292 This implies that 
the court was more concerned with approximating a heteronormative family form 
than they were with recognising parenting autonomy within a same-sex family 
unit. This is particularly surprising given that the court was interpreting legislative 
provisions that were designed to achieve the latter end.  
Despite the legislative intention to remove the differences between same-sex and 
different-sex couples relating to legal recognition in terms of parenting, it seems 
that differences do persist in the courts’ approach to this issue. As Cameron goes 
on to stress, ‘[h]aving a ‘loving and caring’ third party, no matter how long you 
have known them, allowed unsupervised access to your infant daughter against 
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your wishes is an affront to parental autonomy, and very difficult to imagine in 
cases involving an intact, heterosexual couple’.293 This highlights the tension 
between a legislative framework that attempts to achieve parity between same- 
and different-sex couples and a judicial approach that, seemingly, prioritises the 
claims of biology in the context of same-sex parenting without acknowledging the 
sensitivities involved. 
The 2002 amendments to the filiation provisions of Quebec’s Civil Code are 
progressive in that they allow two female parents, at least in situations involving 
unknown donors, to be recognised as a child’s legal parents. However, cases 
such as SG v LC illustrate that these amendments have created a legal 
framework whereby the interests of biological and social parents in the context of 
same-sex families are allowed to compete over the limited recognition of status. 
As a result of the legislature’s limitation to recognising only two adults as being 
capable of having a parental connection with a child, the courts are forced to 
make a choice between competing claims, leaving some parties more akin to 
legal strangers than parents. As Cameron notes: 
While acrimony between the parties may have prevented a three 
parent family from forming, the law in Quebec would have 
prevented legal recognition of three parents, making S.G.’s bid for 
legal recognition a zero-sum game. Either he or M’s non-biological 
mother could be recognized as parents, not both. 
While allowing for the possibility of recognising that more than two adults may 
form a parental project would not have eliminated the tensions and competing 
claims involved, it may have provided a way for resolving them without 
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undermining existing parenting roles. This is similar to the approach advocated 
by the Ontario court in C (MA) v K (M).294  
The Quebec case of L.O. v S.J.295 raises related issues. The case concerns 
female partners, CH and SJ, who had been living together since early 1996, 
which meant they were de facto spouses. The term de facto spouse is defined in 
the law of Quebec as ‘[t]wo persons of opposite sex or the same sex who live 
together and represent themselves publicly as a couple’.296 Quebec’s 
Interpretation Act provides that ‘the word “spouse” includes a de facto spouse 
unless the context indicates otherwise’.297 Furthermore, the Explanatory Notes 
for the 2002 Act instituting the reforms to the rules of filiation in the Quebec Civil 
Code confirms that ‘the bill extends not only to civil union spouses but also to 
same-sex or traditional de facto spouses…’298 Therefore, as the judge explicitly 
confirmed in L.O. v S.J. ‘the expression spouses as used in article 538 [CCQ] 
includes de facto spouses, whatever their sexual orientation’299 (emphasis in 
original). 
SJ and CH had been talking about having a child for some time and due to the 
lack of sperm banks where they lived, they had travelled to Boston to visit a fertility 
clinic, where SJ unsuccessfully underwent artificial insemination three times. Due 
to the costs involved, they decided to search for a known donor, shortly after 
which LO, a friend of CH offered to be involved. Discussion about this started in 
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late 1998 where SJ and CH made it clear that ‘they would be the parents and 
assume all responsibilities’.300 According to SJ and CH, LO’s only stipulation was 
that he be able to see the child ‘once in a while growing up’.301 However, LO 
argues that he agreed on condition that he was ‘part of the parental project and 
to be allowed to act as a father’.302 Notwithstanding this, insemination occurred 
in 1999 at the home of a mutual friend. In July 1999, SJ informed LO that she 
was pregnant and they signed a written document entitled Sperm Donor, whereby 
LO gave SJ ‘full responsibility in the event of a birth, and she accepted all 
responsibilities and consequences arising from a birth’.303 
In 2000, A was born with SJ registered as her mother and no father recorded. In 
February 2003, after the new filiation provisions of Quebec’s Civil Code had come 
into force in June 2002, CH sought and was granted a declaration to establish 
filiation between her and the child alongside SJ and the child. In March 2003, a 
new birth certificate was issued with both SJ and CH’s names. In May 2003, LO 
wrote to SJ requesting, as the letter put it, ‘visitation rights with my biological 
daughter’.304 According to SJ and CH’s reply, the women felt that ‘since our 
daughter was born, we have allowed you to see her only to meet your needs, not 
those of our child’. SJ and CH, therefore, refused LO’s request in June 2003. In 
September 2003, LO launched court proceedings in an attempt to challenge CH’s 
filiation and establish filiation between himself and A. 
The court found that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that a parental 
project existed between the female partners in 1999 and continues. Although this 
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occurred prior to the coming into force of the amended filiation provisions of the 
Civil Code in 2002, the court held that these provisions have retroactive effect.305 
This conclusion resulted from the court’s interpretation of section 240 of Bill 84 
introducing the amendments, which allows for ‘tardy declarations of filiation in 
respect of a child born of a mutual parental project before the coming into force 
of the new provisions’ and section 239, which states that ‘[a]cts made before the 
date of coming into force of the new provisions shall produce the effects attached 
thereto by the new provisions’.306 Therefore, just as in SG v LC, the courts were 
tasked with applying articles 538 – 542 CCQ. However, unlike the previous case, 
the court’s interpretation of those articles in LO v SJ led to the conclusion that a 
parental project existed between SJ and CH and did not involve LO. 
In reaching this conclusion, the judge was influenced by the evidence that SJ and 
CH were de facto spouses who embarked on the process of finding a donor 
together and that they were the ones to bear the responsibility of being parents. 
The Honourable René Hurtubise notes that: 
[t]he fact they continued this lifestyle lends verisimilitude to and 
corroborates the testimony of the respondents: the evidence 
reveals that they continued to live together…and now have three 
children, all conceived using the same method, but the petitioner 
only contributed to the parental project with respect to 
A…Accordingly, we have no hesitation in finding that a mutual 
parental project involving Ms. J and Ms. H is clearly 
established.307 
Having established this, the court goes one to ‘address the second and third 
conditions, namely that the donor must not be a party to the project and that he 
must knowingly act as an assistant’.308 The court, similarly, have no difficulty 
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dealing with this point on the basis of the testimony of the respondents and the 
existence of the donor agreement. 
Although the court seems to have reached the logical outcome on the basis of 
the evidence, the way it reached this conclusion seems somewhat artificial. It 
appears unnecessary to adopt a two stage approach, as the court did, in firstly 
ascertaining whether a parental project exists between the two women and 
secondly whether the biological father was part of this. This approach implies that 
it would have been possible for a parental project to have existed between all 
three adults. Despite this, as highlighted above, this would not have been 
possible under the law of Quebec.   
On the facts of the case, the court was not faced with this conflict. However, had 
the two stage approach explicated in LO v SJ been applied to SG v LC, it could 
have arguably led to the conclusion that a parental project existed between the 
female partner to which the biological father was party rather than the seemingly 
incongruous conclusion that a parental project existed exclusively between the 
biological father and the birth mother, not including her life partner. When 
analysed in this way, the case law suggests that the limitation to the recognition 
of two legal parents adds to the difficulties faced by these families by setting up 
the interests of the various adults as competing claims when they need not be 
mutually exclusive.  
As Cameron notes, ‘…in the Quebec case discussed above, LO v SG, Justice 
Gaetan Dumas notes that, in part, his decision to sever the non-biological 
mother’s parenting rights was dictated by the fact that it is impossible to have 
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three parents under Quebec law’.309 Kelly also stresses that the clarity of 
Quebec’s legislation combined with the clarity of the facts in this case ‘left the 
court with little choice but to make the decision it did’.310 However, she suggests 
that decisions in favour of access for biological fathers are more likely in ‘common 
law Canada, where no legislation exists to protect planned lesbian families’.311 
What is more, the clear legislative provisions of Quebec’s Civil Code in relation 
to filiation notwithstanding, the court did not rule out granting access to the 
biological father in LO v SJ. Despite the fact that in SG v LC the biological father 
was granted ‘access rights’ on the basis of being able to establish filiation with 
the child resulting from being in a parental project with the birth mother, access 
rights were not foreclosed for the biological father in LO v SJ regardless of the 
fact that he was not party to the parental project. As the Honourable René 
Hurtubise notes:  
…we must point out that this judgment does not dispose of the 
access rights claimed by Mr. O in the final submission of his 
amended motion. This is because access rights are not reserved 
exclusively for those who have filiation with the child. If necessary, 
the Court will decide, taking into consideration the best interests of 
the child.312 
Without prejudging the court’s decision in term of access, the decision gives some 
indication of the court’s leaning, stating that the respondents ‘will perhaps be able 
to reach an accommodation’ to fulfil the petitioner’s wish to see the child grow 
up ‘given the fact that the sperm did not originate from a bank of anonymous 
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donors but was donated by a known individual who did so as a friend’.313 These 
remarks are reminiscent of the position adopted by the Ontario courts in C (MA) 
v K (M) and also the courts of E&W in A v B,314 both of which are discussed 
below,315 that the decision to involve a known donor, particularly as in this case 
knowing that the biological father wished to see the child grow up, may have 
certain consequences when it comes to deciding whether the biological father 
can spend time with the child. 
Furthermore, the court seems to make an implicit link between access and what 
they describe as the ‘”need” to know one’s biological origins’. In the middle of 
their discussion of access for the biological father, the court muses on the future 
possibility for the legislation to erase this need ‘for all children born of a parental 
project involving assisted procreation’.316 By invoking the powerful discourse of 
knowledge of biological origins, the courts risk conflating the issues that are at 
stake. Knowledge of biological origins is an issue that all donor conceived 
children face and there has been considerable discussion of this in the UK and 
elsewhere recently.  
Nordqvist and Smart, in their recent study on donor conception in England and 
Wales, discuss how recent changes in policy and legislation have moved towards 
a greater emphasis on openness about knowledge of biological origins and how 
this has shaped what is considered a ‘proper family’.317 Turkmendag goes further 
than this to stress the genetic essentialism that underpins the way these reform 
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are being linked to personal identity. According to Turkmendag, ‘the decision to 
abolish donor anonymity was strongly influenced by a discourse that asserted 
donor–conceived children’s ‘right to personal identity’…[and] that genealogical 
knowledge is central to the development of personal identity’.318  
Given the purchase this discourse of knowledge of genetic origins has had in a 
number of jurisdictions, it is understandable that the court may wish to make 
reference to it. However, the court does not make explicit the relevance of this to 
the issue of access. Given that access decisions are taken on the basis of the 
best interests of the child, the court would need to be clear about whether its 
reasoning was underpinned by an assumption that contact with a genetic 
progenitor is seen as being in the best interests of the child. If this were the case, 
however, the court would be equating knowledge of genetic origins with ongoing 
relationships with genetic progenitors, which does not seem a necessary 
component of the former. By casually associating knowledge of biological origins 
and access in the context of same-sex parenting without addressing the 
implications of this association, the courts run the risk of being influenced by 
these social policy shifts without being explicit about their legal relevance to 
access disputes.     
The Honourable René Hurtubise’s remark is noteworthy, not only because of the 
way it links knowledge of genetic origin and access but also because of its 
characterisation of the intended effect of the filiation provisions. The effect of the 
filiation provisions is to provide a mechanism for different-sex and same-sex 
couples and individuals which conceive through assisted reproduction to 
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establish filiation with their child. While filiation is an important status, it is not 
immediately apparent how this would erase or indeed affect a child’s arguable 
need to know his or her biological origins. Turkmendag draws the distinction 
between disclosing to children the nature of their conception and somehow 
‘imposing on them that their genetic relatedness to the gamete donor is an 
indispensable component of their personal identity’.319 Similarly, it could be said 
that providing a mechanism for establishing legal parenthood for the people who 
intend to raise a child has a different function than the recognition of biological 
origins. However, the court seems to conflate filiation with knowledge of genetic 
origins in a way that suggests they are competing interests that are mutually 
incompatible.  
This conflation could be seen as understandable in light of Nordqvist and Smart’s 
discussion of how genetics are seen as the cornerstone of identity. They argue 
that identity is presented as a ‘fixed thing or cluster of attributes which are 
inherited through genetic connection but which cannot come to fruition without 
full knowledge of the person(s) from whom the genes derive’.320 On this basis, 
genetic connection could be seen as foundational of families. Therefore, the 
court’s invocation of genetics in the context of access and filiation can be 
interpreted in this light.  
However, this does not fully take into account the importance of other factors in 
relation to family formation. Nordqvist and Smart comment that, ‘[w]e therefore 
suggest that family practices create relatedness’, which provides somewhat of a 
counter-narrative to the genetic essentialism of the importance of genetic 
connection to identity formation. Consequently, this issue is not a straight forward 
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one and not one that can be adequately dealt with in passing. It requires courts 
to explicitly address the complexity of the matter. The way in which the courts 
reconcile these competing interests will be discussed in more detail in the next 
Chapter. 
Filling the Legislative Gap in Ontario  
Ontario was importantly the first jurisdiction in Canada to recognise that it is 
possible for a child to have more than two legal parents, albeit through judicial 
rather than legislative means. The Ontario Children Law Reform Act (CLRA) 1990 
determines the legal parenthood of children. The primary purpose of this statute 
was to remove any difference in the legal treatment of children born within and 
outside wedlock. Therefore, it was not specifically designed with assisted 
reproduction or same-sex parenting in mind. The same was true of Ontario’s 
system of birth registration established by the Vital Statistics Act 1990 (VSA). 
Until 2007, it was only possible under that statute to register one man as a child’s 
father and one woman as a child’s mother. This was challenged in Rutherford v 
Ontario (Deputy Registrar General), where the Ontario Court of Appeal declared 
the VSA’s birth registration scheme to be unconstitutionally discriminatory against 
same-sex parents.321 As a result of this Ontario’s legislature amended the VSA 
to allow two women to be registered as a child’s parents but only if the father is 
unknown and conception occurred through assisted reproduction. 
Registration under the VSA as the parents of a child is presumptive but not 
conclusive proof of legal parenthood. It is, consequently, possible to seek a 
declaration of parentage under the CLRA, which is conclusive proof of legal 
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parentage. As the applicants in Rutherford, a married lesbian couple whose 
children were conceived using anonymous donor sperm, were unable to register 
as the parents of the child under the VSA, they sought a declaration under the 
CLRA. The Court of Appeal held that, while the Act did not specifically allow for 
this, they were able to use their inherent jurisdiction to grant such a declaration. 
A single gay man had also previously successfully obtained a declaration that he 
was the sole parent of a child born through surrogacy, with the surrogate’s 
consent.322 In that case, D (KG) v P (CA), the court held that Ontario’s VSA’s birth 
registration scheme was inadequate because it required the applicant to go to 
court to be registered as a legal parent of the child. The same was true for the 
Rutherford applicants who were required to go to court to obtain a declaration of 
parentage rather than being able to automatically register as the child’s parents. 
This has been remedied to an extent in Ontario by the 2007 legislative 
amendments outlined above. However, as Radford notes, ‘[t]he violation of 
equality rights of lesbian families continues for those who use known donor 
sperm, and for families involving two biological mothers’.323 
These judicial and legislative developments in Ontario reveal important 
distinctions in the treatment of male-led and women-led families when it comes 
to family recognition. The argument that was made in Rutherford and 
subsequently, at least partially, accepted by the legislature was that it is 
discriminatory to require female partners to go to court to register, as the parents 
of their child when different-sex couples are not required to do this. The 
legislature only provided a partial remedy to this by allowing the automatic 
registration on the birth certificate of two female parents provided the sperm 
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donor was unknown. This echoes the way in which the AHRA focuses on 
anonymous sperm donation leaving the situation of known sperm donors 
unregulated. As this section will go on to discuss, other provinces that have 
systematically legislated in relation to assisted reproduction have not made this 
distinction. For example, in Quebec, BC and Alberta, as in England and Wales, it 
is possible for two female partners to register as the legal parents of a child 
regardless of whether the sperm donor is known or unknown. 
However, with the exception of BC, none of these jurisdictions have extended the 
possibility of allowing automatic registration on the birth certificate to male 
couples. The UK HFEA provides a mechanism whereby a male couple can apply 
to the court following birth to obtain a birth certificate listing them as the legal 
parents, as discussed above.324 However, in D (KG) v P (CA), the Ontario 
Superior Court questioned whether it was ‘fair and just that the applicant, and all 
those who may follow him, be subjected to a payment of considerable legal costs 
in order to secure and finalize the very important right of birth registration’.325 The 
question was posed in the context of an application for the costs of a single man 
having to go to court to obtain a birth certificate recognising him as the sole legal 
parent, with the consent of the birth mother.  
In awarding the applicant his costs, the Ontario court seem to have reached a 
more equitable position than the HFEA 2008 does in the UK. Naturally, the 
Ontario court did not have the power to amend the legislation to allow future 
parents in the applicant’s position to register as parents automatically. However, 
by awarding the applicant’s costs, the court signalled that men in the applicant’s 
position should not have to bear the burden of going to court in order to obtain a 
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birth certificate for their child. Not only did the UK legislature affirm the opposite 
position, that a court order is required to become a legal parent in a surrogacy 
situation, it also foreclosed that option to single men by requiring that two 
applicants ‘in an enduring relationship’ apply. This contrasts yet again with the 
position in BC, where the legislature has explicitly provided a mechanism for the 
intended parents to obtain a birth certificate following birth in the context of a 
surrogacy arrangement without having to go to court.326 
The legal recognition of male-led families will be revisited in more detail in 
Chapter Seven.327 For the moment, it is simply worth noting the differing 
approaches to both women-led and male-led families in the different Canadian 
jurisdictions and how this contrasts with the position in England and Wales. These 
differences are understandable because there are different interests at stake in 
relation to known donor arrangements as compared to situations involving 
surrogacy. Although Ontario has not adopted a comprehensive legislative 
position in relation to same-sex families formed through assisted reproduction, 
there has been judicial consideration of a wide range of families, including not 
only women-led and male-led families, as discussed above, but also multiple-
parent families.   
The case of A (A) v B (B)328 provides some insight into how the Ontario Court of 
Appeal has addressed the issue of recognising multiple parents. As discussed 
above, there is no legal framework specifically concerning assisted reproduction 
in Ontario. The legal parenthood of a child is determined by the Children’s Law 
Reform Act (CLRA) 1990. Section 1 of the CLRA provides that ‘…for all purposes 
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of the law of Ontario a person is the child of his or her natural parents…’329 In 
addition to this, section 4 provides that ‘[a]ny person having an interest may apply 
to the court for a declaration that a male person is recognized in law to be the 
father of a child or that a female person is the mother of a child’. In Rutherford v 
Ontario (Deputy Registrar General)330 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held 
that such a declaration could be made in favour of same-sex parents and that 
they should be allowed to be registered as the parents of the child under Ontario’s 
Vital Statistics Act. However, such a declaration would mean that the biological 
father was not recognised as a legal parent. 
In A (A) v B (B), A and C, female partners in a stable, long-term relationship, 
asked their male friend B to help them start a family by biologically fathering a 
child with them. The arrangement was for A and C to be the child’s primary 
caregivers. However, they felt that it would be in the child’s best interests if B 
remained involved in the child’s life. C gave birth to D in 2001, whereupon C and 
B were D’s legal parents under the CLRA. All three adults wished A to have equal 
recognition as a parent alongside B and C. Consequently, A and C did not wish 
to adopt D because that would mean extinguishing B’s parental connection with 
D. Therefore, A sought a declaration under the CLRA that, like B and C, she was 
also one of D’s legal parents. The judge at first instance would have made such 
a declaration but he did not consider he had the power to do so either under the 
CLRA or using the court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction.  
Although the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed the trial judge’s finding that the 
court has no power under the CLRA to declare a child to have more than two 
parents, the court held that a legislative gap existed and the court was, therefore, 
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empowered to use their parens patriae jurisdiction to fill that gap. The Court of 
Appeal found that the original legislation was designed to remove any legal 
effects of illegitimacy and did not seek to address parentage following assisted 
conception. The Court held, therefore, that rather than being deliberate the 
legislative gap was a ‘product of the social conditions and medical knowledge at 
the time’.331 In light of this and the Court’s finding that ‘It is contrary to D’s best 
interests that he is deprived of the legal recognition of the parentage of his 
mothers’,332 the court made a declaration that A was one of D’s legal parents 
alongside B and C. 
This finding is particularly significant because of the central importance the court 
places on the concept of legal parenthood in recognising same-sex parenting. 
Lowe contends that the family unit should enjoy ‘adequate and equal legal 
recognition’ whatever form it takes.333 In the context of gay/lesbian co-parenting 
projects, ‘adequate and equal legal recognition and protection’ means granting 
full parental status to those who all parties intend to be social parents to the child. 
The reason for this is that being considered a parent is an important part of being 
considered a member of the family.334 The court in A (A) v B (B) acknowledged 
this by implying that being considered a parent is not only important in terms of 
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332 [37]. 
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forms of marital or non-marital  partnerships and cohabitation: A Report for the attention of the 
Committee of  Experts on Family Law of the Council of Europe ' (2009) 
<http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/FAMILY/CJ-
FA%20_2008_%205%20E%2025%2009%2009.pdf> accessed 16 August 2015. 
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its legal effects (e.g. the right to inherit) but also its extra-legal effects such as a 
feeling of connection between the social parent and child.335 
A (A) v B (B) can be seen as an affirmation that legal parenthood is considered 
as being that which ‘makes the child a member of a family, generating for that 
child a legal relationship with wider kin going well beyond the parental 
relationship’.336 Therefore, the way in which the law confers legal parenthood is 
significant because this determines whether children and potential parents are 
considered as part of a family unit. As Professor Lowe highlights, ‘children do not 
live in a vacuum, but within a family and an important part of their protection is 
that the family unit, no matter what form it takes, enjoys adequate and equal legal 
recognition and protection. In other words, it is as discriminating to the child to 
limit legal parenthood or to deny significant carers legal right and responsibilities 
as to accord the child a different status and legal rights according to the 
circumstance of their birth or upbringing’.337 This goes to the very heart of family 
law and engages tensions within the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which guarantees the right to marry and found a family338 and a right to private 
and family life339 as well as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Therefore, the status of legal parenthood is not simply about 
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protecting the interests of adults. It extends beyond this and impacts on the rights 
of children, which there is a clear international political mandate to protect.340  
Given the importance of legal parenthood, however, reliance on a court’s inherent 
jurisdiction to recognise the legal parenthood of children is not entirely 
satisfactory. One reason for this is that it is highly discretionary and dependent 
on the factual circumstances of the case. Therefore, this does not provide any 
sense of security for those embarking on creating these types of family that their 
family will be legally recognised. Radford argues that, ‘[a]nother constitutional 
case…is needed to recognize and affirm the realities of all families, rather than 
enforce traditional family forms as privileged’.341 At the very least courts require 
statutory powers to recognise multiple parents, similar to the power the courts in 
England and Wales have to recognise two parents of a child born through 
surrogacy. However, it may be desirable to go even further as BC has done to 
allow multiple parents to be registered on the birth certificate without having to go 
to court. 
The Legal Recognition of Former Partners in Alberta 
One of the most recent cases to consider the legal implications of gay and lesbian 
collaborative conceptions is H (D.W.) v R (D.J.),342 which was decided by the 
Alberta Court of Appeal. Unlike many of the other cases, however, this case did 
not concern a dispute between the adults in a collaborative co-parenting 
arrangement but a dispute between male partners in relation to a child born as a 
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Nations Convention on the Rights of the  Child 1989; Geraldine Van Beuren, ‘Child Rights in 
Europe, Convergence and Divergence  in Judicial Protection’ (Council of Europe 2008). 
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result of a collaborative conception with a female couple. Nevertheless, the case 
raises a number of pertinent issues in relation to the legal recognition of the 
relationships that exist between the adults and children in these arrangements. 
In this case, H and R, a male couple, collaborated with C and D, a female couple, 
to have a child S. The arrangement was that R would provide sperm and D would 
give birth. H and R would then raise the child and R would donate sperm to D 
and S so that they could also raise a child together. S was born in May 2003 and 
was cared for jointly by H and R until they broke up in June 2006. During this time 
D and C enjoyed regular visits. Following H and R’s break up, their relationship 
was marked with conflict. As a result, R and D, the biological parents, entered 
into a parenting agreement declaring themselves to be the legal guardians with 
R being the primary carer. H sought to determine parentage, guardianship and 
custody of S. He also sought a declaration that the legal regime surrounding legal 
parenthood in Alberta infringed his rights as a gay man under the equality 
protection of s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
At this stage it is worth exploring the legal framework around legal parentage in 
Alberta. Alberta’s Family Law Act 2003 was amended in 2010 in order to regulate 
legal parentage following assisted reproduction and surrogacy more thoroughly. 
The previous version of the Family Law Act provided that in situations involving 
assisted reproduction a man is the legal parent of a child if he is in a relationship 
of interdependence with the birth mother or is her spouse and one of the following 
apply: 1) his sperm was used in the assisted reproduction; or 2) he consents in 
advance to being the parent. Otherwise he is not considered to be a legal parent 
and has no rights or responsibilities in relation to the child. Prior to this, the 
situation was regulated by the Domestic Relations Act, which similarly made the 
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legal recognition of the father dependent on his relationship with the mother and, 
therefore, only available to heterosexual couples. 
At first instance, there was some confusion about whether the old Family Law Act 
or the Domestic Relations Act 2000 determined the legal parentage of S. In the 
end, it was decided that the Domestic Relations Act applied but that in any event 
both contravened s. 15 of the Charter. The Chambers of Justice (court of first 
instance) held that requiring gay partners to be satisfied with guardianship, which 
they must apply for, and denying them the status of legal parent has a negative 
effect on human dignity. Therefore, they relied on their inherent parens patriae 
jurisdiction, based on the case of A (A) v B (B),343 discussed above, to fill what 
they saw as a legislative gap whereby parentage by operation of law was not 
available to intended gay male fathers. In doing so, the court of first instance 
declared H to be a legal parent and guardian of S. 
On appeal by R, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld this decision in respect of 
the declaration of incompatibility with the charter. Furthermore, they agreed with 
the court of first instance that an appropriate remedy for this was to exercise the 
court’s inherent jurisdiction to make a declaration of parentage in favour of H, 
which they held to be in S’s best interests. The Court of Appeal was also required 
to address an argument in relation to the incompatibility of recognising more than 
two legal parents with the current legal framework in Alberta. Through some 
creative judicial reasoning, the court was able to side step this issue without 
having to address how such a conflict would be resolved. 
Section 9(7) (b) of Alberta’s current Family Law Act provides that ‘An application 
or declaration [of parentage] may not be made under this section if…the 
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declaration sought would result in the child having more than 2 parents’. Faced 
with such a clear legislative statement it would seem that the Alberta courts are 
foreclosed from exercising the inherent jurisdiction if the effect would be to 
recognise more than two parents. The Alberta Court of Appeal found two potential 
ways of addressing this issue. Firstly, they made it clear than neither the old 
Family Law Act nor the Domestic Relations Act contained such a provision. The 
implication being that as the case was to be determined under the Domestic 
Relations Act, the court was free to recognise more than two parents. Indeed, this 
does seem to have been the effect of the declaration of parentage: under the 
Domestic Relations Act, D was already a legal parent as a result of having given 
birth to S and R was already a legal parent as a result of being registered as 
such.344 
It is noteworthy that the court felt able to recognise three legal parents under the 
previous legal regime but would be unable to do so under the current one. The 
court, however, found that it may not have been necessary to recognise more 
than two legal parents under the current regime. As the majority decision 
explains: 
Under section 8(3) of [the current version of the Family Law Act] Mr. 
R. does not benefit from a presumption of parentage because S. 
was born as a result of assisted reproduction. Under section 8.1(2), 
a male person who contributes reproductive material for an assisted 
reproduction is assumed to be the parent, unless the birth mother 
is a ‘surrogate’.345 
Although the court did not decide whether D was a surrogate they held that if she 
were a surrogate, ‘in order for Mr. R to qualify as a legal parent to S., he would 
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need Ms. D’s consent to an application for a declaration under section 8.2(1) (b) 
as well as the declaration itself.’346 As this had not occurred, the court were of the 
opinion that under the current Family Law Act, D would have been S’s sole legal 
parent when the court made a declaration of parentage in favour of H. 
While this reasoning creatively avoids any conflict between the court’s decision 
and the current legislative framework, it was neither necessary for disposing of 
the case nor, lamentably, helpful in advancing the debate on the possibility of 
recognising more than two legal parents. The court chose not to extend its 
reasoning to its logical conclusion and consider what the position would be under 
the current legal framework if R did subsequently pursue a declaration of 
parentage with the consent of D and H, both of whom would already be 
considered legal parents. In such a situation there would arguably be a strong 
case for recognising R, the primary carer with whom the child lives, as a legal 
parent alongside H, who has a declaration of parentage in his favour, and D, who 
is a legal parent by operation of law. 
Legislative Recognition of Poly-Parenting in British Columbia 
In BC, this issue is regulated by the recently enacted Family Law Act 2013 (FLA 
2013). Prior to this ‘BC was one of the few provinces without a comprehensive 
legal parentage regime’,347 with the matter being addressed in a number of 
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separate statutes.348 FLA 2013 confirms that, similar to the law in E&W, in 
situations not involving assisted reproduction, the child’s birth mother and 
biological father are the child’s legal parents.349 Where the child is conceived 
through assisted reproduction, the law in BC has broader application than the law 
in E&W.  
Whereas the equivalent provisions of the UK HFEA 2008 apply to female couples 
in a civil partnership or those being treated at a licensed fertility clinic, the BC FLA 
2013 applies generally to cases of assisted reproduction, defined as conception 
other than by sexual intercourse.350 In such situations, a donor is not considered 
a legal parent of the child, nor can he be declared such other than under the 
provisions of the statute.351 As in E&W, the child’s birth mother is also one of the 
child’s legal parents in cases of assisted reproduction.352 Unlike in E&W, 
however, the BC FLA 2013 distinguishes neither on the basis of whether the birth 
mother and her partner were in a formalised union nor on the basis of where 
conception takes place. Provided the birth mother’s partner was ‘a person who 
was married to, or in a marriage-like relationship with, the child’s birth mother’ at 
the time of conception and it has not been shown that the he or she did not 
consent to be the child’s parent, he or she will be the child’s legal parent.353 
So far the basic parenthood provisions of the BC FLA 2013 reach a similar result 
as the UK HFEA 2008, albeit that they apply to assisted reproduction generally 
rather than restricting their application in the way HFEA 2008 does. However, the 
FLA 2013 adopts a slightly different approach to parenthood following surrogacy. 
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As described above, the HFEA 2008 empowers the court to make a parental 
order in favour of a commissioning couple between six weeks and six months 
after birth provided one member of the couple is genetically related to the child 
and the birth mother consents. By contrast, the FLA 2013 allows the 
commissioning couple to automatically become the legal parents of the child on 
birth without the involvement of the court, provided the birth mother consents after 
the birth and there is also a pre-conception agreement to that effect.354  
The truly innovative aspect of the FLA 2013 is that it allows three parents to be 
automatically recognised at birth in certain circumstances. Kelly notes that ‘the 
scenario commonly envisaged by the provision – section 30 of the Act – is one in 
which a couple conceives a child with the assistance of a sperm donor or 
surrogate with the shared pre-conception intention that the donor or surrogate be 
the child’s third legal parent’.355 Therefore, s 30 of the FLA 2013 envisages two 
scenarios: one where the intended parent or parents make an agreement with 
the birth mother that they will each be parents; and one where the birth mother, 
her partner, with whom the birth mother is in a marriage or ‘marriage-like 
relationship with’, and a donor agree to parent together.356 In these situations, 
provided there is a pre-conception agreement to the effect that all three intend to 
be the child’s legal parents, each will become a legal parent on birth. 
These provisions of the FLA 2013, therefore, recognise same-sex parenting in a 
similar way to the HFEA 2008 but go further towards recognising the legal 
parenthood of more than two parents in same-sex collaborative parenting 
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arrangements in a way that the HFEA 2008 failed to do. Despite this, it is 
disappointing that the intention appears to have been to limit the number of legal 
parents to three in each of these situations. This would seem to leave same-sex 
parents who co-parent collaboratively as two couples without sufficient legal 
protection. As Kelly notes, ‘…the White Paper explicitly allowed for more than 
three parents via two different arrangements…It is not known why the provisions 
were changed when the FLA was drafted, but the removal of the express 
reference to four legal parents suggests that it was not intended that such a family 
be afforded legal recognition.’ This seems an unwarranted distinction given the 
likelihood that a birth mother’s or biological father’s partner may well want the 
option of being included as a legal parent.   
In addition to setting down who is the legal parent of a child, the FLA 2013 
regulates who is the child’s guardian. In Canada, the notion of guardianship is 
different from that in E&W and is more akin to parental responsibility. According 
to the FLA 2013, ‘[o]nly a guardian may have parental responsibilities and 
parenting time with respect to a child’.357 Ordinarily under the FLA 2013 a child’s 
parent is also the child’s guardian, provided he or she has resided with the 
child.358 The Supreme Court of BC has held that the act creates a ‘default position 
of joint guardianship unless the court orders or the parties agree otherwise’.359 
There are various exceptions to this rule, including when s 30 applies as 
described above. In this situation, each of the legal parents is also the child’s 
guardian.360 The parents and guardians can also all agree that a non-resident 
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parent should be a guardian and a parent who regularly cares for the child is also 
a guardian.361  
Although it is mainly legal parents that can become guardians by agreement, the 
court may appoint someone other than a parent to be a child’s guardian if that is 
in his or her best interests. Boyd and Ledger comment that ‘when it comes to 
appointing parties as guardians, the courts have thus far set a fairly low bar’.362 
Non-parental guardians, for example, are able to apply for guardianship without 
first requiring the leave of the court as is the case in the UK. In terms of how the 
courts respond to applications from parents for guardianship, Boyd and Ledger 
note that ‘[t]o the extent that a parent’s behaviour and access needs to be 
controlled or limited, the courts so far seem to favour doing so by restricting the 
scope of their parenting responsibilities or decision-making authority, rather than 
denying them guardianship’.363 Although the cases that have arisen concern 
post-separation heterosexual parenting, the restriction of parental responsibilities 
in this way is reminiscent of the way the courts have dealt with ‘known donor’ 
disputes in E&W.  
Although there have yet to be any cases dealing with this issue, the statutory 
framework set up in the FLA 2013, therefore, allows that in collaborative co-
parenting arrangements involving three parents, each of the adults can 
automatically be recognised as being the legal parents and having parental 
responsibilities and parenting time with respect to the child. Under the FLA 2013 
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parental responsibilities and parenting time need not be shared equally amongst 
the guardians.364 Therefore, the parents are free to agree amongst themselves 
how decision-making and caring for the child is to be divided. It will be interesting 
to see how the courts in BC will strike the appropriate balance in the division of 
parental responsibilities if they are asked to resolve disputes in relation to same-
sex collaborative co-parenting in the future, as the courts in E&W have done. 
Insights from Practice 
Given that the Family Law Act had only recently come into force at the time of the 
interviews with legal professionals in BC in April 2013, the study canvassed their 
views on the likely success of the reforms. Unsurprisingly, they were quite 
tentative about its likely impact. For example, Belinda, an attorney in BC with 
extensive experience of same-sex family law, commented that: 
Literally too soon to say. Because the only time we’ll know if there 
are problems is if we run into some… However, I suppose another 
answer to your question is that the one reform as it currently exists 
makes no provision for existing multi-parent families. Those 
children are conceived and born already. And that’s unfortunate.365. 
An important point that Belinda picks up on in the view she expresses above is 
that the legislative reforms to do not apply to existing families that might be 
parenting in this way, which is a source of regret. This raises the question of 
whether perhaps legislative reform should include a mechanism for retroactively 
recognising arrangements that existed prior to the enactment of the new 
legislation. Such a provision existed in Quebec when it became possible in 2002 
for two women to register as the parents of a child and create a parental project. 
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This was achieved through the introduction of a transitional period following the 
constitutional amendments in Quebec, whereby existing women-led families 
could register as the parents of the child and parties to a parental project. 
It is worth noting, as will be developed in Chapter Six, that none of the Canadian 
participants in this study, all of whom were in fact from BC, were involved in full 
poly-parenting. The Canadian families that were interviewed were closer to an 
involved donor type situation on the collaborative co-parenting spectrum, 
identified earlier in this chapter. This stands in contrast to the participants in E&W, 
the majority of which were engaged in or planning to engage in a parenting 
arrangement that was closer to full poly-parenting. This is ironic given that BC is 
now the only jurisdiction to legislatively recognise these families. It is difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions from this. The simplest explanation is perhaps that 
participant recruitment in Canada went through more formalised, legal channels, 
as Chapter Two explains more fully, whereas participant recruitment in the UK 
benefited from a more wide-ranging parenting conference that happened to be 
running at the time. However it may also be the case that these families are less 
visible in Canada than they are in the UK, with a number of UK-based social 
media networks for these families. 
In addition to the fact that poly-parenting families in BC were less accessible as 
research participants in this study as they were in the UK, it also seems to be the 
case that legal professionals in BC working in this field had considerably less 
experience with LGBTQ poly-parenting families than those in Ontario. In fact, 
none of the four legal professionals from BC interviewed, each of whom had an 
extensive same-sex family law practice, had much experience with full poly-
parenting situations. They had much more experience with situations akin to an 
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involved known donor who was not being treated as a third parent. Belinda noted 
that ‘I don't have very much experience with that, and the reason is that there 
was no legal framework that would give substance to a multi-parent 
arrangement’. This suggests that poly-parenting families in BC may have had 
little desire to seek legal advice because they were not recognised by the legal 
framework.  
However, a number of legal professionals interviewed felt that such families did 
exist in BC and would gradually become more visible following the legal reforms. 
David reported a similar experience as Belinda commenting that: 
I haven’t had the family where they come in as a threesome, the 
two women and the guy, saying, “We are thinking of having a family. 
We consider ourselves all really close even though we don’t have 
sex. We are, like, best friends.” And started from that. So I know 
that those people exist, but they are not my clients. 
Zabrina has had a similar experience but also adds in the context of BC ‘I think it 
will happen. I think more and more’. Therefore, although BC is now the most 
progressive jurisdiction in terms of legislatively recognising LGBTQ poly-
parenting there is not a body of experience amongst legal professionals and the 
court of dealing with these families. 
This contrasts with the position in Ontario where LGBTQ poly-parenting has been 
visible since the 2007 case of A (A) v B (B), discussed above, which concerned 
a female couple and their gay male friend, each of whom wanted all three to be 
recognised as legal parents. Unsurprisingly, legal professionals who specialise in 
this area in Ontario have more experience dealing with poly-parenting families. 
Kerry, an attorney in Ontario with extensive experience of same-sex parenting 
disputes, comments that:  
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I’ve come across many such arrangements in both the pre… the 
family building part of the relationship, but also, of course, I am a 
family lawyer, what happens when these relationships break 
down…I’m not talking about same-sex parents only, I’m not talking 
about, like, a lesbian or a gay couple, but I mean a poly-parenting 
situation…And I have multiple of them going on at any one time. 
Yeah, I have a lot of experience doing these types of cases. 
This experience contrasts quite starkly with the experience of legal professionals 
in BC. It does not appear to be a coincidence that there is increased visibility of 
poly-parenting families in Ontario as compared to BC considering that these 
families were judicially recognised for six year in Ontario before the legislatively 
recognition came into force in BC. Therefore, it will be interesting to see how the 
practice of legal professionals involved in same-sex parenting disputes in BC 
changes as a result of the legislative reforms.   
While the lack of visibility of poly-parenting families in BC may be partly due to 
the lack of legal recognition of these families until recently, geographical location 
can also play a big part. Although Vancouver in BC has a well-developed LGBTQ 
community the city and province are not very densely populated compared to say 
Toronto in Ontario. Given that the legal professionals that were interviewed in 
Ontario each worked in and around Toronto, this may in part account for why they 
had more experience with a wider range of LGBTQ collaborative co-parenting 
families. Similarly, the legal professionals interviewed in the UK each worked in 
and around London and a number of them also reported experience with a 
diverse range of families. For example, Naomi, a solicitor in E&W specialising in 
fertility law reports having dealt with ‘the whole spectrum’ of LGBTQ collaborative 
co-parenting families ranging from known donor arrangements to full co-
parenting. The impact of the geographical locality on the visibility of poly-
parenting families, while something to bear in mind when considering the 
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empirical data, is beyond the scope of this thesis but would form the basis of an 
interesting follow-up study.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered a range of approaches to the issue of collaborative 
co-parenting adopted in various Canadian provinces and contrasted this with 
the approach in E&W. At one end of the spectrum, there are provinces, such as 
Ontario and Alberta, which have not legislatively addressed this issue. This has 
meant that the courts have had to step in to address the legislative gap. While a 
desirable outcome may have been achieved in this way, failure to legislate and 
a consequent lack of legislation addressing the needs of collaborative co-
parenting families has a negative symbolic impact around the wider recognition 
of collaborative families as well as creating greater legal uncertainty in that 
situation.  
This can be contrasted with a province like Quebec, which adopted a 
progressive legislative stance to same-sex parenting early on, which may have 
been somewhat undermined by the subsequent judicial application of that 
legislative framework. Quebec and E&W both have the limitation to two parents 
in common. However, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the courts in 
E&W have attempted to reduce the impact of this restriction unlike the courts in 
Quebec. 
Perhaps the most promising comparison in terms of a potential law reform 
model is the approach that has been taken in BC, which legislatively recognises 
more than two parents in a collaborative co-parenting situation. This option was 
not even mooted during the law reform process in E&W leading to the Human 
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Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, largely because it was too complicated 
an issue and thought to lie outside the remit of the reform.  
It is too early to comment on how well BC’s reforms are working in practice and 
it will likely be some time before disputes surrounding this legislation come to 
court. Furthermore, these reforms are not wholly unproblematic in terms of their 
seemingly arbitrary limit in the number of parents recognised. The way that pre-
conception intentions are automatically enforced may also be problematic in the 
context of the courts discretion in terms of child welfare.366 Nevertheless, BC’s 
legislative model recognising multiple parents in collaborative co-parenting 
situations is a good exemplar (or at least source of inspiration) of a potentially 
workable option for law reform in E&W.       
                                            
366 This issue is discussed further in Chapter Five. 
 
 
144 
Chapter Four: Normativity and 
Vulnerability – Judicial Resolution of 
Collaborative Co-Parenting 
Disputes  
Introduction 
This chapter considers how the courts in E&W and various Canadian jurisdictions 
reconcile the competing claims to legal parenthood and parental responsibility 
that exist in collaborative co-parenting situations. In particular the way in which 
the courts in E&W prioritise the protection of the homonuclear family at the 
expense of recognising collaborative co-parenting arrangements will be 
examined. This chapter suggests that, in doing this, the courts pay insufficient 
attention to the relational aspects of child welfare,367 and in particular the 
psychological utility of legal recognition in relation to gay fathers. Consequently 
the law often does not manage to strike a fair balance between the competing 
interests of those involved with the result that appropriate legal recognition is 
denied to one or more of the potential parents, which tends to have a detrimental 
impact on the legal position of gay fathers. 
                                            
367 For more on this see Jonathan Herring and Charles Foster, ‘Welfare Means Relationality, 
Virtue and Altruism’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 480. 
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The desire to be a parent is widely felt and it can intuitively be understood that, 
for those who experience it, it seems like an intrinsic part of who they are as a 
person. While parental responsibility is undoubtedly of practical importance in 
terms of the ability to care for a child, legal parenthood plays a significant 
psychological role by recognising the parent and child as part of each other’s 
family. What is more, the relative weight of intention and biology as determining 
legal parenthood has been extensively discussed in E&W and other 
jurisdictions,368 in what is a long-standing discussion in family law about who 
should be considered a legal parent.369 Although other authors have discussed 
this in the context of assisted reproduction and same-sex parenting generally,370 
this chapter will explore these issues in relation to collaborative co-parenting. 
Characterising the (Collaborative Co-Parenting?) Cases 
Having discussed the pertinent legislative framework that operates in E&W and 
various Canadian jurisdictions in the previous chapter, this section will discuss a, 
still relatively small, body of case law that has built up in recent years, which is 
relevant to the study’s first research question of how the legal framework 
accommodates the procreative autonomy of gay men and lesbians engaging in 
or considering collaborative co-parenting arrangements. The courts in E&W 
                                            
368 See for example Gillian Douglas, ‘The Intention to be a Parent and the Making of Mothers’ 
(1994) 57 Modern Law Review 636–641; John Lawrence Hill, ‘What Does It Mean to Be a 
Parent--The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights’ (1991) 66 New York University 
Law Review 353; Marjorie Maguire Shultz, ‘Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality’ [1990] Wisconsin Law Review 297–398. 
369 See Andrew Bainham, Shelly Day Sclater and Martin Richards, What Is a Parent? A Socio-
Legal Analysis (Hart 1999) for a multi-disxiplinary analysis from a number of different 
substantive perspectives. 
370 See for example  Jeanette Edwards, Sarah Franklin, Eric Hirsch, Frances Price, and Marilyn 
Strathern, Technologies of Procreation: Kinship in the age of assisted conception (Mancheser 
University Press 1993); Caroline Jones, ‘Parents in Law: Subjective Impacts and Status 
Implications around the Use of Licensed Donor Insemination’ in Alison Diduck and Katherine 
O’Donovan (eds), Feminist perspectives on family law (Routledge-Cavendish 2006); G A 
Dunne, ‘Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries and Transforming the 
Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship’ (2000) 14 Gender & Society 11. 
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invariably become involved in deciding how collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements should be recognised at the stage where there is a dispute 
between the adults. As a result of this, the courts in this jurisdiction have not 
typically been asked to recognise collaborative co-parenting arrangements with 
the consent of all parties as they have, for example, in Ontario. Therefore, the 
starting point of this analysis is how the courts resolve disputes between female 
couples and gay fathers who collaborate to conceive a child but subsequently 
disagree about their respective roles in the child’s life. It is important to recognise 
that the majority of these cases concern children born prior to the reforms 
instituted by the HFEA 2008. Therefore, these cases will be considered on the 
basis of the legal framework that existed at the time but also bearing in mind the 
effect the subsequent amendments would have.   
The cases discussed in this section relate to situations that might arguably be 
characterised as collaborative co-parenting arrangements, although this will have 
inevitably been contested by one of the parties. The characterisation of these 
cases as potentially involving collaborative co-parenting arrangements is a 
preliminary issue that is worth highlighting at this stage before considering the 
case law in any depth. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, an 
arrangement whereby a single or partnered lesbian conceives a child (normally 
not through sexual intercourse) with a single or partnered gay man and they co-
parent that child (along with their partners if they are not single) typifies this 
study’s conception of collaborative co-parenting. However, there are certain 
parenting practices within same-sex families, evident in, what is commonly 
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referred to as, the known donor cases371 discussed in this section, which may 
approximate this model but also differ from it in certain key respects.  
Consequently, a central issue raised in each of these cases is whether it concerns 
a collaborative co-parenting family, a homonuclear family or a sui generis family 
that lies somewhere in between. This is the subtext of what the parties are 
arguing about in each of these cases. Therefore, it is important to ascertain to 
what extent these distinctions are important or relevant and what, if any, legal 
consequences this should have.   
The vast majority of relevant cases that have come before the courts, and 
therefore each of the cases that this section will consider, concerns a female 
couple that wishes to have a child to whom one of the partners has given birth. 
That element of these cases is never in dispute. However, the desires and 
intentions of the single men and male couples when entering into these 
arrangements is difficult to ascertain from the reported case law as there is 
invariably a lack of agreement between the parties. As a result, it is difficult to 
know what type of family the courts are dealing with.  
In addition to this, it is difficult to ascertain what legal weight the courts attach to 
the different factual circumstances of the case because the courts are not always 
clear whether the outcome is influenced by a particular finding in fact , or whether 
the courts are applying some sort of general principle despite specific factual 
difference. What is more, the cases on this issue involve adults, which already 
have a range of legal relationships with the child and seek a range of legal 
remedies. In the majority of the cases, conception occurred prior to the coming 
                                            
371 See for example Leanne Smith, ‘Tangling the Web of Legal Parenthood: Legal Responses to 
the Use of Known Donors in Lesbian Parenting Arrangements’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 355. 
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into force of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. Therefore, the 
birth mother and biological father are considered the legal parents, with the 
former invariably having parental responsibility for the child and the latter often 
having parental responsibility as a result of being registered on the birth 
certificate.  
These cases were being decided within a legislative framework that did not 
specifically contemplate the family forms that are involved and arguably the HFEA 
2008 reforms did little to change this. Therefore, the way the courts interpret and 
apply the legislative framework of the Children Act 1989 in resolving these 
disputes remains instructive not only from the point of view of judicial willingness 
to accommodate the needs of collaborative co-parenting families but also in terms 
of the limitations of the legislative framework itself, which can be assessed in light 
of subsequent amendments. 
A number of common themes are present in these female parenting known donor 
cases discussed below, which are highly relevant to a consideration of the legal 
response to gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting. Issues relating to the 
legal weight attached to pre-conception intentions and post-birth parenting reality 
emerge as significant alongside the importance of genetics, caregiving and the 
possession of parental responsibility/legal parenthood. Nevertheless, the cases 
can be broadly separated into three categories. Firstly there are the cases 
involving disputes around both parental responsibility and contact. These include 
the High Court cases of Re D,372 Re B,373 R v E and F374 and the Court of Appeal 
case of T v T. It will become evident that the courts do not always adopt a 
                                            
372 Re D [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam). 
373 Re B (Role of Biological Father) [2007] EWHC 1952 (Fam). 
374 R v E and F (Female Parents: Known Father) [2010] EWHC EWHC 417 (Fam). 
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consistent approach to the use of parental responsibility in relation to these 
families. Secondly, there are the cases primarily concerning contact, which 
include the High Court cases ML v RW, P & L (Minors) and the Court of Appeal 
case A v B. Here the courts seem to strike a more consistent line in relation to 
contact. Finally, there is the case of Re G; Re Z, which is an application for leave 
to apply to the court for contact and residence orders and is the only case so far 
to be decided under the framework established by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008. The remainder of this section will outline how these issues 
have been addressed by the courts in E&W, which will form the basis of a more 
theoretically-informed discussion of the courts’ approach in a number of 
jurisdictions in Chapter Four.   
In these cases where the biological father does not have parental responsibility 
he may be seeking this, under the Children Act 1989, by way of, what was at the 
time, a joint residence order and he would also be seeking a contact order. The 
courts would now deal with these issues by way of a child arrangements order.375 
In some of these cases, the mother’s female partner may already have parental 
responsibility pursuant to a parental responsibility agreement with the mother376 
and in other cases the mother’s partner may be seeking to acquire this by way of 
a shared residence order. Each of these scenarios has different legal 
implications, which will be explored more fully when discussing the relevant 
cases. While this discussion may seem somewhat abstract at this stage, it is 
worth bearing in mind, and will hopefully become more concrete, through the 
subsequent analysis of the case law. 
                                            
375 See s. 8 Children Act 1989 as amended by the Children and Families Act 2014. 
376 Children Act 1989, s 4A. 
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The courts have been very reluctant to lay down general guidance for these sorts 
of cases, arguing that they are so fact specific that it would be impossible to 
decide them on the basis of general rules. While the best interests of the children 
remain the courts’ paramount concern there is room for judicial discretion as to 
which outcome best serves these interests.377 As Zanghellini comments: 
The welfare standard is sufficiently amorphous that, when applied 
free of heteronormative preconceptions about what constitutes 
ideal parenthood and ideal parenting configurations, it will rarely 
dictate one single outcome, rather than suggesting a range of 
possible outcomes equally compatible with the child’s best 
interest.378  
In some cases the courts have been explicit about the sufficiency of same-sex 
parenting and their desire to protect the same-sex nuclear (or homonuclear)379 
family.380 However, in other cases the way the courts have disposed of the 
applications suggest that they are considerably influenced by the biological 
connection between father and child per se.381  
Legal professionals in E&W have highlighted this inconsistency in how what is in 
the best interests of the child is determined and the difficulty this can cause in 
advising clients about the likely legal outcome. Lizzie, a solicitor in E&W, 
comments that: 
You've got one couple's word against another or one party's word 
against another and you've got two very different dialogues going 
on - one perception and one story from one side and a very different 
story and dialogue from another and how do you reach a middle 
                                            
377 See for example Helen Reece, ‘The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus or Construct?’ 
[1996] Current Legal Problems 267. 
378 Aleardo Zanghellini, ‘A v B and C [ 2012 ] EWCA Civ 285’ (2012) 24 Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 475, 480 
379 This term is used in the Australian case of Re Patrick (An Application Concerning Contact) 
(2002) 28 Fam LR 579. For a discussion of this case see Fiona Kelly, ‘Redefining Parenthood : 
Gay and Lesbian Families in the Family Court — the Case of Re Patrick’ (2002) 16 Australian 
Journal of Family Law 1. 
380 See for example the discussion below of A v B and C at page 210. 
381 See for example the discussion below of Re B at page 163.  
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ground on that and that and that's what the courts are finding and 
the courts will say well we're looking at the best interests of the child 
but is the best interests of the child to work with say the lesbian 
couple and to give them the legal status and to make the donor or 
quasi-donor just that or is it to try and reach a more nuanced 
agreement.382 
This seems a fairly accurate characterisation of how child welfare has 
emerged in the case law as an indeterminate standard that does not in fact 
call for a particular outcome in the case.     
An analysis of the case law reveals that the courts’ struggle to reconcile the 
various parental claims in these families with what is in the best interests of the 
child. The pattern that has emerged is that the courts have aligned child welfare 
with the protection of the lesbian homonuclear family as the child’s central family 
with the duty and privilege of raising the child. However, child welfare does not 
definitively determine the outcome in favour of the homonuclear family in all cases 
but suggests a number of different outcomes that are consistent with the best 
interests of the child, as discussed above.383 As John Eekelaar has suggested 
‘the very ease of the welfare test encourages a laziness and unwillingness to pay 
proper attention to all the interests that are at stake in these decisions’.384 I argue, 
therefore, that by interpreting child welfare in this way, the courts are paying 
insufficient attention to the psychological utility of legal recognition in relation to 
gay fathers.  
In respect of legal parenthood, the courts are constrained by a restrictive 
legislative framework that affords no discretion over who to recognise as legal 
                                            
382 UKPB9LG. 
383 See page 150. 
384 John Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 14(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 
237 – 249.  
 
 
152 
parents. Therefore, in some respects, the courts may be trying to achieve through 
parental responsibility, in relation to which they do have discretion, an outcome 
that might be better reached through a more flexible approach to legal 
parenthood.385 In making decisions about PR, whether through a PR order or a 
child arrangements order, the courts are required to the child’s welfare as the 
paramount consideration.386 This may be understandable with regards to parental 
responsibility, which, at least in theory, concerns the practical decision-making 
powers in relation to a child’s upbringing. However, the best interests of the child 
does not necessarily need to take the same precedence in relation to legal 
parenthood and does not explicitly do so in the legislative framework.387 
Therefore, the ubiquitous best interests standard is being invoked in these cases, 
as it must in disputes over parental responsibility, but somewhat unnecessarily to 
the extent that the dispute is around status than parental responsibility, properly 
so-called.     
The Various Manifestations of Heteronormativity 
A number of commentators have suggested that the law relating to parenthood 
and parenting promotes an inherently heteronormative model of the family.388 
This implies that law is, if not entirely resistant to, not wholeheartedly accepting 
of the multiplicity of gay and lesbian families. The legislative and judicial approach 
                                            
385 For more on this see Craig Lind and Tom Hewitt, ‘Law and the Complexities of Parenting: 
Parental Status and Parental Function’ (2009) 31 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 
391. 
386 Children Act 1989, s1. 
387 See Emily Jackson, ‘Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 65 
Modern Law Review 176.  
388 See for example Rosie Harding, ‘(Re)inscribing the Heteronormative Family’ in Robert 
Leckey (ed), After legal equality: family, sex, kinship, 2014; Julie Wallbank, ‘Channelling the 
Messiness of Diverse Family Lives: Resisting the Calls to Order and De-Centring the Hetero-
Normative Family’ (2010) 32 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 353; Julie McCandless 
and Sally Sheldon, “The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (2008) and the Tenacity of the 
Sexual Family” (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 175. 
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to collaborative co-parenting has been criticised for adopting a heteronormative 
approach, rather than affording appropriate legal recognition to these families in 
a number of different ways. However, in commenting on the way the law reflects 
heteronormative conceptions of parenthood in relation to collaborative co-
parenting, many of these critiques do not address the vulnerability of the gay men 
in these arrangements who want to become parents. Instead, much of the 
commentary focuses on the vulnerability and protection of the lesbian parents. 
Furthermore, the female couples in these cases often seek to highlight the 
vulnerability of lesbian families and their need for protection. This is an argument 
that the judiciary has been particularly receptive to in the reasoning that supports 
their decisions, whether or not the outcome of the cases is ultimately seen as 
supporting lesbian parenting. In one of the earliest ‘known donor’ cases in E&W 
Lady Justice Black (as she then was) held that ‘particular care must be taken to 
protect the couple’s relationship from undue stress at what was still an early stage 
in the formation of their family’.389 At a subsequent hearing the same judge 
reinforced how mindful she is of the difficulties lesbian families face, noting that: 
  …it may be more difficult for them than for heterosexual couples 
to establish themselves as a family, as the family which is providing 
the primary parenting for D. This difficulty may be in establishing 
their status to outsiders who they meet day to day in their lives, but 
there will also be work to be done with regard to Mr B's perception 
of them as a family and I think with regard to D's too.390 
Lady Justice Black adopted a similar position in the later case of R v D and E, 
which similarly concerned a known donor and is discussed more fully below. In 
that case the judge was heavily influenced by expert psychiatric evidence which 
                                            
389 Re M (Sperm Donor A Father) [2001] Family Law 94. 
390 Re D [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam) [9]. This case is discussed in more detail at page 202.  
 
 
154 
indicated that, ‘[the child’s] needs, which were all important, was to belong…to a 
nuclear family. That would provide security for [the child], and clarity for what was 
in [the child’s] best interests’.391 
It is understandable why the vulnerability and protection of lesbian parents is a 
central feature of these cases. Empirical research suggests that a considerable 
number of lesbian parents engage in collaborative conception with a man who is 
known to them, as opposed to an unknown donor, for a variety of reasons.392 
Until recently, the bulk of legal and academic discourse on same-sex parenting 
focused on the experiences of lesbian parenting.393 Therefore, collaborative co-
parenting has largely been viewed as a means for lesbians to have children. 
Having outlined some of the key themes and controversies that run throughout 
the case law, the first case this section will consider in detail is Re G (A Minor) 
and Re Z (A Minor).394 Harding draws on this case in an attempt to demonstrate 
that ‘the implicit heteronormativity of the family survive[s] in 
contemporary…judicial discourse.’ Furthermore, she characterises the case as 
‘the reinscription of heteronormative understandings of family into a situation 
where the children in question were legally fatherless’.395 Re G; Re Z concerns 
distinct but related applications by two men for leave to apply for orders under s. 
8 of the Children Act 1989 (i.e. residence and/or contact orders as they then 
were). In each of the men's cases, a child was conceived using their sperm and 
                                            
391 R v E and F (Female Parents: Known Father) (n 368) [88]. This case is discussed in more 
detail at page 168. 
392 Dunne, ‘Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries and Transforming the 
Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship’ (n 364); Leanne Smith, ‘Is Three a Crowd: Lesbian 
Mothers’ Perspectives on Parental Status in Law’ (2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 
231; Fiona J Kelly, Transforming law’s family the legal recognition of planned lesbian 
motherhood (UBC Press 2011).  
393 Ibid. 
394 Re G ( A Minor ); Re Z ( A Minor ) [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam). 
395 Harding, ‘(Re)inscribing the Heteronormative Family’ (n 380) 186. 
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was born to a woman in a civil partnership. Since the adoption of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, the civil partners, and not the biological 
father, are the legal parents. As a result, the biological father would not be 'entitled 
to apply for a section 8 order’ with respect to the child'.396 Instead, he would have 
to 'obtain 'the leave of the court to make the application'.397 This case, therefore, 
turned on whether the men should be granted leave to apply for such orders 
rather than on whether such orders should actually be granted. 
The facts of the two cases are somewhat separate but linked. D and E, two 
females in a long-term relationship who subsequently became civil-partners, 
approached a male couple with whom they were friendly (S and T), who were 
also in a long-term relationship and subsequently became civil-partners, with 
whom they were friendly about having a child. S agreed to be the biological father 
and E would be the biological mother. In December 2008, shortly after D and E's 
civil partnership, F was born as a result of home insemination. At this stage the 
2008 reforms had not come into force and, therefore, S would be considered as 
one of F's legal parents and would, as a result, have an automatic right to apply 
to the court for a s. 8 order. Following F's birth, there seems to have been regular 
contact between S and F, although the frequency and quality of that contact is 
disputed. About a year after F's birth, E became pregnant again following home 
insemination using S’s sperm and subsequently gave birth to G.  
At the same time that E was pregnant with F, T provided sperm for X and Y (who 
were friends of D and E) and X subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to 
Z. Following birth, there was a high degree of contact between T and Z. As G and 
Z were born to women in a civil partnership, following the coming into force of the 
                                            
396 As required by Children Act 1989 s.10 (2) (a). 
397 Ibid. s. 10 (2) (b). 
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2008 act, S applied for leave to apply for a contact and residence order in respect 
of G, and T applied for leave to apply for a contact order in respect of Z. In 
granting leave to apply for the contact orders (but not a residence order), the 
judge held that biological fathers in the applicants’ position should not 
automatically be denied leave to apply for a s.8 order and that under the facts of 
this case a relationship was allowed to develop between the biological fathers 
and the children that suggests they should be granted leave to apply for a contact 
order. 
Returning to Harding’s comment above that the case represents ‘the reinscription 
of heteronormative understandings of family into a situation where the children in 
question were legally fatherless’, this is not immediately apparent from the 
outcome of the case. The effect of the decision was not, in fact, to make any 
orders relating to the biological fathers’ relationships with the children but to grant 
them the opportunity to make their case in court just as any other adult with a 
close relationship with the child (such as a grandparent might). As Baker J noted:  
…no other person is absolutely excluded from seeking redress 
and…biological fathers who are deprived of legal parenthood by the 
2008 Act should be treated no differently. Had parliament intended 
that a person in a position of the applicants in this case should be 
entirely stripped of legal remedies, it would have expressly provided 
that a person in the position of S and T in these circumstances 
would be disqualified even from seeking the court’s leave.398 
Furthermore, Baker J makes it clear that granting leave to apply is more about 
providing the biological fathers with access to justice than a sense that the 
substantive case will or should succeed. He stresses that ‘it is well established 
that the granting of leave under s.10 (9) does not create a presumption in favour 
                                            
398 Re G ( A Minor ); Re Z ( A Minor ) (n 386) [119]. 
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of a substantive order’.399 In his conclusion he further emphasises this point, 
perhaps even indicating that their chances of success are slimmer than the 
biological fathers may anticipate: 
‘I make it clear, however, that it does not follow that any substantive 
order for contact will be made in either case. Furthermore, if contact 
is ordered, it may well be significantly less frequent than the 
applicants are seeking’.400 
However, Harding’s criticisms are not primarily aimed at the outcome of the case 
but the use of language in the judgement. Harding cites the judge’s use of 
‘biological father’ to refer to the applicant rather than the respondents’ preferred 
term of ‘known donor’ in support of her argument. In Harding’s submission: 
‘By referring to the men as ‘biological fathers’, Baker J is drawing 
the discursive power of ‘father’ on to their side of the dispute. 
Other commentators have made the link between reference to biological father in 
Re G; Re Z and the promotion of heteronormative understandings of the family. 
Brown, for example, notes that ‘[Baker J’s] chosen language suggests that the 
judgment is underpinned by assumptions and ideals that promote the traditional, 
heterosexual, ‘nuclear family’ model’.401 
However, Harding’s and Brown’s criticism of the judgment for referring to the 
biological father, supposedly as a way of reasserting the heteronormative family 
model, needs to be interpreted in light of the specific context in which these 
comments were made. Had the case concerned a female couple that had 
adopted a child or had conceived with the sperm of an unknown donor, it would 
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401 Alan Brown, ‘Re G; Re Z (Children: Sperm Donors: Leave to Apply for Children Act Orders): 
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have been a very different scenario. In those situations, it is unlikely the father 
would make any sort of parental claim and in the latter situation would not even 
know the child existed. It is also unlikely that the court would contemplate allowing 
such a claim. Therefore, it seems that any underlying normative assumptions 
(such as right to knowledge of biological origins) would be applied in a similar 
way to a same-sex couple as to a different-sex couple without any suggestion 
that a heteronormative bias would result in different treatment.        
Both Harding and Brown are constructing the dispute in Re G; Re Z as one where 
a female couple seek to have a child through the involvement of a sperm donor 
that is known to them in order to facilitate their aims. This would suggest in their 
eyes that from a legal point of view there is little to distinguish this situation from 
one where there is a sperm donor that is not known to the couple. However, even 
if one did not accept that heteronormative ideas of the family did not seem to 
have a detrimental impact on the recognition of lesbian families created through 
unknown sperm donation, there is a strong case to suggest that the reproductive 
involvement of a man who is known to the family creates a different set of 
considerations that may need to be judged differently from unknown donation. 
Therefore, the way Baker J uses the term ‘biological father’ may not be as 
straightforwardly heteronormative as it might have been had the case involved 
conception with an unknown donor.402  
On a related note, Brown criticises Baker J’s statement that ‘alternative family 
forms without fathers are sufficient to meet a child’s need’.403 He contends that 
                                            
402 For more on the effect of the language used to describe biological fathers in these families 
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the use of the word ‘sufficient’ reflects ‘the implicit assumption that children 
ordinarily benefit from having a relationship with their “biological father”’404 
because the statement suggests that same-sex families are merely adequate but 
less than the ideal. The suggestion that law has a tendency to view lesbian 
families as not complete is a valid one and has been reinforced by arguments 
made by other commentators.405 However, in this specific context it may be a less 
than generous interpretation of the judge’s comments especially as they draw on 
arguments that counsel for the respondents made in their submissions.406  
In some senses, these comments go beyond the literal meaning of what judges 
say in a particular case. They may be an attempt to second guess what meaning 
a judge has in his or her own contemplation when making particular remarks or 
an attempt to expose hidden assumptions or biases that may be operating. 
Therefore, the judgments in these cases can be read in a number of different 
ways. These deeper critiques about the role of language in these cases is almost 
an attempt to read between the lines, which may or may not reflect the judge’s 
actual approach but which is, nonetheless, a plausible, if not very generous, 
interpretation. This almost deconstructionist approach to judicial reasoning has 
been important in revealing the unquestioned assumptions upon which the law is 
based and can be a means of encouraging a more critical and reflective 
engagement with how laws are expressed. 
While there is a need for this sort of work to continue in order to avoid 
complacency in the way in which legal norms are constructed and invoked in 
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various situations, it is also important to genuinely engage with the apparent 
reasoning and meanings judges ascribe to their interpretation of the law. In this 
way, it is possible to elucidate the legal constructions and normative frameworks 
that judicial comments, on their surface, might imply, while also indicating where 
less obvious agendas and assumptions may be operating and the effect they may 
have.       
In that spirit, when Baker J refers to lesbian families as sufficient he need not be 
understood as invoking an ideal notion of the family against which lesbian families 
fall short despite being passable as families. He could simply be understood as 
indicating that, as far as the HFEA 2008 is concerned, lesbian couples that have 
children through ART are in the same position as different-sex couples. In that 
sense, Baker J could be seen as affirming the fact that there are no longer any 
questions remaining about the sufficiency of same-sex parenting as there once 
was.  
In order to support his argument that the language used in Re G; Re Z betrays a 
certain reticence about same-sex parenting, Brown argues that: 
the law now accepts that lesbian couples are capable of parenting 
children sufficiently. However the emphasis placed on the 
importance of fatherhood leads the courts to stop short of fully 
endorsing, in the context of lesbian-led families, the two-parent 
‘nuclear family’ model (which it usually embraces).407 
However, I would suggest that there is considerable indication in the case law of 
the courts’ endorsement of the two-parent ‘(homo) nuclear family’ model. In Re 
G; Re Z, for example, Baker J notes that ‘[t]o my mind, the policy underpinning 
sections 42(1), 45(1) and 48(2) of the 2008 Act is simply to put lesbian couples 
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and their children in exactly the same legal position as other types of parent and 
children’.408 Baker J goes on to say that ‘[i]n this regard, the position of a lesbian 
couple who have been granted the status of legal parents by the 2008 Act is 
exactly the same as any other legal parent’.409  
Furthermore, Baker J recognises the continuing vulnerability and need for 
protection of lesbian families noting that ‘the integrity of their family’ and 
protection from ‘the risk of disruption’ are ‘manifestly material considerations for 
the court.’410 This is the latest judicial expression of concern for protecting the 
homonuclear family dating back to the judgment of Lady Justice Black (as she 
then was) in Re D in 2006 where she states, echoing her earlier judgment on 
contact in 2003: 
I confess that I have been anxious about whether making a parental 
responsibility order would be in D's interests for the sort of reasons 
that have influenced Dr Sturge, notably the potential threat to the 
stability of D's immediate family from what I may loosely call 
“interference” from Mr B as well as the impact on society's 
perception of the family if he were, in fact, to use it to become more 
visible in D's life.411 
These judicial dicta paint a picture of a family judiciary that is grappling with 
unfamiliar and challenging legal situations but are doing so in a genuine attempt 
to achieve justice for the parties and promote child welfare.  
It is, nevertheless, important to remain vigilant, as commentators such as Harding 
and Brown are, to implicit heteronormative and gender bias in judicial reasoning 
in these cases. This is especially so because judges are still operating within a 
gendered and heteronormative framework in relation to parenthood and 
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parenting. Consequently, it is not surprising that certain problematic assumptions 
may be uncritically (and sometimes unwittingly) drawn on in their decision-
making. However, this does not suggest that judges are deliberately and 
systematically marshalling heteronormative conceptions of the family to the 
detriment of the lesbian homonuclear family when they are resolving collaborative 
co-parenting disputes. Therefore, it is just as important to commend genuine 
judicial attempts to accommodate the various interests of those involved within 
the context of a less than ideal legislative framework.   
The Vulnerability of Female Parents, Biological Fathers and their 
Partners 
So far, this has largely focused on the impact of the judicial resolution of ‘known 
donor’ disputes on lesbian homonuclear families. This has resulted from the fact 
that known donor disputes are for the most part characterised in the case law and 
academic commentary as being about the creation of women-led families and 
whether or not the biological father can fit into that somehow. I would suggest, by 
contrast, that what are typically referred to as ‘known donor’ disputes concern 
parenting practices that sit on a continuum of collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements.412 At one end of the continuum there is the scenario that is being 
treated as the archetype of known donor disputes whereby a female couple 
approaches a (often gay) male friend and asks him if he is willing to donate sperm 
in order to enable them to have a family and the friend agrees to this out of 
altruism and solidarity with the female couple. 
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However, at the other end of the continuum is what might be termed poly-
parenting arrangements where a lesbian homonuclear family was not the 
intended outcome but a parenting arrangement that involved both biological 
parents (and potentially both of their partners). These poly-parenting 
arrangements are the core focus of this thesis but it is also important to unpack 
the implications of the judicial resolution of known donor disputes. I would 
suggest, therefore, that not all of the cases that are loosely termed ‘known donor’ 
disputes conform to the archetype detailed above but sit somewhere between 
that and poly-parenting. Consequently, this section will explore how tensions 
between the vulnerability of female parents and the vulnerability of biological 
fathers play out in the different types of ‘known donor’ cases and how this is 
resolved in the case law.  
Re B413 could be seen as coming close to the archetype of a known donor dispute, 
although it involved a heterosexual family member rather than a gay friend. In Re 
B the man (TJ) agreed to donate his sperm to his sister (S) and her civil partner 
(CV), who was also the child’s biological and birth mother. There was some 
controversy as to how conception occurred (whether through intercourse or 
artificial insemination) but the judge did not consider it necessary to make any 
finding on this matter; as discussed in more detail below, he held that this would 
not have any impact on the outcome of the case. The case came before the court 
because the father was applying for a contact order and parental responsibility 
order following disputes with the female couple about his role in the child’s life. In 
the end, the judge held that the man should be allowed some contact (i.e. 4 times 
per year) but made no order in relation to parental responsibility. He attempted to 
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make this a long-term solution by making an order under s.91 (14) of the Children 
Act 1989 on all three parties to the affect that they could not initiate further 
litigation on this matter without the leave of the court for a period of five years. 
Had TJ been an anonymous donor, presumably the judge would have had no 
difficulties in refusing both of the father’s applications thereby denying him any 
legal relationship with the child. Although there has been no case on this, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 provided that the donor was not a 
legal parent for any purpose414 and this has not been changed in the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.415 The factual scenario in Re B comes 
closer than the other ‘known donor’ disputes to a situation where a lesbian couple 
try to achieve their aim of starting a family through sperm donation but rather than 
the donor being anonymous/unknown they turn to a family member for help.  
This raises the question of whether the mere fact that the man was known to the 
female couple should impact on his relationship with the child or imply a certain 
role in the child’s life. Nordqvist and Smart argue that this is not a straightforward 
or clear-cut issue as it might be in relation to anonymous/unknown donation. The 
author’s note that in these cases: 
there are important social values and ethical questions at stake. For 
example, in any situation where a gamete donor is already known 
to a recipient…there are commanding questions about how much 
of a role a donor should have in the life of a child they have helped 
to create.416  
This does not, however, necessarily imply that the decision to involve a known 
donor should result in him being legally recognised as a parent. It also does not 
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imply that the donor should necessarily have any involvement with the child. 
However, as will be evident from the subsequent cases that will be discussed, 
the courts rarely exclude the biological father altogether.  
To some extent, the judge in Re B did consider that there was some role for TJ 
to play in the child’s life, as can be seen from his judgment. Mr Justice Hedley 
held that: 
it is essential that the door is kept open for BA so that without 
artificiality he can picture TJ as someone significant but not 
ordinarily important in his life yet someone with whom (in time and 
if he so wishes) he can explore the implications of the kind man who 
enabled him to be and he can ask questions to satisfy his own 
natural curiosity.417 
In some ways the law does try to keep the door open for a relationship to develop 
even between an anonymous donor and the child by allowing the child to identify 
the donor once he or she has reached the age of 18.418 However, the judge’s 
solution in this case, of allowing contact to happen 4 times a year, seems to go 
above and beyond this.  
This approach to contact is noteworthy because it exceeds the amount of contact 
offered by the female couple (i.e. once a year at family gatherings) but does not 
really come close to meeting the man’s expectations. This raises the question of 
why a contact order was made at all given the statement in the Children Act 1989 
that the court ‘shall not make the order or any of the orders unless it considers 
that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all’.419 
Furthermore, as the judge highlighted, ‘the fulfilment of an avuncular role needs 
no contribution from the court’.420 Indeed the female couple in this case accepts 
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that TJ would continue to fulfil this role in the context of the child’s extended family 
and the contact that might be associated with this. Therefore, why should the 
court institute a contact regime that goes beyond the role of an uncle? The judge 
in this case seems highly influenced by what he characterises as the man’s 
‘unique biological position’. This led him to conclude that it was ‘in BA’s interests 
to maintain some kind of relationship with TJ’ in order to be able to deal with any 
questions the child has as he grows up.  
There are parallels here with the move towards increasing openness in the 
adoption process and the removal of donor anonymity.421 However, in each of 
these situations the courts do not impose a contact regime on the parties but 
merely leave open the possibility of a future relationship developing at the child’s 
instigation by allowing access to identifying information about the donor once the 
child reaches the age of eighteen. In the context of anonymous donation, the law 
precludes any kind of relationship with the child until he or she is eighteen. 
Therefore, in the judge’s eyes it would appear that there is a distinction (although 
not one that is specifically addressed in the judgement) between an anonymous 
donor and a known donor in terms of the relationship that ought to be allowed to 
develop between the donor and child.  
It is, however, far from clear that merely donating sperm to help a lesbian couple 
conceive entitles a man that is known to the couple to play a significant role in 
the life of the child that is born as a result. Allowing such known donors to play a 
significant role in the life of the child would suggest that heteronormative 
conceptions of parenting influenced by biological essentialism were at play to a 
greater extent than in unknown donor situations. It would, therefore, be 
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inappropriate to consider the biological father in this case as a legal parent or as 
having parental rights and responsibilities in relation to the child because the 
intra-familial nature of the arrangement (without evidence of contrary intentions) 
suggests that the arrangement was one of donation and not ongoing parental 
involvement. 
It may be the case that the decision to conceive with a known donor does and 
should carry with it certain implications. Perhaps it would be reasonable for a 
court to say that the very nature of a known donor arrangement implies a greater 
degree of contact than an anonymous donor arrangement. However, in Re B, the 
judge was quite clear that the purpose of contact was ‘not to give TJ parental 
status in the eyes of BA or indeed anyone else. It is not to allow the development 
of a relationship which would amount to parental.’422 Therefore, one might 
conclude that the biological relationship between TJ and BA was appropriately 
reflected in the four days a year contact and that the female couple’s 
homonuclear family was protected from perceived threat by the known donor 
through the judge’s refusal to grant TJ parental responsibility. As the judge 
correctly noted to do so would be inconsistent with the autonomy of the 
homonuclear family,423 and I would suggest that, on the facts of this case, this 
would have been done for no better reason than to advance a heteronormative 
conception of the family based on biological essentialism.  
These comments are likely to apply in situations where there is a clear inference 
that the overriding motivation on the part of the known donor for donating sperm 
is to facilitate the creation of a lesbian homonuclear family. However, not all 
collaborative co-parenting situations can be characterised in this way and the 
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issues are considerably more complicated where lesbians and gay men 
collaborate to have children.  
Two cases stand out where the issues were particularly finely balanced: R v E424 
and T v T.425 R v E involved a female couple (who were civil partners) and a 
biological father who was in a same-sex relationship. The child’s primary carers 
were the female couple but the child had frequent contact with the male couple. 
In terms of the legal position, the father did not have parental responsibility 
(because at that time being on the birth certificate did not automatically confer 
parental responsibility unlike now).426 However, the second female parent did 
have parental responsibility by virtue of a parental responsibility agreement with 
the mother.427 Following a dispute between the two couples, the biological father 
sought a contact order, which allowed for overnight staying contact, as well as 
parental responsibility and shared residence. The issue of overnight staying 
contact proved relatively unproblematic and that developed at the child’s request. 
However, the female couple did not agree to shared residence or parental 
responsibility and, in fact, sought a residence order in their favour, which the trial 
judge granted, denying the father’s application for parental responsibility and 
shared residence. 
In reaching this conclusion, the judge seems to have been strongly influenced 
both by pre-conception intentions and the post-birth parenting reality. In this 
regard, the judge found that the intention was never for the father to be a co-
parent nor is that how things had turned out.428 One factor that may have been 
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significant was that the contact arrangements had proved satisfactory for a 
number of years after the child’s birth. It was only following the dispute that the 
biological father came to view them as unsatisfactory. This could indicate a 
change of heart on his part especially considering that the judge found that ‘the 
father's position was already recognised by the female parents who had not 
attempted to marginalise him after the dispute, and who had consulted and would 
continue to consult him as to significant decisions.’429   
However, it could also be that the arrangement had been satisfactory only until 
there was a disagreement over discipline because up until that point, all the 
parents were on the same page in terms of parenting. Therefore, it is difficult to 
gauge whether this is a case where the biological father subsequently sought 
more involvement than he initially did or that he was prevented from asserting his 
point of view with regard to the upbringing of the child, which he thought he had 
the right to assert.430 Nevertheless, the circumstances leading to the conception 
are sufficiently dissimilar to those in Re B, the case I am treating for these purpose 
as the archetypal known donor case, to warrant different treatment. 
In Re B, the female couple had decided to have a child together and it was only 
after several unsuccessful attempts at becoming pregnant using unknown donor 
sperm that they sought the help of a family member. In R v E, however, the female 
couple and male couple discussed the possibility of having a child over a long 
period of time and there was no suggestion that the female couple would have 
gone ahead regardless using unknown donor sperm. Therefore, there is not the 
same sense in R v E, as there is in Re B, that the biological father was simply 
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enabling the female couple to have a child. This fact alone could be sufficient to 
mean that R v E is not a true known donor case, properly so-called, as Re B was, 
because the biological father was not simply making a donation of sperm with no 
intention of being involved in the child’s life, other than in his role as a family 
friend. 
This version of family formation is born out not only by the recollection of the 
biological father and his partner but also that of the birth mother and her partner, 
even though the accounts of the men and women differ markedly. In the 
judgment, the biological father is described as recalling that for the female parents 
‘it was important for a child to have a father who wants to play an active role in 
the child’s life. They wanted a good friend to be the father rather than a mere 
sperm donor’.431 The biological father’s partner is reported as recalling that the 
biological father ‘wanted to be fully involved with the child as a father’.432 The 
women do not explicitly refute this account but they were both clear that it was 
the two of them that were bringing up the child and ‘they would want to make final 
decisions about the child, having consulted [the biological father]’.433 
Nevertheless, the judgment reports that the birth mother’s recollection is ‘that the 
child to be born would have a positive and meaningful relationship with Richard 
as the child's biological father’.434 Therefore, although this does not necessarily 
imply a high degree of involvement, even the women’s recollection of their pre-
conception intentions does not sit easily with idea of the biological father as a 
mere (known) donor.        
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The court in R v E does not explicitly recognise any potential tension between 
this family’s lived reality and the legal framework. There is little acknowledgment 
that the court struggles to accommodate this type of parenting arrangement within 
the existing legal framework. Therefore, the court seems to be shoehorning a 
parenting arrangement that doesn’t easily fit with existing models without 
acknowledging the potential difficulties this creates. Callus argues similarly that 
R v E is an example of where the court appears: 
to gloss over the legal reality of the situation in the hope of finding 
a solution which matches the practical reality. However, where the 
sperm donor father also has a relationship with the child, the reality 
is that a two-parent-nuclear family model is wholly inadequate.435 
She also suggests that the judge’s reasoning is open to question relying as it 
does on the notion of parental responsibility, which the father did not have: 
the argument that the father could not lay claim to being a co-parent 
and taking decisions is actually because the law did not grant him 
automatic parental responsibility. When he disagreed with a 
decision of the mother, he had no legal standing to object. 
Consequently, he needed to apply for parental responsibility in 
order to exercise the co-parenting role, which the judge found to be 
lacking.436 
This is a plausible account of the father’s position and runs contrary to the idea 
of the father simply having changed his mind. Although, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine what was agreed prior to conception without written 
evidence, this version of events does not seem to be contemplated by the court 
in R v E in its, understandable, attempt to protect the homonuclear family. 
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The case of R v E stands somewhat in contrast to that of T v T, 437 which is also 
open to criticism but more for undervaluing the role of the mother’s partner rather 
than being overprotective of it. T v T concerned the children’s biological father 
(F), who, along with his male partner, advertised for someone to have children 
with, and a female couple, the biological mother (M) and her partner (L), who 
responded to the advert. In this case F and M already had parental responsibility 
and the court at first instance further granted parental responsibility to L. Although 
the children spent most of their time with M and L, they did have contact with F. 
In addition to granting parental responsibility to L, the court at first instance also 
granted a joint residence order in favour of M and F, which provided for a 
significant amount of staying contact for F. In doing this, the court denied M’s 
application to restrict F’s parental responsibility and L’s application for a joint 
residence order in favour of M and L. The judgment at first instance seems to put 
F in a similar position to a post-separation father which the previously decided 
cases had been reluctant to do. M and L appealed against this decision asking 
the court to set aside the residence order in favour of M and F and preferably 
substituting it with a residence order in favour of M and L, failing which 
substituting it with a residence order in favour of all three parties, the latter of 
which F would agree to. 
In substantially denying the appeal in relation to the appellants’ first alternative, 
the court held that the order made at first instance was within the trial judge’s 
discretion and was not contrary to the best interests of the child. The appeal court 
would, therefore, have upheld that order and denied the appeal entirely had F not 
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offered to agree to a residence order in favour of all three adults, which order the 
court, therefore, made.  
In T v T, it seems that the reasons for the known donor being involved in the 
children’s lives were irrelevant. The salient fact was that F had been having 
regular and progressively increasing contact and parental responsibility for the 
entirety of the children’s lives (I.e. 10 and 7 years respectively). Does this level of 
contact, however, imply that it should result in a residence order? If a similar 
contact regime had existed in relation to another family member (e.g. an aunt or 
an uncle) would the court have granted a residence order in their favour? Perhaps 
the court was heavily influenced by the fact that F already had parental 
responsibility. However, it seems essentially accidental that F in this case had 
parental responsibility but TJ in Re B did not and yet the outcomes in the cases 
are very different. In some ways this is an unfair comparison because there 
seemed to be considerably more hostility and relationship break down in Re B 
than in T v T. However, the court doesn’t really address these difficult issues 
explicitly. 
While in R v E the court was very concerned to protect the position of the birth 
mother’s partner, the court in T v T did not seem to consider this a priority. 
Therefore, just as R v E was open for criticism on the basis that it failed to give 
proper consideration to the allegedly agreed role of the father, so too did T v T 
fail to give sufficient consideration to the role of the birth mother’s partner. 
Smith is similarly critical of Lady Justice Black’s reasoning in the Court of Appeal 
decision in T v T because of the way it makes L’s inclusion in the shared 
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residence order dependent on the wishes of F.438 Lady Justice Black’s approval 
of the first instance judge’s finding that it was not necessary for L to appear on 
the residence order because she already had parental responsibility and the 
children were secure in their relationship with her,439 is surprising in two key 
respects. Firstly, this is out of step with the recent case law on the symbolic use 
of shared residence orders in post-separation parenting to protect the 
psychological security of the parents, discussed above and also referred to in the 
judgment. Smith goes so far as to say that ‘[t]he decision in T  v T  thus sits 
uneasily with some of the other authorities on shared residence and adds to the 
claims of those who argue that there is now little clarity of purpose underpinning 
the making of shared residence orders’.440 
 Furthermore, it also seems to be inconsistent with the same judge’s earlier 
comments in Re D that a co-mother in a position similar to L was ‘the most 
vulnerable person in this situation, whom society will view to some extent as “the 
cuckoo in the nest”’.441 Smith notes that Lady Justice Black’s position in the 
subsequent case of T v T arguably ‘serves to compound this vulnerability’.442  
Not only is the birth mother’s partner vulnerable in terms of her parental 
relationship with the child but potentially so also is the biological father’s partner, 
of which there is very little mention in the case report. The case report notes that 
the biological father advertised that he wanted to become a father, the birth 
mother and her partner responded and discussions with the biological father and 
his partner followed this.443 Although Lady Justice Black makes little mention of 
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the biological father’s partner’s role in her summary of the children’s parenting 
reality, she notes the recorder’s finding that both children love the birth mother, 
the biological father and their partners and are ‘enthusiastic about their lives in 
both household’.444 
Therefore, similar to the case of R v E discussed above, it is unclear why F’s 
partner was not included in any of the applications. It is difficult to know whether 
the biological father and his partner understood themselves to be having a child 
together with the female couple or whether the biological father’s partner did not 
consider himself fully part of that arrangement. The fact that the judgment 
describes the initial advert as having been placed by the father without 
mentioning his partner may indicate that he did not conceive of himself as a 
parent to these children. However, it is also possible that the father’s partner is 
not mentioned because men in his position lack visibility in the case law and are 
not contemplated by the legal framework. It may be the case that the couple felt 
that it would be difficult enough to have the biological father’s parental claim 
recognised without complicating things by discussing his partner’s position. They 
may have felt that the likelihood of success of the application would be reduced 
if he were involved. We do not have enough information in the case report to 
conclude one way or another about this. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the role and legal position of the biological father’s 
partner needs to be developed further in the case law. The position of the birth 
mother’s partner has been extensively discussed in the reported cases and is 
now explicitly addressed in legislation. Although there are still concerns about the 
vulnerability of the birth mother’s partner, the biological father’s partner is in an 
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arguably even more vulnerable position. The issue of the biological father’s 
partner’s position will be returned to in a subsequent chapter when discussing the 
empirical data.   
Although his partner’s position may not have been explicitly addressed, the court 
in T v T were clear that the biological father should certainly be included in the 
shared residence order and were even minded to omit the co-mother in the 
absence of the father’s agreement. One conceptual difference that may have 
been influential is that in T v T, unlike the earlier cases, the biological father was 
the one who initiated things by placing an advert. This could arguably place the 
biological father in this case in a somewhat stronger position than those in earlier 
cases because it may evidence his intention to be a parent from the outset.  
However, this is not explicitly discussed in the case report. 
While the case of T v T is commendable for recognising the legal position of both 
the birth mother’s partner and the biological father in what is arguably a 
collaborative co-parenting arrangement, the outcome and the court’s reasoning 
seems to have been somewhat at odds with previous cases with materially similar 
facts. In Re D, Mrs. Justice Black, as she then was, expressed particular concern 
that formally recognising the biological father would undermine the position of the 
co-mother. Therefore, she only ordered a version of parental responsibility in that 
case that was essentially stripped of practical effect. Furthermore, in both Re B 
and R v E and F the court refused the biological fathers’ applications for parental 
responsibility. Hedley J commented in Re B that the child’s family life with his 
female parents was ‘wholly inconsistent with the exercise of parental 
responsibility’.445 This has led Smith to opine that ‘it is hard to avoid concluding 
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that the exercise of discretion has led to inconsistency in the application of the 
law, irrespective of whether one prefers the approach taken in T v T or that taken 
in the earlier cases’.446 Therefore, it cannot really be said that a coherent 
approach to the legal recognition of poly-parenting families has yet been 
developed.  
Overall, therefore, it would seem that a desirable outcome was reached in T v T, 
although the route through which this was achieved undervalued the intentions 
of the parties and the role that the mother’s partner plays in the children’s lives, 
not to mention that of the biological father’s partner. All three adults that were 
parties to the case have parental responsibility and a residence order in their 
favour, which guarantees contact with the children. This reflects the post-birth 
reality that has developed, namely that the children view all three adults as their 
parents. This may or may not have been the intention of the adults prior to birth 
but it is the situation that they have allowed to develop.  
It is arguable that the different outcomes in R v E and T v T are justified on the 
facts of the cases. However, in T v T, the way in which the court marginalises the 
birth mother’s partner by making her inclusion in a joint residence order 
conditional on the father’s consent is indefensible. This observation similarly 
applies to the Quebec case of S.G. v L.C.447 discussed more fully in the previous 
chapter. Although Quebec’s civil code is supportive of female same-sex 
parenthood in a similar way to the HFEA 2008 in E&W, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, S.G. v L.C. indicate that the protection of the homonuclear 
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family is not such a high judicial priority in Quebec as it has been in a number of 
the cases decided in E&W.   
Although it is possible to contrast the generally affirmative position in relation to 
women-led families that is evident in the judicial reasoning from some of the E&W 
case law with the approach in cases like S.G. v L.C. in Quebec, it is important to 
recognise the substantive differences in the cases emanating from these two 
jurisdictions. While the cases in E&W concerned disputes around parental 
responsibility or contact, S.G. v L.C. was about who the child’s legal parents were, 
which is an issue conclusively resolved in E&W by statute.  
Furthermore, the case, S.G v L.C., is somewhat problematic because it was 
decided solely on the basis of the biological father’s affidavit evidence. Therefore, 
the court did not have the benefit of hearing arguments on behalf of the biological 
mother and her partner. In addition to this, due to a publication ban, it is difficult 
to ascertain the facts of the case in detail. However, based on the interim 
judgment,448 it seems that the lesbian couple, who were registered as the parents 
on the birth certificate, had a allowed contact between the child and biological 
father under the father sought to establish filiation with the child. This would 
essentially recognise the biological father as the child’s second legal parent 
instead of the birth mother’s partner. 
As the previous chapter highlighted, under Quebec’s civil code, a sperm donor 
does not have an automatic bond of filiation with any child born, although he may 
establish filiation in the year following birth if conception occurred through sexual 
intercourse.449 Under Quebec law, the parents of a child born using assisted 
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449 Quebec Civil Code 1991, art. 538.2.  
 
 
179 
reproduction are those who were party to the ‘parental project’ and this is 
presumed to be the birth mother and her spouse, whether male or female.450 The 
biological father argued that the parental project existed between the birth mother 
and himself rather than her partner. This was based on the assertion that, 
although the birth mother’s partner went on to co-parent the child, she had never 
intended to enter into the parental project. The court relied heavily on this to 
conclude that the biological father and not the mother’s partner was party to the 
parental project and, therefore, granted him access rights. 
As other commentators have acknowledged,451 this decision was understandable 
given that the court only had the biological father’s version of events to base its 
decision on. However, it is problematic in the sense that it disrupts the security of 
female-led families. In a similar way to the court in T v T, the Quebec court in 
S.G. v L.C. seem to have unwarrantedly prioritised the interests of the biological 
father over those of the birth mother’s partner despite this outcome not being 
supported by the child’s parenting reality.  
One thing that seems striking about S.G. v. L.G. is that there appears to be an 
unjustified level of judicial certainty and conviction about the outcome. The judge 
is critical of the women who are, in the judge’s view, trying to deny the child’s right 
to a father. There is no acknowledgment that this type of situation is not directly 
analogous to the typical heterosexual reproductive scenario. This is a further 
indication that the Quebec court is unquestioningly prioritising heteronormative 
conceptions of the family without having any regard to the vulnerability of the 
homonuclear family in this situation.  
                                            
450 Ibid. art. 538.3. 
451 Kelly, Transforming law’s family the legal recognition of planned lesbian motherhood (n 384). 
 
 
180 
Understandably, much of the commentary on this case has been scathing about 
the judge’s failure to prioritise the intentions of the women-led family. This is 
unsurprising given that the judgment fails to engage with or recognise the 
differences, complexities and vulnerabilities of female same-sex parenting as 
compared to different-sex parenting. However, the judgment could also be 
criticised from the point of view that it does not even consider the possibility of all 
three adults being recognised in some parental capacity.  
Therefore, while the judgment fails to recognise the differences between the 
homonuclear same-sex family and different-sex parenting, it also fails to 
acknowledge that the parenting situation in the case is not directly analogous to 
an unknown donor situation either. I would argue that quasi-donor situations 
where the biological father is known is sui generis and needs to be treated as 
such in legal discourse rather than try to shoehorn it into existing concepts. This 
is something that the courts of E&W seem to have recognised, although they do 
not necessarily follow through on this when applying the legal rules. To some 
extent this outcome was precipitated by the legislative framework in place and 
the nature of the arrangement. It is not self-evident that a man whose sperm has 
been used to conceive a child with a single woman or female couple has 
necessarily ‘donated’ the sperm. This is different from an unknown donor situation 
where the nature of the situation indicates that it is a donation more along the 
lines of blood donation. 
The Ontario courts by contrast have experience of engaging with a more flexible 
legislative framework in resolving these disputes. A prominent example of this is 
the case of C (MA) v K (M)452 where the court reached a similar outcome, in terms 
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of recognising more than two adults as parental figures, as the England and 
Wales case of T v T. The judge in C (MA) v K (M) was considerably influenced 
by the earlier Ontario case of A (A) v B (B) discussed in the previous chapter, 
which concerned a situation where the court was being asked to afford legal 
recognition to a parenting arrangement that had been reached consensually, 
involving three legal parents. Unlike that earlier case, C (MA) v K (M) involved a 
dispute between a female couple and biological father about legal parenthood. 
Although, this case is more akin to the disputes that arise before the courts in 
E&W, it differs in the crucial respect that it concerned legal parenthood rather 
than parental responsibility. The applicants were a female couple who had 
approach the respondent, a gay man, to help them have a child. The intention of 
all three adults was that the respondent would be more than a sperm donor. He 
would, in fact, be recognised as the father and would be able to spend a generous 
amount of time with the child on a regular basis. Following birth, the parties signed 
an agreement with respect to custody, access, child support and adoption. 
Amongst other things, the agreement stipulated that the respondent would 
consent to the termination of his parental rights in the event that the applicants 
sought to adopt the child. 
For a number of years, things went smoothly and the biological father and child 
spent time together as agreed. However, as the relationship between the 
respondent and applicants deteriorated, the applicants sought to rely on the 
agreement in order to adopt the child without the respondent’s consent. Despite 
the agreement, the court found that an order dispensing with the respondent’s 
consent would not be in the child’s best interests. It reiterated that it is the child’s 
best interests that determine the outcome of the case and, consequently, the 
court is not bound by any agreement reached by the parties. 
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In deciding the case, the court was influenced by the fact that both the applicants 
were secure in their position as the child’s parents as they both had custody of 
the child pursuant to the agreement, which could be incorporated into a custody 
order. The court also found that the child had a positive and beneficial relationship 
with the respondent and his family, which might be jeopardised if consent was 
dispensed with. Given that the respondent had been a caring and loving influence 
in the child’s life, the court was keen to protect this relationship. 
Interestingly, in C (MA) v K (M), the issue was presented by the court not as one 
involving competing interests but as involving mutually reconcilable interests. In 
particular, the court highlighted the fact that a declaration could be made 
recognising all three as legal parents. In the court’s judgment, this was a more 
appropriate way of recognising the legal position of each of the parties than 
adoption. The significance of this approach is that it demonstrates the potential 
for reconciling different interests that a more flexible legal stance on the number 
of legal parents can present. This is typified by Justice Cohen’s comments that:     
[I]n determining B's best interests, the issue for the court is not the 
protection of a specific family structure ab initio. This court sees all 
kinds of family structures and, absent specific statutory provisions 
otherwise, the nuclear family of two parents and a child enjoys no 
special preference when the court is assessing the best interests of 
a child. Indeed, a child can have more, or less, than two parents for 
the purposes of family law. 453   
This is similar to Lord Justice Thorpe’s comments in A v B to the effect that there 
is no a priori reason for not recognising more than two parents.454  
While this degree of flexibility around legal parenthood is a welcome 
development, the court would need to be careful when applying it not to impose 
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a legal parenthood regime that is inappropriate for the family before it. The court 
in C (MA) v K (M) adopt quite a strict approach to the consequences of the female 
couple’s decision to involve a known donor, implying that the legal recognition of 
multiple parents might necessarily flow from such a decision. As Justice Cohen 
goes on to say: 
When they decided to have a child, they fully understood that, 
although engaging a sperm donor was a biological necessity, 
engaging a known sperm donor was not. Thus, when they decided 
... that they wanted their child to have a known and involved father, 
they knew that, if they chose well, their child would develop a 
relationship with a parent who was not part of their immediate 
family. They knew that a parent-and-child *19 relationship gives rise 
to rights and responsibilities. They anticipated that a third parent 
would be involved with their family and had to have anticipated that 
this parent might disagree with, or challenge, their parenting 
choices, just as they must do with one another…Now they want to 
turn back the clock and make a different choice.455 
This is also reminiscent of Lord Justice Thorpe’s comments to the effect that the 
female couple possessed the decision-making power in relation to the child and 
they chose to involve a known donor, from which certain consequences may flow.  
Fiona Kelly raises a note of caution in relation to such an approach where multiple 
parents are recognised because it may be used as a means of imposing men on 
lesbian families, particularly in light of the currency of the fathers’ rights 
movement. She notes that: 
[W]idening the category of “parent” so that three or more people 
can be included might result in men being given additional tools with 
which to control women within the family, despite women remaining 
the primary caregivers of children in both the heterosexual and 
homosexual context.456 
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Kelly presents women-led families as being particularly vulnerable in terms of 
being prevented from exercising their autonomy to create the families they desire. 
It may well be the case that the courts’ approach in C (MA) v K (M) was justified 
on the basis of the facts of the case. As Kelly notes, ‘there was little evidence that 
the mothers in M.A.C. had in fact parented as a nuclear family unit. The donor 
had played a significant role in the child's life and had been a party to both 
caregiving arrangements and decision making’.457 However, that does not mean 
that the decision to involve a known donor to help conceive a child would 
necessarily imply that the biological father should be afforded legal recognition 
as the court in C (MA) v K (M) seem to suggest.  
It is worth noting at this stage that these known donor disputes not only raise 
issues related to the vulnerability of the female partners involved but also the 
vulnerable position the biological father finds himself in. This is particularly true 
of gay men, who are in a vulnerable position not only as donors but also when 
they seek to create autonomous families. This is an issue that will be explored 
further in Chapter Seven.  
The earlier discussion of T v T and R v E illustrate that disputes concerning 
collaborative co-parenting families can be analysed from a number of different 
perspectives. The perspective the courts in E&W have taken in the cases that 
have come before them has been to start from a consideration of how the legal 
rules might impact the women-led homonuclear family. This is understandable 
given that female same-sex parenting has been increasingly visible in society for 
a number of years. In addition to this, the protection of female same-sex parenting 
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has been prioritised in the previous cases and legislative reform as discussed 
above. 
However, in situations where gay men and lesbians collaborate to have children 
this is not invariably done in order to facilitate the creation of women-led 
homonuclear families. In other words, same-sex parenting is broader than lesbian 
parenting. The cases that have come before the courts in England and Wales 
demonstrate a range of practices around initiating these collaborative co-
parenting arrangements that may evidence various intentions in terms of parental 
involvement. Re B could be seen as closely approximating a donor situation 
where the donor is known; Re D was a situation where the female couple 
advertised for a man to help them start a family. In each of these cases, the 
impression is that the female couple were looking to start a family one way or 
another and sought the involvement of a man to help them do that. This does not 
necessarily imply that the man intended to be a donor because that would depend 
on his own reasons for getting involved in the arrangement. However, this has to 
be assessed in light of whether the female couple would have likely been willing 
to accept an involved father or would have looked for another donor. 
The way the arrangement was initiated, however, may indicate different 
intentions in terms of parental involvement. R v E resulted from informal 
discussion between four friends (a male couple and a female couple). Therefore, 
arguably, this wasn’t a case of a female couple wanting to start a family one way 
or another but of four adults deciding to start a family together. In T v T, it was 
the male couple who placed the advert and the female couple that responded, 
which suggests even more strongly that the father intended to be involved rather 
than be a donor.  
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In the absence of written agreements, these observations are merely inferences 
from the facts surrounding intentions. This highlights the importance of written 
agreements as a record of pre-conception intentions even though they are not 
legally binding. In addition to this, the way the parenting arrangement was 
initiated can be an important indicator of intentions, which also needs to be 
consider alongside post-birth parenting.   
While the female partners in these cases have sought to demonstrate how fragile 
the legal protection of the lesbian homonuclear family is, the legal position of male 
same-sex parents is even more precarious, not to mention the lack of legal 
recognition of collaborative co-parenting arrangements. The difference in legal 
position of female and male same-sex parents is evident from the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. Under that act, the birth mother of a child 
born following assisted reproduction is automatically one of the two legal parents 
and has parental responsibility on the birth of the child. As outlined above, her 
female partner would also be recognised as the second legal parent if they were 
married/in a civil partnership at the time of conception or conception occurs in a 
clinic. It is less than ideal that similar protection is not open to unmarried female 
couples who conceive informally at home, which accounts for a significant 
number of cases. However, at least those female couples covered by the 2008 
Act can be certain at the time of conception that they will be the child’s legal 
parents. 
By contrast, this option is not open to male same-sex parents. As the birth mother 
is automatically one of two legal parents on birth (along with her partner if 
married), she/they would have to first consent for the male couple to be the legal 
parents in order for the court to be able to make a parental order to this effect. 
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While it is a positive development that this ‘expedited adoption’ procedure is 
available to male couples, the parental order mechanism presents a number of 
difficulties in relation to male same-sex parenting. This raises questions about the 
role of intentionality in relation to surrogacy, which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.458 
This difference in the legal treatment of female and male same-sex parenting can 
partly be explained by the fact that different considerations are involved when 
legally separating a birth mother and child compared with a biological father and 
child. There is a greater reluctance to separate a birth mother and child because 
of the bonding that may take place during gestation and childbirth, which is not a 
factor in relation to biological fathers. However, it is also the case that law and 
society generally has more longstanding engagement with female same-sex 
parenting than male same-sex parenting, which has only recently become 
increasing visible. As Naomi, a family law solicitor in E&W, comments:  
I think that gay male couples are a newer phenomenon. So they're 
less visible and I think the fact that people like Elton John are having 
children is very helpful because it puts it, kind of, very firmly and 
prominently in the public mind. But I think lesbian couples have 
been conceiving children for longer. You know, I think it's more 
unusual for men to be raising children without women than for 
women to be raising children without men. 
The legal recognition of male same-sex parenting per se is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, a future study might fruitfully consider the complexities of 
legally recognising gay male parenthood following surrogacy.     
Some commentators construct these disputes as between homonuclear and 
heteronormative conceptions of the family, whereby biological fathers are being 
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imposed on women-led families in a heteronormative way. This may be how 
judges and others are conceiving of this. However, another dimension to these 
disputes is that the interests of both male and female same-sex parents are 
engaged. Therefore, the tension between these interests should not be obscured 
by focusing on fathers’ rights discourse. The interests of gay fathers may coincide 
to an extent with, but are separate from, fathers’ rights generally in separating 
different-sex couples. As Wallbank and Dietz argue: 
It is unfortunate for [gay fathers] to be cast as agents of hetero-
normative patriarchy when empirical evidence suggests that there 
is a sense amongst lesbian and gay prospective parents that the 
PTP family is a re-imagining and reshaping of family life with a 
shared aim of decentring the traditional two parent family.459 
Therefore, while commentators have criticised the cases for being 
heteronormative in the sense of imposing biological fathers on women-led 
families it is also important to recognise that the imposition of dyadic parenting is 
also a manifestation of heteronormativity. The decision to recognise the parental 
involvement of the biological father could be seen as both promoting 
heteronormativity by undermining the homonuclear family and subverting it by 
recognising potential collaborative co-parenting arrangements. Similarly denying 
the biological father any parental involvement may be seen as clear subversion 
of heteronormativity in that it promotes the female homonuclear family but at the 
same time promotes heteronormativity in that it furthers the two-parent model.  
The reasoning behind the decisions that courts reach is important because they 
may indicate whether heteronormative assumptions played a determinative role 
or whether there was a genuine attempt to value difference in same-sex parenting 
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and grapple with the unique factual context before the court. The courts are 
constrained by a legislative framework that promotes the heteronormative two-
parent model while also protecting homonuclear families from claims based on 
biology. The way the courts have used parental responsibility to afford status to 
the biological father could be seen as a way of circumventing the legislative 
reforms and ‘reinscribing heteronormativity’.460 However, the judicial rhetoric and 
reasoning discussed above in relation to the protection of the homonuclear family 
indicates this is not self-evidently the case. An alternative interpretation is that the 
courts are trying to mitigate the harshness of the two-parent model by affording 
some recognition to the adults involved in these situations through the imperfect 
tool of parental responsibility and, what used to be, residence orders. 
Troubling Terminology 
In addition to the way in which parental responsibility is used, these cases also 
raise issues about the use of vocabulary. This is an issue that Mrs Justice Black 
particularly highlighted in Re D: 
the debate about parental responsibility is particularly finely tuned. 
Ms A and Ms C are entirely happy for Mr B to be recognised as D's 
“father” and for her to see him for regular contact. They do not agree 
to an order that, as they see it, recognises him as D's “parent”. They 
see themselves and their two children as a family. They argue that 
they are D's parents and that if she were to have a third parent, it 
would compromise the family, affecting not only their relations with 
Mr B but also the way in which they, and D, are seen by others. For 
Mr B, to be D's father is simply not enough; he wishes to be 
recognised as a father and a parent and he perceives that a 
parental responsibility order would bring this recognition.461 
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It would seem that the use of the terms 'father', 'parent', and 'family' in this dictum 
need to be unpacked a lot more before we can understand what is meant by them 
and the type of legal weight that should be given to these labels. It may be that 
in terms of biology these terms have particular meanings. However, despite the 
biological interpretation of these terms, our everyday understanding of them 
might be somewhat different. A mother and father could, for example, be any 
woman or man, respectively, that raises a child as her or his own. These terms 
are commonly used to denote social parents. It is unclear, however, how this 
would differ from being a parent in the sense that the courts use the term. The 
term parent could be understood as the gender-neutral equivalent of the 
gendered terms 'mother' and 'father. The dictum, however, seems to suggest that 
being a parent is somehow more than merely being a mother or father.462 
It seems that the judge’s use of father is in recognition of the biological position 
whereas parent is someone, above and beyond that, who is raising the child. As 
will be discussed below in relation to later cases, the court seems to struggle with 
finding the terminology for men in Mr B's position. The court's solution has been 
to grant a form, albeit a restricted one, of parental responsibility. As illustrated by 
the judge's comments, the award of parental responsibility is important for men 
in Mr B's position because of the recognition that it brings. This would seem to 
indicate an issue that a number of participants in this study have commented on, 
namely that the courts, and perhaps society more broadly, are struggling to find 
the vocabulary to describe co-parenting arrangements and how to label the adults 
who are involved in them. 
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The issue of the courts and society struggling to find the terminology to describe 
these arrangements was a common theme that ran through a number of the 
interviews with legal practitioners in E&W. Lizzie, a solicitor in England with 
considerable experience dealing with same-sex parenting disputes, highlighted 
that the courts are not used to such fine-tuned and in-depth consideration of the 
terminology surrounding parenthood, often taking it for granted in the majority of 
disputes they are asked to resolve. Lizzie notes that: 
…there [is] still quite a struggle amongst the judiciary in this country 
as to what terminology to use and what language to use and what 
status that should bring because concepts of parenthood is not 
something historically that mainstream family lawyers and judges 
have had to deal with. That's been a given and suddenly that's no 
longer there and they're being asked to adjudicate and determine 
this and it can be a very difficult thing to do…463 
This comment could apply not only to the judiciary but also society at large, which 
equally struggles to find the terminology to describe the relationships that exist 
between the adults and children in these parenting arrangements. As Dr Sturge, 
an eminent child psychologist, notes in Re D, there is ‘a range of difficulties that 
the present terminology does not cover’, which in her mind illustrates ‘…just how 
deep rooted concepts and language are in relation to families and that the law, in 
a sense, pre-empts ways of understanding new family structures’.464  
The discussion around terminology in Re D is echoed in some ways by the 
discussion that takes place in the later case of Re G; Re Z. In Re D, Mrs Justice 
Black explicitly acknowledges the fact that the biological father feels that being 
referred to as a father but not a parent is inadequate. In Re G; Re Z, however, 
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the judge does not make a similar acknowledgment in relation to the female 
partners. Harding notes that: 
by not referring to D or Y, the civil partners of the women who had 
carried the children, as ‘parents’ but merging them into a category 
of ‘mothers’, [the judge] is concurrently erasing their legal status in 
this judicial discourse’.465 
This observation derives from the fact that the terms ‘mother’ and ‘father’ are 
significantly more normatively loaded than the more neutral, but perhaps legally 
significant, term ‘parent’. Diduck, commenting on the Re G case discussed 
above, notes that ‘[t]he importance of father(ing) and mother(ing) to a child’s 
welfare, if not always clear for the law, is at least meaningful. The role, on the 
other hand, of a de-gendered ‘parent’ is opaque and, as yet, imaginary’.466 
Brown reinforces this idea and is similarly critical of the more recent case of Re 
G; Re Z for its lack of consideration of what the term parent actually implies as 
distinct from mother or father. He notes that: 
the role of the ‘parent’ in lesbian-led families lacks the fall back, 
‘common-sense’ social construction possessed by the traditional 
gendered parenting roles (of ‘mother’ and ‘father’); and that this role 
of ‘parent’ has not been fully explored or developed in judicial 
discourse and hence is not being given the same weight or 
consideration as those gendered roles.467 
These issues relating to terminology are particularly pronounced in relation to 
collaborative co-parenting situations. Caroline Jones argues that ‘‘[t]he gendered, 
heteronormative framing of parenting in social and legal discourses clearly can 
have powerful normalising effects’.468 The effect of this use of language can be 
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the sense that there is a parenting hierarchy with the birth mother at the top with 
her partner and the biological father competing for their place within the hierarchy.  
To an extent this is a tension created by a lack of flexibility in the legal concepts 
and language used to recognise the adults in these parenting arrangements. 
Given that collaborative co-parenting arrangements are not homogenous, the 
most appropriate language to be used may vary from family to family. It is 
nevertheless important for judges to more explicitly explore their understandings 
of the terms being used to describe the adults in these parenting arrangements. 
By unpacking the range of meanings the terms mother, father and parent can 
bare, a more apt description of the family before the courts might be reached 
based on the factual circumstances and parenting arrangement in that particular 
case. In doing this, it is important not only to recognise the equivalence in terms 
of parenting between the birth mother and her partner but also to afford an 
appropriate level of recognition for the biological fathers in these situations 
without disempowering the birth mother’s partner. 
In contrast to E&W, these discussions around language and terminology do not 
seem to be as present in the Canadian case law as they are in the E&W case 
law. Part of the reason for this may be that the Canadian cases have often 
involved a written agreement in preparation for which discussions around 
terminology may have taken place. This is reflected in the emphasis that a 
number of the Canadian legal professionals interviewed in this study placed on 
discussing the language used to describe each of the adults when establishing 
the parenting arrangement. Mary, an attorney in Ontario with a broad family law 
practice including same-sex parenting disputes, stresses that: 
kids just look up and see adults; they don't necessarily slot them, 
they're their adults…So, I think what's really important is to make 
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sure that there's language in place that allows the original group to 
plan as a group how that relationship will roll out… not formalising 
language around those ongoing relationships, I think is unfair to the 
children.469 
Therefore, while a number of legal professionals in E&W were struck by the 
struggles courts were having deciding the appropriate terminology, as mentioned 
above, some of the Canadian legal professionals were more focused on the need 
to have these discussions when creating the parenting arrangement, perhaps in 
order to avoid disputes later. 
Furthermore, when asked about whether differences in terminology created 
difficulties, legally or otherwise, in Canada as they do in E&W, none of Canadian 
legal professionals interviewed identified language or legal terminology as a 
significant issue. Lance, an attorney in BC with a significant practice in relation to 
parenthood following assisted reproduction, felt that the way terminology was 
used to identify each of the parties and their relationships with the children did 
not present any obstacles at the stage of negotiating a written agreement. 
Reflecting on the parenting arrangements and written agreements he has been 
involved in, he comments that ‘I have discussed it. But I don’t think I’ve ever 
described it as a difficulty’.470 
Not only does the use of terminology not seem to present significant obstacles at 
the stage of creating these parenting arrangements in Canada but it also does 
not seem to complicate the legal resolution of disputes in relation to parenthood. 
David, an attorney in BC who specialises in the law relating to same-sex 
relationships and parenting, suggested that how the parties identify themselves 
does not necessarily have a legal impact in terms of the legislation. In response 
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to being asked whether he had come across any struggle with terminology in the 
cases he had dealt with the comments that: 
 No, I haven’t felt that at all… The parties can self-define in their 
agreements using words like ‘sperm donor’ or ‘biological father’ or 
any other term they want… But everybody, sort of, knows what you 
are talking to. So I think that’s a false argument about terminology. 
It’s often just the discomfort of the people who are dealing with the 
situation to not know what to call people… So I don’t think the 
terminology is actually that big of a deal.471 
This position stands in contrast to the point of view expressed above by a number 
of legal and other professionals in E&W that stresses the importance of language 
in these situations. Dr Sturge, a well-recognised child psychiatrist in E&W, even 
went so far as to opine in Re D that, ‘I believe if the Court can find appropriate 
terms to refer to the parties in this case, the issue will be solved.’472  
The way in which the relationships between the adults and children in these 
parenting arrangements are signified and referred to may at least be of 
significance to the parties themselves, at least in some cases, as both Harding 
and Brown’s discussion of Re G; Re Z. Nevertheless, it seems overly optimistic 
to suggest that the use of language has the power to resolve the legal difficulties 
that the adults in these arrangements have in have their relationship with the 
children recognised. A clearer and more established way of referring to the adults 
and the relationships is required both legally and socially speaking.  
However, it is the status that the adults have in relation to the children that is more 
important legally speaking. Belinda, an attorney in BC with considerable 
experience negotiating same-sex parenting agreements and dealing with same-
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sex parenting disputes, for example, highlights the significance of the change in 
status afforded by the BC’s Family Law Act. She comments that: 
as a matter of legal practice, I never, ever refer to a donor as a 
father ever, in any circumstances, ever. Because I never wanted 
anybody to think of them that way… However, now the parties have 
an opportunity to confer status at the moment of the child’s birth on 
that person as a parent. And then the question is, what's the content 
of that? What's the content? What does it mean to have a dad and 
two mums on your birth certificate, especially if the dad doesn’t live 
with the two parents?... we don't have social models. The legislation 
is ahead of social conversation about this, way ahead.473 
Therefore, for Belinda, the way in which parental status had been opened up to 
more than two parents was a more complicated a potentially challenging issue 
that how terminology is used. Having said that, in terms of how these families are 
recognised by society, terminology and language will play a significant role as a 
signifier of this legal status. Consequently it may be that status and terminology 
are inextricably linked and it is this issue that the courts in E&W are struggling 
with when resolving known donor disputes.              
Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been on the judicial resolution of collaborative co-
parenting disputes in E&W, drawing on examples from other jurisdictions where 
appropriate. It has raised the issue of how these disputes are characterised by 
the parties as either known donor type situations or poly-parenting situations 
depending on what supports the vision they have of their family. Despite a lack 
of evidence about what was initially agreed by the parties, the courts have often 
sought to characterise these families with reference to heteronormative 
standards without necessarily fully considering the interests of the parties 
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involved. At times, this has meant that the homonuclear family has been 
supported with little consideration to any potential collaborative co-parenting 
arrangement. At other times, although to a lesser extent, biogenetic discourses 
have been drawn on in a way that undermines the homonuclear family. On 
balance, this has had a more detrimental impact on the biological fathers involved 
in these arrangements where the courts have paid little attention to their 
motivation for getting involved in these arrangements. The focus has instead 
primarily been on the female couple’s desire to start a family.   
Furthermore, the courts in E&W have largely failed to engage with collaborative 
co-parenting as a valid family form that deserves legal protection in its own right. 
This is illustrated by the lack of a settled judicial understanding of the vocabulary 
that might best reflect the relationships involved in these collaborative co-
parenting arrangements. Interviews with legal professionals who work with 
collaborative co-parenting families suggest, however, that terminological 
confusion is not limited to the judiciary but can also be a factor for them in their 
work and also for the families themselves. Therefore, it seems that courts, and 
society more generally, are still getting to grips with the relationships involved in 
collaborative co-parenting arrangements. Consequently, it is important to 
approach the issue of legal regulation with an open mind and question whether 
the importation of legal principles and terminology from other contexts most 
accurately reflects the issues at stake in relation to collaborative co-parenting.      
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Chapter Five: Valuing Autonomy – 
Indeterminate Intentions and 
Collaborative Parenthood  
Introduction 
This chapter discusses a number of different reform options and how these might 
improve the legal recognition of these families as well as ameliorate the difficulties 
the courts face. In particular, the chapter considers the way the parties’ intentions 
are currently dealt with by the courts and how pre-conception intentions might be 
drawn on in resolving disputes in the future. The chapter examines how the courts 
in E&W take intentions into account when resolving disputes about parental 
responsibility and contact but ultimately give greater weight to the post-birth 
parenting reality. In doing this, the courts position themselves in relation to the 
case law concerning post-separation different sex couples, which has, to an 
extent, resulted in the uncritical acceptance of an approach to resolving 
collaborative co-parenting disputes that is not specifically tailored to the needs of 
that family arrangement. The chapter concludes by arguing that pre-conception 
intentions are a good starting point in resolving disputes concerning these 
intentionally created families but that they still need to be balanced against the 
interests of the parties involved.    
 
 
 
199 
Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Section 8 Orders as 
Badges of Status 
The court’s approach to the use of section 8 orders in resolving these disputes is 
succinctly summarised in the following sentence from the Court of Appeal’s 
judgement in T v T: 
Whatever the initial intentions of the parties when the children were 
conceived, things had moved on with time and the Recorder's 
orders had to accommodate the position as it actually was rather 
than the position that the adults wanted or had originally planned.474 
This dictum is instructive because it echoes the approach taken in subsequent 
cases. In the appellants’ submission, however, the recorder failed to adequately 
reflect the reality of the situation in the order made because they felt that they 
were the child’s parents, not F, and this could be reflected in a joint residence 
order in their favour. 
The Court of Appeal took a different view of this, however, which is illustrated by 
the following section from their judgment: 
One might, perhaps, be forgiven for thinking that someone who has 
been granted parental responsibility has truly been recognised as 
a parent of the child. In this case, three people have parental 
responsibility, M, F and L, and have thereby been recognised as 
parents; it seems to me that that probably accords with how things 
look at the moment from the children's point of view.475 
Here the court seems to be saying that the post-birth parenting reality is that all 
three adults have been involved to some extent as parents of the child, albeit with 
M and L as the primary carers, and, therefore, each deserve to be recognised as 
such. In saying this, the court is implicitly approving the fact that all three adults 
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currently have parental responsibility. This is noteworthy because in each of the 
cases discussed in the previous chapter (Re D, Re B and R v E), the facts of 
which are broadly similar to T v T, the court refused to grant either a parental 
responsibility or a residence order in favour of the biological father. 
In considering the issue of a residence order, the court in T v T referred to 
previous case law outlining the function of such an order. In particular they relied 
on the following statement of the then president of the Court of Appeal: 
It is now recognised by the court that a shared residence order may 
be regarded as appropriate where it provides legal confirmation of 
the factual reality of a child's life or where, in a case where one party 
has the primary care of a child, it may be psychologically beneficial 
to the parents in emphasising the equality of their position and 
responsibilities.476 
The use of a residence order to reflect the factual reality of a child’s life seems to 
have been particularly important in this case because the court felt that the 
children did view F as one of their parents. Therefore, it would appear justified to 
include him in a residence order. However, it is more difficult to justify omitting L 
on any residence order, which the court would have done in the absence of F’s 
agreement. If a residence order is supposed to reflect the parenting reality for 
these children then surely L is as much a parent as F is and, therefore, deserves 
to be recognised as such. To deny this would be to give too much weight to 
biological and heteronormative understandings of parenting.  
The use of residence and parental responsibility orders in collaborative co-
parenting disputes stems from the 2006 case of Re D, 477 (formerly known as Re 
M (Sperm Donor Father)478 which is one of the earliest cases involving a known 
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sperm donor decided in E&W. The case concerned a lesbian couple (Ms. A and 
Ms. C) who advertised for a man to father a child with them. The case report 
indicates they were happy for the man to act as a father figure provided there was 
an understanding that they were the primary carers. Mr. B, a married man, 
responded and a child (D) was subsequently conceived through sexual 
intercourse between Mr. B and Ms. A. Shortly after the child’s birth conflict arose 
when Mr. B attempted to have a more involved relationship with D than Ms. A 
and Ms. B had envisaged. Therefore, they only allowed the biological father to 
see the child on two occasions following birth and then ended contact. Mr. B saw 
himself as being in a similar position to a separated father whereas Ms. A and 
Ms. C preferred relatively infrequent contact and ‘benign interest’ on his part 
perhaps along the lines of an uncle. 
In terms of the legal position of each of the adults, as Ms. A gave birth to D, she 
had automatic parental responsibility. Ms. C acquired parental responsibility in 
relation to D as a result of being granted a joint residence order by the High Court 
in 2001. Although Mr. B also received a contact order in his favour in 2001, his 
application for parental responsibility was adjourned at that time until there had 
been a period of contact. The 2006 case concerned his renewed application for 
parental responsibility, which Ms. A and Ms. C opposed on the grounds that it 
would be disruptive for their family. This was the main ground of contention in the 
case because the adults had managed to reach a mutually acceptable agreement 
in relation to contact in the period between the two cases. 
In making a defined contact order for indefinite, monthly, limited contact and 
adjourning the parental responsibility application in 2001, Mrs Justice Black held 
that the family the female couple had formed with the child was potentially fragile 
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and deserved protection. Consequently, the court held that a joint residence 
order, and the parental responsibility that went with it, in favour of the couple 
would provide the family with some security.  Despite this, the judge did not feel 
able to rule on the issue of parental responsibility for the father until after there 
had been a period of contact. Furthermore, contact with the biological father was 
desirable in order that the father could answer any questions the child may have 
at a later stage. Therefore, Mrs Justice Black reasoned that the early 
establishment of contact with the biological father was important for the child’s 
self-esteem. 
On the face of it, this does not seem to be a case concerning collaborative co-
parenting but a case where a female couple have advertised for a sperm donor 
who was not intended to parent the child with them. This can be inferred from the 
fact that the intention was for the female couple to be the primary carers and 
decision-makers in the child’s life. Nevertheless, the female couple’s decision to 
involve a known donor and specifically refer to him as a father figure raises 
different considerations than those that are present in the context of unknown 
sperm donation.479 As Douglas notes in her comment on this case, ‘[t]his rather 
unusual case provides an example of the difficulties that may arise when a single 
sex couple have a child other than by anonymous gamete donation’.480 While 
choosing to conceive with a known donor may not imply a high degree of 
involvement on the donor’s part, such a decision may, nevertheless, carry certain 
implications. This is something the courts need to discuss more explicitly when 
resolving these disputes than they have been willing to do so far. The implications 
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of involving a known donor need to be clarified in the interests of legal certainty 
even though this is not always explicitly addressed in the cases. 
It is important to set the judgment in context. This case was initially decided in 
2001 at a time where there had not yet been the legislative and policy shifts 
described above recognising the sufficiency of same-sex parenting. Furthermore, 
although the courts had previously held that being in a lesbian relationship was 
no basis for discriminating against an applicant,481 cases where the mother being 
in a lesbian relationship was relevant to the welfare assessment when 
determining the child’s residence were not yet in the distant past.482 Given this, 
and the novelty of the courts having to deal with known donor arrangements, it is 
commendable that Mrs Justice Black recognises the fragility of same-sex families 
and expresses the desire to protect them. 
The initial judgement seems to indicate, however, that the fact that the biological 
father is present and desires contact means that such contact is likely to be in the 
best interests of the child. This reasoning and the outcome of awarding contact 
on this basis almost seems to suggest that female same-sex parenting is not 
sufficient in itself when the biological father is present, which is per se beneficial. 
It is unlikely that Black J intended to imply this in anyway and her decision may 
be understandable from the point of view of the courts encouraging fathers to be 
involved following separation in the heterosexual context. Nevertheless, the 
court’s decision does not sufficiently justify the assumption that a present and 
willing biological father should be allowed contact in the, at the time, novel context 
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482 See for example C v C (A Minor) (Custody: Appeal) [1991] 1 FLR 223, 233. 
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of female same-sex parenting involving a known donor. The court simply imports 
this assumption from the case law on post-separation different-sex couples. 
The issue of contact was resolved by mutual agreement between the parties 
following the 2001 decision, and no doubt against the background of that 
decision, with the result that the 2006 case solely concerned the issue of parental 
responsibility for the biological father. As the case concerns an application for 
parental responsibility under the Children Act 1989, it is instructive to recall the 
purpose this was designed for and how this has changed over time. Parental 
responsibility as contained in the Children Act 1989 was originally conceived of 
as a means of making practical decisions in relation to children.483 Initially this 
was reflected in the decisions of the family law courts.484 However, since then the 
courts have used parental responsibility as a badge of status.485 This use of 
parental responsibility, evident in relation to post-separation parenting, can also 
be seen in the present case of Re D. 
In Re D, the High Court awarded Mr. B parental responsibility but was 
considerably influenced by his voluntary undertaking to limit the practical 
consequences of the order. As Mrs. Justice Black states in her judgement, ‘the 
grant of parental responsibility to Mr B alongside the sort of undertaking that he 
offers would amount to a grant of a status, stripped of practical effect’.486 This use 
                                            
483 For more on this see Peter G Harris and Robert H George, ‘Parental Responsibility and 
Shared Residence Orders: Parliamentary Intentions and Judicial Interpretations’ (2010) 22 Child 
and Family Law Quarterly 151. See also Craig Lind and Tom Hewitt, ‘Law and the Complexities 
of Parenting: Parental Status and Parental Function’ (2009) 31 Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 391. 
484 For example Re H (Minors) (Local Authority: Parental Rights) (No 3) (1991) 1 FLR 214. 
485 See for example Re S (Parental Responsibility) 2 FLR 648 (CA). For more on this see Helen 
Reece, ‘The Degradation of Parental Responsibility’ in Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore and 
Jonathan Herring (eds), Responsible parents and parental responsibility (Hart 2009); Craig Lind 
and Tom Hewitt, ‘Law and the Complexities of Parenting: Parental Status and Function’ (2009) 
31 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 391.. 
486 Re D (n 467) [21]. 
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of parental responsibility would appear to be quite far from its original purpose 
but is consistent with how the courts have deployed the concept in relation to 
post-separation different-sex parenting.  
This is confirmed by Lady Justice Butler Sloss, as she then was, in the case of 
Re H (Parental Responsibility), who comments that ‘[p]arental responsibility is a 
question of status…The grant of the application declares the status of the 
applicant as the father of that child’.487 Mrs. Justice Black refers to these 
comments with approval in her judgment in Re D. The symbolic importance of a 
shared residence order (as a vehicle for conferring parental responsibility) was 
highlighted in Re A (A Child) (Joint Residence: Parental Responsibility)488 where 
Sir Mark Potter confirmed that: 
[i]t is now recognised by the court that a shared residence order 
may be regarded as appropriate where it provides legal 
confirmation of the factual reality of a child’s life or where, in a case 
where one party has primary care of a child, it may be 
psychologically beneficial to the parents in emphasising the equality 
of their position and responsibilities.489  
Despite this, Reece has criticised this decision as being ‘fundamentally 
inconsistent with granting parental responsibility’.490 These remarks indicate that 
in the post-separation different-sex parenting context, issues to do with legal 
status were inappropriately being dealt with through the use of parental 
responsibility  
This criticism of the use of parental responsibility in this way has also been 
extended to the same-sex parenting context. Although parental responsibility 
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seems to have been the main tool available to the court in Re D for granting some 
recognition to the adults involved in this quasi collaborative parenting 
arrangement, it is questionable whether this is an appropriate response to these 
types of families. As McCandless notes ‘[t]he “creative” use of parental 
responsibility in Re D  further reflects the current inadequacy of legal terminology 
in a society where parenthood increasingly occurs outside the confines of the 
traditional nuclear family’.491 Therefore, rather than relying on traditional tools to 
afford recognition to collaborative co-parenting families as the court did in Re D, 
it may be necessary to develop novel ways of accommodating alternative 
parenting arrangements not predicated on the post-separation different-sex 
parenting model. This is discussed further in the following section.   
In R v E, the real issue seemed to be that there was a disagreement between the 
two couples about upbringing and in particular discipline. The biological father 
wanted to be able to discipline the child in certain ways (e.g. through smacking) 
because he felt the child was being spoiled, which the mother would not allow. 
Therefore, this case does actually seem to have been about parental 
responsibility to a large degree, which contrasts with Re D which was really only 
about status. As a separate point, the father also made an application for contact, 
which seemed necessary because of the diminished contact between him and 
the child which had resulted from the breakdown of relations between the adults. 
Although the issue of contact seemed to resolve itself with the child initiating 
overnight staying contact, there was, however, some disagreement about how 
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contact should develop in the future. The male couple wanted it to increase 
whereas the female couple would have liked it to remain the same. 
In relation to parental responsibility, the judge accepted that it was nearly 
impossible, in the absence of written evidence, to ascertain which party’s 
recollection of the pre-conception agreement was more accurate. Instead he 
looked to what happened following birth to ascertain what the agreed 
arrangement was. In his judgement, Mr Justice Bennett found that the biological 
father was not acting as a parent towards Daniel (i.e. caring for him and taking 
decision about his life). He referred to the Law Commission’s intention for 
parental responsibility as reflecting actual parenting and as a result denied the 
father’s application. This decision would seem to stand in contrast with that of Re 
D where parental responsibility was used to recognise status rather than actual 
involvement and decision-making. It does seem somewhat ironic that in one case 
parental responsibility was granted where it was accepted that it wouldn’t be used 
but in the other parental responsibility was denied despite, and perhaps because 
of, the fact that the dispute was about actual parenting rather than status.  
Post-Separation Different-Sex Parenting: Uncritically Adopting 
Similar Approaches 
Wallbank and Dietz have noted that the gay fathers in these cases have sought 
to equate their position with post-separation heterosexual fathers.492 In Re D, for 
example, the judge notes, referring to the biological father Mr B:  
Mr B was expecting something of the role of the absent parent after 
divorce who might share the child's leisure time equally with the 
child's mother and participate in decisions about the child whereas 
                                            
492 Julie Wallbank and Chris Dietz, ‘Lesbian mothers, fathers and other animals: is the political 
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Ms A and Ms C intended that he should complement their primary 
care of the child by being a real father but by doing so through no 
more than relatively infrequent visits and benign and loving 
interest.493 
Here the idea of being a ‘real father’ is invoked as something the female couple 
find desirable. This is contrasted with the role of the ‘absent parent’ after divorce, 
which is seen as something that is not desirable. The terminology used in these 
cases is discussed in more detail in the final section. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that the term ‘absent parent’ may have certain negative connotations and 
a more neutral description (such a post-separation parent) would be desirable. 
Furthermore, the usefulness of the notion of ‘real father’ is questionable. 
The judge in that case goes on to comment that ‘I know that Mr B now recognises 
that he is not working towards the sort of role in [the child’s] life that an absent 
father may have after divorce’.494 In the case of Re D, where a female couple had 
advertised for a man to help them start a family, it may well be inappropriate for 
the biological father to conceive of himself as being in a similar position to a post-
separation heterosexual father. Therefore, the approach adopted in resolving 
disputes in the different-sex post-separation parenting context cannot be 
uncritically imported into the context of collaborative co-parenting. There have 
been a number of judicial dicta to this effect. Perhaps the most recent of these 
are contained in Lord Justice Thorpe’s judgment in the Court of Appeal decision 
of A v B.495 
The facts of this case are that A (a gay man) offered to help B and C (two lesbians 
in a long-term relationship) have a child M (now 2 1/2 years old). In order to give 
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the appearance of a conventional family A and B married but the intention was 
always that B and C would be the primary care givers with A being recognised as 
the father but with a secondary relationship with the child. During the period 
leading up to the birth the parties disagreed about A having staying contact with 
the child. After birth A applied for a contact order and B and C responded by 
applying for a residence order and also a specific issue order relating to A's 
parental responsibility (which he had acquired by being married to the mother). 
At first instance the judge granted the joint residence order in favour of B and C, 
thereby granting C parental responsibility. The judge held that although the child 
should have contact with A so that he would know his father it should not be so 
much as to fracture the nuclear family. 
It seems in this case that the trial judge took a different approach compared to 
the trial judge in T v T. While the trial judge in T v T made little to no findings in 
fact about the preconception intentions of the parties, the trial judge in this case 
held that both parties had articulated their views about A's involvement prior to 
conception and both parties felt that there was agreement but that in fact there 
was no agreement. It is noteworthy in this case that, unlike the case of T v T, the 
biological father was only applying for a defined contact order and not a full 
residence order. By contrast, the female couple in A v B were making a very 
similar application as the female couple in T v T, namely a joint residence order 
in their favour and limiting A's parental responsibility. The unique feature of this 
case is that A had parental responsibility by virtue of the fact that he was married 
to B at the time of conception. The reason for this was that B's family were very 
religious and therefore A and B married in order to appease B's parents. C, 
however, did not have parental responsibility and, therefore, required the joint 
residence order in order to gain that. 
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The trial judge granted the joint residence order in favour of B and C and made a 
defined contact order in favour of A. Therefore A's appeal was not so much 
directed at the contact order itself but at the way the judge characterised his role 
in the child's life. The judge essentially provided for some additional contact to 
that which the female couple proposed. However, in characterising A as a 
secondary parent, the judge suggested that contact between A and the child was 
unlikely to increase and thereby, in effect, precluded any further application on 
A's part. Therefore it is this characterisation as a secondary parent that A appeals 
against. 
In emphasising the difference between biological fathers in these parenting 
arrangements and post-separation fathers, Jenkins J, as quoted by Thorpe LJ in 
A v B, notes that: 
The situation that is referred to is not in any way analogous to a 
situation which has been referred to as the "divorce model". The 
father himself used the phrase at an early stage, seeing himself in 
the role of the separated parent but, in broad terms, in most cases 
where there is a separation between married or previously 
cohabiting parents a relationship has been established between the 
parent with whom the child is not living.496 
Jenkin J’s statement was made in the factual context of Re D, which may not 
have been analogous in any way to the ‘divorce model’. However, this does not 
mean that the biological father in a collaborative co-parenting situation will never 
be in a sufficiently analogous situation to a post-separation father to justify a 
similar level of involvement with the child. 
Jenkin J’s comments were also echoed in the case of ML and AR v RWB and 
SWB,497 which was later revisited as P & L (Minors). The facts of this case are 
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broadly similar to previous cases in that the respondents, a female couple, 
advertised for a gay man or couple to start a family with, to which the applicants, 
a male couple, responded. All four adults decided to have a child together but, as 
so often happens in these cases, there may have been a mismatch in the parties’ 
expectations. In terms of the legal position of each party, the biological father had 
parental responsibility over the children by virtue of a court order and the mother’s 
partner also had parental responsibility by virtue of an agreement with the mother, 
with whom she is in a civil partnership. One of the key disputes in this case is 
over the meaning of key terminology. The mismatch in expectations between the 
parties relates to the meaning and role of a ‘father’ in this context. In struggling 
with these issues, the trial judge felt that traditional concepts such as mother and 
father proved quite problematic in this context and, therefore, he preferred the 
notion of primary and secondary parents. He felt that this accorded with the idea 
that the female couple were the principal parents and the biological father 
engaged in ‘a parenting role, albeit in a secondary capacity’.498 
Mr Justice Hedley makes the point that parenting arrangements such as the one 
in question (which might be termed poly-parenting arrangements) are different 
from post-separation parenting. This would seem to be quite an unproblematic 
claim because it seems evident that agreeing to parent in this way from the outset 
is very different from making the best of the situation that presents itself upon 
divorce. However, the trial judge indicates that the reason why these parenting 
arrangements are different from post-separation parenting is because the adults 
in this case were not equivalent to separated parents in that ‘there was a clear 
agreement that the respondents would do the principal parenting and that they 
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would provide the two-parent care to these children’.499 This, however, does not 
appear to be very different from the type of arrangements that often exists within 
post-separation parenting arrangements.  
The trial judge was particularly concerned with protecting the female co-mother’s 
position in light of the fact that she feels her position is threatened by the biological 
father’s presence. This is commendable, especially considering the courts 
seeming dismissiveness of the co-mothers position in T v T. However it is open 
to debate how much her concerns should be prioritised, as the trial judge had 
done, over the concerns of the biological father. After all, the biological father’s 
position in the child’s life is also threatened by characterising him as a secondary 
parent and the female couple as the principal parents. In fact, it could be argued 
that the father is in an even more precarious position because he does not live 
with and care for the children. The trial judge seems to fail to appreciate the 
father’s position and confines him to quite a limited role in the child’s life. In the 
context of post-separation parenting, a similar arrangement whereby the mother 
(and her partner) were the child’s primary caregivers following separation would 
not lead to an inference that the father is a secondary parent with a specific and 
limited role to play. Indeed, the courts place greater emphasis nowadays on 
equality between parents following separation.500 Therefore, the justification for 
treating fathers in this position less favourably than post-separation fathers is not 
necessarily self-evident. 
One position advanced by the trial judge in defence of this difference in treatment 
is the initial agreement between the parties that the respondents would be the 
principal parents and be responsible for child care. This, in and of itself, would 
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not appear to be enough to characterise the father as a secondary parent any 
more than a father in a heterosexual relationship who was not significantly 
involved in the child care would be. Perhaps this issue relates to the gendered 
nature of parental responsibilities and the basis on which the law allocates these. 
However, it would seem reasonable to suggest that what would prevent a post-
separation father as being characterised as a secondary parent is the fact that 
the child was born during the relationship and is a child of that relationship. In a 
collaborative co-parenting situation, although there is no intimate relationship 
between the biological mother and father, there is a parenting arrangement 
between them. The trial judge acknowledges this when he accepts that the 
original agreement was that all four adults would have a parenting role in the 
child’s life. He seems to be mistaken, however, when he characterises this as a 
secondary role. 
The judge goes on to clarify what he means by a parenting role, namely: 
That parenting role was to fulfil at least three purposes. The first 
was indeed to give a clear sense of identity to the child or children 
in due course. The second was to provide the male component of 
parenting which all must be taken to have acknowledged. Thirdly, 
there was a more general role of benign involvement which would 
have, but would certainly not be confined to, an avuncular 
aspect.501 
Here the judge seems to be conflating the different aspects of parenthood. When 
he refers to part of the parenting role as being ‘to provide the male component of 
parenting’, it is unclear whether he means providing the genetic material 
necessary for conception or being some sort of male role model. Each of these, 
however, is arguably separate from the father having any kind of parenting role 
in relation to the child. Furthermore, giving the child a clear sense of identity does 
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not immediately relate to parenting as can be seen in relation to anonymous 
donors, whom children can identify once they reach 18 even though they are not 
considered to be parents.  
The way different aspects of parenthood are being separated out with different 
adults involved with different components has led Nordqvist and Smart to 
conclude that: 
This case, and others like it, raises the question of whether 
parenthood can be envisaged as a kind of ‘parenthood pie chart’ 
which is no longer comprised of two equal parts taken by two 
genetic parents, but of several different adults who each have a 
different-sized slice of the pie or a different role to play.502  
This atomization and separating out the different components of parenthood has 
been remarked on by a number of commentators503 and was discussed more fully 
in Chapter Four.  
The third aspect of parenting that the judge mentions, namely involvement with 
the child, is highly relevant. However, the fact that the judge refers to this as 
‘benign involvement’ with an ‘avuncular aspect’ suggests that the envisaged 
involvement is not the type of involvement one would expect from someone 
exercising a parenting role. The implication of this discussion would seem to be 
that either the agreement was that the father would exercise a parenting role, 
properly understood, in which case he is in a closer position to a separated father 
than the judge would care to admit, or the initial agreement was for some sort of 
uncle figure in which case the biological father cannot be said to be exercising a 
parental role. Each of these options has certain implications and while the former 
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would certainly strengthen the father’s position, the latter wouldn’t necessarily 
preclude his arguments.  
There seems to be an element of contradiction in the judge’s comments about 
the biological father’s role. On the one hand the judge holds that: 
What matters is that there was a degree of regularity to the contact, 
that the children were clear about the contact, they were clear that 
the first applicant was daddy and that the second applicant was 
known as Addy. There were birthdays and Christmases and 
Father's Day cards, and all the things that you would expect to see 
where there is a relationship of parenting. 504 
This seems uncontroversial and not inconsistent with a post-separation father’s 
role. However, the judge goes on to say that ‘[a]ll that the picture of contact does 
is to establish a parenting role for all four, and to establish in the concepts that I 
have tried to develop in my own thinking of the role of the women as principal 
parenters and the role of the men as secondary parenters.’505 Here the judge 
seems to be coming close to saying that the females are the primary caregivers 
but this does not mean that the men are secondary parents, as such, even though 
they may only be caring for the child in a secondary capacity. 
In his judgement, the judge continues to discuss evidence which might be used 
to support the father’s claim. However, the judge interprets this evidence to 
support the idea that the father merely had a secondary parenting role. One 
compelling endorsement of the situation that existed after the birth of the first child 
is the fact that the four adults decided to have a second child. The conclusion that 
the judge draws from this is that ‘everybody went into that second arrangement 
with their eyes wide open about the issues that would be involved. Secondly, it 
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must be the case that at least in 2004 all the parties were sufficiently content with 
the arrangements that were then on foot that they were prepared to go through it 
all again’. In ascertaining what the arrangements were, the judge considers the 
fact that the men had developed a significant role in the first child’s life and it was 
likely that everyone wanted this to continue in relation to the second child. In 
addition to this the judge finds it significant that staying contact had developed 
prior to the birth of the second child. It might be reasonable to suppose that this 
pattern of contact suggests a highly involved role for the father. This is 
strengthened by the fact that the applicants moved house to be closer to the 
respondents and the judge’s finding that all four adults agreed with that decision. 
However, the judge draws on this evidence to bolster the notion of primary and 
secondary parents in a way that does not necessarily accord with the pattern of 
contact that existed between the father and child stating that ‘all these events, in 
my judgment, are consistent with the general picture that is firmly established of 
the respondents as the principal parents with the applicants playing a secondary 
role which never lost its parental nature’.506 
The case was revisited several months later in order to assess how suitable the 
arrangements were. In giving this judgment, the judge accepted that ‘there are 
really no restraints on what parties can choose to agree should be their respective 
roles’ and that ’in exercising a welfare jurisdiction the court will be bound to give 
careful consideration and weight to any such agreement’.507 In saying this, the 
judge is acknowledging the validity of poly-parenting arrangements, which was 
not something that came across in his previous judgment in the case. In the 
judge’s eyes, therefore, the primary purpose of the judgment is ‘to provide a level 
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of contact whose primary purpose is to reflect the role that either has been agreed 
or has been discerned from the conduct of the parties’. Against this background, 
what the judge seems to be saying is that, in cases like this, a full co-parenting 
arrangement may well have been agreed prior to birth and persisted following 
birth but the evidence in this case suggests that this did not occur. On the face of 
it, this seems quite a balanced approach and one that is echoed in subsequent 
cases.  
Therefore, there seems to be judicial acceptance that collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements can present unique legal challenges, which existing models may 
not easily accommodate. This approach is reflected in Hedley J’s warning in P v 
L ‘against the use of stereotypes from traditional family models and in particular 
to resist the temptation to squeeze a given set of facts to fit such a model’.508 
However, this does not imply that collaborative co-parenting is not in any way 
analogous to post-separation parenting, as Mr Justice Jenkin’s comments above 
might indicate,509 merely that we cannot uncritically import assumptions from 
post-separation parenting without first reflecting on the type of parenting 
arrangement that is being considered. 
This is supported by Mr Justice Hedley’s comments in ML v AR, which suggest 
that the type of agreed parenting arrangement may have a marked impact on 
how disputes are resolved. He notes that: 
It is all too easy in these cases for biological fathers to see 
themselves in the same position as in separated parent cases in 
heterosexual arrangements, whereas this arrangement is, and was 
always intended to be, quite different.510 
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The corollary of this is that if the intention is for the biological father to be involved 
as a parent, this should be reflected in law. This relates to the importance of 
reaching an agreement about the type of parenting arrangement that is being 
created and evidencing this in writing, which will be discussed later in this chapter 
in relation to the empirical data.511 
Wallbank and Dietz argue that the way the courts characterise the biological 
father in these cases unjustifiably undermines his position in relation to the 
children. They note that: 
In ‘protecting’ the lesbian family by looking at pre-conception intent 
and the father’s role post-birth, the courts see a lesbian nuclear 
family residing together and exclusive of the non-resident father. 
His role as exercised outside the residential unit is sometimes 
trivialised and not treated as a parental one even when there has 
been a fairly high level of input on his and his partner’s part. 
Questions are therefore raised about when a father becomes a 
parent and what kind of conduct or contribution transmutes him into 
such.512 
This argument picks up on what Mr Justice Jenkins, quoted above, felt was an 
integral part of post-separation parenting, namely prior cohabitation. However, it 
is not clear why cohabitation should be a sine qua non for being recognised as a 
parent. This could apply to a broader range of parents than collaborative co-
parents, for example couples that ‘live apart together’.513 
One of the factors that may have encouraged the court to import principles from 
the post-separation, different-sex case law is the fact that conception did not 
occur through assisted reproduction but sexual intercourse. It is unclear what 
relevance this should have. The significance of the fact that conception occurred 
                                            
511 See page 240. 
512 Wallbank and Dietz, ‘Lesbian mothers, fathers and other animals: is the political personal in 
multiple parent families?’ (n 482) 466. 
513 Sasha Roseneil and Shelley Budgeon, ‘Cultures of Intimacy and Care Beyond “the Family”: 
Personal Life and Social Change in the Early 21st Century’ (2004) 52 Current Sociology 135. 
 
 
219 
through sexual intercourse was not discussed in Re D. However, it could lend 
weight to the suggestion that an exclusive two-parent arrangement was not 
necessarily envisaged and agreed upon prior to conception. Mr Justice Hedley in 
Re B, where the manner of conception was disputed as discussed more fully 
below, took a different view, however. He held in that case that whether 
conception occurred through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination ‘is 
irrelevant to the future of BA. It would not affect my view either way (given my 
other findings about them) of CV or TJ in terms of the part they may play in BA’s 
future’.514  
Despite this, while the manner of conception may be irrelevant in terms of 
assessing whether the biological father’s involvement is in the best interests of 
the child, it is relevant to the question of legal parenthood. In order for the legal 
parenthood provisions of the HFEA 2008 recognising a second female parent to 
apply, conception must have occurred as a result of ‘artificial insemination’.515 If 
this is not the case, the common-law rules apply and the biological father would 
also be the legal father. 
In the seminal House of Lords case of Re G, which concerned a dispute over the 
residence of children between separated female parents, Baroness Hale 
commented that ‘I am driven to the conclusion that the courts below have allowed 
the unusual context of this case to distract them from principles which are of 
universal application’.516 By contrast Diduck notes, in her fictitious concurring 
opinion in Re G as part of the feminist judgment project, that:  
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I regard the “unusual” context of this case to be of crucial 
importance to it. It means that this family cannot be compared 
directly with those in more “usual” contexts and compels this House 
to attempt to achieve a form of equality among different family and 
parenting arrangements without requiring assimilation of all to a 
standard that was not set with all in mind.517 
This emphasis on valuing difference rather than formal equality with different-sex 
parents applies not only to lesbian parenting but to same-sex parenting generally. 
Although Re G concerned a post-separation parenting dispute between female 
parents of a child conceived through anonymous donor sperm, the above 
comments could serve as a useful warning against simply treating collaborative 
co-parenting arrangements the same not only as post-separation heterosexual 
parenting arrangements but also as two-parent families based on the 
heteronormative model. To do either of these things would, as Diduck argues in 
the context of post-separation lesbian parenting, ‘obscure what is different about 
same-sex parents themselves’.518 Therefore a more responsive form of legal 
recognition that privileges neither the homonuclear family form nor claims based 
on biology is required. Monk, in his commentary on Diduck’s feminist judgment, 
argues for ‘a flexible framework that creates space for and recognises, the social, 
cultural and individual contingencies of both children’s and parents’ lived 
experiences’.519 
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Making Intentions Clear 
In these situations, it is important to be clear about what the intentions of the 
adults were in this respect when they agreed to have a child. There is a spectrum 
of possibilities ranging from, on the one hand, a sperm donor who has no 
additional involvement with the child other than what he would have already had 
given his relationship with the couple to, on the other hand, the three adults each 
sharing care-giving responsibility.520 However, as the judge acknowledged in R v 
E, It can be difficult to ascertain what the pre-conception intentions of each of the 
parties were, let alone whether there was agreement on the issue.521 In order to 
clarify the agreed/expected role of the biological father, the post-birth parenting 
reality becomes an important means of gaining insight into what was agreed prior 
to birth, alongside the way the parenting arrangement was initiated. 
One of the striking features of T v T relates to the role of pre-conception 
intentions, which was discussed above in relation to the previous cases. 
Seemingly unusually in this line of cases, the Court of Appeal in T v T found that 
the parties’ pre-conception intentions were not relevant. The Court of Appeal 
were satisfied with the recorder’s finding that ‘neither parents wanted “simply to 
be involved in the means of procreation”’522 and felt no need to take account of 
the appellants submission that ‘M and L had made clear to F and his partner from 
the outset their intention that they would be the children's primary parents, albeit 
with F having some involvement by means of contact, and that F acquired 
parental responsibility only because they felt unable to resist his bullying and 
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domination’.523 Once again, this raises the question of how important pre-
conception intentions are and how they can be proven in the absence of a written 
agreement.  
In each of the previous cases it would be fair to say that there was a dispute 
between what was agreed prior to birth resulting in the finding that there was no 
clear agreement and that each of the parties had different expectations all along. 
As a matter of evidence and proof, in the absence of a written agreement, it would 
be nearly impossible to show that this was the case rather than one of the parties 
subsequently changing their mind as has been alleged in some of the cases. 
Therefore, it is understandable why a judge at first instance would be reluctant to 
make a finding of fact in this regard. This, however, does not mean that pre-
conception intentions are irrelevant in deciding issues of residence and parental 
responsibility, as suggested in T v T. 
It may be necessary to acknowledge the limitations of relying on pre-conception 
intentions. As Lizzie, a solicitor in E&W, notes:  
if [the biological father] is being referred to as dad or a significant 
adult in that child's life, that can be sufficient in practice to set up a 
practical precedent which then of course the donor could use to try 
to elevate his legal status notwithstanding what was set up at the 
time of conception and if there is a proven track record of contact, 
of status, of involvement, of language that can set up a very strong 
platform which can then enable that donor and, of course, what one 
can't legislate for with these arrangements is how people are going 
to feel in two years, three years, five years down the line.524 
This comment is in line with Lord Justice Thorpe’s dicta in A v B, which very much 
stressed the importance of post-birth involvement and the potential for this to 
mean that it would not be appropriate to follow any pre-birth agreement. 
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Nevertheless, there may be some merit in the argument that pre-conception 
intentions should be used as a baseline to determine the outcome of a case. As 
discussed above in relation to R v E, a combination of pre-conception intentions 
and post-conception parenting reality can be instrumental in determining what is 
in the best interests of the child. The court in Re B gave considerable weight to 
the post-conception parenting reality but almost no consideration to the pre-birth 
intentions. This may be commendable from the point of view that it values 
caregiving and a ‘principle of care’, which some commentators have argued 
should underpin decisions in post-separation parenting disputes.525 However, 
uncritically importing this critique of the resolution of different-sex post-separation 
parenting disputes into the novel context of same-sex collaborative co-parenting 
means that intentions are not given the weight that the conception and parenting 
arrangement warrants.526  
A number of commentators have advanced the idea that intentions should be a 
determinative factor in deciding legal parenthood. Horsey, for example, argues 
that: 
If intention was the pre-birth determinant of parenthood, then those 
who intended to play the social parental roles (whether a 
heterosexual or lesbian couple, a single person or a collaboration) 
could legitimately (and more easily) be recognised as parents of the 
child that they collectively or singly, in all senses other than the 
doubly biological, created.527 
This leads Horsey to the conclusion that ‘the recognition of the intention to parent 
should be used as a stable and consistent foundation for all parenthood status 
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provisions in legislation governing assisted reproduction, in turn leading to a 
greater and easier recognition of 'alternative' family forms’.528 
Callus takes this idea further and suggests that intention as the basis for 
determining parenthood should not be restricted to assisted reproduction but 
should apply regardless of the mode of conception. She advances a law reform 
model based on a ‘principled framework which would place formally recognised 
intention at the heart of parental status in order to reconnect legal duty with social 
reality for as many children and parents as possible’.529 It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to discuss the general application of such a model, although Callus 
ably addresses a number of potential criticisms in her article. However, such an 
approach has considerable value in relation to collaborative co-parenting. 
As has been highlighted above, the courts have engaged to varying degrees with 
the pre-conception intentions of the parties. Some cases, such as T v T, 
suggested that pre-conception intentions were irrelevant. There is also judicial 
dicta, such as Lord Justice Thorpe’s judgment in A v B that indicate that pre-
conception intention may be overridden by the post-birth parenting reality. 
However, a number of judgments have also placed considerable weight on what 
was agreed prior to birth when deciding the outcome of the case. In R v E, Mr 
Justice Bennet holds that:  
One important issue is what agreement was arrived at between 
Richard and John on the one hand and Emily and Frances on the 
other as to how the child would be parented after its birth… 
conclude that the arrangement arrived in 1999/2000, or in any event 
before Daniel’s conception, was that Emily and Frances were to be 
his parents. His family was to be Emily and Frances and himself. 
Richard would have a role to play, and an important one, beyond 
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merely identifying him as Daniel’s father in the life of Daniel. I reject 
the evidence of Richard, supported by John, that he was to be not 
just Daniel’s father, but also one of his parents.530 
In reaching this conclusion the judge was heavily influenced by the post-birth 
parenting reality as a guide to pre-conception intentions. The judge 
acknowledged that: 
It would be close to impossible in a case such as this, absent 
relevant contemporary documentation, to conclude whose 
perceptions of what was agreed are likely to be the more accurate, 
based only on an evaluation of the evidence of each of the adults' 
state of mind in 1999/2000.531 
On that basis, this is not truly a case where pre-conception intentions and post-
birth parenting reality are being weighed as separate factors. The two factors are 
being made to align with the latter providing evidence of the former.  
The relevance of agreements and pre-conceptions intentions has come to the 
fore in E&W in the recently decided case of H v S.532 The case concerned a 
dispute between a male couple, H and B, and a single woman, S, over the 
residence of a child, M, conceived as a result of a collaboration between the three 
adults. According to the male couple, the child, conceived with H’s sperm and 
carried to term by S, was to live with H and B and S was to have a subsidiary 
parenting role. S, however, disputed this, claiming that although she and H were 
to co-parent M, B had not been involved and M was to live with S. Upon birth, S 
registered the child under her surname with her as the sole parent. H successfully 
applied for parental responsibility as the biological father but B was not successful 
in this regard as he was neither a step-parent nor a parent in terms of the HFEA 
2008. However, both men were given unsupervised contact with M. H and B were 
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also successful in obtaining a prohibited steps order to prevent S from baptising 
M, which S proceeded to do and initially lied to the court about. 
At the time of the hearing before Russell J, S continued to disrupt contact 
between M and the male couple but, despite that, overnight contact had been 
occurring and a relationship had developed between the men and M. Russell J 
found that the case did not concern a surrogacy arrangement and as such fell to 
be decided by the ordinary principles contained in the Children Act 1989 and, in 
particular, was governed by the paramountcy of the welfare of the child. The 
conclusion the court reached in this regard was that the welfare of the child was 
best served if she lived with H and B, if B had parental responsibility and if S was 
given supervised contact, each of which the court ordered. 
This case is particularly noteworthy because of the emphasis placed on the 
importance of the agreement that existed between S and the two men prior to 
conception in deciding what is in the best interests of the child. Russell J notes: 
The circumstances of M's conception and birth are relevant 
because M will, in time, need to understand the background to her 
birth and, secondly, because it will inform and assist the court in 
reaching its decisions to conclude what agreements were made 
prior to M's conception and birth.533 
This suggests willingness on the part of the judiciary in E&W to recognise, and to 
some extent enforce, pre-conception intentions in the context of collaborative co-
parenting. This is, however, subject to the best interests test and in this case what 
was in the best interests of the child from the point of view of the mother’s conduct 
in terms of frustrating contact and breaching a court order, happened to coincide 
with what was agreed prior to birth. Therefore, it is not self-evidently the case that 
                                            
533 Ibid. [8]. 
 
 
227 
such an agreement would be enforced where the mother’s conduct was not also 
brought into question. 
Mary Welstead is critical of what she describes as an ‘unusual, and Draconian, 
order to remove a 15 month old baby girl from her mother’.534 She argues that 
the judge placed a surprising amount of emphasis on the pre-conception 
agreement given that the best interests of the child are the court’s paramount 
consideration. Nevertheless, Welstead accepts that given the judicial approach 
on the matter it would be preferable ‘if all agreements to procreate, whether by 
way of surrogacy, sperm donation, or co-parenting, were to be regulated by law. 
Agreements could then be entered into with the secure knowledge that they 
would normally be enforced’.535 This echoes Russell J’s remarks in H v S that 
‘The lack of a properly supported and regulated framework for arrangements of 
this kind has, inevitably, led to an increase in these cases before the Family 
Court’.536 
Despite this, it is important to acknowledge that what was intended prior to 
conception may no longer reflect how the adults feel following the birth of the 
child. As Lord Justice Thorpe starkly comments in A v B, ‘[w]hat the adults look 
forward to before undertaking the hazards of conception, birth and the first 
experience of parenting may prove to be illusion or fantasy’.537 This is also a 
concern for legal professionals working with prospective collaborative co-
parenting families who advise their clients to think through the implications of 
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what happens when someone changes their minds. As Gail, a family law solicitor 
in E&W, comments:  
What I say to people when they come in, particularly to women is 
“well look you say the man doesn’t want any involvement, well that 
is fine but you have got to realise that we are all human and we can 
all change our minds and you really do need to think that he may 
fall in love with the baby so I mean, just think about what you would 
do.538     
Therefore, the courts in E&W would have to assure themselves that what was 
agreed prior to birth remains in the best interests of the child despite any change 
in circumstances. 
Nevertheless, given this judicial willingness to recognize changing intentions 
following birth, it would be interesting to see how the courts resolved a dispute 
where there was a clear record of the pre-conception intentions, which may or 
may not accord with the post-birth parenting reality. This is a situation the courts 
in E&W have not had to face, given that none of the reported cases have yet 
concerned a written agreement, but has been addressed in other jurisdictions.  
This lack of written agreements in the E&W cases contrasts with the cases in 
Quebec, which invariable concern a written agreement. This may be partly due 
to the different role legal agreements in family law tend to play in common-law 
and civil-law legal systems. The priority afforded to written agreements in Quebec 
even in relation to parenthood was demonstrated in A v. B, C and X.539 The case 
was similar to L.O. v S.J. in that a lesbian couple conceived with a known donor 
who had signed a written agreement relinquishing any rights in relation to the 
child. Nevertheless, the donor sought to block the non-biological mother’s 
                                            
538 UKPB5. 
539 A v. B, C and X, [2007] Q.J. No. 1895. 
 
 
229 
second-parent adoption of the child and brought an action for filiation. However, 
the Quebec Court of Appeal concluded that despite the fact the father had been 
having occasional contact with the child the written agreement took precedence. 
Some commentators have viewed this outcome as progressive in terms of 
recognising women-led families.540 By prioritising the intentions of the adults over 
biology, the court is recognising women’s procreative autonomy to conceive 
children without involving the biological father in raising the child. Various 
commentators have long argued for the prioritisation of intentions in the context 
of assisted reproduction.541 While this does seem a positive in that case, it raises 
issues which need to be considered more fully. 
One of the most positive aspects of this case is that there is no sense in which 
the validity of women-led families is being questioned. Undoubtedly the court is 
guided by child welfare. It would be inconceivable for a court in that position not 
to be mindful of child welfare. However, there is no indication that the court 
questioned that the child’s needs would be met within the women-led family. 
Therefore, the court could not have been further from imposing father-figures on 
same-sex families, which has been highlighted as a problematic bias within the 
legal regulation of same-sex parenting. This is commendable from the point of 
view of not automatically prioritising biological and heteronormative discourses 
suggesting that children need to be raised by a mother and a father. 
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However, in some respects there is a concern that this line of thinking may go too 
far the other way and lead to an automatic prioritisation of intentions and the 
autonomy of women-led families over other interests. Although the fact that 
biology was not determinative was laudable, it is important not to overlook the 
legitimate interests that the biological father has. Often these can result from a 
post-birth relationship that develops with the child and the court was mindful of 
this but decided this was insufficient to override the intentions. However, the 
biological father also has a weaker interest, which stems from the biological 
connection itself. John, a solicitor in E&W who was interviewed in this study, 
echoes this sentiment when he notes that: 
as a very general statement of principle it is better for children to 
have a relationship with their parents and while I do not believe that 
biology is in anyway conclusive of a relationship if there is a 
biological connection I think that is a legitimate reason to say that if 
that is a relationship that is desired to be pursued either by adult or 
by child that is a reason to know and understand and appreciate.542 
Viewed from a contractual perspective, intentions would take precedence and be 
determinative. However, unlike in a purely contractual situation, each of the 
parties has a degree of emotional investment in the child, which should not be 
ignored.  
The case for allowing the biological father to play a role in the child’s life is 
stronger where post-birth contact has taken place and some sort of relationship 
has been allowed to develop. In that situation, not only are the child’s and father’s 
interests engaged in maintaining the relationship but the relationship itself has 
developed partly as a result of parenting decisions the women have made. 
However, even in the absence of such a relationship, if the biological father 
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asserts a genuine interest or need for connection with the child it may be 
justifiable to explore how that can be accommodated. This is not meant to 
suggest that a biological father should automatically be able to assert his rights 
over the interests of the women-led family nor that he should be able to ignore 
any pre-conception agreement on an emotional whim. It is, nevertheless, argued 
here that the courts need to engage in a genuine balancing exercise between the 
interests of all involved when deciding these disputes rather than promoting a 
particular family form.  
I would suggest that it is the decision to involve or a known donor (or put slightly 
differently, the fact that a female couple have conceived with a man who is now 
aware of the child’s existence) that justifies the court to weigh the father’s 
interests against those of the women-led family. One implication of this decision 
may be that the man might develop feelings for the child and feel a need to have 
a connection with that child, which may be strongly related to their biological 
connection. In the literature, this tends to be argued from the female/feminist 
perspective, as an illustration of the problematic way the legal system approaches 
known donation by imposing fathers on these families. However, once one moves 
beyond suggestions of bias and heteronormativity, in a similar way to the Quebec 
court, one is confronted with a biological father whose legitimate interests are 
engaged. 
Nevertheless, the judge’s task in resolving disputes surrounding parenthood and 
parenting is made more difficult in the absence of any evidence of the type of 
parenting arrangement that was envisaged prior to conception. This speaks to 
the need, from an evidentiary point of view, for parties to make a prior written 
agreement about the parenting arrangement even though such an agreement 
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may not be legally binding. Furthermore, not only does the existence of a written 
agreement provide evidence of pre-conception intentions, which can assist in the 
resolution of disputes, but the process of negotiating an agreement means that 
there is an opportunity to clarify the respective roles of the adults. This may have 
the beneficial effect of reducing the likelihood of disputes arising. 
Negotiating a written agreement as a means of facilitating discussion was seen 
as crucial by many of the legal practitioners interviewed in this study both in the 
UK and Canada. Gail, a family law solicitor in E&W with considerable experience 
dealing with same-sex parenting disputes stresses that, ‘[w]hat I have always 
thought the benefit of written agreements are is that it concentrates people’s 
minds on what it is that they are getting involved with. It helps people to think 
about how they will deal with uncertainties’. The idea that a pre-conception written 
agreement puts these families in a better position to deal with future uncertainties 
is one that is echoed by a number of the legal professional participants. Mary, for 
instance, an attorney in Ontario introduced above, comments that: 
I think that it’s very important that couples be educated and 
understand that what you're planning against is bad management 
in the future. And what we are planning for is an agreement that 
goes in the drawer and you'll never look at it again. Think down the 
road now, you know, be intentional and then see how things go. But 
at least you’ve got something to come.543 
The way that Mary phrases the purpose of a written agreement is noteworthy 
because she does not approach the issue from a purely legal perspective as a 
court might but she frames it in terms of the ability of written agreements to 
provide peace of mind for these families that they have though through the 
relevant issues should future difficulties arise. This way of communicating the 
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significance of written agreements is important in terms of educating parents, as 
Mary puts it, because the desire for peace of mind in the face of future uncertainty 
is likely to be a more attractive feature of written agreements than their more 
legalistic uses, which may seem more abstract to these families. 
These experienced views, therefore, paint the picture of written agreements not 
as legally binding contracts that determine the outcomes of future disputes but 
as a means of facilitating discussion and also as evidence of pre-conception 
intentions. Kerry, an attorney in Ontario with a considerable same-sex family law 
practice, summarises the dual purpose and importance of written agreements 
quite forcefully: 
It’s critical. Critically important. And not because the contract is 
enforceable. Because, at least in Ontario and probably most places, 
it’s not enforceable. It’s important for two reasons: One, it is 
evidence of what everyone intended in the event that the 
relationship breaks down, so it will provide some guidance for a 
decision maker in the future, a judge or arbitrator, about what the 
parties intended…And secondly, maybe even more importantly, 
erm, it helps clarify everyone’s intentions. 
It is noteworthy that in both E&W and jurisdictions such as Ontario in Canada, 
written agreements about parenthood and parenting are unenforceable and yet 
legal professionals in both jurisdictions strongly recommend entering into them. 
Understandably the legal framework in the jurisdiction they are in influences how 
legal professionals view the role of written agreements. John, a solicitor in E&W, 
where the courts have a large degree of discretion when exercising their child 
welfare jurisdiction notes that: 
While a certain amount of analysis would need to be paid to what 
the agreement was, what the agreement was is not determinative 
of what the answer should be. What the answer should be is, what 
is in the best interests of this child, and so if the agreement was 
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Dad has no role whatsoever and he is not going to be recognised 
as Dad fine that is relevant and needs to be taken into account but 
the reality is whether that child is best served by having a 
relationship with the Dad and if the child is best served by having a 
relationship with the Dad then that is determinative of the outcome 
irrespective of what the agreement was.544 
 This contrasts with Belinda, an attorney in BC, who stresses that following the 
Family Law Act reforms in 2013, as a result of the written agreement ‘[t]he donor 
is never a parent, period, full stop. Very simple. And that reflects the biological 
reality that donors don't, you know, they're only involved at the beginning; they 
don't deliver the child, or anything like that’.  
Despite this seemingly clear distinction in the legal position between E&W and 
BC a number of legal professionals in BC mooted the idea that the courts could 
arguably retain a degree of discretion in deciding the involvement of the biological 
father, any written agreement notwithstanding. David, an attorney in BC, 
commenting on the binding nature of written agreements denying the donor any 
legal status in BC, notes that ‘there will eventually be cases that will try to 
challenge that, but it’s clear that that’s the intention of the law and that’s the way 
it’s written’. Lance, an attorney in BC specialising in fertility law, goes further to 
say that: 
my sense is that, regardless of how the Statute’s written, there will 
be a case and therefore a precedent at some point which is going 
to establish rights for that donor or that surrogate if the actions of 
the parties are such that they are contrary to whatever their 
agreement may read. And if their actions are consistent with the 
agreement when they say they are going to have contact, I think the 
court will make an order…And given the rights to the facts, I’d like 
to argue the case.545 
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This is reminiscent of Lord Justice Thorpe’s comments above to the effect that 
the post-birth parenting reality might indicate that the pre-conception intentions 
were unrealistic. However, these judicial dicta were made in respect of a legal 
framework that does not recognise the binding nature of written agreements 
unlike the revised framework that now exists in BC.    
Despite this, there does appear to be a difference in the cases coming before the 
Canadian courts, whether that’s in Ontario, Quebec or Alberta, on the one hand 
and those in E&W in terms of the existence of written agreements. None of the 
cases in E&W have involved families with written agreements, whereas a number 
of the Canadian cases have. The cases that reach the courts are not necessarily 
representative of families parenting in this way many of which may resolve 
disputes without going to court. It is also unlikely that there would be a significant 
difference in terms of the existence of a written agreement between families in 
Canada and E&W who sought the advice of a legal professional when creating 
their family given that legal professionals in both jurisdictions emphasise the 
importance of written agreements, as discussed above. 
As Chapter Seven will discuss more fully, the Canadian parents in the current 
study’s sample all had written agreements and had sought legal advice, whereas 
there was a mixture of families with and without written agreements in the E&W 
sample. There could be a number of explanations for this. As Chapter Two 
discusses in more detail, the sample size is too small to generalise. However, the 
engagement of legal professionals in education initiatives within the (prospective) 
LGBTQ parenting community can play a significant role in this. This varies greatly 
depending on geographical location but some cities in Canada, for example 
Toronto, have very well developed (legal) education programmes, which likely 
 
 
236 
result in more legally aware prospective LGBTQ parents. Such initiatives do exist 
to a certain extent in the UK, for example in London, but one of the hopes for this 
research is that it can feed into legal education programmes for (prospective) 
LGBTQ parents in the UK. 
Despite tentative indications in the present study’s sample and in the case law 
that LGBTQ collaborative co-parents in Canada may be more legally aware than 
their counterparts in E&W, this is by no means universally the case as the 
Canadian legal professionals interviewed attest to. Zabrina, a family law attorney 
in BC, notes that ‘the one’s I've seen have had formal agreements. But that’s 
probably proportionate because of the work that I do’. Therefore, legal 
professionals, like Zabrina, who are involved not only at the stage of disputes but 
also in drafting written agreements at the stage of family creation are more likely 
to encounter written agreements in their practice. By contrast, Mary, an attorney 
in Ontario mentioned above, who mainly has experience dealing with same-sex 
families that are at the point of separation has more experience of families that 
do not have written agreements. She describes a particularly emotionally fraught 
case she was involved with where the female couple in a collaborative co-
parenting situation were separating: 
it was very unpleasant all around, and I could not get a discussion 
happening to get the parties to the point where they wanted to 
discuss how all of this was going to play out over time… there was 
no agreement in place, nor could I convince anybody that it would 
be a good time to put an agreement in place, to at least state 
intention about the relationship between those children and those 
dads.               
The reasons why families may or may not wish to put written agreements in place 
will be explored in more detail in Chapter Seven where the views of participants 
in the current study will be considered.  
 
 
237 
While legal professionals in both Canada and E&W are keen to stress the 
importance and utility of written agreements, there is also a sense of 
acknowledgment that from the families’ point of view, it is not the written 
agreement per se that is important but the discussions that it encourages. Dan, 
a family law solicitor in E&W, comments that ‘I don’t see it necessarily needing to 
be a legal contract because you can’t contract on this stuff, but I do think at least 
some note or memorandum of what is agreed is going to be useful but the most 
important thing is clearly to talk about it’.546 Therefore creating a written 
agreement is not essential for people to think about ‘how they will deal with 
uncertainties’, as Gail put it, but it can be a useful means of addressing these in 
the future to have something down in writing.  
As will be discussed more extensively in Chapter Seven, a number of the 
participants in this study had wide-ranging discussions prior to conception about 
what the future might hold but did not write any of this down. Fortunately, these 
families had not been in dispute about the roles of the various adults, perhaps 
because they had not encountered the difficulties that some of the other families 
have or perhaps because they pre-empted any disputes in the discussions that 
they had. Nevertheless, the process of creating the written agreement can be a 
good focal point for these discussions and can provide evidence of what was 
agreed should dispute occur in the future where memories of what was agreed 
might be understandably sketchy.  
While there may be some resistance to thinking about the possibility of disputes 
further down the line, there is a clear sense that confronting these issues at the 
stage of family creation can avoid or at least ameliorate more intractable 
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difficulties further down the line. In response to being asked whether families 
embarking on collaborative co-parenting can reasonably expect to consider 
potential worst case scenarios at that stage, Gail, a solicitor in E&W introduced 
above, comments that:  
Well I think you can. I do, then they think about what would we do, 
and that’s what I was saying, heterosexual couples don’t tend to sit 
down and think what happens if we divorce. If they did then we 
would have a lot less disputes if people actually looked at it like that. 
It seems unrealistic to expect that a pre-conception written agreement is the silver 
bullet that avoids dispute further down the line. As mentioned above, intentions 
and feelings can change following the birth of the child and prior planning may 
not be able to avoid this. However, as Gail implies, the fact that collaborative co-
parenting families are, by necessity, intentionally created could be seen as a good 
opportunity to address any potential issues that might arise, which can only be a 
positive thing even it is not a full-proof means of avoiding future conflict.       
Contracting Contact 
Despite the inconsistency in the use of parental responsibility in previous cases, 
the courts have taken a more consistent approach to contact as demonstrated in 
two recent cases (ML v RW547 and A v B548). It would seem that the women’s 
attempt to drastically curtail contact in ML  v RW is somewhat unwarranted given 
the role for the men, which the evidence suggests they agreed to and which the 
men have been performing. By contrast, one might argue that the women’s desire 
in Re B to limit the biological father’s contact with the child would seem warranted 
because that was never what was agreed and is not the situation that existed 
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after birth. In that sense Re B deals with a situation that is more akin to a 
charitable donation than an attempt to start a family together.  
Despite this, the case can be seen as an illustration of how female-parented 
families create through the involvement of a known donor might feel vulnerable 
in the face of claims by the biological father. Nordqvist and Smart argue that the 
case contains echoes of a situation where ‘the looming donor can make claims 
to a child, even though the child is happy with the family they already have’.549 
This is a particular concern given that female couples that create a family in this 
way may feel insecure that the family they have created is going to be recognised 
as a ‘proper’ family.550 In making this point, Nordqvist and Smart recognise the 
countervailing consideration that some female couples actively seek an involved 
father figure rather than just resorting to known donation as a means of 
conception. As they put it, ‘[s]ome parents are therefore trying to reshape 
parenthood away from the familiar twosome model towards a different 
combination of adults, while insisting that this too is a proper family’.551   
Nordqvist and Smart’s critique of ML v RW focuses very much on the female 
couple’s vulnerability and perspective in trying to create a family. This is 
unsurprising given their study’s focus on lesbian parenting. However, the men in 
this case and others like it are also embarking on the process of family formation 
alongside the female couple. Therefore, it is important to consider the 
vulnerability and needs not only of the female couple but also the biological father 
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(and his partner if he has one) in these types of collaborative co-parenting 
situations. This issue will be considered in greater depth in Chapter Seven. 
Building on this, although the female couple did not manage to restrict the contact 
in the way they sought, the male couple in ML and AR v RWB and SWB will be 
similarly disappointed because they had hoped for shared residence. Again, 
without a written document, it is difficult to ascertain what was agreed prior to 
birth. However, in this case, the post-birth parenting situation does seem to 
suggest that shared residence was not what was agreed. Therefore, the men’s 
expectation may be equally unrealistic in this respect. Despite this, it is regrettable 
that the courts are unable to insist on greater contact between the children and 
the male couple, largely because of the female couple’s hostility (justified or not) 
towards the male couple.           
Incidentally, it is worth exploring a little further at this stage A's choice of 
application for a contact order rather than a residence order, unlike the 
respondent in T v T. Perhaps in this case the level of contact that had developed 
with the child was less; perhaps because the child was younger such a strong 
relationship hadn't developed between A and the child; or perhaps A felt that 
contact was as much as he could hope for. These are important issues to 
consider because they can affect how just the outcome of the case is. A 
comparison of the cases T v T and A v B begs the question why the former case 
resulted in a joint residence order in favour of all three but the latter case resulted 
in a joint residence order in favour of the female couple. The simple answer to 
that is that no such joint residence order in favour of all three adults was sought 
in A v B. As indicated above, perhaps the facts of the case warrant such a 
distinction and perhaps the reason no such application was made is because that 
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has a lower likelihood of success. Regardless, it is interesting to note that the trial 
judge in T v T was willing to grant a residence order in favour of the biological 
father and mother, whereas the trial judge in A v B was reluctant to even allow 
increasing contact between the biological father and child. Can this be explained 
simply by the differing approaches of different judges or was there a crucial 
distinction in the facts of these cases? 
It is possible to infer from the facts of the case that the father might have 
considered applying for a joint residence order had he felt able to do so. This is 
implicit in the trial judge’s finding that 'there has never been an acceptance of the 
basics of the father's position, even if he made it plain, that there should be three 
parents and two homes.'552 However, the trial judge goes on to say: 
Any benefit that might accrue from developing the relationship with 
the father to regular contact, shared holidays and a situation where 
in normal terms in these days a Shared Residence Order might be 
appropriate is not [present in] this case. The father has done well 
with the child. That is his evidence and I accept it, but to try and 
develop the relationship to a full divorced parent type of 
relationship, in my judgment any benefit that accrues is likely to be 
outweighed by what I consider is likely to be confusion and 
disruption and the potential disruption of the relationship between 
the mothers and the child, and it is that relationship which provides 
the nurture, stability and security for M.553 
The trial judge emphasises the fact that the child has never lived with the father. 
However in T v T the Court of Appeal referred to case law that confirmed that this 
is not a prerequisite of granting a residence order. It seems to be the case that, 
mutates mutandis, the father in this case is in more or less a similar position to 
the father in T v T but just at an earlier stage in his relationship with the child 
because the child is younger. This suggests that it would not be inappropriate, as 
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the trial judge indicates, to grant a shared residence order if one were applied for. 
There does seem to be an element of different judges reaching different decisions 
as a matter of discretion rather than on the basis of a principled distinction. As 
noted above, this is a concern Smith expressed in relation to earlier case law. 
However, the age of the child may have been a significant factor in this case. It 
may well be disruptive to the life of a 2 1/2-year-old to have to share time between 
his parents whereas it wouldn't be so disruptive to a 7-year-old or a 10-year-old. 
Nevertheless, there is no suggestion in the court of first instance's judgement of 
this sort of distinction and very limited recognition of the role the biological father 
can play as the child grows up. 
Fortunately, the Court of Appeal takes a slightly different approach, which is 
evident in the following, telling section of the judgment:  
A's involvement in the creation of M and his commitment to M from 
birth suggest that he may be seeking to offer a relationship of 
considerable value. It is generally accepted that a child gains by 
having two parents. It does not follow from that that the addition of 
a third is necessarily disadvantageous'.554  
The Court of Appeal recognises that there may have been a mismatch in 
expectations. However, in their judgement expectations are not determinative 
and what is subsequently in the child's best interest may not accord with pre-
conception intentions. In light of this, Lord Justice Thorpe, in delivering the 
judgement of the Court of Appeal allowing the appeal, held that:  
in my judgment the conclusion that Judge Jenkins should have 
reached was that the issue of whether the relationship between M 
and A should be encouraged to thrive and develop had to be 
decided by stages in the light of accumulating evidence. There were 
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too many unforeseeable factors to allow this judge to declare the 
future as definitively as he did.555  
In some ways this is a more satisfactory outcome which accords with the court's 
reasoning in T v T. However, it once again raises the issue of the security of the 
female couple's homonuclear family, which needs to be explored in greater depth. 
The case, and in particular Lady Justice Black's concurring judgment, also raises 
a number of ancillary issues that deserve to be considered in greater detail such 
as the use of language and labelling in these situations as well as the role of 
written agreements in documenting the expectations of the parties. 
Lady Justice Black, who has considerable experience with these types of cases 
dating back to 2001, felt it necessary to expand on some of the issues she felt 
were particularly problematic. She reviewed some of the key cases on the issue, 
which have been discussed in more detail above. She highlighted that pre-
conception intentions can never be determinative of the outcome of the case but 
forms part of the consideration of factors involved in assessing what is in the best 
interests of the child. In addition to this, Lady Justice Black highlighted the 
difficulties around terminology for these families, particularly in relation to the 
biological father, which was discussed in more detail above. Zanghellini is 
particularly critical of Lady Justice Black’s use of the term father, arguing that: 
‘father’, like ‘mother’, is a normatively loaded term which 
immediately naturalises the role of all male progenitors in lesbian 
and gay families as something more than their genetic contribution, 
inviting us to think of them in terms of ‘fathers’ no matter what – 
regardless, for example, of shared intentions about whether or not 
they should act as fathers in the child’s life.556 
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This is a powerful critique because it is impossible to ‘unload’ this normative 
content from our everyday use of these terms. However, it does not follow that 
the use of the term father implies an uncritical acceptance of these normative 
assumptions. 
Zanghellini’s critique compellingly demonstrates the ease with which courts can, 
perhaps unwittingly, rely on heteronormative assumptions when dealing with 
these families. However, it also reveals a tendency to criticize court decisions on 
this basis without necessarily making any attempt to interpret judicial reasoning 
in its best light or give credit for attempting to engage with these complex issues. 
Zanghellini’s critique stems from his characterization of the case as one where 
the biological father subsequently changed his mind about the involvement he 
was comfortable with rather than one where there was no clear agreement about 
his role. 
The trial judge in A v B found that ‘the father never managed to establish an 
agreement to his satisfaction’.557 In Zanghellini’s interpretation: 
this is quite different from saying that the father may have been 
under the impression that his role would be different. What Judge 
Jenkins seems to be saying here is, rather, that the father entered 
the agreement with mental reservations – that is, despite failing to 
be happy with its terms. Characterising the situation any differently 
– in particular, as one in which the sperm donor was not clear about 
what had been agreed –gives an undue rhetorical advantage to the 
sperm donor, setting the stage for deciding the appeal in his 
favour.558     
It is, however, questionable whether such a definitive inference is warranted from 
the facts of the case, especially in the absence of a written agreement. The trial 
judge’s position, which the Court of Appeal accepted, that there was a lack of 
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agreement over the biological father’s role is at least arguable on the facts of the 
case and does not necessarily imply any inherent bias in favour of the biological 
father. 
Given Zanghellini’s interpretation of the facts, which is arguable and valid 
although difficult to be definitive about, it is understandable why he characterises 
the case as one suggesting that ‘biological connection, in and of itself, should be 
constitutive of a relationship of belonging between genetic progenitors and ‘their’ 
children.’ In support of this Zanghellini highlights Lord Justice Thorpe’s comment 
that ‘the issue of whether the relationship between M and A should be 
encouraged to thrive and develop had to be decided by stages in the light of 
accumulating evidence’.559 He suggests that ‘[t]he language here betrays what 
Thorpe LJ assumes to be the best case scenario in lesbian and gay families – a 
thriving relationship between children and their biological fathers’. However, 
generalizing from a case of same-sex parenting involving a known biological 
father where his role may or may not have been agreed, to the best case scenario 
in lesbian and gay families more broadly would seem to be a surprising leap to 
make. 
Overall, Zanghellini’s critique of A v B is an important one because it unearths 
hidden assumptions that may be implicitly operating in the judicial reasoning of a 
case that, on the face of it, may be seen as a step in the right direction towards 
recognizing same-sex collaborative co-parenting. While the possibility of 
recognizing collaborative co-parenting may be a positive step, it should not come 
at the expense of acknowledging the sufficiency of same-sex parenting. As 
Zanghellini notes: 
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it is one thing to facilitate poly-parenting on the ground and to the 
extent that the participants to a parenting project desire it, and 
another thing entirely to promote it, let alone enforce it, because of 
the supposed (and unsubstantiated) benefits of dual-gender, 
biological and genetic parenting.560 
Zanghellini goes further to suggest that: 
When poly-parenting is court-imposed, or when a court implicitly 
pictures it as the desirable outcome in circumstances such as those 
of the present case, then poly-parenting (as actually practiced or as 
regulatory ideal) risks losing any transformative potential.561 
However, I would argue that these poly-parenting or collaborative co-parenting 
arrangements also risk losing their transformative potential when we fail to 
recognise genuine attempts to engage with the complex issues of legal 
recognition that arise in these cases and the way they advance the debate around 
these issues, as well as warning of the dangers of potential heteronormative bias. 
As the court highlighted in the more recent case of Re G; Re Z,562 decisions in 
these cases are highly fact-specific. Therefore, it is worth considering the factual 
circumstances of that case in some detail. It is also worth examining the 
arguments advanced by counsel in some depth to see which are most 
compelling. One aspect of the case that makes detailed analysis problematic is 
the considerable disagreement that exists over various facts in the case such as 
the duration and quality of contact with the children. This is something that would 
hopefully have been resolved during a fact-finding hearing had the substantive 
applications been brought. However, the parties settled the case out of court. 
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Therefore, as this was merely an application for leave to apply to the court, no 
findings in fact were made. 
In relation to F and G, one of a number of disputed issues in the case concerns 
what was agreed prior to birth. D and E contended that they made it quite clear 
to S that he was to have no parental title, no parental responsibility and no 
financial contribution. In E’s words, ‘we wanted a known donor to make it possible 
for the child to find out more about its background. We were not looking for a 
father, we didn't want involvement, we, that is D and I were to be the parents’.563 
S, however, argued that these were not the terms of the agreement but that D 
and E would care for the children and S would be involved in their upbringing and 
have contact as their father. Just as in A v B and other previous cases, in the 
absence of a written agreement as evidence of their pre-conception intentions it 
seems impossible to resolve the issue. This would appear to be a recurrent theme 
throughout the case law in this area and highlights the importance of reaching an 
agreement about the expectations and roles of the respective adults and to 
evidence this in writing. 
Pre-conception intentions, although not determinative, can be an important factor 
in cases like these, if they can be ascertained. Often judges have tried to infer 
what roles were agreed for each of the adults prior to birth by examining their 
post-birth involvement with the children. In this case, however, even that was 
disputed to an extent. In relation to F, it seems clear that contact took place 
somewhere between once a fortnight and once a week, either at S and T’s home 
or at D and E’s home, and that F was introduced to various members of S and 
T’s families. There was, however, considerable dispute about the quality of the 
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contact. D and E argued that S mainly came round to socialise with them, paying 
little attention to F and rarely seeing G as he would be asleep. S, on the other 
hand, felt that he and the children had a very close relationship, claiming that ‘the 
children were clearly very pleased to see us both and particular wanted to be very 
close to me and kiss me’.564 Again, the dispute about the quality of contact will be 
a difficult one to resolve during the fact-finding hearing. However, the trial judge 
felt that, given the regularity of contact that existed between S and the children, 
he would be able to at least make a prima facie case for a contact order in relation 
to both children. 
In relation to Z, the disagreement about pre-conception intentions seems even 
more pronounced. X and Y argued along similar lines to D and E that they wanted 
a known donor with no other responsibilities in relation to the child other than 
perhaps being a role model. Furthermore, they argued that T didn’t express 
wanting anything more than this at the time. However, T argued that the 
arrangement was that X and Y would be Z’s parents and care for Z but that he 
would still be Z’s father and be involved in Z’s life. T went even further and argued 
that he thought he would still be one of Z’s legal parents and would be recorded 
on the birth certificate as such. In any event, regardless of what had been agreed, 
approximately fortnightly contact occurred between Z and T. Once again, 
however, the quality of this contact was disputed. T argued that he had a bond 
with Z who was pleased to see him and was very relaxed around him. X and Y 
claimed that T and Z did not interact much at all and X even described T’s 
assertions to the contrary as a ‘bare-faced lie’.565 
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The central contention of the applicants’ argument in relation to Z is similar to that 
of the applicants in relation to G and is succinctly summarised in the statement 
that T ‘is not challenging the respondents’ place in Z’s life, merely seeking the 
continuation of one for himself’.566 According to the applicants this accords with 
the idea advanced by X and Y of T as a role model for the child. The respondent’s 
arguments in this case again are similar to those in relation to G, in terms of the 
autonomy of the family unit. The respondents in this case also go further to argue 
that pre-conception intentions cannot be enforced by the court and that options 
other than being a known donor would have been open to the applicants had they 
wanted to be involved fathers. The enforceability of pre-conception intentions and 
the implications of involving/being a known donor are issues that deserve grater 
consideration in their own right and would, no doubt, have been considered in 
greater detail during the substantive hearing. 
One of the underlying concerns that runs throughout cases like this is the worry 
that the validity and suitability of same-sex parenting arrangements in general are 
being brought into question. After all, it was not all that long ago that the law didn’t 
fully recognise same-sex parenting and may have even considered being in a 
same-sex relationship prejudicial to custody applications in relation to children. In 
some quarters this issue may still be debated. However, such debate is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Recent amendments to the law567 have made it clear that 
the law fully recognises same-sex parenting. Therefore, it is important in deciding 
these cases that there is no suggestion that same-sex parenting is in any way 
inadequate and that is why the biological father needs to be involved. Although 
none of the judgments contain any explicit reference to this, it is a valid concern 
                                            
566 Ibid. [75]. 
567 Such as the Human and Fertilisation Act 2008 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002. 
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especially when some judgments (such as Re B discussed above) have come 
close to imposing contact merely because the donor/biological father is known. 
In Re G; Re Z, however, the judge explicitly acknowledges that ‘the policy 
underpinning [the 2008 Act] reforms is an acknowledgement that alternative 
family forms without fathers are sufficient to meet a child's need.’ In the judge’s 
view, this is bolstered by the fact that ‘it is now established beyond doubt that the 
relationship between a same-sex couple constitutes 'family life' for the purposes 
of article 8: see Schalk and Kopf v Austria [2010] ECHR 995.’568 This 
acknowledgment is of crucial importance to the decision because it belies any 
suggestion that the suitability of same-sex parenting is being brought into 
question. The judge explicitly states that in relation to applications for section 8 
orders, ‘the position of a lesbian couple who have been granted the status of legal 
parents by the 2008 Act is exactly the same as any other legal parent.’ The 
converse of this, however, is that the biological father is not precluded by the 
2008 Act from making an application to the court and therefore his status is the 
same as any other applicant who needs the leave of the court to make an 
application for a section 8 order.569 I have argued elsewhere that: 
[t]he court’s reasoning in this regard is commendable to the extent 
that it allows the biological fathers to argue their case at a 
substantive hearing: not granting these biological fathers leave to 
apply would have meant putting them at a disadvantage (based on 
their biological relationship) as compared to other adults with a 
similar connection to the child to whom the courts may well have 
granted leave to apply.570   
                                            
568 Re G (A Minor); Re Z (A Minor) (n 551) [113]. 
569 Ibid. [115]. 
570 Philip Bremner, ‘CASES: Lesbian Parents and Biological Fathers – Leave to Apply for 
Contact’ (2014) 36 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 83, 80. 
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By contrast, some commentators have been critical of the case because of the 
emphasis it places on biological fathers571 and its potential to undermine the 
policy of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 by allowing disputes 
to continue between lesbian parents and known biological fathers.572 
Despite this, the judge’s approach to determining the application for leave to 
apply for section 8 orders proceeds from a well-balanced and solid analysis of 
the law and the policy underlying it. From this, he goes on to make the 
determination that both T and S should be able to apply to the court for contact 
orders based on the particular facts of the case. Rather than on considerations 
of family form or the importance of biological parenthood per se, the judgment is 
based on the decisions made by the child’s legal parents. In relation to G, the 
judge holds: 
As a result of choices made by the respondents, both S and T had 
regular and frequent contact with G and Z respectively. D and E 
chose S, an old friend of D's, who lived 100 yards or so away, to 
provide sperm to enable them to conceive a child. They involved 
him in preparations before the birth. They invited him to see the new 
baby, F, immediately after birth and thereafter on a regular basis. 
When they decided to try for another child, they asked him to 
provide sperm again. They wanted their second child to have the 
identical genetic background to their first. Again, they involved S in 
the preparations before the birth and allowed him regular and 
frequent contact thereafter.573 
In his judgment, the judge is taking the position that none of the resulting 
involvement and contact were a necessary consequence of involving a known 
donor but, for whatever reason, this took place and, therefore, whether the parties 
                                            
571 For an interesting discussion of how the language used in the case favour biological father 
see Alan Brown, ‘Re G; Re Z (Children: Sperm Donors: Leave to Apply for Children Act Orders): 
Essential “Biological Fathers” and Invisible “Legal Parents”’ (2014) 26 Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 237, 240. 
572 Natalie Gamble, ‘Lesbian Parents and Sperm Donors : Re G and Re Z’ (2013) November 
Family Law 1426, 1429. 
573 Re G (A Minor); Re Z (A Minor) (n 551) [115]. 
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like it or not, the biological father does play a role in the child’s life. He reaches a 
similar conclusion in relation to Z, highlighting that X and Y could have chosen 
anyone to be a role model for their child but they decided to involve the biological 
father. In relation to both families, the judge takes the view that a fact-finding 
hearing is required to determine the disputed facts but that it is at least arguable 
that the relationships that were allowed to develop were in some way linked to 
the fact that these men were the children’s biological fathers. 
Although this case concerned an application for leave to apply for a section 8 
order, the likelihood of success of the main application is a factor to be taken into 
account alongside others listed in s.10(9). In considering the merits of the 
substantive application, the judge made the following instructive remarks: 
All parties have much to reflect on as a result of this hearing. Both 
D and E, and X and Y, may care to reflect on the fact that they 
chose S and T respectively to enable them to conceive children. In 
the case of D and E, they repeated that choice when they decided 
to have a second child. In the case of X and Y, they specifically 
wanted T to be a role model for their son. It was always part of the 
plans in both cases that there should be some contact between the 
children and their biological fathers. Equally, both S and T should 
reflect on the fact that the primary family unit for these children is 
with their mothers and this court will, when considering their 
substantive applications, look very carefully to ensure that any risk 
of harm to the children is avoided.574  
As one of the most recent judicial comments on known donor/poly-parenting 
arrangements, this provides a succinct and balanced summary of the competing 
interests involved but does not necessarily give any insight into how the 
substantive application will be decided. The judge goes on, however to say: 
These mothers understandably feel very vulnerable by the 
challenge to their family units. Notwithstanding the great social 
changes that have facilitated the creation of these new types of 
family, mothers in the position of D and E, and X and Y, 
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understandably continue to feel vulnerable, and this court will take 
that vulnerability into account when considering the applications for 
contact.575 
This, perhaps, gives some indication of where the court’s sympathies lie in 
relation to the substantive application. On the one hand, it is commendable that 
the court is sensitive to these issues and does not seek to impose contact with 
biological fathers on same-sex families. On the other hand, it also seems to 
indicate that the courts pay little attention to the vulnerability of the poly-parenting 
arrangement itself which arguably could be said to constitute a different sort of 
family unit. Both in this case and others, the courts have opined that adults in 
these situations could have chosen to enter into a full co-parenting poly-parenting 
arrangement but on the facts of these cases this hasn’t been out. It is 
questionable, however, whether this is truly the case or whether the courts have 
simply failed to recognise where a co-parenting arrangement exists. It would be 
interesting to see how the courts handled a case where all parties acknowledge 
the initial intention was full co-parenting between all three or four adults but that 
this subsequently did not work out. 
In each of the cases discussed above, the female couple have sought to argue 
that they envisaged, and that everyone agreed upon, a lesser role and a lesser 
degree of involvement for the father in the child’s life than he now seeks. By 
contrast, the father invariably argues that the agreement was for greater 
involvement than the female couple are now allowing. Given that none of the 
cases involve written agreements, it is very difficult to ascertain precisely what 
the preconception intentions were, especially when many of the facts are 
disputed between the parties. Therefore, the courts have had to infer what was 
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agreed from the post-birth parenting reality (which would be a factor for 
consideration in and of itself aside from any consideration of pre-birth 
agreements).  
On this basis, it is difficult to assess the relevance of this body of case law to the 
type of full co-parenting, poly-parenting arrangements that is the primary focus of 
this thesis. It would be interesting to see how the courts would resolve disputes 
similar to those in the cases discussed above where there was a written 
agreement evidencing the intention to engage in full co-parenting, poly-parenting. 
Although such a case has not yet come before the courts, certain judicial dicta 
(such as in the case of A v B) and the creative use of court orders (such as in T 
v T) suggest that the courts would be willing to recognise such arrangements as 
being of considerable value to and in the best interests of the children involved. 
Furthermore, the court in H v S indicated its approval (and incredulity) that the 
male couple still wished to involve the birth mother in the child’s life, despite her 
attempts to minimise the male couple’s role. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that in resolving collaborative co-
parenting disputes the courts have insufficiently valued the autonomy of the 
parties involved, preferring instead to adopt a default position that insulates the 
homonuclear family from potential threats. It is commendable that the courts 
protect the homonuclear family from unwarranted threats. However, when the 
adults’ initial intention is to create a collaborative co-parenting family, this 
default approach is unjustified. The way in which the courts position themselves 
in relation to the approach used in post-separation, different-sex parenting, 
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whether that is distancing or approximating, does not sufficiently recognise 
collaborative co-parenting arrangements as valid families in their own right. In 
order to do this, the courts need to adopt an approach that takes pre-conception 
intentions seriously in a way that values the autonomy of the adults involved but 
also reflects a genuine assessment of the best interests of the child. As a 
number of participants in this study commented, this would be greatly assisted if 
the adults involved in these parenting arrangements recorded their intentions 
prior to birth in the form of a written agreement, however unemotional that may 
seem. The implications of this for future law reform will be discussed further in 
the concluding chapter of this thesis.    
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Part Three: The Viewpoint of Law’s 
Families 
The chapters in Part Three explore the legal regulation of collaborative co-
parenting from the perspective of the families that participated in this study. The 
doctrinal analysis in Part Two revealed the potentially problematic nature of the 
dyadic model of parenthood based on an intimate couple relationship, which I 
explored empirically with participants through the use of vignettes of various 
collaborative co-parenting scenarios. The following chapters explore the themes 
that emerged from the analysis of these data and situate them alongside other 
studies that have explored these issues. 
The key finding that is presented here is that the interests of collaborative co-
parents are not homogenous and that the legal framework in E&W is overlooking 
the emerging procreative consciousness of gay men in this respect. This finding 
results from the typology of collaborative co-parenting that has emerged from the 
data and is discussed in ‘Chapter Six: Family Portraits and Parenting 
Journeys’. By presenting the data in this way, the problematic nature of the 
heteronormative, dyadic approach to parenthood in terms of collaborative co-
parenting becomes apparent. The idea that a more flexible approach to 
parenthood is required is, consequently, corroborated through a triangulation of 
the doctrinal analysis, empirical data and the findings of previous studies.  
‘Chapter Seven: Women-Led Families, Male-Led Families and Poly-
Parenting’ builds on this by considering the complementary and competing 
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interests of gay men and lesbians in relation to collaborative co-parenting through 
the lens of the theoretical framework of procreative consciousness.576 This 
combination of the theoretical and empirical explorations surrounding the 
pathways to parenthood, which prospective collaborative co-parents (and gay 
and lesbian parents more generally) take allow issues of reproductive autonomy 
and procreative consciousness that arise in the empirical data, reflecting the lived 
experiences of the participants, and in the theoretical literature, to be related back 
to the legal framework in order to explore whether and how such concepts can 
be accommodated. 
‘Chapter Eight: Conclusion - Collaborative Co-Parenting as a Call to Reform 
Law’s Families’ links together the doctrinal, empirical and theoretical insights of 
the previous chapters as each challenges from a different perspective the rigidity 
and implicit heteronormativity of existing legal frameworks around parenthood 
and parenting. Drawing on theoretical perspectives from recent works on family 
sociology and anthropological kinship,577 this chapter questions the notions that 
traditionally underpin our conception of the family and suggests how law might 
be reformed to be more inclusive of a wider range of families.  The argument this 
chapter (and the thesis as a whole) pursues is that an in-depth examination of 
the legal regulation of gay and lesbian collaborative co-parenting commends a 
                                            
576 W Marsiglio, “Male Procreative Consciousness and Responsibility: A Conceptual Analysis 
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577 For example, Elizabeth B Silva and Carol Smart, The New Family? (Sage 1999); John 
Eekelaar, Family law and personal life (Oxford University Press 2006) Charlotte Faircloth, Diane 
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model of family law and policy predicated on valuing difference within family life578 
rather than the promotion of the homogeneous ideal family form against which 
other families are measured.  
                                            
578 Linda McClain, ‘A Diversity Approach to Parenthood in Family Life and Family Law’ in Linda 
McClain and Daniel Cere (eds), What is Parenthood? Contemporary Debates About the Family 
(New York University Press 2013); Susan B Boyd, ‘Equality: An Uncomfortable Fit in Parenting 
Law’ in Robert Leckey (ed), After legal equality: family, sex, kinship (Routledge 2014). 
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Chapter Six: Family Portraits and 
Parenting Journeys 
Introduction 
The reported case law almost exclusively concerns disputes between female 
couples and biological fathers who are being characterised as known donors. 
However, this study attracted and selected a range of different types of 
collaborative co-parenting families to participate in this study. Represented 
within it are a spectrum of arrangements ranging from some where the 
biological father was primarily a donor that was known to the family to full poly-
parenting situations where the parenting was shared between the biological 
father (and sometimes his partner) and the birth mother (and often her partner). 
Despite this, it was surprising that more families involving a male couple and a 
single or partnered lesbian were not identified. It is unclear whether this is 
because women-led collaborative co-parenting arrangements are more 
prevalent or that other types of family are simply more difficult to recruit. 
Nevertheless, a range of families is represented in the data, which provides 
important insights into the different motivations and expectations of men and 
women in these parenting arrangements.   
In order to identify the potentially varying needs of these different families (in 
response to this study’s second research question) this chapter first presents 
mini-biographies of the seven families (four from E&W and three from BC) that 
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have been involved in this study as a series of case studies.579 These are then 
drawn on in order to suggest a typology of collaborative co-parenting families, 
which modifies those advanced in previous studies carried out in other 
jurisdictions, such as Australia.580 In addition to this the pathways to parenthood 
that these families have pursued are considered, in order to reveal that a range 
of motivations and interests are implicated in the decision to engage in 
collaborative co-parenting, and of which, it is argued, the courts need to 
demonstrate a more sensitive appreciation. It is worth noting that only the first of 
these families involved planned conception at a clinic whereas for the rest the 
children were conceived at home, which could potentially make a difference in 
who is considered a parent under the current legislative framework.  
Poly-Parenting Family Portraits    
Betty, Eliza and Lenny 581 
Each of the three members of this British prospective poly-parenting family was 
interviewed in turn. It was fortunate to be able to interview the entire family 
because it provided an opportunity to gauge the level of agreement that existed 
between the adults, which turned out to be very high. These three adults were 
still trying to conceive at the time of interview, which was not the case with other 
participants all of whom had children. Therefore, these interviews provide an 
insight into how these arrangements are perceived prior to birth. As such, it is 
interesting to compare their views with those families who had been co-parenting 
                                            
579 See Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of participant recruitment and research 
methods used. 
580 Deborah Dempsey, ‘Beyond Choice Family and Kinship in the Australian lesbian and gay 
‘baby boom’’ (La Trobe University 2006). 
581 Each of the names used are pseudonyms in order to protect participant confidentiality and 
anonymity. 
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for a while. None of the families interviewed were currently in dispute about the 
roles of the respective adults. However, comparisons can also be drawn with the 
reported experiences of disputing families from the case law. 
Betty and Eliza had been together for six years and were in a civil partnership, 
whereas Lenny was a single gay man. Although Betty and Lenny would be the 
biological parents, Betty and Eliza would be the legal parents as a result of them 
being in a civil partnership. There was a written agreement, which all three of 
them acknowledge was very protective of the women’s role in terms of 
responsibility and the ability to make decisions in relation to the child. There was 
an understanding, however, that Lenny would seek to obtain parental 
responsibility following the child’s birth. 
There was a strong sense from all three interviews that each of them understood 
this arrangement as an attempt to create a family that included all three of them. 
The women already thought of Lenny as part of the family and vice versa. Despite 
this, the written agreement, pre-birth intentions and legal recognition played an 
interesting role in the family dynamic. Although both the women and Lenny 
professed the ideal of creating a family, for the women this was very much 
predicated on the idea of firm pre-conception intentions. Lenny, however, 
seemed more willing to take things on faith and see how things developed, 
trusting that they would be able to navigate the future together in a mutually 
acceptable way. This tension between prior ‘family planning’ and organic 
development as a family can be seen as a theme that emerges in a number of 
the case studies. 
Chris, Callum and Camilla (four-year old Gabriella and two-year old Hayden)  
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Unfortunately it was not possible to interview each member of this British poly-
parenting family and in the end, only Chris was interviewed. Whereas Betty and 
Eliza had posted an advert on a co-parenting website to which Lenny had 
responded, this co-parenting arrangement grew organically from the relationship 
that already existed between Chris, Callum and Camilla. Chris had been aware 
of wanting a child for a long time and he and his partner Callum had discussed it 
at length. There had been some tongue-in-cheek discussion between the three 
of them that if Camilla hadn’t met someone by a certain age that they would have 
a child together. As time went by and they all got older, they started talking about 
it more seriously. It seems as though no one had necessarily gone into these 
discussions with a strong conviction that they wanted to co-parent. It was just a 
logical progression of the relationship they already had, in light of their mutual 
desire to have a child. 
Camilla and Chris are the biological parents and they are on the birth certificate. 
Initially having a biological child seemed more important for Chris but as he has 
come to see how his partner Callum interacts with their children he has come to 
realise that biology actually has very little impact for him. Camilla and Chris are, 
therefore, the legal parents with Callum having no legal relationship with the 
children. They intended to remedy this to some extent when Chris and Callum 
got married, (which they have subsequently done) but at the time of the interview 
they had not remedied Callum’s legal position in relation to the children. 
Just as with Betty, Eliza and Lenny, Chris, Callum and Camilla, along with their 
children, consider themselves a family. An interesting point of contrast between 
these two families, however, is the importance of the written agreement in the 
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first one and the complete lack of written agreement in the second. That is not to 
say that the second family did not discuss a wide range of issues that might 
potentially affect their family, because they did. However, they did not feel the 
need to have a written agreement, partly because it would not be legally binding. 
Therefore, this family would fall more into the organic family development 
category, whereas the first are a more pre-planned family. One dimension of this 
that will be explored subsequently in relation to the data is whether having the 
women as the primary driving force for creating the family has any impact on this. 
In the case of Betty, Eliza and Lenny, the women very much sought to make this 
happen with whomever they could. Whereas, in relation to Chris, Callum and 
Camilla, co-parenting was not seen as a goal to be achieved but as an opportune 
solution to their situation. 
Colin, Joel, Lisa and Rosalind (sixteen year old Geoff)  
This is the third of the British poly-parenting families. Unfortunately, only Colin 
was willing to be interviewed. In contrast to other co-parenting families in this 
study, who had relatively young children, this family had been co-parenting for 
the past sixteen years. Colin and Joel, who are in a civil partnership, had already 
been together for over ten years when their single, lesbian friend Lisa suggested 
having a child together. The inception of this family differs slightly from that of the 
other two. Unlike Chris and Callum, Colin and Joel had more or less accepted 
they were not going to have children until Lisa suggested it. From this point of 
view, the family creation was more at Lisa’s instigation than that of the men. 
However, unlike Betty, Eliza and Lenny’s family, the creation of the family flowed 
from the relationship that existed between the adults rather than on the basis of 
relationships forged in order to co-parent. The difference between creating co-
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parenting relationships and allowing existing relationships to develop into co-
parenting ones and the implications of this on the types of families formed will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
In this family Joel and Lisa are the biological parents, because being biologically 
related to the child was more important to Joel than it was to Colin. Therefore, 
Joel and Lisa are Geoff’s legal parents on Geoff’s birth certificate. However, Colin 
and Joel both view themselves as equal fathers of Geoff. Despite this, they never 
sought to alter the legal position because they didn’t feel that legal recognition 
was available for the type of family they were trying to create. The type of family 
the three adults had envisaged involved two mums and two dads, rather than a 
single mum and two dads.  
A few years after Geoff was born, Lisa met Rosalind, who is now also considered 
to be Geoff’s mum. Despite this Colin feels that Geoff is different with Rosalind 
as compared to Lisa in a way that is not evident with the men:  
[Joel] and my relationship with [Geoff]…certainly I don’t think we 
feel that it’s shaped fundamentally differently by the fact that he’s 
genetically linked to [Joel] in a way that he isn’t to me.  Whereas 
George definitely has a very different relationship with [Lisa] than 
he does with [Rosalind] and I don’t know whether it’s the nature of 
what being a biological mum is in terms of pregnancy and child 
birth.582 
While the biological connection between the birth mother and child may certainly 
play a role here, it may also be to do with the almost ‘step-parent’ nature of Geoff’s 
relationship with Rosalind relationship. What is more, this family did have a 
written agreement, although in Colin’s recollection they had not referred to it since 
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it was written. The agreement did not include Rosalind as she was not in their life 
at the time. Therefore, she has had to adjust to this pre-existing arrangement. 
Sally, Rachel, Casey and Rich (eight year old Jason and ten year old Steven) 
This is the last of the families that is currently poly-parenting and the only poly-
parenting family that was recruited in Canada. Rachel had always wanted a child 
and wanted to experience pregnancy, whereas Sally did not necessarily have the 
same desire to become pregnant. They decided to ask a gay friend from high 
school, Tim, if he would help them to have children. Tim and his partner at the 
time, Casey, felt it would better if Casey were the biological father because it 
would mean more to him. Tim was already involved with another friend’s child. 
Tim and Casey broke up very early on in the arrangement. So Tim does not really 
feature in the children’s lives. Casey re-partnered fairly quickly and the women 
think of both Casey and his partner Rich as the children’s dads, occasionally 
referring to Rich as a stepdad. The children refer to Casey as their dad and they 
refer to Rich by name. 
Given Rachel’s desire to become pregnant, it made sense to the couple for 
Rachel to be the children’s biological mother. Rachel’s family also did not have 
any descendants in the way Sally’s family did. Therefore, biological connection 
took on a different significance for Rachel. Connection to family was very 
important for Rachel, which is why the couple chose to have an involved 
biological father. As Rachel shared during the interview: 
My father left my mum when I was very, very young. And so I have 
a bit of that feeling, that I don’t have any connection to that side of 
my family, and the feeling that I have regarding my family being so 
tiny and having my brother die, my mother, my father, and feeling 
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like family, biological family is very important. I wanted it to be a 
father that they knew…583 
This is reflected in the fact that Casey and Rich often have the children for 
overnight stays and take them on camping holidays without the women. They 
have a fairly flexible arrangement about contact. Casey’s mother also visits quite 
often and was heavily involved in supporting the women to care for the children 
when they were young. 
Despite this level of involvement, Casey and Rich have no formal, legal 
relationship to the children. Sally and Rachel stressed the fact that they were 
named on the birth certificate but not the men. In addition to this there is a written 
agreement, which confers the responsibility and decision making power on the 
women rather than the men. The way in which the women attempted to retain all 
responsibility for the child from the outset, reflects the concerns the women had 
prior to deciding to start a family about the potential for the biological father to 
disrupt their family unit. Fortunately this has not been their experience of post-
birth parenting reality, unlike some of the families in the reported case law. 
Delilah (eight year old Oscar)  
Delilah is a single mother raising her eight-year old son in the UK. Although she 
did not conceive with a donor of any sort, she is included in this study because of 
her exploration of the idea of collaborative co-parenting before she became 
pregnant with her son. After Delilah and her husband were told by a fertility 
specialist that the husband’s sperm would not result in a viable pregnancy, they 
considered conceiving through donor conception. However, her husband was 
uncomfortable with this idea. Therefore, Delilah began exploring the idea of co-
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parenting with two gay partners who were friends of hers. In her mind this would 
be a four-way co-parenting arrangement between the gay couple, her husband 
and herself. As it turned out though, she became pregnant naturally with her 
husband and shortly after her son Oscar was born. Following the birth, however, 
the couple divorced and Oscar and his biological father have no contact. Although 
Delilah was not a single mother by choice, she did briefly consider having a 
second child through co-parenting having previously explored this option but 
decided against this in the end. 
Delilah is, therefore, different from the other participants in the sense that she is 
neither a current/prospective co-parent nor did she conceive through donor 
conception. However, her experience exploring both these options, although 
subsequently precluded by her individual circumstances, makes her well placed 
to comment on the issues these parenting options raise. In particular, Delilah was 
keener on the idea of co-parenting/known donation than unknown donation 
because of the awareness that the child would have of his or her biological 
origins. She also favoured the idea of co-parenting because, in the family that 
she had conceived of for her future child, there would be four parents each of 
whom love the child and have his or her best interests at heart. 
Reflecting on her parenting aspirations back when she thought this was a viable 
option, she identifies a tension between utopian ideals and parenting reality: 
I don’t know what’s utopia or not but in my head the idea would be 
co-parenting I suppose. Ideally, ultimately, the child would live 50% 
with one parent and 50% with the other…having now had a child I 
think that in babyhood it’s very important for a child to be with its 
mother. I think it would be quite hard for a baby to be separated 
from mum for half the time. That said, I think they would adjust.584  
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Given this, in order for any compromise solution to work effectively it would have 
been vital from Delilah’s perspective to agree on parenting values before 
embarking on a co-parenting arrangement. For example, she would have only 
been willing to be separated from her very young child if the men were also going 
to be full-time carers and not rely on full-time child care. This is the type of issue 
Delilah foresaw as potentially causing friction in the adults’ relationship and 
would, therefore, need to be addressed in advance.      
Known Donor Family Portraits 
Angela, Ruth and Rob (four year old Matthew) 
This Canadian family, each member of which was interviewed, had what seemed 
to be a very successful (largely) uninvolved, known donor arrangement. Angela 
and Ruth had been together for five years before they decided to have children. 
They debated whether to go down the unknown donor route but in the end opted 
for a known donor. Their main concern in doing this was ensuring that the children 
did not feel as though a part of their identity was missing. In choosing a known 
donor, Angela and Ruth did not want to approach a close friend but rather a friend 
of a friend. That way too close a relationship between the biological father and 
children wouldn’t develop but at the same time, the women could be sure they 
were meeting someone trustworthy. In the end, Rob, one of Ruth’s colleagues 
offered to be a known donor and they conceived at home. Although they had 
initially decided not to accept if anyone offered, they felt the right connection with 
Rob and were constrained by the limited degree of choice available when going 
through a sperm bank for an unknown donor. 
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Rob did not have any biological children at the time and did not have any plans 
to have any. At the time of interview, however, he and his female partner, Lulu, 
were parenting Lulu’s child from a previous relationship. Therefore, Rob’s primary 
motivation in helping Angela and Ruth to have a child was not in order to be 
involved in parenting because he was already experiencing that. Rob’s main 
motivation was to help his colleague/friend have a child. He was also motivated 
by biological curiosity, which has characterized his subsequent involvement with 
Matthew. The women made clear their expectation that Rob was not to be present 
at the birth, which Rob was happy to go along with. He has, however, met four-
year old Matthew and they spend time together roughly once a year, which each 
of the adults seems happy with. 
A clear written agreement exists between the three adults, which states that 
Angela and Ruth are the intended parents and that Rob has no intention to parent 
or exercise decision-making power. It also makes clear that Rob would not, under 
any circumstances, become Matthew’s legal guardian. Similarly, Rob would have 
no legal support obligations towards Matthew. For Rob this was an opportunity to 
support his friends in having a child and have a biological child himself without 
having any responsibility for that child. Having said that, in the minds of each of 
the adults, there is considerable scope for a relationship to develop in the future 
should that be what Matthew desires. 
Frieda and Calvin (and nine year old Mary)  
Frieda is a single lesbian who was raising her daughter Mary in Canada at the 
time of the interview. Frieda had wanted to be a parent since her mid-twenties 
and had assumed that this would be with a partner. However, by her early thirties 
she considered becoming a single mother by choice. At this time in her life, the 
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material conditions for her having a child seemed to be right. Therefore, she 
approached an acquaintance about being a known donor. After a couple of years 
getting to know each other they conceived at home and shortly afterwards, Mary 
was born. 
Frieda was clear that she would not want to co-parent with anyone other than a 
partner, especially as she did not have a close male friend with whom she would 
feel comfortable co-parenting:  
I didn't want to share parenting with someone who wasn't my 
partner, primarily because…not because I don't think that kind of 
arrangement can work - very well in fact, but certainly at that point 
in my life I would have wanted years of planning that.585 
Therefore, the written agreement between Frieda and Calvin makes it clear that 
Calvin has agreed to facilitate Frieda’s desire to have a child. Consequently, 
Frieda is Mary’s sole parent and any access to or contact with Mary that Calvin 
might have is at Frieda’s discretion. Despite this, Frieda’s decision to involve a 
known donor was at least partly motivated by her desire to have a somewhat 
involved donor rather than someone who was not going to be involved in Mary’s 
life at all.  
Fortunately, Frieda’s and Calvin’s expectations did not conflict and the process 
of reaching agreement and the subsequent experience of parenting has been 
relatively smooth. The initial agreement provided for monthly contact between 
Calvin and Frieda, although the reality has been closer to every five or six weeks. 
Although it was not possible to interview Calvin, Frieda had the impression that 
Calvin was comfortable with the level of contact he currently has and does not 
have the desire to become a more involved parent. In the future, Frieda would 
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seemingly be happy for the contact to evolve further towards spending time alone 
together etc. However, she wants Mary to be the driving force behind this rather 
than the adults.  
Everyone seemed to be quite loose about the terminology used to describe 
Calvin. Frieda initially referred to him as Mary’s donor and is increasingly using 
the term donor dad, which indicates a somewhat more familial relationship. Mary 
calls Calvin by his name but acknowledges him as her dad. In contrast to Rob 
and Matthew, discussed previously, Calvin seems to have relatively more 
involvement in Mary’s life. This supports the idea, discussed in the literature and 
considered in greater detail below, that these ‘plus two’ parenting arrangements 
exist on a continuum of relatedness between everyone concerned.586 
Parenting Journeys 
Why Do People Engage in Collaborative Co-Parenting? 
One of the questions participants were asked is why they chose to engage in 
collaborative co-parenting. There was a range of different answers. One of the 
participants, Lenny, a single gay male in the UK aged 25 – 33, felt that co-
parenting allowed him to have children, without being a single parent, despite the 
fact he wasn’t in a relationship: 
 I really want to be a dad…but I’m not entirely sure if I can do this 
on my own...Why should I wait until I’m with someone or have a 
relationship? I don’t have to be in a relationship with a man to have 
a child.587  
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This is an idea that will resonate not only within the LGBTQ community but also 
with many other single men and women. People are increasingly planning their 
private lives and the timing of having children. Something that cannot always be 
factored into this planning process is meeting a partner with whom you can have 
an intimate relationship and raise children. For Lenny, collaborative co-parenting 
was a way of meeting his need to have children despite the uncertainty of finding 
a partner.  
The centrality, for many, of a desire to have children regardless of whether we 
have a partner is reflected in the sociological literature. Whether as a result of 
natural inclinations or socialisation, the desire to have children has been 
‘imprinted on our minds and hearts and imaginations’588 from an early age. A 
particularly salient observation to the current study is that ‘the struggle to have 
children, to create a family in whatever form, is constituted as central to an 
aliveness and humanity’.589 This innate desire was something that Lenny seemed 
to feel particularly strongly as did his female co-parents.  
Often, however, the focus is on women when discussing the desire to have 
children. Reproductive technologies, which facilitate greater choice around 
having children, are sometimes construed as a response to women’s demand for 
this technology, which ‘has in essence increased the cultural value of having 
one’s own child, thus reaffirming the reproductive function of women’.590 
Therefore, ‘the desire for the child is located as both issuing absolutely from the 
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woman as an innate wish and demand and as an imposed, externally controlled 
and mediated story’.591 
Furthermore, traditionally, ‘the concepts of heterosexuality and parenthood [have 
been] so inextricably intertwined in our culture’592 that gay men becoming parents 
outside the context of a prior heterosexual relationship has not been thought a 
likely or particularly feasible option. This is reflected by the comments made by 
Colin, a gay man in the UK aged 34 – 49, who is in a relationship and raising a 
child with a female friend and her partner:  
I think for us probably initially the sense that we wouldn’t be parents, 
that neither of us would be dads, was probably quite a big part of, I 
suppose, the role that we thought we’d have as gay men.593  
This sentiment is echoed by Lenny who states that:  
I didn’t think that I could have kids. I didn’t think that it was an option. 
I just thought by being gay you are choosing to accept that you 
wouldn’t have a family, you wouldn’t have kids because you just 
couldn’t.594 
This is a deeply held feeling that these gay men have internalised. Interestingly, 
this seems to apply irrespective of age, which is surprising because one might 
have expected Lenny, being over a decade younger than Colin, to approach the 
issue differently. Therefore, despite the increasing acceptance of same-sex 
relationships, there may not necessarily be a corresponding shift in the 
internalised views that gay men have about becoming parents.   
Nevertheless, nowadays gay men having children seems a much more realistic 
and achievable goal. According to a recent US study which interviewed 14 gay 
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men aged between 18 and 25, and reviewed previously gathered statistical data 
‘recent historical changes have opened doors such that gay men are now more 
likely to pursue fatherhood and to pursue it outside of heterosexual marriage’.595 
As Lenny comments: 
Things have changed a lot. I think because things have changed, 
my eyes have opened. It is more common place. I have read more 
and more about gay parenting…I think because I saw that more 
and more people were parenting and quite successfully, it inspired 
me…596 
Here Lenny mentions the benefit of having positive gay male parenting role 
models in terms of his own thinking about the feasibility of becoming a parent. 
This highlights the symbolic importance of legislation that recognises these 
parenting arrangements and sends the message that they are a viable route to 
parenthood.  
It is important, therefore, when thinking about the legal regulation of collaborative 
co-parenting to recognise that the desire to have and raise a child can be felt 
quite keenly by both men and women. Furthermore, the most viable way of 
becoming a parent may not necessarily be to try to emulate the heteronormative 
ideal. Viewed in this light, it is questionable how appropriate it is for courts to have 
a particular family form in mind as their starting point in resolving collaborative 
co-parenting disputes, whether that is the homonuclear family or the post-
separation different-sex family. It is necessary to consider each of the adults’ 
reasons for engaging in collaborative co-parenting, as reflected in their pre-
conception intentions. 
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Amongst those gay men who desire children, many would wish to raise their 
children in the context of a dyadic relationship with their romantic partner. As 
Rabun and Oswald in their previously mentioned US study comment:  
We entered this research project assuming that contemporary 
young gay men belong to a cohort for which family models are 
inclusive of diversity but also shaped by an ideal of middle-class 
heteronormative procreation. However, given the legacy of gay 
identity being defined in opposition to family (Weston, 1991), we did 
not expect all of our participants to envision their future lives in 
terms of parenting within the ideal normative family. Contrary to our 
expectations, all 14 participants intended to become fathers and the 
majority described their future family goals in ways that uphold the 
normative family: a committed couple who delay their parenthood 
until after establishing themselves in a middle-class career and then 
acquire 2 children and organize daily life around meeting the child's 
needs.597 
This heteronormative model, however, is not appropriate for every gay man who 
wishes to start a family. Some, like Lenny, may have initially wished to raise a 
child with a partner but as that became a less-likely prospect turned to co-
parenting as a way of facilitating having a child and not raising a child alone.  
Others such as Chris, a gay man in the UK aged 34 – 49 who is raising two 
children with his partner and their female friend, did not feel any particular desire 
to co-parent; ‘It just felt like something that suited us as a family’598  
Based on the case law, differences can emerge between the birth mother (and 
potentially her partner) and the biological father (and potentially his partner) about 
each of the adults’ respective roles.599 These differences are also evident in the 
different family configurations that could broadly be termed collaborative co-
parenting (at least in terms of conception). Dempsey identifies a ‘continuum of 
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kinship intentions’600 in relation to gay and lesbian families. These range from 
standard known donor arrangements to full co-parenting. According to Dempsey, 
standard known donor arrangements ‘appear to be modelled very strongly on the 
conventions of donor insemination characteristic of contemporary clinical 
practice, where ‘identity-release’ provisions exist’.601 Co-parenting arrangements, 
on the other hand, tend to be based on a ‘mutual desire to fully co- parent in the 
context of [the] friendship’.602 This spectrum of kinship intentions was reflected to 
some extent amongst the present study’s participants. 
Betty (aged 25 – 33) and Eliza (aged 34 – 49), who are lesbian civil partners in 
the UK, along with Lenny, who has been mentioned previously, are a good 
example of a family whose intention is to fully co-parent. As Betty comments, she 
and her partner were looking for someone who was very much behind ‘the idea 
of co-parenting which means all of us being equal, all of us being equally involved, 
all of us being a family as well and [Lenny] is very much part of our family now’.603 
Betty, Eliza and Lenny were at the stage of trying to conceive a child through 
home insemination when the interviews for this study were being conducted. 
Therefore, it is possible that these feelings and intentions might change once the 
baby is born. In some senses it is Lenny who would be in the more vulnerable 
position if this were to happen because only Betty and Eliza would be the legal 
parents of the child and only they would appear on the birth certificate. Lenny, 
however, seems content to operate on the basis of trust that things will work out, 
especially given his view that ‘we are trying to create a family, really, and to be a 
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bit flexible about it’.604 He also seems reassured that the three of them will seek 
to have him named on a shared residence order following the child’s birth, 
commenting that ‘that was kind of the compromise that if I’m not going to be the 
legal parent, I am taking that court order which sort of gives me that parental 
status’.605 
Continuum of Relatedness: A Typology of Collaborative Co-
Parenting 
Having introduced the four British and three Canadian families in the first section 
of this chapter, this section will attempt to conceptualise their position in a broader 
spectrum of collaborative co-parenting relationships. In particular, this section will 
consider the degree of fit between the empirical data in this study and previously 
postulated theorisations of how collaborative co-parenting families might be 
categorized. 
One thing that has emerged across the data is that these parenting projects have 
mostly been women-driven initiatives. In relation to the two known donation 
families (i.e. Angel, Ruth, Rob and Matthew; and Frieda, Calvin and Mary), the 
families were created almost entirely as a result of the women’s desire to have 
children. The men in these arrangements were facilitating the women’s wish to 
become parents rather than their own. Although both these arrangements might 
be classed as known donor rather than co-parenting situations, they differ in 
terms of the level of donor involvement. Furthermore, neither of these donor 
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arrangements conforms to what Dempsey refers to as ‘standard donor 
arrangements’.606 
According to Dempsey, a standard donor agreement ‘attempts to replicate the 
goal [of] donor anonymity achieved in the clinical setting’.607 Unsurprisingly as the 
goal was to examine co-parenting, none of the participants in the present study 
were in this position. Each of the parents was open about the identity of the 
biological father and envisaged a greater or lesser degree of involvement. 
Dempsey represents standard donor arrangements as being at the opposite end 
of the spectrum of parenting arrangements from poly-parenting.  
The next increment in her analysis is social solidarity arrangements, which she 
characterises as ‘less impersonal than the first, and couched in language 
emphasizing ongoing friendship and mutual support’. Here the biological father 
and his partner are ‘embraced, not as resident parents or legal custodians, but 
nonetheless as fathers who are part of the child’s social family’.608 This could 
accurately describe the arrangement Sally, Rachel, Casey and Rich have, even 
though they are referred to more as poly-parenting families here. 
However families such as Frieda, Calvin and Mary; and Angela, Ruth and Rob 
seem to fall somewhere between what Dempsey refers to as ‘standard donor’ 
situations and ‘social solidarity’ situations, which suggests that even within these 
categories a range of parenting arrangements exists. None of the participants in 
the current study sought to imitate an unknown/anonymous donor situation in its 
entirety. Although Angela and Ruth sought very limited involvement from their 
donor, they did not seek to hide his identity as the biological father. A strong 
                                            
606 Dempsey (n 600). 
607 Ibid. 1153. 
608 Ibid. 
 
 
279 
motivation in involving a known donor in the first place was to avoid any secrecy 
around the identity of the biological father. 
In terms of Frieda’s family, Calvin has more involvement than Rob does with 
Angela and Ruth and is also acknowledged as the biological father. Therefore, 
like Rob, Calvin is not involved in a standard donor arrangement. However, it 
would seem to be stretching the relationship that exists between Calvin, Frieda 
and Mary to say that there was a social solidarity agreement between them. For 
Dempsey, this requires the biological father to be recognised as a father and, 
thereby form part of the child’s social family.  
It is an interesting question whether Rob and Calvin are respectively recognised 
as fathers and also as part of the children’s social families. Frieda initial use of 
the term donor and subsequent use of the term donor dad to refer to Calvin does 
imply a degree of familialisation. There does seem to be some recognition that 
through his post-birth involvement Calvin has become more than a mere donor 
to Frieda and Mary. However, it is questionable whether he is recognised as a 
father. It is true that he is acknowledged as the biological father, which would not 
be the case in a standard donor arrangement. Therefore, If Dempsey’s reference 
to being recognised as the father simply refers to biological fatherhood then both 
Rob and Calvin may be involved in social solidarity arrangements. However, what 
constitutes a father has been extensively discussed in academic literature and 
this is not always coextensive with biological fatherhood.609    
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The final category Dempsey refers to is co-parenting,610 which she views as ‘an 
affirmation of mutual desire to fully co-parent in the context of [a] friendship’.611 
This would typically involve shared residence with the child. In Dempsey’s study 
a non-cohabiting single gay man and a single lesbian, who decided to have a 
child together, typified this type of arrangement. According to Dempsey, ‘[i]n the 
co-parenting agreement, the conventional assumption is that biological 
motherhood and fatherhood are grounds for parental rights and respon-
sibilities’.612 
Dempsey’s category of co-parenting is a narrow one, which has the potential to 
exclude some families, such as one or two in this study, which consider 
themselves to be engaged in co-parenting but do not necessarily fit Dempsey’s 
notion of this. Betty, Eliza and Lenny could be an example of this. Although each 
of these adults sees themselves as creating a family by having a child together, 
this is not done on the basis of a co-parenting agreement like the one Dempsey 
describes. The written agreement this family has protects the legal rights and 
responsibilities of the female couple while leaving the biological father legally 
vulnerable. The intention is to remedy this following the birth of the child through 
a court order but the power very much remains in the hands of the female couple. 
Despite the skewed nature of the agreement in terms of legal rights and 
responsibilities, which seems more like a social solidarity agreement, the actual 
parenting envisaged in the agreement would fit more with an understanding of 
co-parenting. 
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An important point that has emerged from this study is that there can be a 
complicated dynamic in some agreements between legal protection and the type 
of parenting envisaged which makes it difficult to fit the agreements into the 
categories Dempsey has suggested. Therefore, this thesis suggests an 
alternative way of categorising these families based not only on the types of 
parenting arrangement they engage in but also how their family was formed.  
One significant element of this that has emerged from the empirical data is the 
way in which family members enact what might be termed an organic method of 
family creation as compared to a planned one. Betty and Eliza, for example, were 
very keen on having a written agreement in place, which spelt out a range of 
issues and contingencies. Lenny placed greater emphasis on paying attention to 
how relationships and feelings evolve and develop over time without feeling the 
need to completely plan out his role in the child’s life in advance. This relates to 
an important finding this study has made, which will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter, namely that the relative power dynamics between lesbians 
and gay men in terms of the reproductive relationships they form can have a 
marked impact on their perceived ability to assert their needs and interests at the 
stage of family planning. Therefore, Betty and Eliza came across as being more 
invested in the need for planning than did Lenny, who did not necessarily see a 
more organic development of family relationships as problematic. 
Chris, Callum and Camilla, along with their two children, are a good example of 
organic co-parenting. There is no written agreement between the adults as to the 
specific role each is going to play in the child’s life. As a result childcare 
arrangements are quite flexible, which suits the busy lifestyles of these three 
working adults. One stipulation they all made at the outset was that they would 
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stay in the same country and preferably live close together while the children are 
at school. This was seen as important in providing stability for the children. 
Beyond that, however, they felt it was important to be able to respond to the 
various occurrences of everyday life in a flexible and adaptable way. As Chris 
emphasises, ‘you never know what is going to happen you need to be open 
minded and flexible’.613   
In addition to having a more organically developing setup, this family could also 
be referred to as engaging in ‘happenstance co-parenting’. This phrase suggests 
that co-parenting was not necessarily a goal in and of itself for these adults. 
Instead, co-parenting presented itself as an opportune way of expressing each of 
their desires to have children. As Chris puts it: 
it was very much something that came out of the three of us talking 
rather than me thinking oh I’d like to co-parent and then looking for 
someone to do that with. The situation arose from the relationship 
anyway, if that’s clear. I wasn’t looking to co-parent and this 
situation presented itself and we all thought that was the right thing 
for us.614 
While each of the adults had been aware of separate desires to have children, 
co-parenting as an idea might not have been foremost in their mind as a way of 
achieving this. Chris, for example, would have considered exploring adoption as 
a way of becoming a parent had this opportunity not presented itself. 
Happenstance co-parenting can be contrasted with deliberate or goal-oriented 
co-parenting, where co-parenting is the desired outcome and steps are then 
taken to try to achieve this. Becky, Eliza and Lenny are a good example of 
deliberate co-parenting. Becky seems committed to the idea of co-parenting for 
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a number of reasons. She refers to the strong relationship she had with her father 
and the benefits she feels that brings. She also refers to her conviction that the 
child should know his genetic origins. Her commitment to co-parenting seems to 
be both a personal one, in terms of building the type of family she wants, and also 
a political one, whereby she realises she is challenging what she perceives as 
exclusionary family law norms. 
Both Becky, Eliza and Lenny’s family and Chris, Callum and Camilla’s family 
could be described as co-parenting arrangements. However, the former could be 
conceived of as being at one end of the spectrum in terms of being a deliberate 
and planned-out co-parenting arrangement, whereas the latter lies at the other 
end of the spectrum as an organically-developing, happenstance co-parenting 
arrangement. The differences between these two types of co-parenting 
arrangements are, however, not necessarily as pronounced as this dichotomous 
positioning makes it seem. For example, although Chris, Callum and Camilla did 
not have a written agreement in place, they did discuss various scenarios and 
contingencies extensively prior to conception. As Chris notes: 
we talked about every eventuality as you do in these situations; you 
always look at worse case scenarios and what happens if 
somebody moves away and if we disagree on things. We talked 
through so much to begin with until we were blue in the face and 
we decided the best way was to just go ahead, I think you can talk 
yourselves out of things sometimes but we talked about all the worst 
case situations but one thing that comes up time and time again is 
that it doesn’t seem to be any different co-parenting with someone 
than where a couple has broken up, you get on.615 
Therefore, despite a desire to get it right, there was a recognition that it is not 
possible to plan for every eventuality beforehand and that the best approach 
might be revealed along the way while engaging in parenting. This is an 
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interesting insight into co-parenting because many of the cases, which have 
come before the courts have not involved a written agreement. This makes them 
appear to be organically developing co-parenting arrangements. One question 
this raises is whether these types of co-parenting arrangements are more 
susceptible to leading to intractable disputes. 
At the same time families that appear to be engaged in planned co-parenting 
seem to deviate from the script at times and organically develop in ways which 
were not necessarily envisaged in the written agreement. Colin, Joel, Lisa and 
Rosalind’s family are an example of this. Although the family did have a written 
agreement in place, they have not referred to it since the birth of their son. As 
Colin comments, ‘I think if you looked at it and compare what’s actually happened, 
I’m not sure we’ve followed what we agreed at all. I mean I think we probably 
followed the spirit of what we agreed but we’ve never sort of checked it’.616 
Therefore, despite an initial sense that having a written agreement was an 
important way of providing security for the family, it has had little influence on 
parenting practice.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the families that were interviewed as part of this 
study as a series of case studies. Through analysing the parenting journeys 
these families have been engaged in, this chapter has also advanced a 
typology of collaborative co-parenting based on family formation rather than 
purely the parenting arrangement that is in place as previous studies in other 
jurisdictions have done. The suggested typology categorises families in terms of 
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the level of planning involved in the co-parenting arrangement and whether 
such an arrangement was a goal in and of itself or whether it simply evolved. 
This analysis has revealed that there is considerable emotional investment in 
these collaborative co-parenting arrangements both on the part of the gay men 
and lesbians involved. This will be built on in the next chapter to argue that any 
future law reform needs to adopt a more nuanced understanding of 
collaborative co-parenting families in order to adequately reflect their needs and 
interests.  
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Chapter Seven: Women-Led 
Families, Male-Led Families and 
Poly-Parenting 
Introduction 
Despite a number of recent high-profile cases, the body of case law on 
collaborative co-parenting in both E&W and Canada is still not very well 
developed. Furthermore, of the relatively few collaborative co-parenting cases 
that exist in these jurisdictions, only one or two have been recognised to involve 
actual poly-parenting. Given that the law on poly-parenting/collaborative co-
parenting in E&W is still in its infancy, it is important to consider how these 
parenting arrangements between gay men and lesbians sit alongside their ability 
to form autonomous women-led and male-led families.  
This chapter begins by considering the implications of the possibility for female 
couples to conceive a child using gametes from an unknown donor and the basis 
on which unknown sperm donation is regulated. The socio-legal context 
surrounding same-sex parenting is then outlined before considering in turn the 
ability of lesbians and gay men to create autonomous families. This involves not 
only a discussion of female couples’ motivations for involving known donors but 
also a consideration of how gay men are positioned in relation to parenthood and 
reproduction generally.   
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Assisting Reproduction 
It is perhaps obvious to observe that biological human reproduction is implicitly 
present in any discussion of parenting. That is to say that whenever a concrete 
parenting situation is being considered there is a child, a woman who gave birth 
to that child and a man who is the male progenitor of that child. The intention in 
making this initial observation is not to accord primacy to biological or natural 
discourses of parenting but it is to suggest an intuitive starting point for a 
discussion around parenting. Nevertheless, our understanding of personhood 
and human nature would seem to indicate that we all have, to some degree, a 
vested personal interest or stake in our biological offspring and progenitors. This 
has been recognised within the sociological literature617 and also in the context 
of the ECHR’s Article 8 right to private and family life.618 
In the early days of regulating artificial donor insemination, the Warnock 
Committee was able to mitigate the tension between this innate interest we have 
in our biological offspring and the purpose of gamete donation by insisting on the 
complete lack of relationship between donor and recipient and the ‘absolute 
anonymity of the donor’.619 In this way the Warnock Committee attempted to 
address the concerns of earlier reports620 about the involvement of a third party 
in the reproductive relationship not only with respect to the emotional needs of 
                                            
617 Karín Lesnik-Oberstein, On Having an Own Child : Reproductive Technologies and the 
Cultural Construction of Childhood (Karnac Books 2008). 
618 See for example S.H. and Others v Austria (Application No. 57813/00, November 15 2007); 
Marleen Eijkholt, ‘The Right to Found a Family as a Stillborn Right to Procreate?’ (2010) 18 
Medical Law Review 127; Caroline Forder, ‘Article 8 ECHR: The Utter Limits of “Family Life” and 
the Law of Parenthood’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 125.  
619 Great Britain. Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology., A question of 
life : the Warnock report on human fertilisation and embryology (Mary Warnock (ed), Blackwell 
1984) 25 
620 Church of England (1948). Artificial Human Insemination. The Report of a Commission 
Appointed by His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury. London. SPCK (Wand Report); 
Feversham, Earl of (1960). Report of the Departmental Committee on Human Artificial 
Insemination. Cmnd. 1105. London: HMSO. 
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the intended parents but also those of the child and donor too. Requiring a 
complete separation of donor and intended parents not only reduces any threat 
to the family unit, it also protects the donor from any associated emotional and 
legal complications. As Richards et al. have put it ‘there was a reduction of the 
person from a sperm donor to a sperm. Sperm was the drug that would cure 
infertility. The sperm donor, as a person, was erased and separated from the 
recipient family.’621 
Since the Family Law Reform Act 1987 and the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, which enshrined donor anonymity and transferred all 
parental rights and responsibilities from the donor to the intended parents when 
using a licensed clinic, there has been a slow gravitational pull in the opposite 
direction towards increased emphasis on a child’s right to know his or her genetic 
origins.622 This has resulted in a child being able to identify the donor after the 
age of eighteen.623 This establishes and reinforces the idea that the connection 
between biological progenitors and offspring is significant for the child. It stands 
to reason, therefore, that this connection is also significant for the biological 
progenitor. The suggestion that this biological connection is not so easy to 
dismiss as inconsequential is supported by the parallel rise in open adoptions in 
many jurisdictions.624 
Therefore, the system of anonymous gamete donation seems to be underpinned 
by an acknowledgment that connections resulting from biological reproduction 
                                            
621 Martin Richards, Guido Pennings, and John B. Appleby, Reproductive Donation Practice , 
Policy and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press 2012) 11. 
622 See for example Julie A Wallbank, ‘The Role of Rights and Utility in Instituting a Child’s Right 
to Know Her Genetic History’ (2004) 13 Social and Legal Studies 245; Eric Blyth, Marilyn 
Crawshaw, Lucy Frith, and Caroline Jones, ‘Donor-conceived people’s views and experiences 
of their genetic origins : A critical analysis of the research evidence’ [2012]  769–789. 
623 Disclosure of Donor Information Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1511. 
624 See for example D. H. Siegel, ‘Open Adoption: Adoptive Parents’ Reactions Two Decades 
Later’ (2012) 58 Social Work 43–52. 
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are important but it is legitimate to sever these connections provided that no 
relationship is allowed to develop between the donor and the recipient or child. 
Central to this is the idea that a donor donates gametes not knowing how these 
have been used and whether a child even exists. Nevertheless, this separation 
between donor and child has begun to be eroded through the rise of genetic 
origins discourse and the removal of complete donor anonymity.625  
This only comes into play, however, once the child has reached eighteen. 
Therefore, in terms of the implications for parenting, it is a very different scenario 
to be aware that you are the biological progenitor of a child who can only become 
known to you as an independent  ‘adult offspring’ as compared to being a known 
donor who has knowingly fathered a still dependent child. One could draw an 
analogy with blood donation. Although the biological processes involved in 
reproduction are more fundamental and arguably significant, the clinical setting 
of gamete donation and lack of connection with the recipient, as with blood 
donation, can mitigate the emotional and psychological impact.    It is also worthy 
of note that in the licensed clinic context, the act of donation is fully explained as 
just that, albeit with consequences far in the future.  It is legally established as an 
essentially altruistic yet fundamentally impersonal act (even where the donor is 
known) undertaken in a formal medical setting.  This, it is argued, sets unknown 
clinical donation apart from known donation. 
While some concerns exist about the potential ramifications of no longer providing 
completely anonymous donation, these concerns are amplified in known donor 
situations. As Richards et al. have put it recently: 
By lifting the veil of secrecy, the parents accept the existence of a 
person whose actions have led to the conception of their child. By 
                                            
625 See n 623. 
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allowing the identification of donors and known donation, the donor 
can even be contacted either by the recipients or the child…Will we 
be able to construct a coherent framework that includes these new 
requests while respecting people's views on how social and genetic 
parenthood should balance?626 
The implication seems to be that the very involvement of known donors reignites 
concerns, which existed prior to the enactment of donor anonymity,627 such as 
the intrusion of the donor into the reproductive relationship, and which the 
Warnock Committee sought to address through the separation of donor and 
recipient/child. It seems logical to suggest that the involvement of a known donor 
per se requires recognition and negotiation of the potential significance of the 
biological connection in a way that is not necessary in relation to anonymous 
donation. One might go so far as to say that, in the absence of countervailing 
considerations, the biological connection and knowledge of that child’s existence 
might be so significant as to mean that a ‘known donor’ prima facie ought to form 
part of that child’s family. 
On the face of it, this line of reasoning seems at odds with much of the literature 
on known donation and same-sex parenting, which argues that the imposition of 
donors on women-led families curtails their autonomy in creating a family.628 
However, as one commentator has acknowledged ‘while reproductive autonomy 
is an extremely important interest…reproductive autonomy may have to give way 
to other interests’.629 In the case of known donation, there is a tension between 
                                            
626 Richards, Pennings, and Appleby, Reproductive Donation Practice , Policy and Bioethics (n 
609) 11. 
627 Church of England (1948). Artificial Human Insemination. The Report of a Commission 
Appointed by His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury. London. SPCK (Wand Report). 
628 See for example Angela Cameron, ‘“A chip off the old (ice) block?: Women-led families, 
sperm donors and family law”’ in Jennifer Kilty (ed), Women and the Law (Canadian Scholar’s 
Press 2013); Fiona Kelly, ‘Equal Parents, Equal Children: Reforming Canada’s Parentage Laws 
To Recognize The Completeness Of Women-Led Families’ (2013) 64 University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal 253. 
629 Erin Nelson, Law, policy, and reproductive autonomy (Hart Publishing 2013) 308 – 309. 
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the autonomy of women-led families and the interest a biological father has in the 
having a connection with his offspring, which he knows exists (and vice versa). 
This tension is largely avoided in situations involving unknown donors because 
of the wall of anonymity that exists between donor and intended parent/child. As 
some commentators have acknowledged, some families ‘have often consciously 
and politically chosen an anonymous sperm donor to avoid the legal and 
parenting complexities that come with using a known donor.’630 
Legally speaking known donation in a clinic is treated in the same way as 
anonymous donation in a clinic. However, it is questionable whether this should 
always be the case. It is understandable that a known donor who is merely 
donating in order to enable a female couple to have a child with no further 
involvement with that child should be treated in the same way as an anonymous 
donor. However, it is not so clear cut where the biological father is providing 
sperm to facilitate the creation of some type of collaborative co-parenting family 
but they have decided to go through a clinic for medical reasons. Therefore, it 
seems a more nuanced approach to the legal effects of conceiving at a clinic, that 
takes into account the range of intentions that the parties might have in relation 
to their family, is required.  
What is more, the literature on same-sex parenting does not appear to be 
objecting to any sort of discussion about recognising the contribution of known 
donors. The main objection is against the legal bias that seems to operate to a 
large extent in favour of the interests of the donor and against the interests of 
autonomous women-led families at least where conception occurs at home and 
                                            
630 Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben, and Fiona Kelly, ‘De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in 
Canada: Some Doubts and Directions Rethinking Assisted Conception’ (2010) 26 Canadian 
Journal of Family Law 95, 118. 
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the female coupled are not civil partners/spouses. This perceived bias provides 
a complicated background for a discussion of the various interests, which are 
engaged in a known donation situation. It makes it more difficult to be 
conceptually clear about when a genuine contribution and interest is being valued 
and when pre-conceived notions about the family are entering the discussion.        
Reaffirming Same-Sex Parenting 
In legal terms in the UK, there has been legislative and judicial affirmation of the 
equivalence of same-sex and different-sex parents as regards their suitability as 
parents. Since 2005 legislation has provided that same-sex couples have been 
able to foster and adopt,631 and since 2009 same-sex couples have been on an 
equal footing as different-sex couples in terms of assisted reproduction.632 This 
was recently emphasised by a High Court judge who endorsed the idea that ‘the 
policy underpinning [the 2009] reforms is an acknowledgement that alternative 
family forms without fathers are sufficient to meet a child's need.’633   
These recent legislative and judicial signals contrast with those of the recent past. 
Although opposition to same-sex parenting in the UK may not have been as 
vehement as it continues to be in some countries such as the USA, there has 
traditionally been considerable resistance to the idea of same-sex parents as 
suitable parents in the British press, Parliament and courts. As recently as 1998, 
child welfare concerns in relation to same-sex parenting were raised within the 
then Labour government with one minister remarking, ‘I am not in favour of gay 
                                            
631 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 50(1) and s.144 (4), which came into force in 2005. 
632 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, ss.42-44 and 54, which came into force in 
2009. 
633 Re G (A Minor); Re Z (A Minor) [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam) [113] per Mr Justice Baker. 
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couples seeking to adopt children because I question whether that is the right 
start in life. We should not see children as trophies.’634 These concerns are 
reflected in early post-separation custody cases where the mother has 
subsequently identified herself as a lesbian. The courts in these cases highlighted 
the risks presented to the child of being raised by a lesbian couple, risks which 
were supposedly exacerbated if the couple were ‘militant lesbians’.635 
Fortunately, legal attitudes have moved on considerably in the past twenty years 
with more recent cases concerned with protecting the integrity of same-sex 
families.636 Consequently the earlier concerns that being raised in same-sex 
families is detrimental for the child are no longer readily visible within the legal 
framework. However a degree of hesitancy remains in terms of legal and policy 
discourses, as well as social attitudes, when it comes to suggesting that same-
sex parenting might be ‘as good as’ different-sex parenting. In 1991, Glidewell 
LJ, sitting in the Court of Appeal, held that it was ‘axiomatic that the ideal 
environment for the upbringing of a child is the home of loving, caring and 
sensible parents, her father and her mother.’637 Since then, there has been over 
two decades of same-sex, in particular lesbian, parenting, despite which this 
statement still has considerable traction within the legal and social imagination. 
These ideas that the two-parent, heterosexual family is both natural and better 
than other family forms (i.e. ideal) for raising children lies at the heart of the 
hegemony of heteronormativity within family law and policy. There is, however, a 
growing body of empirical evidence that disputes the claim that (in particular) 
                                            
634 Comments of the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, on Radio 4’s Today Programme in 
November 1998. This is quoted in Leanne Smith, ‘The Problem of Parenting in Lesbian Families 
and Family Law’ (PhD Thesis, Queen’s University Belfast 2007) 72. 
635 B v B (minors) (custody: care and control) [1991] 1 FLR 402, 410. 
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lesbian parenting is somehow less than ideal. The courts have drawn extensively 
on the expertise of child psychiatrists in disputes about same-sex parenting to 
confirm that child welfare is not put at risk through being raised by same-sex 
parents.638 
In a recent overview of research into planned lesbian parenting, a researcher in 
child development cited numerous studies to support the assertion that ‘growing 
evidence suggests that there are no differences between young children raised 
in lesbian-parent families and those raised in two-parent heterosexual families 
with regard to problem behaviour and well-being.’639 It is difficult to be conclusive 
about this finding because this type of research has a number of limitations. 
Sample sizes are often small, for example, and studies sometimes rely on 
parental reports of wellbeing, which can introduce bias into the results.640 
However, there have been a number of studies, which have drawn on large data 
sets, used more objective measures of psychological wellbeing and have often 
been conducted longitudinally. Golombok et al, for example, used the UK Avon 
Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children to compare the psychological 
wellbeing of young children in families led by two women with two-parent 
heterosexual households. Their results suggested that: 
…even with a general population sample it remains the case that 
children reared by lesbian mothers appear to be functioning well 
                                            
638 See for example, C Sturge, ‘Gay and Lesbian Parenting in the UK: Biological, Societal and 
Psychological Issues Relevant to Children’ [2008] International Family Law 32; Chris Barton, 
‘Lesbian Couples and Their Families : Harmony for the Child , the Women and the Man’ [2014] 
Family Law 851. 
639 Henny M W Bos, ‘Lesbian Mother Families Formed Through Donor-Insemination’ in Abbie E. 
Goldberg and Katherine R. Allen (eds), LGBTQ-Parent Families: Innovations in Research and 
Implications for Practice (Springer 2013) 25. 
640 For more detail on this see Fiona Tasker, ‘Same-Sex Parenting and Child Development: 
Reviewing the Contribution of Parental Gender’ (2010) 72 Journal of Marriage and Family 35–
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and do not experience negative psychological consequences 
arising from the nature of their family environment.641 
In addition to the more representative sample size, another strength of this study 
is that a range of measures were used to assess psychological wellbeing such 
as parental reports, teacher reports and psychological indicator measures in 
relation to the children themselves. 
More recently, researchers have used similar strategies to assess the 
psychological wellbeing of adolescents in lesbian-led families. In the US, for 
example, Wainwright and colleagues used the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health to reveal no difference in substance use, peer relationships 
and academic progress between children raised in two-women-led families and 
two-parent heterosexual families.642 Other similar studies have gone further than 
this to indicate more positive results for adolescents from lesbian-led families 
compared to children from two-parent heterosexual families. Data from the US 
National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study indicates that children from lesbian-
led families are no more likely to engage in heavy substance abuse and, in fact, 
demonstrate greater academic competence and social skills.643 This is supported 
by a recent study in the UK, which found that adolescents in lesbian-led families 
                                            
641 Susan Golombok, Beth Perry, Amanda Burston, Clare Murray, Julie Mooney-Somers, 
Madeleine Stevens, and Jean Golding, ‘Children With Lesbian Parents: A Community Study’ 
(2003) 39 Developmental Psychology 20, 30 
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had higher self-esteem and lower levels of depression, anxiety, hostility and 
alcohol abuse compared to adolescents in heterosexual two-parent families.644 
Therefore, although more research is needed on a diverse range of planned 
same-sex families, the best evidence we have, based on sound psychological 
research, indicates that it is not ‘axiomatic’ that a same-sex family is per se a less 
favourable environment for raising children than a heterosexual family. On the 
contrary, the research indicates that the absence of parents of both genders in 
planned lesbian families has little impact on the psychological wellbeing of 
children.  
Despite this, even this tentative formulation of the point is not universally 
accepted in terms of social attitudes.645 This lack of acceptance provides the 
background for much of the scholarship on same-sex parenting, which in different 
ways challenges the hegemony of heteronormativity within family law and policy. 
While this is a laudable aim, there isn’t always a clear delineation between 
arguments deployed against a specific rule/decision because it embodies this 
heteronormative bias and arguments that decry a prejudicial outcome, which may 
have resulted more from the existence of that rule/decision within a 
heteronormatively-biased system rather than that rule being biased in itself. 
However, this is not always an easy distinction to make because the motivation 
for making a given rule/decision may be relevant even where the rule itself is not 
inherently biased. Therefore, this is an important consideration when examining 
the legislation and case law. 
                                            
644 Susan Golombok and S Badger, ‘Children raised in mother-headed families from infancy: A 
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The Role of Men in Women-Led Families 
As discussed in the previous section, the psychological wellbeing of children 
seems to be unaffected by whether they are raised by a female couple or a 
heterosexual couple but, despite this, heteronormative bias continues to exert a 
pervasive influence on legal and social discourses. These two linked 
observations have a considerable impact on the discussion of the role of men in 
women-led families: 
…in becoming parents, lesbian mothers open themselves to many 
of the values that govern heterosexual families, such as the 
assumed need for both male and female role models. These values 
may contradict their own lived experience, such as the desire, 
implicit or explicit, to become parents without men.646 
Although the authors here refer to a lesbian mother’s desire to become a parent 
without men, there is, self-evidently, a biological impediment to this, namely that 
a man at least needs to make a biological contribution for conception to occur. 
Although perhaps the authors were referring to more than mere biological 
contribution, it is worth dwelling on this point a little. 
The biological reality of the situation is that men and women cannot create 
children independently of one and other. Therefore a same-sex couple cannot 
conceive a child without involving someone of a different sex, whereas a fertile 
heterosexual couple can. However, as discussed above in relation to the 
Warnock Report, it has long been possible for infertile heterosexual couples to 
side step the involvement of a third party in the reproductive relationship through 
anonymous gamete donation. This option is now also open to female same-sex 
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couples. Therefore while ‘anonymous’/unknown sperm donation does not quite 
allow lesbians to become parents without men it does in the sense that it is not 
necessary to identify a specific man, which in practical terms is a close 
approximation. 
The relatively recent inclusion of female couples and single women in the 
institution of ‘anonymous’ gamete donation has arguably made them reproductive 
insiders in this respect along with infertile heterosexual couples, where previously 
these groups may have been excluded from reproduction. This is largely due to 
the possibility of separating the donated gamete and the donor and, therefore, 
not having to deal with the donor as a person. This possibility does not, however, 
exist for women, or couples involving women (lesbian or heterosexual), who 
cannot bear children nor for gay men (as individuals or couples) because these 
groups require a gestational surrogate as well as donated gametes in most 
cases.647 
Despite this, the decision to conceive with a known donor, which may occur for a 
number of reasons, raises different and more complex issues compared to 
unknown donation. Lord Justice Thorpe commented in a recent case involving a 
known donor/collaborative co-parenting arrangement that: 
…the desire to create a two parent lesbian nuclear family 
completely intact and free from fracture resulting from contact with 
the third parent…may be essentially selfish and may later 
insufficiently weigh the welfare and developing rights of the child.648 
Some commentators are highly critical of this statement. One author argues that: 
Thorpe LJ seems to assume that a supervening and unilateral 
desire for full parenthood on the donor’s part will generally be 
natural and to the child’s advantage and that it should thereby bring 
                                            
647 This is discussed further at page 312 onwards. 
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about an adjustment in parenting arrangements…This assessment 
is predicated on [the] highly problematic understanding that biology 
or human nature makes it almost inevitable that, sooner or later, a 
donor will want his contribution to escalate to full parenthood…649 
This reaction seems understandable given the persistence of heteronormative 
hegemony in family law and policy as discussed above. Nevertheless, the 
author’s point does not acknowledge, as Lord Justice Thorpe seems to, the 
potential impact on both the donor and child of being able to identify the biological 
father who may have some ongoing social relationship with the child.   
It seems unlikely that the author views an acknowledgment that the biological 
father’s interests in relation to the biological connection may well be engaged as 
a ‘highly problematic understanding’ of human nature and biology. It seems more 
likely that the author was taking issue with any suggestion that this is inevitable, 
which is not necessarily the case. As one of the ‘known donors’ in the current 
empirical study commented: 
I was very surprised at how detached I am. I was detached in the 
process and after he was born I was still detached. I don't feel any... 
pull, not right now anyway and I mean he's, what, four years old 
now. I don't feel like he's my child.650 
This is quite a telling observation because it demonstrates that a biological 
connection does not necessarily hold any significance for the donor. However, 
the increasing number of known donor cases coming before the courts recently 
suggests this is not always the case. Studies on surrogate motherhood suggest 
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a similar outcome with some surrogate mothers experiencing very little emotional 
difficulty when relinquishing the child compared to others.651 
Importantly, the law does not ignore the psychological security of the parents652 
but the child’s welfare as a whole, of which the parents’ psychological security 
may form a part, is clearly the law’s central concern. As Diduck and Kaganas 
note: 
The welfare of children has increasingly claimed the attention of 
policy makers and law reformers alike in recent decades. Children 
are portrayed as victims of divorce and of child abuse…These 
concerns have led to the elevation of the welfare principle to a 
central and seemingly unassailable position in the law relation to 
children.653 
Despite this, some commentators question the overriding nature of specific 
interpretations of child welfare in resolving disputes concerning parents and 
children.654  
 As Zanghellini argues, it may well be the case that ‘it is likely that the child’s 
welfare is equally compatible with, or promoted by, a variety of different 
arrangements’.655 Arguably, Thorpe LJ is suggesting that it is in the best interests 
of the child for the biological father to be involved in his or her life, which brings 
to mind heteronormative influences and fathers’ rights discourse. However, 
suggesting that a biological father has an interest in having a relationship with his 
offspring and that the child may well benefit from his presence does not 
necessarily imply any heteronormative bias in favour of fathers’ rights.  
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Despite this, it is important to acknowledge that there is a perception that ‘fathers 
are essential to the healthy psychological, moral, social, and gender development 
of children,’656 which is likely to have an impact on how Lord Justice Thorpe’s 
comments are interpreted. However, Lord Justice Thorpe’s comments do not 
necessarily ‘assume that a supervening and unilateral desire for full parenthood 
on the donor’s part will generally be natural and to the child’s advantage’ as 
Zanghellini suggested above. The judge’s comments recognise this as being a 
distinct possibility and one that ultimately must be weighed against the intended 
parents’ desire to create an autonomous family free from the interference of a 
third party.  
Unfortunately, ‘[t]here are few data on what it means for offspring to have known 
or unknown donors’.657 One of the few studies to have looked into this, the US 
National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study, indicated that ‘donor type has no 
bearing on the development of the psychological well-being of the offspring of 
lesbian mothers over a 7-year period from childhood through adolescence’.658 
This area of research is still in its infancy and much more work needs to be done 
here. Nevertheless, the research seems to indicate that a female couple’s 
decision to use anonymous donor sperm to form an autonomous family without 
the involvement of a third party has little effect on child welfare.  
Indeed, research suggests that the conscious and deliberate way many of these 
families manage male influences in the child’s life mean that they compensate for 
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the lack of an immediate role model, which may be present in families consisting 
of a mother and a father. Goldberg contends that ‘[m]en do not need to be central 
in a family to be valued as socialization sources’.659 In her study of lesbian 
mothers’ perceptions of male involvement, Goldberg found that a majority of the 
women (i.e. 41 women) ‘were highly conscious of the fact that their child will not 
grow up with a male parent and expressed concern about the absence of a male 
figure. Their concern fuelled their intention to find potential male role models’.660 
Therefore, these couples engaged in a number of creative strategies to ensure 
that the child was exposed to a range of influences, including from both genders, 
with around half of the lesbians interviewed with a known donor opting to involve 
him in the child’s life.  
Motivations for Involving a Known Biological Father 
Conceiving with a known donor is an option that a considerable number of 
prospective lesbian parents have considered for a variety of reasons. In Kelly’s 
Canadian study, she found that: 
Twenty-four of the thirty-six families interviewed had conceived 
their children using anonymous-donor sperm. However, about half 
of this group stated that they had initially wanted to use a known 
donor, and only after careful deliberation had they decided it was 
not the right choice.661 
According to Kelly, the motivation of those who initially wanted a known donor 
but eventually chose an anonymous donor was that ‘they wanted a father in name 
only – a symbolic father – who served little more than a semiotic function’.662 
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However the participants in that study were largely unable to find men who were 
willing to fulfil this role because most wanted more active involvement. Therefore, 
many of the women who initially wanted a known donor felt this was too risky and 
settled for an anonymous donor. 
Furthermore, the idea of wanting the known donor to be a ‘symbolic father’ but 
having no role in the child’s life is a problematic one. In commenting on the 
Australian case of Re Patrick, Dempsey makes the point that:  
…it is clear that the mother assumes having lesbian parents 
automatically excludes a child from the right to have contact with 
his biological father. This line of reasoning by the biological mother 
is both philosophically and empirically problematic.663 
 As Dempsey highlights, such a presumption is almost as problematic as the 
assumption that children should have fathers. Some of the participants in 
previous studies use this as an oppositional discourse and in so doing adopt a 
scathing view of the potential role of fathers. One of the participants in Kelly’s 
study responded to the suggestion that a father might have rights by saying ‘What 
because he donated sperm? I don’t think so.’ This led Kelly to suggest that ‘the 
known donor emerged from these conversations as a slightly sinister figure with 
the law on his side’.664  
These reactions are understandable as a response to the dominance of 
perceived heteronormative biases within the legal system. However, it is 
important to try to fairly represent the interests of both women-led families and 
known donors when discussing questions of legal recognition. What is more, 
there was not the same sense of known donors as slightly sinister figures in the 
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current study, which suggests that opinion among lesbian parents on the role of 
the known donor is somewhat divided with a number of lesbians advocating a 
more involved role.  
Angela, Ruth and Rob’s story emerging from the current study is an encouraging 
one for women-led families who wish to involve a known donor without entering 
into a co-parenting arrangement. Angela comments that: 
I think because it was so clear to him and to us right from the get-
go, I’ve never felt uncomfortable with it or unsafe in terms of him 
asserting any kind of rights to that child, probably just because 
that’s him and because we were able to be so clear. Whereas I 
could see it towards the end of our relationship with our first 
potential donor, that that was becoming fuzzy.665  
Angela’s remarks highlight that the process of finding a suitable known donor is 
an important one, just as it is in relation to selecting a co-parenting, which involves 
gauging the level of involvement everyone is comfortable with. Four years down 
the line all parties are still on the same page and the donor has not felt compelled 
in any way to assert any kind of relationship with the child. As Rob (who is 
heterosexual and is currently raising his partner’s child) remarks: 
I'm ok with the way things are. I'd be ok if they lived in town and I'd 
spend more time but I'm...so involved in my own family life and work 
that there isn't much time to really think about much else…but ye 
it's kind of out of sight out of mind.666 
This arrangement, therefore, although involving a written agreement, is also 
based on a considerable degree of trust that has developed during the process 
of finding the right match and being explicit about the envisaged level of 
involvement.  
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Moreover, although a number of the participants in the present study 
acknowledged the unknown donor approach based on their awareness of how 
other lesbians have become parents, this did not necessarily chime with their own 
views and experience. As Betty (from the UK) comments:  
Obviously as a lesbian couple we are very fortunate in that we have 
the options of going either with an unknown donor or even a known 
donor who is not involved…I didn’t want to go to the sperm bank 
and just pick out a profile with information about the father…50% of 
my child’s genes. Not that there is anything wrong with that…it is 
really horses for courses.667 
Therefore, while Kelly’s study found that a number of lesbians were rejecting 
known donation as inherently risky, both the UK and Canadian participants in this 
study conversely rejected unknown donation for a variety of reasons. Betty and 
Eliza, for example were quite concerned about genetic identity, as the allusions 
to genes in the view expressed above highlights. Related to this, Angela and Ruth 
(a Canadian couple) were concerned with the child’s identity more generally and 
not feeling a sense of absence or loss. Angela notes: 
I know that he’ll never have to go out looking for his other parent, 
his other family, which is exactly what Robin and I were 
uncomfortable with in an unknown donor, in an anonymous donor, 
is that his feeling like there’s a part of him that’s missing or that’s 
mysterious or that maybe they would know themselves if they found 
that.668 
This suggests that female couples seeking to involve a known biological father 
are not uniform in their desires for doing so but that motivations for seeking to 
involve a known donor can vary, which may be significant when deciding the legal 
effect such decisions should have.  
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This is evident not only from the findings of the current study but also from 
previous studies. One concern that a US study on lesbian parenting identified 
relates to the importance of medical history. As one of the participants in that 
study commented:  
The only reason we wanted a known donor was because we 
thought at some point in this child’s life there would probably be 
reasons why they would want to be able to trace their medical 
history in order to make certain decisions or to figure out certain 
medical stuff… It wasn’t because we wanted a known donor.669 
With increasingly sophisticated medical screening procedures and the possibility 
of obtaining medical information about ‘anonymous’ donors, this may be less of 
a motivating factor to involve a known donor nowadays. However, medical 
concerns were evident in the current study, for example in Betty and Eliza’s 
decision to conceive at a licensed fertility clinic rather than at home.   
As mentioned previously, the idea of the known donor as a male role model also 
emerged from the current study. Sally from Canada stressed that she ‘wanted 
[the children] to have other people that would be role models for them, that 
wouldn’t be fleeting…when you are family, there is this connection’. This supports 
what was found in the US study where one of the participants  commented, ‘I 
thought of the possibilities that, you know, there would be, maybe if I found the 
right person, a male influence, you know, in the child’s life’.670 To some extent 
this type of thinking is influenced by the societal norm that having both an involved 
mother and an involved father is beneficial for a child. This relates to Goldberg’s 
suggestion discussed earlier that women-led families may feel social pressure to 
include specific male role models in a child’s life. However, as Goldberg’s study 
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revealed, this can be achieved in a number of ways without having to involve the 
biological father. Therefore, women-led families who feel that it is important for a 
child to have male and female influence need not feel compelled down the route 
of known donation. 
While knowledge of medical history and having male influences in the child’s life 
may be important for many women-led families, some feel these can adequately 
be achieved in the context of having two female parents. One of the participants 
in a recent UK study, which represented quite a typical response, emphasised 
the importance of joint parenting independently of the biological father: 
I didn’t want to have to consider there being a third parent in the 
family really, which would kind of maybe be the case with using a 
known donor. Yeah, I don’t feel the need to share [our child] with 
another parent. So we decided, yeah, the two of us were enough 
so, yeah, we would use an anonymous donor; and that was that.671 
Therefore, this couple were not interested in involving a third parent and for that 
reason avoided involving a known donor in favour of anonymous donation. 
From the present empirical study, the importance of genetics/medical history 
emerged, adding a further and new dimension to the knowledge developing 
around these issues. One of the UK participants, Eliza, who was in the process 
of conceiving with her female partner and male co-parent commented that: 
I wanted to know where the sperm comes from. I wanted to know…I 
mean, perhaps this is slightly sort of genetically fascist. [Laughter]. 
I wanted to know that you are getting some good genes, really. 
When you go to a clinic you only get so much information, and that, 
you know, made me a bit more reticent to consider that route as a 
first option.672 
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Another factor, related to genetics and biology, which surfaced as an important 
consideration is the importance of the child not feeling anything is lacking in terms 
of his or her genetic identity. Angela stresses that: 
What we both felt was really important is that our kid would have 
the… that none of his identity would be a secret, he wouldn’t feel 
like it was mysterious and that there was some part of him that he 
needed to track down and find or that there was some missing 
father figure or something like that, which I think is sometimes… we 
knew some people who had done the anonymous donor route and 
their kids then got to be teenagers and wanted to find their father.673 
 This resonates with some of the responses found in Goldberg’s study discussed 
above where the female couple were concerned with being ‘fair to the child’ and 
compensating for any perceived lacking as a result of the absence of a biological 
father. 
For a number of families in the current study, however, it was about more than 
mere genetics. Ruth, a Canadian participant, who is the non-biological parent of 
a child conceived with the help of a known donor, links genetics with the idea of 
attraction: 
I think it’s really important to reproduce with somebody that you find 
appealing. Like, even if you are not…you wouldn’t have a sexual 
relationship with them, I think that there’s a lot to do with attraction 
and good genetics. So that was a huge part of, like, not wanting to do 
an unknown donor. Because everyone looks good on paper.674 
This goes beyond genetics for its own sake or medical history. It recognises that 
reproduction is an important process and it brings in our inbuilt intuition about 
interpersonal, rather than romantic, attraction. This idea is reinforced by Eliza’s 
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partner Betty who makes the point that it was as if they were ‘dating this guy’ 
when they were selecting a male co-parent.675    
Therefore, alongside considerations to do with the importance of genetics, which 
participants in other studies on known donation highlighted as discussed above, 
a number of the participants in the current study stressed the importance of the 
relationship with the male co-parent. As Eliza comments, ‘[i]t felt like you had to, 
kind of, I don’t know, not fancy them but kind of feel sort of connected to them 
somehow, or attracted to them somehow’.676 While this would be an important 
consideration in relation to someone who will share parenting duties, it may not 
be so relevant in the case of a known donor who will not have any kind of 
relationship with the child. 
Nevertheless, participants in the current study indicated that the choice of known 
donor was an important consideration, albeit perhaps one that involves different 
considerations compared to the choice of a co-parent. Angela, the biological 
mother of children born through known donation in Canada, comments that: 
We spent quite a long time finding somebody who would be 
suitable. We were looking for somebody who was in our life in a 
kind of periphery, not involved on a daily basis, not one of our close 
friends, not somebody we were going to see all the time, but not 
somebody who was really distant. Not a stranger, because we 
wanted to know them and trust them a little bit.677 
Therefore similar importance is being placed on the search for a known donor as 
it is for a co-parent, although perhaps the emphasis in what is important in each 
of these situations is slightly different. Both Betty and Eliza, who are in the 
process of conceiving with a co-parent in the UK, and Ruth and Angela, who have 
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conceived with a known donor in Canada, seem to emphasise that it is important 
to find the right person. However, Betty and Eliza focus more on the idea of 
‘attraction,’ whereas Ruth and Angela seem more concerned with suitability in 
terms of the right level of relational proximity when looking for a man to conceive 
with.   
Gay Men and Parenthood 
The previous sections have considered female same-sex parenting generally as 
well as the intended role of, and motivations for involving, known biological 
fathers. The remaining sections of this chapter will focus more on how gay men 
are positioned in terms of collaborative co-parenting. They will look at the general 
context of gay male parenting as well as the nature of gay men’s involvement in 
collaborative co-parenting before turning to the issue of accommodating the 
experiences of gay men in terms of reproduction and parenting within the legal 
framework. 
Gay male parenting and lesbian parenting, sometimes referred to collectively as 
same-sex parenting, are often discussed together, particularly in contrast to 
different-sex parenting. These discussions often focus on sexuality-based 
differences between same-sex and different-sex parenting, without necessarily 
considering the different experiences that gay men, on the one hand, and 
lesbians, on the other, have in relation to parenting. Neither gay men nor lesbians 
are homogenous groups in terms of their experiences of parenting, as with other 
areas of their lives. Therefore, it is important to consider the different parenting 
accounts given by individual families. However, one might also intuitively expect 
there to be gender-based differences between the parenting experiences of gay 
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men and those of lesbians. This intuition is likely to be predicated on our 
appreciation of the different experiences that men and women have in relation to 
different-sex parenting. This section considers gay male routes to parenthood 
and the various challenges that gay men face. The section contrasts the 
experiences of gay men in becoming parents with those of lesbian women in an 
attempt to disentangle the different interests involved when gay men and lesbians 
reproduce collaboratively. 
The discussions in the previous sections of this chapter suggest that single 
women, female couples and infertile heterosexual couples have been made 
reproductive insiders as a result of anonymous gamete donation, which comes 
very close to being able to conceive children without involving an identified third 
party. However, unlike fertile women, female couples and heterosexual couples, 
gay men remain reproductive outsiders to some extent regardless of their fertility 
status. The reason for this is that in order to conceive a child, they need an 
identified woman to be involved and give birth to the child. It is a biological reality 
that unlike gamete donation, the act of child-birth cannot be separated from the 
gestational carrier. 
As discussed above, there may be a tension in women-led families between the 
desire to become parents without the involvement of men and the pressure these 
parents might feel based on the heteronormative ideal of involvement of the 
mother and the father. Similarly, it seems plausible that men, particularly gay men 
and gay male couples, may also have a desire to become parents without the 
involvement of women. The idea that the biological connection between a 
progenitor and offspring may be significant seems to accord with our 
understanding of human nature and biology without necessarily implying a 
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biological imperative in this regard. Furthermore, given that the ECHR is a living 
instrument that can respond to social change,678 this potentially engages tensions 
in relation to article 8 ECHR right to private and family life and also issues relating 
to equality between male and female couple. This begs the question of what 
extent autonomous male-led parenting should be reflected in law in a similar way 
as women-led parenting. 
Unlike women, men are not traditionally thought of in terms of having or lacking 
the desire to have children.679  This would appear to stem from the fact that 
‘gender norms locate reproductive planning as a woman’s issue’.680 As a result 
of this, there is a considerable amount of, mainly feminist, literature around 
motherhood and reproductive autonomy681 but little on men’s involvement in 
reproductive decision making.682 This has led to the recent suggestion that: 
greater attention needs to be shown to how men emerge and 
express themselves as procreative beings. In ways that feminist 
theory has made explicit in women’s lives, reproductive issues do 
not simply become personally relevant for men at the birth or 
adoption of their children. Reproductive concerns can come to the 
fore much earlier as men, often in conjunction with their partners, 
strive to promote or restrict reproduction.683 
Building on this, the present study was particularly interested in eliciting 
experiences from the gay men who participated about how they position 
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themselves in relation to having children and how the collaborative co-parenting 
arrangement they were engaging in fitted into that. Therefore, the current study 
adds to the empirical knowledge available on gay men’s reproductive choices, 
especially in the context of collaborative co-parenting arrangements. 
Reproductive decisions in heterosexual partnerships are made as a couple, 
which may obscure any gender differences in the reproductive decision-making. 
In relation to gay and lesbian parenting, however, gender-based differences may 
be more apparent when comparing gay male and lesbian parents’ reproductive 
decision making processes. Both lesbian and gay parents face a common 
sexuality-based challenge as compared to heterosexual parents, namely that 
‘heterosexual norms construe childbearing among heterosexual couples as a 
taken-for-granted aspect of life that does not require deliberation,’684 whereas the 
opposite is true in relation to both gay and lesbian parenting. However, it is likely 
that gay men experience the intersection of gender-based and sexuality-based 
challenges in relation to parenting, in a qualitatively different way from lesbians. 
This needs to be taken into account when considering gay men’s and lesbian’s 
respective motivations for engaging in collaborative co-parenting in order to 
ensure that the potentially distinctive needs and interests of both groups are being 
adequately reflected. This stands in contrast to the existing approach where these 
concerns are conflated in the interests of protecting the (largely women-led) 
homonuclear family.        
Parenting by lesbians has become increasingly accepted and more 
commonplace since the 1980s.685 Lesbians becoming parents today do not face 
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the same opposition or obstacles as those ‘pioneer[s] of planned lesbian 
motherhood’686 did. Part of the reason for this is that lesbians parenting children 
is seen as consistent with the gendered notion in society that women are suitable 
primary carers. In this way, lesbian parenting has become ‘normalised’ through 
them being seen as fulfilling a supposedly ‘natural’ desire for women to become 
mothers. In legal terms, this process of normalisation has only really come to 
fruition fairly recently as a result of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008 reforms. Nevertheless, there is not the same sense in relation to lesbians 
who become parents that they are acting inconsistently with gender norms in 
doing so as there is with gay men who become parents.  
Therefore, the perception persists that gay men as parents challenge 
fundamental norms of family life in a way that lesbian parents do not. According 
to Biblarz and Stacey, ‘gay male parents challenge dominant practices of 
masculinity, fatherhood, and motherhood more than lesbian co-mothers depart 
from normative femininity or maternal practice’.687 This is reinforced by the 
prejudicial way that the courts have treated gay fathers in the past as 
demonstrated by Re D (An Infant) Adoption: Parent’s Consent688 In this case, the 
House of Lords dispensed with the consent of a father, who had subsequently 
come out as gay, to the adoption of his child by the mother and her new partner, 
on the ground that any reasonable father would consent. According to Lord 
Wilberforce the father’s refusal to consent ran the risk of the child being exposed 
to experiences which ‘may lead to severance from normal society, to 
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psychological stresses and unhappiness and possibly even to physical 
experiences which may scar them for life’.689 Although this case was decided a 
number of decades ago now, this scathing indictment of gay fatherhood continues 
to detrimentally impact upon how male same-sex parenting is conceived of, not 
least in the minds of potential gay fathers themselves.    
Furthermore, gay men lack a framework and set of well-established conventions 
in relation to becoming a parent because parenthood for gay men has not gained 
such cultural traction as lesbian parenting. There remains considerable hostility 
towards gay male parenting in some jurisdictions, particularly the United States, 
because of the combined challenge it presents to the link between 
heterosexuality and parenting and normative masculinity, which is perceived as 
a bigger threat than that posed by lesbian parenting.690 Mallon notes that a 
number of the participants in his US study who were hostile to the idea of gay 
parenthood commented on ‘the threat to their patriarchal privileges from the 
presence of gay men who were blatantly taking on traditionally female 
responsibilities in the home’.691 Therefore, choosing to raise a child in the 
absence of a woman as the primary care giver challenges dominant social norms 
around parenting and caregiving, adding to the hurdles faced by gay men who 
are prospective parents.692 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of the gay male participants in 
the present study had discounted the idea of having children until they came to 
view collaborative co-parenting as a way of achieving this.693 This finding is 
supported by other recent studies that have revealed how many gay men have 
internalised this hostility, which prevents them from envisaging options for 
becoming a parent. In a recent qualitative study of civil partnerships in the UK, 
Heaphy et al. found that of the twenty five lesbian couples interviewed only four 
did not envisage having children, with the rest already having children or had 
plans to have children in the near future. By contrast, none of the twenty five male 
couples had children: 
Among these young men there were those who very much did want 
to have children but who felt that the process of becoming parents 
was rather alien and outside their possible scope of 
action…However, the majority of the male couples did not include 
parenthood in their plans for the future. Some thought it might be 
wrong for gay male couples to have children.694  
These results are surprising because you might expect that, as a group, civilly 
partnered gay men would be more likely to want children than other gay men. 
However, unlike with the lesbian couples, becoming parents did not appear to be 
a priority for many of the male couples.  
The absence of narratives of gay male parenthood within the gay community is 
highlighted by another recent study in the UK by Cooper on gay male identity.695 
This study of contemporary gay male identity contains very little discussion of 
parenthood, which is telling in itself even though the focus of the study was not 
on parenting. Similar to Heaphy et al.’s study discussed above, of the twenty one 
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gay men Cooper interviewed, (who were a mixed sample of single men and those 
in a relationship), none were currently raising children in a male-led family, either 
because they were not interested or had tried unsuccessfully: 
Several of the men talked about having children. Some were 
against the idea, while others hoped to have a baby at some 
point…Although two of the men that I interviewed had children from 
previous relationships with women, none were currently bringing up 
children with a male partner. However, some stated that they would 
like to have children. Others had already tried to have a baby but 
had been unsuccessful.696  
These qualitative studies relied on relatively small sample sizes and cannot claim 
to be representative in any statistical sense. However, they do capture a range 
of views and provide a snapshot of contemporary gay men’s thoughts about 
family, which, for whatever reason, rarely seems to include planned gay male 
parenthood.  
A potential explanation for this could be that gay men are less interested in 
becoming parents than heterosexual couples and lesbians. However, this was 
certainly not the case for the gay men interviewed in the current study. What is 
more, the findings from the current study, when combined with the range of views 
captured in the two studies discussed above, indicate that this could only be a 
partial explanation because structural, institutional and social influences have a 
marked impact on the parenting aspirations of gay men. It is, therefore, important 
to be cognisant of the fact that gay men may desire to become parents but feel 
excluded from this for a variety of reasons. 
There has been relatively little research on men’s desires to become parents 
generally. A key study in this regard is Marsiglio and Hutchinson’s 2002 
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qualitative project where they interviewed fifty-four young men (some single, 
some in a relationship, some with children, most without) about their thoughts in 
relation to procreation and fatherhood.697 The authors of the study did not 
explicitly address the sexual orientation of the participants. However, the focus of 
the study was on attitudes about becoming fathers through sexual intercourse. 
Therefore, it is likely that the majority of the participants were heterosexual. The 
picture that emerged from this study is a group of ethnically diverse men aged 
sixteen to thirty, the majority of whom were actively thinking about and making 
plans in relation to becoming parents, as the authors explain: 
A few of the men seemed particularly eager to get on with their lives 
and make the transition to fatherhood. One 21-year-old, Terry, 
excitedly speaks of how…[he] “would rather start a family early, so 
I’m kind of young so I can relate more with the kids, rather than 
starting like later in life, that’s kind of, I guess, why I wanna find a 
girl, settle down fairly soon, start a family.” Although only a few of 
our participants share Terry’s need to search immediately for a wife 
and the future mother of their children, most state that this type of 
family arrangement is something that they want eventually for 
themselves.698 
Here the culturally taken-for-granted nature of having children in the context of 
heterosexual relationships is evident. These men were not struggling over the 
question of whether or not they wanted to have children, because the vast 
majority were clear they did. They also didn’t feel the need to deliberate over how 
they should go about having children because that appeared to be obvious. The 
consideration foremost on many of these men’s minds was what type of father 
they wanted to be.  
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This contrasts markedly with the context in which gay men who might be thinking 
about having children operate. Berkowitz and Marsiglio, writing from the 
perspective of society in the USA, comment that ‘heterosexuality and parenthood 
are so inextricably intertwined in the United States, the mere suggestion of gay 
fatherhood appears strange, abnormal, and even impossible’.699 Therefore, 
rather than taking the possibility of parenthood for granted and assuming that 
they will become parents, as the men in Marsiglio and Hutchinson’s study did, 
many gay men (at least in the USA where much of the research has been 
conducted but likely also elsewhere too) ‘automatically assume that fatherhood 
is not an option’.700    
Neither of the UK studies mentioned earlier (Heaphy et al and Cooper) were 
focused on parenthood specifically. However, narratives about wanting to 
become parents and experiences of having children were conspicuously absent 
from the accounts of the gay men interviewed. This could lead to a suggestion 
that gay men are less likely than women and heterosexual men to want to have 
children. However, given the research in the USA that many gay men feel 
automatically disqualified from becoming parents, it is necessary to consider 
whether the sociological data indicate a genuine lack of desire to have children 
or whether more complicated factors feed into procreative decision making for 
gay men.701    
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Many of the men in Berkowitz and Marsiglio’s study, ‘viewed the coming out 
process as synonymous with the realization that they will never be fathers’.702 
However, while participants in the current study echoed this sentiment, it also 
identified a slow awakening to the possibility that this is not necessarily the case 
by some. As discussed in the previous chapter,703 both Lenny and Colin initially 
felt that being gay precluded them from becoming fathers until collaborative co-
parenting became a feasible way of realising that deep seated desire. Therefore, 
this assumption that being a gay man means being childless seems to be an 
influential force that impacts upon procreative decision making for these men, in 
a way that is not present in relation to heterosexual or even lesbian parenting. 
However, there are a number of stumbling blocks for gay men before they get to 
the stage of feeling able to have children. One of the obstacles is how difficult it 
is for gay men to have genetically related children of their own, which contrasts 
with the more available option for lesbian women of conceiving children through 
sperm donation. As Heaphy et al comments about the male participants in their 
study: 
The male couples were in a different position, however, because 
those who wanted a genetically related child could only go down 
the surrogacy route which for most seemed rather remote. Options 
to adopt or foster were mentioned by eight of the 25 male couples, 
but these were always rather tentative plans for action in five or ten 
years’ time.704 
For many, surrogacy might seem like an unrealistic option. There is an increasing 
presence in the media and academic studies of gay men engaging in commercial 
                                            
702 Berkowitz and Marsiglio (n 685) 372. 
703 See page 273 above. 
704 Heaphy et al. (n 680) 162. 
 
 
321 
surrogacy abroad. However, the expense associated with this means that only a 
small portion of gay men would be able to afford this.  
In addition to the financial implications a number of gay men are ambivalent about 
surrogacy as a practice. As Chris, a participant in the current study who is co-
parenting two children with his male partner and female friend, stresses: 
I have always had certain issues with surrogacy, there are a number 
of reasons, I don’t think it would have been right for me to do…I 
wouldn’t be comfortable with paying someone to have a child for 
me and then hand it over. It doesn’t…there are too many questions 
I am unable to answer about how I feel about it, I like to be clear on 
how I feel about a situation and I am not clear on…there’s too many 
things that don’t sit right with me so it wouldn’t be right for me.705 
This reflects a more general disquiet about commercial surrogacy in society, 
which is highlighted by the approaches different jurisdictions take to the issue. 
There has been considerable literature arguing in favour of lesbians being able 
to have children autonomously without the involvement of men.706 Commercial 
surrogacy is the closest to having children without the ongoing involvement of a 
woman that gay men come to. However, there are considerable financial and 
ideological barriers to this. 
An additional hurdle gay men face is the perception that having children is 
incongruous with their identity as gay men. Firstly, there is a perception that gay 
men having children without a woman as the primary caregiver is seen as deviant 
by some in society. As Berkowitz and Marsiglio highlight:  
[F]or some of these men, being socialized into a world that 
stereotypes gay men as pedophiles constrained their ability to 
envision themselves as future fathers. Even worse, as both Luke 
and Aiden express, it is not uncommon for gay men to incorporate 
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these heterosexist myths and irrational stereotypes into their own 
self-concept.707 
Although this particular stereotype did not appear in Heaphy et al.’s study, they 
did find that a number of the male couples they interviewed felt it was wrong for 
gay men to become parents. Berkowitz and Marsiglio note that ‘many young 
childless gay men are apprehensive about becoming fathers because they are 
overly concerned with how outsiders would perceive them’ and implicitly their 
family.708 One manifestation of this present in both studies is a concern about 
how their children would be treated at school, which would put them off having 
children in the first place. 
Another pernicious obstacle to gay men having children is the perception, rightly 
or wrongly, of the gay male community as being ‘sexually voracious’ and 
characterised by ‘the freedom to have many sexual partners’.709 This enhances 
the perception of those outside the gay community that gay men are unsuitable 
primary carers and also affects those within the gay community. Some of the 
participants in Heaphy et al’s study, for example, felt that ‘children would not fit in 
with their lifestyle, particularly with holidays and “hedonism”’.710 For some of the 
participants in Dempsey’s 2006 Australian study, this type of attitude, which they 
felt typifies the gay community is particularly problematic in terms of their 
aspirations to become parents:  
Distinguishing between the values of men as parents, and the 
sexually voracious gay majority also featured in other interviews 
with gay male primary carers. Russell and Anthony Sorenson 
professed to have few other gay men in their close social networks. 
The values Russell, in particular, saw exemplified in the gay male 
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communities, notably the freedom to have many sexual partners, 
were not those he aspired to. Far more keenly than in interviews 
with lesbian mothers, resident parenting by gay men entailed a 
greater sense of isolation—whether self-imposed or reluctant—
from gay male sociality.711 
At this point in time, it appears that gay male parenthood has not become part of 
the culture of gay male communities in the same way as it has in lesbian 
communities. Traditional stereotypes about how inconsistent parenting is with the 
gay male lifestyle abound and may have a detrimental effect of those gay men 
who do want to be parents or would wish to feel they had the choice. It seems 
likely that this environment, which is hostile to gay men having children, could 
have an impact on gay men’s desires to have children.  
It is also important to recognise that to ask whether as a gay man you would want 
to be involved in caring for and raising a child is a different question to the 
question of whether as a gay man you would want to have a child. The former 
question does not entail considering the complexities that gay men face in having 
a child of their own, whereas the latter does. Despite what might be classed as a 
hostile culture to gay male parenting, increasing numbers of gay men do want to 
become parents. As Berkowitz and Marsiglio note:  
Despite standing outside the traditional family building path, gay 
men appear to develop a procreative consciousness somewhat 
similar to their heterosexual counterparts. But because gay men 
cannot biologically reproduce with one another, their procreative 
consciousness and father identities are constructed, negotiated, 
and expressed in unique ways.712 
For a number of gay men the feeling that they might be unable to become a 
parent brings with it a considerable sense of loss. In the present study, for Collin’s 
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partner Joel, ‘there had been a sense that that was something being gay would 
mean…you know was a bit of a loss’.713 Therefore, in considering gay men’s 
involvement in collaborative reproductive arrangements with lesbian women, it is 
important to bear in mind the constraints that these men face when thinking about 
parenting ‘autonomously’, in comparison to prospective lesbian parents. 
Gay Men and Collaborative Reproduction 
Having discussed the general context surrounding planned parenthood in relation 
to gay men in the previous section, this section will consider more specifically the 
nature of gay men’s involvement in reproductive collaborations with lesbian 
women. The section will begin by discussing the motivations of gay men who 
enter into such arrangements and will go on to discuss the different types of 
families that are formed as a result. This will provide a good point of comparison 
with the initial sections of this chapter, which mainly focused on the experiences 
of lesbian parents. 
There is some evidence to suggest that gay known sperm donors at the time of 
the Gay Liberation movement in the 1980s donated mainly for altruistic and 
political reasons. As gay men who experienced a sense of exclusion from 
heteronormative institutions, such as the patriarchal family, they felt a sense of 
solidarity with lesbian women in the struggle to resist the restrictions placed on 
them by society. As van Reyk explains in the Australian context, ‘Becoming 
donors was not only about supporting the right of women to control their 
reproduction, but also a challenge to the construction of patriarchal relations 
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through the heterosexual nuclear family’.714 This was very much at a time where 
women were asserting control over their bodies and reproduction and the 
involvement of gay men facilitated this in relation to lesbians who wanted to 
become parents. Since then gay men have been actively developing a 
‘procreative consciousness’715 and are seeking to exercise their reproductive 
autonomy in a similar way as lesbians sought to do in the 1980s. 
While feminist critiques of patriarchy may have been a dominant influence on gay 
men’s decisions about facilitating lesbians to have children, a fathers’ rights 
discourse has developed greater prominence recently.716 Although the focus of 
the fathers’ rights movement is on heterosexual fathers particularly following 
separation from the mother, it is suggested here that gay men may ultimately be 
influenced by the rhetoric as awareness of their own reproductive needs 
develops. This may even be reflected in the fact that today, more gay men are 
seeking involvement with the children they conceive with lesbians. Riggs has 
argued that this in an indication that gay men are drawing on fathers’ rights 
discourse to support their own position in relation to children. 717 Developing this 
line of thinking, some lesbians may come to view gay men as aligning themselves 
with heterosexual men in terms of asserting their parenthood and challenging 
women-led families. By contrast, gay men and lesbians previously were 
perceived as being part of a ‘reproductive coalition’ because their interests in 
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terms of parenting aligned more closely with each other than they did with 
heterosexual parents.718  
Partly as a result of this uncertainty about how gay men might assert their 
relationship with the child further down the line, lesbians have, as discussed in a 
previous section, varying views about the involvement they envisage from the 
biological father.  This in turn is prompting a greater variety of non-traditional 
parenting arrangements within the gay and lesbian communities as they grapple 
with the possible roles which can be played by known donors and surrogates 
within their child’s life without threatening the relationship with their partner. 
Dempsey has recently drawn on a series of case studies based on her previous 
qualitative research conducted in Australia to illustrate the range of family 
configurations that exist and the challenges gay parents face. Dempsey identifies 
a ‘continuum of kinship intentions’ within which these families operate, ranging 
from a ‘standard donor’ arrangement to full ‘co-parenting’.719 It is helpful to 
explore and further consider this spectrum using examples from Dempsey’s own 
study combined with data from the current study.   
Standard donor arrangements attempt to approximate a situation similar to 
anonymous donation with the possibility of future identity release. As Dempsey 
explains ‘this renders a social father invisible and allows the lesbian parents to 
ensure their family is established as a social entity’.720 This type of arrangement 
allows the biological father to be on hand for when (and if) the child becomes 
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curious or wants to develop some sort of relationship. This type of arrangement 
is essentially what existed between Angela, Ruth and Rob in the current study.721 
Although the focus of the present study was primarily on situations where 
parenting was shared between the biological mother and father (and potentially 
their partners), this family represents a case study of a known donor situation 
where a poly-parenting arrangement was expressly rejected.  
One important feature here is that Rob is currently also raising a child in the 
context of a heterosexual relationship, which impacts on his view of the situation. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Rob reports being happy with the known 
donor arrangement whereby he is on hand should the child wish to develop a 
relationship with him, but otherwise has little involvement in his life: 
I'm so involved in my own family life and work that there isn't much 
time to really think about much else…I'm open to if he wants, you 
know, to get to know me and potentially I can be a, you know, a 
mentor for him or you know...I don't know if I'll be a parent. I think 
it'll be more of a role model or mentor for him, potentially.722  
A recurring theme in Rob’s responses is that he is focused on his own family life, 
although he does admit that ‘if I didn't have [my stepson] in my life it would 
probably be a different situation for me’. Therefore, in Rob’s mind, he already had 
a family and was not looking to raise any more children, which made him 
particularly suitable as a largely uninvolved known donor.    
However, as discussed in the previous section, collaborative co-parenting is likely 
to be a way for gay men to realise their own parenting desires, which may well 
conflict with some female couples’ desire to parent autonomously. Although such 
situations have arisen in the case law discussed in part two of the thesis, none of 
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the families interviewed in the current study reported conflicting expectations. It 
is noteworthy, therefore, that the case study from recent research on the 
involvement of gay men in lesbian families conducted by Dempsey in Australia 
that most closely resembles the standard donor type of arrangement also 
happened to be one of the most challenging in terms of conflicting expectations 
between the donor and his partner, on the one hand, and the lesbian mothers, on 
the other.723  
Dempsey describes a couple, Greg and Martin who are 43 and 42 respectively. 
Greg is the biological father of a one-month and a four-month old child, both of 
whom live with their biological mother and her female partner. A striking feature 
of this case study is the very young age of the children compared to a wider range 
of ages amongst the other families. This may well have an impact on the 
expectations of the parties as even in co-parenting arrangements the mother is 
sometimes reported as being primarily responsible for very young children. 
Nevertheless, the arrangement as it then was, of Greg and Martin’s contact about 
once a month with the children, was less than desired by the male couple and a 
source of ongoing disappointment for them. Indeed, Greg and Martin’s 
experiences of this type of collaborative reproduction seem to be characterised 
by disappointment and insecurity about their relationship with the children. Their 
concerns seems to centre on not being given the freedom to develop the 
relationship with the children they would like, not being able to assume the 
caregiving responsibilities they desire and not being able to find their place in the 
women’s ‘nuclear family’. 
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These concerns that are being raised by Greg and Martin contrast markedly with 
Rob’s approach to a very similar sort of arrangement, as discussed above. This 
might in part be due to the young age of the children. It is possible that the 
arrangement will develop into a more mutually satisfactory one, as the children 
get older. Alternatively, it may be that the mismatch in expectations widens given 
that the way relationship develops is principally in the hands of the lesbian 
mothers. It is, however, worth noting that Dempsey’s study did not include any 
‘standard donor’ arrangements between gay men and lesbians where the adults’ 
expectations were aligned as in the case of Angela, Ruth and Rob in the current 
study. It is, therefore, fortunate that the current study was able to capture a 
successful example of this type of parenting arrangement despite the hard-to-
access nature of the sample.   
Traditionally, since the Gay Liberation movement, gay men and lesbian women 
have been thought of as well-matched allies in the struggle to have families. A 
number of factors could have facilitated this. As noted, gay sperm donors were 
politically and altruistically motivated. Also, the templates of lesbian families and 
the frameworks in which they operate did not exist then as they do to a greater 
extent now. Therefore, historically, the fact that lesbian families were different 
from the nuclear family ideal may have been taken for granted. More recently, 
however, we can observe more of an assimilationist attitude among lesbian 
couples. Rather than tolerate or accept that lesbian families are going to be 
different, many now aspire to a heteronormative ideal of the lesbian family. This 
in turn has the potential effect of dividing the same-sex community in terms of 
their attitude to parenting. 
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As discussed in part two of this these there has been considerable criticism 
levelled at the way legal frameworks promote and encourage this 
heteronormative ideal of lesbian parenting by limiting the number of recognised 
parents to two to the detriment of those families who do not conform to that.724 
That criticism has been a central focus of this thesis because of the way 
heteronormative assumptions present in the legal framework delegitimises co-
parenting families. However, that is not to say that aspiring to a heteronormative 
ideal, or in other words desiring to create a homonuclear family, is not a legitimate 
aim. This is what lesbians create when they conceive with anonymous donor 
sperm. As Angela, Ruth and Rob, discussed above, illustrate, at least some 
successfully do so with known donors where the donor is acting purely 
altruistically in the process and remains content with this. Whether or not being a 
childless gay man lends itself to this type of wholly altruistic arrangement 
deserves more detailed consideration. However based on the available empirical 
studies and case law, the birth mother and biological donor father may have 
inherently conflicting needs in that situation. 
Based on empirical studies from both the UK725 and Canada,726 it appears to be 
the case that the majority of lesbians raising children are doing so without the 
involvement of their biological father. That is to say that the same-sex ‘nuclear’ 
family is more widespread than multi-parenting families.727 However, by and 
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large, where the biological donor father is involved in caring for the child to some 
extent this is not as a primary carer but a non-resident occasional carer. 
Dempsey uses the term ‘social solidarity agreements’ to describe parenting 
situations where the biological father is acknowledged as the father and is given 
the opportunity to develop a non-resident but caring relationship with the child. 
These arrangements could potentially work for a number of reasons. The primary 
focus of this type arrangement, like the standard donor arrangement, would have 
to be facilitating the birth mother to have a family, rather than facilitating the birth 
mother and biological father to have a family. This latter goal could only really be 
achieved through a co-parenting arrangement. Although the focus of the 
arrangement would be on facilitating the creation of the women-led family, the 
father would have a certain stake on the periphery of that family, as, has often 
been suggested, an uncle-like figure. 
From the biological mother’s point of view, this arrangement might work well if 
she feels a need to incorporate a male role model into the child’s life, if she feels 
the biogenetic relationship has some importance or even if she just wants to pave 
the way for a future relationship between the father and child. All of these are 
reasons lesbians have given for opting for a known donor, as discussed above.728 
Therefore, from the women’s point of view this arrangement could work quite well. 
There could be a number of motivations on the part of the biological father. It may 
be that, for whatever reason, perhaps to do with his identity as a gay man, the 
biological father does not wish to have children. However, just because the man 
does not wish to have the responsibility of raising a child of his own, does not 
automatically mean that he does not wish any peripheral involvement in the lives 
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of children, perhaps as part of an extended family relationship. Some might 
wrongly equate this formulation with fathers who are unwilling to take 
responsibility for their child but may still assert their right to have a relationship 
with that child.  
From a feminist perspective, gay men who enter these types of arrangement 
might be accused of wanting all the fun parts about being a parent without having 
to take any responsibility, which lays itself open to being seen as a typical male 
perspective. However, it is important to distinguish conception which occurs in 
the heterosexual context with planned gay and lesbian conception. In the 
heterosexual context, calls for fathers to take responsibility for their children and 
not cherry pick the relationship they have with them are much weightier because 
the biological father is as responsible for that child’s birth as the biological mother. 
Therefore, the relationship of responsibility that exists between him and the child 
is no more optional than that which exists between the birth mother and the child. 
This contrasts with the biological father’s position in a social solidarity 
arrangement because, from an ethical point of view, the birth mother is more 
responsible for the child than the biological father, due to her insistence that any 
rights and responsibilities in relation to the child lie with her and not the father. In 
this situation it is disingenuous to suggest that the biological father is being 
irresponsible if he wishes to limit the amount of time and caregiving he devotes 
to the child. Nevertheless, it may still be the case that a biological father in that 
position may feel a sense of personal obligation towards the child and 
consequently wish to assume a greater share of the rights and responsibilities in 
relation to the child if this were required. Therefore, there is a fine line between 
biological fathers who want the joys of having a child without any of the 
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responsibilities and those who wish to honour the parenting arrangement with the 
female couple but at the same time also feel responsible for the child’s wellbeing 
and development.  
The closest of Dempsey’s case studies to the social solidarity arrangement is 
Carl and Roman, who are 44 and 41 respectively.729 Carl is the biological father 
of a two-year old who lives with his biological mother and her partner. Carl and 
Roman care for Harry at their home on average every 2-3 weeks sometimes for 
two full days over the weekend. Therefore, Harry was having overnight stays with 
the couple, in addition to other social occasions where everyone was together, 
which is more frequently than Greg and Martin’s case study. Although Dempsey 
does not expand on this, it would be interesting to know what the arrangements 
were when the children were younger. It may have been the case that when the 
children were very young that the situation resembled more a standard donor 
arrangement more akin to that which exists with Greg and Martin. To some extent 
this may depend on how this family is positioned in relation to the typology 
advanced in this thesis. If the family is enacting a more pre-planned form of 
parenting arrangement than it may be less likely for the parenting to evolve in the 
way it might in relation to an organically developing parenting arrangement. 
Further longitudinal research in relation to these families would be required to test 
this out.  
Ironically, while Greg and Martin may well envy Carl and Roman’s position, the 
latter couple feel ‘exhausted and overwhelmed’730 by the level of contact and the 
demands they feel the female couple are placing on them. Interestingly a theme 
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that occurs in relation to both families is that they feel the contact encouraged by 
the female couple is not what was originally agreed. For Greg and Martin the 
contact is less than agreed, whereas for Carl and Roman the contact and 
responsibility is more than the original agreement. A comparison of these two 
case studies raises a number of questions. As a starting point, it is worth 
considering whether the two couples are expressing different expectations or 
whether they may have similar expectations but, in different ways, neither of the 
arrangements is quite meeting those expectations.  
It would be tempting to conclude that Greg and Martin would be happy with more 
involvement than Carl and Roman are comfortable with. This inference might be 
made from the fact that Greg and Martin have expressed concerns that the 
children do not know who they are and that they regret that they don’t see the 
relationship developing into one of care taking. Despite this, they may feel equally 
uneasy, as Carl and Roman do, with a burdensome level of caretaking 
responsibility. It is impossible to know for sure without following up these case 
studies longitudinally. It may just be the case that Greg and Martin would want to 
be involved more than Carl and Roman do, although this seems unlikely given 
Carl’s strong desire to become a father. 
Dempsey comments that: 
It was apparent that this discourse of paternal choice was in play 
for men like Carl, who seemed able to simultaneously position 
themselves as ‘distant’ and ‘active’ in their child’s life when it suited 
them… [T]here was a sense in Carl’s story that a ‘father’ 
relationship is about having all the joys and emotional rewards of 
involvement when these are wanted, but not the responsibility or 
obligation to care when it does not suit.731 
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This raises the interesting question of whether ‘having all the joys and emotional 
rewards of involvement when these are wanted, but not the responsibility or 
obligation to care when it does not suit’ is what Carl envisaged when he felt the 
desire to become a father in his 20s. Indeed, a related question is whether or not 
the legal framework should facilitate the desire on the part of some gay men to 
seek the emotional rewards of involvement in a child’s life, without also 
shouldering a share of the care taking responsibility, bearing in mind that this may 
also be the arrangement that suits the birth mother and her partner. 
The Legal Regulation of Gay Male Parenting 
Riggs has emphasised the necessity of drawing ‘attention to gay men’s location 
as men in a legal and social context that often privileges the needs of men over 
those of women and children’732 when discussing their involvement in 
reproductive collaborations with lesbians. Riggs goes further than this asserting 
that in the current social and legal context ‘men more broadly not only benefit 
from the fact that the law is centred upon a (hetero)patriarchal understanding of 
parenting and families, but also where men as fathers are increasingly having 
their calls for rights affirmed’.733  
The idea of locating gay men as men would appear to be an important one, as 
will be discussed in more detail later. However, the suggestion that it is important 
to locate these men as operating within ‘a legal and social context that often 
privileges the needs of men over those of women and children’ could be seen as 
a provocative one. It is important to acknowledge the long-standing feminist 
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critiques of the patriarchal nature of norms surrounding the family.734 Despite the 
‘formal commitment to gender neutrality and equality’ which characterizes 
modern legal framework, feminist writers have criticised the way formal gender 
equality has ‘reinforced gendered norms by effacing still extant questions of 
gender difference… [and how it] fails to redress the material basis of dominance, 
side-stepping issues of social power’.735 However, I would suggest that a more 
nuanced understanding of the situation is required when discussing gay men’s 
involvement in reproduction.  
In response to the assertion that men benefit from law’s ‘(hetero)patriarchal 
understanding of parenting and families’,736 it is important to ask how accurate 
this is particularly in the context of gay men’s reproductive collaborations. Saying 
that law is premised on a (hetero)patriarchal understanding of parenting and 
families suggests a system controlled by (heterosexual) men. However, there is 
a rapidly developing counter-narrative to men’s exercise of power in relation to 
parenting, namely that of men as law’s ‘victims’:  
The idea of men as victims highlights the broader disadvantages 
seen to befall men in general, and certain groups of men in 
particular. It focuses on the costs and 'crises' of contemporary 
masculinity, including the displacement of men from the workplace, 
and, in particular, from the family.737 
Collier and Sheldon highlight that ‘There exists a common assumption in law and 
society that reproduction is a time of specifically female responsibility, one in 
which a woman's role as mother is natural, instinctive and inevitable, an “umbilical 
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Publishing 2008) 14. 
736 Damien W Riggs, What About the Children! Masculinities, Sexualities and Hegemony 
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2010) 31. 
737 Ibid. 217. 
 
 
337 
attachment”’.738 Much of the feminist scholarship on this has focused on the 
expectations this creates for women and on men’s attempts to exercise control 
over women’s reproduction.739 Little attention has been paid to men’s 
experiences of reproduction, which, ‘in contrast, have tended to be seen in law 
as somewhat distant and vicarious, mediated by and through the agency of the 
woman, who stands as a 'gate-keeper' to their involvement.’740  
Therefore, it is not self-evident that men inherently benefit from law’s 
understanding of parenting and families. It seems more to be the case that men 
and women engage in reproduction and parenting in the context of a number of 
gendered expectations, which interact in quite complex ways. As Collier and 
Sheldon stress: 
We have argued throughout against the idea that power can be 
usefully conceptualised in (‘zero-sum' terms, whereby as men (or 
fathers) 'lose' power, women (or mothers) somehow 'gain' it, and 
vice versa. While a 'zero-sum' understanding might resonate with 
certain strands of both feminist and fathers' rights thinking, each 
curiously mirroring the other in terms of seeing legal reform as 
having 'winners' and 'losers', law's relation to social change is far 
more complex.741 
Although Collier and Sheldon were primarily concerned with heterosexual 
parenting a number of their insights are highly relevant to parenting by gay men. 
While Riggs’s starting point was to explicitly recognise the way the law’s 
understanding of parenting may privilege men, another, important dimension that 
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needs to be acknowledged is the way in which men are marginalized in terms of 
reproduction. As Marsiglio puts it: 
Every day, all over the world, men think about having babies, 
imagine themselves as parents, struggle with infertility, donate 
gametes, hear of unintended pregnancies, receive news of fetal 
abnormalities, make decisions about abortions, and become 
parents. Although feminist scholarship has centered these 
experiences in women’s lives, it has inadequately explored their 
meanings in men’s lives. Granted, research on women and 
reproduction does acknowledge that men influence women’s 
reproduction in a number of ways but “men need to be considered 
reproductive in their own right.742   
When discussing gay men’s involvement in parenting, it is, therefore, important 
to acknowledge men’s interests tend to be seen as subordinate to those of 
women/mothers in terms of reproduction. 
Much of the focus in the literature on same-sex parenting is on women’s 
reproductive autonomy and the rights of lesbian parents to create autonomous 
families. This is understandable because lesbian parenting, and women’s 
assertion of reproductive autonomy more generally, has been becoming more 
present in society for at least the past few decades. Reproduction is also seen as 
more of a women’s issue and one where men’s agency does not come to the 
fore.743 This has led to considerable discussion of the interests that lesbians have 
at stake in relation to same-sex parenting and much less discussion of gay men’s 
interests. 
The importance of biogenetic connection could be seen as a site of contestation 
between lesbians and gay men when engaging in reproductive collaboration. 
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Before discussing how biogenetic relatedness plays out in relation to lesbians 
and gay men, it is important to acknowledge the socio-legal context which 
surrounds this biogenetic discourse. As Collier and Sheldon comment: 
While on its own a genetic link might not be either necessary or 
sufficient to claim the rights associated with fatherhood, it is now 
legally accepted as forming an important basis on which a father 
may claim the right to develop a relationship with his child...even 
where such recognition might be seen as posing a risk to the 
stability of a social family unit.744 
This presents the real concern for women-led families that a renewed emphasis 
on the importance of ‘the genetic link’ might permit biological fathers to disrupt 
their nuclear family.  
Kelly has identified what she refers to as ‘the recent valorization of biological 
fatherhood’.745 This is based on the fact that, in her assessment, ‘the "best 
interests of the child" test, which governs both custody and access law in Canada, 
has been so influenced by the fathers' rights agenda that there now appears to 
be a de facto presumption that father access is in a child's best interests’.746 
Millbank’s comparative research looking at lesbian parenting cases in a number 
of other jurisdictions, including various states and territories in Australia, USA, UK 
and New Zealand, supports the idea that biological fatherhood is often prioritized 
by the courts over recognition of the non-biological mother. As Millbank stresses: 
A functional family model should protect the autonomy of the 
mothers in these circumstances, because it is they who are the 
functioning family unit. But while the co-mother has to meet a very 
high standard to prove herself a functional parent, the donor 
through a friendly or recreational contact relationship with the child, 
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or even the sincere wish to have such relationship which has not in 
fact occurred to date, is seen as a real and immutable father.747 
This highlights a genuine concern that in a number of jurisdictions the position of 
the non-biological mother is not being adequately recognised. As Millbank 
acknowledges, this is evident not only in disputes involving a lesbian couple and 
a biological father, but also those between the birth mother and non-biological 
mother.  
Although the priority given to genetics and biology plays a role in this it seems to 
do so in favour of a particular family form. As Donovan highlights: 
Genetic relationships are the least important when the structural 
and ideological features are not contentious. In other words, when 
the resulting family ‘looks right’ … the genetic links are not an issue 
and can be ignored. It is only when the structural or ideological 
features of the resulting family raise concern - for example in the 
case of lesbian parents - that the genetic relationships become 
important and questions are raised about the child's need for a 
(genetic) father.748 
These systemic biases in the legal system relate to the interrelation between the 
prioritization of biological/genetic connection as well as the privileging of a 
heteronormative conception of the family. 
It is important to acknowledge that an unquestioning prioritization of biogenetic 
connection over other forms of relatedness and the privileging of the 
heteronormative family is neither in the best interests of lesbians who wish to 
become parents nor in the interests of gay men who want to be parents. While 
this bias may operate in a gendered manner it is a matter of concern for both 
lesbians and gay men who wish to become parents. As a result, both groups have 
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an investment in combating such systemic bias within the legal system both at 
the legislative and case law level. 
Despite this, it is necessary to recognise the distinction between individual gay 
men expressing a desire to be involved with children who have been conceived 
in a collaborative reproductive arrangement with lesbians, even if this is largely 
based on the biogenetic connection, and a systematic preference in favour of 
recognising biological fathers in the promotion of a heteronormative family ideal. 
As Collier and Sheldon highlight: 
we have argued in this context against seeing the evolving law as 
a 'zero sum game' where recognising genetic links necessarily 
detracts from valuing other kinds of connections. Rather, we have 
argued that a greater emphasis on genetics has been accepted, at 
least in part, because of a growing belief that knowledge of and 
contact with a genetic father is unlikely to disrupt unduly a child's 
social family.749     
Furthermore, as the current study and the various other empirical studies 
discussed show, there are a number of women-led families, which actively seek 
to include the biological father for various reasons discussed in an earlier 
section.750 As Kelly acknowledges, ‘the challenge for lesbian mothers is to secure 
legal recognition in a manner that does not exclude those lesbian families that 
parent outside traditional norms’.751 I would also add to this that it is important not 
to undervalue the contribution gay men may make to the lives of these families. 
This is a complex issue given the desire to accommodate families that parent 
outside the norm and the interests of gay men, while resisting heteronormative 
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influences based on essentialised notions of biology that pervade the legal 
system and a fine balance, therefore, needs to be struck.  
Riggs argues that gay men are considerably influenced by the fathers’ rights 
discourse in the way they think about their role in reproductive collaborations with 
lesbians. He comments that ‘gay men are not outside of discourses of fathers’ 
rights, and may thus be influenced by the demand for men’s rights’.752 An 
example that Riggs draws on is a data from one of his participants, Chris, who 
has previously been a donor and was considering doing so again but had a bad 
experience at a community parenting event where a number of lesbians were 
sharing negative experiences with donors. Chris comments that:  
I think women are wonderful people and to have children is 
wonderful and that is fine. But a man is also part of the conception 
and it can be a truly shared thing. Perhaps in the past men have 
been awful to women, I am not one of them.753 
Riggs characterizes this as a conflict between the rights of lesbians to ‘seek 
donors who will only be involved on the basis of the child’s directions and Chris’s 
rights as a man. While this could be a valid interpretation of what Chris is saying, 
it is also possible to examine it from the perspective of gay men’s evolving 
procreative consciousness which might imply an alternative interpretation. 
By saying that ‘a man is also part of the conception,’ Chris is not necessarily 
making a rights-based claim on the basis of essentialised notions of biology, 
which fathers’ rights discourse is criticised for doing. Chris may just be 
recognising the fact that when a lesbian, for whatever reason, choses to involve 
a known man in having a child, he is necessarily part of that conception in a way 
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that an unknown donor is not. In some ways, what Chris has said indicates a 
desire for his contribution to be valued and not simply taken for granted. This 
seems to be a major part in how satisfied other participants in the same study 
were with their arrangements. Rick comments: 
I know to them I am not a means to an end. Of course those 
thoughts come up: you think ‘do they only see me that way?’ But 
then when they want you to be involved in their child’s life you 
realise no, I am not just a sperm donor or sperm maker, I am 
something more.754    
This is lauded by the Riggs as reflecting ‘something other than a possessive 
investment in paternity or access’.755 Therefore, it seems likely that at least some 
of the concerns gay men might express in relation to collaborative reproduction 
with lesbians, which may have some resonance with fathers’ rights discourse, are 
likely to stem from a concern for their contribution to be appropriately valued 
rather than asserting some patriarchal notion of rights.  
As Dempsey cautions, ‘it is important not to completely conﬂate an interest in 
genetic relatedness with a desire for power and control over parenting 
relationships, as some previous research on this topic insinuates’.756 This is 
reinforced by Wallbank and Dietz’s argument that: 
 [t]he notion of third-party threat apparently draws upon an idea of 
dominant paternal authority historically associated with 
heterosexual fatherhood. It is at least doubtful whether this notion 
of paternal authority is appropriate for gay fathers…the gay father’s 
position is rather more ambiguous.757 
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Therefore, the fact that gay men are not immediately associated with this idea of 
paternal authority has meant that they are viewed as a safer option for creating 
women-led families because they are less likely to attempt to assert paternal 
rights.758   
Furthermore, in past decades, gay men seem to have been strongly motivated 
by political and personal desires to help lesbians become pregnant.759 This may 
have partially stemmed from the perception that parenting was a feasible reality 
for lesbians in a way that it just wasn’t for gay men. Therefore, it is understandable 
that gay men might want to help lesbians as an act of solidarity even though they 
could not have children themselves. According to Robinson, the feeling that it is 
feasible to have children as a gay man may be restricted to relatively few, 
advantaged individuals in the west: 
While alternative parenting practices might be common knowledge 
in some districts of Manhattan, some parts of north London, as well 
as in some pockets of some suburbs in Auckland, Los Angeles, 
Manchester or Melbourne, it is likely that only small cliques of 
privileged gay men share a similar awareness of fatherhood 
choices and possibilities in the major cities of the developing world 
– in Hong Kong or Mumbai, for example. The strong impression I 
have from analysing these data in light of other published research 
is that alternative fatherhood is a practice only available to certain 
groups of gay men in some parts of the First World.760 
Robinson does, however, acknowledge a considerable shift in terms of gay 
parenthood which is likely to increase in the future: 
It is reasonable to assume, however, that the incidence of non-
heterosexual fatherhood will increase, representing as it does 
everyday experiments on which young gay and lesbian people are 
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increasingly prepared to embark in advanced, western 
democracies like Australia, Britain, and the USA.761 
Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the changing social landscape 
where gay men increasingly feel the desire and are able to have children 
of their own, which wasn’t the case in the earlier days of lesbian parenting. 
Given this shift in gay men’s ‘procreative consciousness,’762 it cannot be taken 
for granted that gay men are mainly motivated to engage in collaborative co-
parenting arrangements for altruistic reasons. Riggs notes that: 
As more gay men ‘discover’ a desire to become parents, and as the 
law seeks not necessarily to recognise gay men’s rights, but 
certainly to recognise fathers’ rights, it is likely to be the case that 
gay men are not automatically the ‘safe option’ they may once have 
been for lesbians wishing to become pregnant.763 
To some extent, this has been borne out by the empirical studies discussed in 
this chapter and the current study, where Angela, Ruth and their heterosexual 
known donor Rob were the primary example of a stable known donor 
arrangement. Therefore it is important for the law, as well as those engaging in 
collaborative co-parenting, to recognise that these parenting arrangements be 
viewed by the gay men involved as a means of realising their own parenting 
desires rather than facilitating the creation of women-led families.  
Struggle for Coherence 
A number of commentators have argued that the autonomy of women-led families 
is being threatened by giving weight to the biology-based claims of the biological 
                                            
761 Ibid. 99. 
762 Marsiglio and Hutchinson, Sex, Men and Babies (n 683). 
763 Riggs, ‘Lesbian mothers, gay sperm donors, and community: Ensuring the well- being of 
children and families’ (n 703) 229. 
 
 
346 
father.764 This position is understandable because of the way heteronormativity 
and biology are often privileged in judicial and broader social discourses. Many 
argue in favour of actively displacing the hold these pervasive concepts have on 
the legal imagination. However, in doing this, it is important not to lose sight of 
legitimate claims that might exist on the basis of biology, for example. 
In some respects, it is the limitation to two parents that exacerbates some of these 
problems. In an unknown donor situation, there is a legally and socially 
sanctioned separation of the donated sperm and the person donating. Legal 
firewalls are erected, based on that man’s written consent, which prevent him 
from accessing data about, let alone bringing claims in relation to, any children 
that may have been born. Such an approach seems intuitively less appropriate in 
a situation where the biological father is necessarily aware of the children that are 
born. 
In addition to this, there is even greater reluctance to sever parental ties between 
a birth mother and child unless the mother agrees following birth. This is largely 
predicated on the idea that the act of giving birth can affect the birth mother in an 
unanticipated way as a result of the bond that develops between the birth mother 
and child during pregnancy. On this analysis, there may be a compelling case for 
not enforcing a surrogacy agreement to the extent that it would extinguish the 
birth mother’s parental connection with the child. It does not, however, follow from 
this that the ‘intended parents’ should be deemed never to have had any parental 
connection with the child. A serious attempt to engage with the interests of the 
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birth mother and the intended parents would, therefore, necessarily recognise 
that each have valid parenthood claims that deserve respect and legal 
recognition.765 
It is argued here that a similar line of reasoning applies in collaborative co-
parenting situation involving a female couple and biological father. Admittedly, 
the donation of gametes by the biological father is a lot less physically involved 
than the process of giving birth which the birth mother experiences. However, it 
need not necessarily be the case that the emotional impact resulting from this is 
necessarily dramatically different for all men and women. It seems 
uncontroversial to suggest that carrying and giving birth to a child might have a 
profound emotional effect on the woman giving birth. However, what seems to be 
largely ignored in law and policy nowadays is that being the biological father of a 
child whose existence he is aware of might also have a profound effect on the 
biological father. Making this point is in no way an attempt to diminish the 
significant physical and emotional investment a woman makes in terms of 
childbirth and post-natal caregiving, nor is it an attempt to accord primacy to 
biological connection. The purpose of making this argument is to illustrate the 
point that there are a number of interests engaged in the conception, birth and 
raising of a child, which need to be appropriately recognised and respected. 
The ‘best interests of the child’ test governs court decisions relating to contact 
and parental responsibility. This test in itself is not unproblematic, as has been 
discussed in part two.766 However, who is considered to be a legal parent is not 
normally subject to a best interests analysis. Therefore, it is important to separate 
out the concept of legal parenthood from any rights or decision-making powers in 
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relation to the child. From a pragmatic perspective, it may seem that the only 
important issue is who has decision-making powers and contact rights in respect 
of the child. However, who is considered the child’s parent can also be significant 
in terms of recognising and respecting the various interests of the parties 
involved. 
A further consideration is the potential for prevailing social and legal norms, 
influenced by their historical development, to polarise the discussion over the 
respective weight given to intention and biology. Historically, the (presumed) 
biological father of a child made decisions in relation to that child not the mother. 
Upon divorce, the mother was in a very weak position often having very limited 
contact with the children.767  This could be seen as prioritising abstract biological 
connection with the father over day-to-day caregiving and psychological 
attachment with the mother. As a reaction to this, courts began to recognise the 
claims of mothers and the perception grew that the interests of (particularly 
unmarried) fathers were being overlooked.768 
This historical perspective continues to bear on present day disputes between 
female couples and ‘known donors’. It is important to recognise that mothers who 
had children in the context of a heterosexual relationship and subsequently came 
out as lesbian faced additional obstacles. Traditionally courts viewed it as being 
in the best interests of children not to award custody to lesbian mothers. 
Therefore, from a female couple’s perspective a ‘known donor’ dispute occurs 
against a legal backdrop whereby heteronormative bias in the courts has 
traditionally meant that the claims of female couples have been ignored in favour 
of the biological father. This is compounded by the fact that biological fathers 
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have recently been asserting their legal claims over children through the fathers’ 
rights movement. These factors combined with the ambivalent social acceptance 
of women-led/lesbian families means that it is understandable for female couples 
to feel vulnerable in terms of the legal relationships they have with their children 
and their legal/social acceptance as a family. 
The vulnerabilities of women-led families have been ably discussed in feminist 
legal scholarship.769 In contrast to the growing discussion of the vulnerability of 
women-led families, there is relatively little scholarship on the vulnerability of men 
in terms of having children outside the context of a heterosexual relationship.770 
Therefore, while the female couple in a known donor arrangement experiences a 
sense of vulnerability, so too does the biological father. Just as it might be 
psychologically unsettling and upsetting for a birth mother to be denied access to 
her child, this is also a concern for the biological father and potentially his partner. 
One of the functions of family law is to protect vulnerable parties and in a known 
donor situation each of the parties, not least of which the child, is vulnerable to 
some extent. As a result, courts and policy makers need to give careful 
consideration to resolving the various tensions in a way that is as fair as possible 
to those involved. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered collaborative co-parenting from the perspective of 
both the lesbians and gay men who may be involved in such parenting 
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arrangements. It has attempted to highlight that the legitimate interests of both 
the birth mother/female couple and biological father/male couple are engaged in 
these parenting collaborations. The chapter has considered the importance of the 
general context surrounding assisted reproduction and women’s ability to 
conceive children largely autonomously from men through a fertility clinic as well 
as the potential threat that involved donors may present to autonomous women-
led parenting. However, this chapter has also asserted that the motivations, 
desires and experiences of gay men in terms of parenting need to be considered 
in more depth alongside the already detailed consideration of these elements in 
relation to lesbians.  
This chapter recognises that it is understandable that prospective lesbian parents 
might feel uncomfortable about the suggestion of greater involvement from the 
gay men with whom they have reproduced collaboratively given the law’s dyadic 
approach to parenting. At the same time, however, it is important to acknowledge 
that the involvement of gay men, predicated on their biogenetic connection, with 
children is not the same as attempting to assert patriarchal rights over women-
led families and control women’s reproductive autonomy. Therefore, the legal 
framework should strive to accommodate the fact that gay men’s agency and 
experiences of reproduction can often be marginalised, leading them to feel 
excluded from having and raising children, while also protecting women-led 
families from unwarranted intrusions. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion - 
Collaborative Co-Parenting as a Call 
to Reform Law’s Families 
This thesis has sought to discuss the legal recognition in E&W of gay and lesbian 
collaborative co-parenting families, taking into account developments in various 
Canadian jurisdictions. The overall aim was to explore, within this comparative 
context, how well the law regulating parenthood and parenting following assisted 
reproduction in E&W balances the interests of those involved in these co-
parenting arrangements, as well as to consider whether there were any wider 
implications for family law. It has done this by looking theoretically, empirically 
and doctrinally at the issues across the selected jurisdictions, focusing on its three 
stated research questions.771  
Dealing with the first two of these, which are closely related, about how the law 
does and should respond to collaborative co-parenting, the combined 
comparative analysis of the legislation, case law and interview data has identified 
both a lacuna and tunnel vision approach in the law of England and Wales in its 
lack of recognition of the phenomenon of collaborative co-parenting born out of 
its unchallenged and accepted dyadic focus. The study has revealed criticisms 
by both practitioners and particularly male-led families around the limitations of 
the heteronormative assumptions which underpin this and which have been 
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critiqued here and in the wider scholarly literature.  Indeed one of the key issues 
to emerge from the analysis of the legislative framework in E&W was how 
problematic it can be when legislation promotes an ideal(ised) version of the 
family.  
In this way, family law in E&W for all its recent reform can be seen as still 
promoting an archetypal concept of the family. Nigel Simmonds explains that: 
The essential hallmark of an archetypal concept is the fact that 
instantiations of the concept count as such by resemblance or 
approximation to the archetype, such resemblance or 
approximation being a property that can be exhibited to varying 
degrees.772 
While Simmonds is discussing this idea in relation to the rule of law as a whole, 
we have seen here that this is an equally valid interpretation of the way that family 
law constructs a heteronormative model of the family based on dyadic conjugality, 
against which different family forms are measured when it comes to deciding 
whether or not to afford legal recognition. 
Yet in considering how to address this, having looked empirically at the needs of 
collaborative parents in this study and drawing on others, this thesis has identified 
that collaborative co-parents are not a homogenous group, but fall within a 
typology with differential approaches to collaborative co-parenting. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, they have different needs and perspectives around the 
complex legal issues, which surround such families. I would suggest that the most 
important finding of this study, even though potentially controversial, is that the 
interests of women-led and male-led families are different and that the power 
dynamic in these arrangements is often very significant. While the women 
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involved in these arrangements may seek to legally protect the homonuclear 
family form, the interests of the gay men involved may be better served through 
recognising a multiple parent family. Consequently, different vested interests call 
for legislative intervention which recognises the emergence of collaborative co-
parenting arrangements as a legitimate choice which requires the law to respond 
beyond the assumptions which surround the discourses on women-led families 
and (stigmatised) surrogacy arrangements for gay men. 
From the doctrinal analysis of the case law conducted in this study it is clear that 
the courts’ attempt to mirror Parliament’s equality discourse has resulted in 
considerable protection for the women-led homonuclear family, at the expense of 
the range of interests involved in collaborative co-parenting, not least of which is 
those of the gay men involved in these arrangements. Although the homonuclear 
family deviates from the heterosexual parenting ideal in that it does not include 
gendered parenthood in the same way, the homonuclear family also conforms to 
the heteronormative model in that it is still based on the intimate couple 
relationship. Therefore, while the law in E&W is not, either legislatively or 
judicially, privileging heterosexual parenting per se, the legal framework is still 
recognising family forms that closely approximate the archetype of dyadic 
heterosexual parenting. 
Given this finding that the interests of lesbians and gay men in collaborative co-
parenting arrangements are different and potentially in competition with one 
another, one inference from this study is that lesbians who wish to create 
homonuclear families may not support the recognition of collaborative co-
parenting families, but may prefer the homonuclear family. This is supported by 
Smith’s research, which demonstrates the strong desire on the part of lesbian 
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parents ‘to see unequivocal endorsement of their parenting arrangements, most 
notably via recognition of co-parents as parents’.  
This thesis has, however, advanced the argument that in collaborative co-
parenting situations insufficient attention is paid to the more precarious nature of 
gay men’s ability to start a family as compared to lesbians. As a result of the 
gendered nature of reproduction it is more problematic for gay men to create 
autonomous male-led families than it is for lesbians to create autonomous 
women-led families. As a number of the gay men interviewed in this study 
stressed, collaborative co-parenting may appear the only viable means of having 
a family, if surrogacy and adoption are thought to be too complicated and costly. 
By contrast, lesbians have the less complicated avenue of unknown donor 
insemination open to them as an alternative to co-parenting. This leads to the 
situation where, in this procreative realm, the women are in a more powerful 
position than the men. While this power dynamic ought not to determine the 
outcome of any co-parenting dispute, it should be borne in mind as a potentially 
salient factor and the background social context against which these parenting 
arrangements are created.  
A number of the studies discussed in this thesis have commented on perceived 
threats to the women-led homonuclear family. However, few have identified the 
vulnerability of the biological father (and his male partner if he is not single) in 
relation to these arrangements, which came across strongly in this study. Kelly’s 
study in Canada highlighted that any model of law reform could not ‘simply map 
the existing legal framework onto lesbian families’ because this is ‘unlikely to 
capture the diversity of needs and the complexity of the family relationships that 
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exist’.773 This study has added to that understanding by demonstrating that the 
source of this complexity is not only lesbian families but also gay men’s desire to 
become parents. Similarly Dempsey’s study stressed the interaction between the 
influence of biological discourses and female reproductive autonomy and choice 
in deciding whether to involve a known biological father. Therefore, combining 
these previous studies, which focused on lesbian parenting, with the current 
study, which included gay men, has provided a more holistic picture of 
collaborative co-parenting. The law needs to respond to this. 
What is more, the female participants in this and other studies felt able to clearly 
articulate and protect their own needs in these parenting collaborations. 
However, the gay men were much more focused on the friendship that existed 
between the adults and the desire to create a family. As a result, the gay men 
interviewed in this study were more likely to discuss their needs as a family rather 
than identify their own needs within the co-parenting arrangement as distinct from 
those of the female parents. Therefore, it is important that the interests of gay 
men in these parenting situations are not being side-lined in an effort to guard 
against the perceived vulnerability of the female homonuclear family. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the empirical data from the legal professionals and 
parents/prospective parents in this study, along with previous empirical studies, 
suggest that there may be more that unites these different types of gay and 
lesbian families than divides them. Many of the gay men and lesbians interviewed 
in this and other studies are very much committed to a diversity model of 
parenting that recognises all sorts of different families that individuals create. This 
idea was also echoed by the legal professionals that were interviewed. Therefore, 
                                            
773  Fiona J Kelly, Transforming Law’s Family the Legal Recognition of Planned Lesbian 
Motherhood (UBC Press 2011) 160 - 161. 
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there was a clear sense among parents/prospective parents and legal 
professionals that the current system of legal recognition was not adequately 
meeting the needs of the range of gay and lesbian families but there was also a 
sense of caution about how this could be achieved without compromising the 
progress that has already been made. 
The empirical insights gained from this study add valuable knowledge to the 
limited amount of research that currently exists on this topic. Other researchers 
in this area have acknowledged the difficulties they faced in terms of sample 
recruitment and sample size and this study is no exception.774 The aim of this 
study was not to recruit a large statistically representative sample but rather to 
canvas the experiences of a number of different case studies as heuristic devices 
for reflecting upon the legal framework. With more time and resources, it would 
have been ideal to recruit a greater number of each family configuration in order 
to explore potential differences within, as well as across, family types. 
Nevertheless, a robust sample was achieved within the context of a case study 
approach, which represented each of the different family types that were of 
interest. The rigour of the data that emerged was further bolstered by triangulating 
this with data from a sample of legal professionals, which have been involved 
with a wide range of families, in order to provide invaluable insights into the 
experiences of collaborative co-parenting families.    
So, given the above discussion, how should the legal framework respond to 
mediate the differential needs, interests and power of those involved in 
collaborative co-parenting? The comparative doctrinal analysis revealed a 
number of different legislative and judicial approaches to the legal regulation of 
                                            
774 For more on the difficulties encountered and the strategies for dealing with this see p. 74. 
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collaborative co-parenting, which endorsed the critique of shortcomings in E&W 
in meeting the needs of the collaborative co-parenting community. A prominent 
feature in the case law of a number of Canadian jurisdictions (such as Ontario 
and Quebec) was the important role that pre-conception intentions can play in 
guiding who is to be recognised as a legal parent. This thesis has also considered 
the legislative approach in BC, which is predicated on the legal enforceability of 
pre-conception intentions and which challenges the limitation of the number of 
parents to two.  
Importantly, the legislative approach in BC chimed with the responses of 
participants in both Canada and E&W to vignettes about hypothetical families. 
Both groups of participants indicated that the adults in this situation should honour 
their intentions. Unsurprisingly, Canadian legal professionals interviewed in this 
study were more strongly in favour of pre-conception intentions being 
determinative of legal parenthood than the legal professionals in E&W were. 
However, all the legal professionals interviewed agreed that written agreements 
were an important means of evidencing pre-conception intentions, regardless of 
whether or not they are enforceable. 
However, while BC’s legal framework is progressive in terms of its recognition of 
pre-conception agreements it is problematic in terms of its limitation to three legal 
parents and also the lack of discretion available to courts in deciding issues of 
legal parenthood. As regards the first of these, there need not be an arbitrary limit 
on the number of legal parents that could be recognised under this framework. In 
the majority of cases there would not be more than four parents because these 
arrangements tend to involve single individuals, a couple and a single person or 
two couples collaborating. However, there may be circumstances where 
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recognising more than four parents would be appropriate and this possibility 
should not necessarily be excluded. It would, however, be important to ensure 
that there was a genuine intention to be involved in the child’s life as a legal parent 
and not merely an adult figure without any sort of parental involvement.   
Furthermore, the typology of families that has been advanced in Chapter Six, 
based on participant responses, suggests a degree of variance and ambivalence 
about the use of written agreements, and consequently the role of pre-conception 
intentions, in the lives of their own families. Therefore, rigidly enforceable pre-
conception agreements, along the lines of the BC approach, is not necessarily 
the outcome that all of these families are seeking to achieve. Consequently, from 
this thesis I recommend a more nuanced approach that lies somewhere between 
the pre-determined legislative outcome approach in BC and the highly 
discretionary approach in E&W. 
A key distinction identified in this typology is between organically formed and pre-
planned families. Although, in relation to both families extensive pre-conception 
discussions took place, written agreements featured more prominently in the pre-
planned families. Previous studies have suggested a continuum of relatedness in 
collaborative co-parenting arrangements depending on the type of agreement the 
parents have.775 However, the present study adds to our understanding of these 
families by noting that organically formed families, where collaborative co-
parenting was never a goal in itself but grew out of the relationship that existed 
between the adults, may resist the idea of having a written agreement. These co-
                                            
775 Dempsey, ‘Conceiving and Neogtiating Reproductive Relationships: Lesbians and Gay Men 
Forming Families with Children (2010) 44 Sociology 1145. 
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parents had an optimistic outlook and were confident that any difficulties that 
arose could be resolved within the context of the relationship. 
In addition to the different approaches of different collaborative co-parenting 
families, this study has also revealed that gay men and lesbians might approach 
pre-conception agreements differently. It was often the case with participants in 
this study that the men involved in these arrangements would downplay the 
significance of the written agreements, whereas the women found them very 
important. This was reflected in the content of a number of the agreements 
themselves, which tended to protect the position of the female parents more so 
than the male. Even in poly-parenting situations where the agreement stated that 
the intention was that all the adults would be parents, the agreement nevertheless 
often stipulated that the male co-parent would not attempt to assert his rights at 
the expense of the female co-parents. Therefore, the threat that poly-parenting 
may present to women-led families, which has been referred to in other 
studies,776 was at play for the participants in this study when it came to negotiating 
written agreements.      
One potential explanation for this that has emerged from this study is the power 
dynamics that exist in collaborative co-parenting arrangements and the relative 
vulnerability of gay male parents. It became clear in a number of agreements that 
the biological fathers were in a manifestly weaker position than the female couple 
in terms of the rights the agreement purported to confer on them. This was the 
case not only in more ‘known donor’ type arrangements but also where the 
intention was to fully poly-parent. As previous studies have noted, a big part of 
why the female couples were so keen to assert their rights in relation to the 
                                            
776 See Kelly, Transforming law’s family the legal recognition of planned lesbian motherhood (n 
759). 
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biological father is the seeming power that biological fathers are perceived to 
have in legal discourse to threaten their family security. However, while it is 
important to recognise the concerns that single lesbians and female couples have 
in that regard, this study suggests that the law should ensure that the interests of 
the gay men in this situation are being protected, and distinctions drawn from the 
situation of more reproductively powerful heterosexual men.  
The position of male couples in relation to reproductive collaborations with a birth 
mother came to the fore during the recently decided case of H v S, discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Five, which concerned a collaborative co-parenting 
arrangement between a male couple and the birth mother.777 The fact that the 
judge in that case was willing to order that the residence of a young child be 
transferred from the birth mother to the male couple, which is very uncommon, 
suggests that the courts in E&W are open to affording appropriate recognition to 
the reproductive relationships that gay men form with children in the context of 
collaborative co-parenting arrangements. The judge made it clear that she was 
not enforcing the pre-conception agreement per se but that nevertheless this was 
a factor in determining which living arrangement was in the best interests of the 
child. 
Therefore, this timely case has highlighted the need, which was identified in this 
study, for a more responsive legal framework surrounding parenthood in E&W, 
which foregrounds the role of pre-conception intentions rather than promotes a 
particular version of the family. In doing this, the law would be recognising the 
negotiated nature of parenting relationships within collaborative co-parenting 
families rather than promoting the taken-for-granted assumptions that currently 
                                            
777 See page 227. 
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underpin parenthood law in E&W. It is necessary to acknowledge the potential 
for the interests of the adults involved to be in conflict with the welfare of the child. 
However, a more nuanced approach to the interpretation of the best interests of 
the child would allow these interests to be balanced rather than automatically 
privileging a particular family form under the guise of the best interests of the 
child.778  Furthermore. it is important to recognise that these pre-conception 
agreements would not be enforced in a contract law sense but would form 
(perhaps quite an influential) part of the overall welfare assessment.               
Given the range of collaborative co-parenting families identified in this study and 
the highly negotiated nature of parenthood relationships, it is suggested that 
some sort of ‘parenting solidarity agreement’ could might be a happy medium 
solution between BC’s legislative approach based on the enforceability of pre-
conception agreements and the more discretionary approach in E&W relying on 
parental responsibility rather than legal parenthood. Currently in E&W, there is 
no recognition that legal parenthood may have a negotiated element to it, which 
contrasts with the approach in relation to parental responsibility.  
Therefore, parenting solidarity agreements might be conceived along the lines of 
parental responsibility agreements, which are currently legislatively provided for 
but which the courts have the discretion to deviate from. This has the advantage 
of being a familiar type of agreement in family law, stemming from post-
separation parenting, and would not necessarily imply any sort of 
commodification of children as a purely contractual arrangement might. In this 
way, it would be desirable for the legislative framework in E&W to facilitate the 
creation of private agreements around parenthood, which would result in the 
                                            
778 For more on the need to balance the interests of those involved see John Eekelaar, ‘Beyond 
the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 14(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 237 – 249.  
 
 
362 
conferral of legal parenthood, while also maintaining the courts’ discretion to 
modify these legal relationships by way of court order.  
Such an approach, where legal agreements are facilitated through the legislative 
framework, might encourage their use. Although some families in this study did 
not have a written agreement, they invariably spent a considerable amount of 
time discussing how the parenting arrangement was going to work and trying to 
pre-empt any issues that might arise. Detailed discussions prior to engaging in 
co-parenting was something that the legal professionals in both Canada and the 
UK advocated but this did not, in parents’ eyes, remove the need for a written 
agreement.  
The potential consequences of not having a written agreement emerged from the 
doctrinal analysis of the case law in E&W, where the disputes were highly 
acrimonious and did not, in any of the cases, involve a written agreement. The 
effect of this was that given the differing accounts of the parties and in the 
absence of any written evidence to the contrary, the judge had to determine the 
type of intended parenting arrangement from how the child was parented 
following birth, which may or may not be an accurate interpretation. By properly 
valuing intentions in the context of collaborative co-parenting the law would be 
facilitating gay and lesbian parents’ procreative autonomy and consequently 
recognising the diversity of families that exist.  
Wider Implications of Legally Recognising Collaborative Co-
Parenting 
This section now turns to the study’s final research question: What are the 
potential implications, if any, for the wider legal regulation of gay and lesbian 
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parenting and family life of expanding a legal response to gay and lesbian 
collaborative co-parenting beyond the heteronormative model? To address this 
question, I drew on the theoretical constructs of gay men’s procreative 
consciousness and the diversity model of parenting as a lens through which to 
discuss participants’ parenting journeys and the factors they found important in 
terms of engaging in collaborative co-parenting. This was then used as a basis 
for considering the impact that legally recognising collaborative co-parenting 
might have on the autonomy of homonuclear same-sex families, and families 
more generally.  
The discussion of the first two research questions provides a strong indication 
that, unlike BC, the law of E&W has a narrow approach to legal parenthood based 
on dyadic conjugality. This stands in contrast to the views of legal professionals 
and parents/prospective parents interviewed in this study who seem united in 
their view that the diversity of families that individuals create should be legally 
recognised even if this deviates from the heteronormative ideal. This is 
particularly important in the context of gay and lesbian parenting because 
collaborative co-parenting is seen as the main viable route to parenthood for 
many gay men and lesbians. 
Furthermore, this insight has broader implications for the legal regulation of family 
life. Collaborative co-parenting, although primarily seen as a form of gay and 
lesbian parenting, is of potential significance for a range of people who wish to 
parent outside the heteronormative framework. A particularly salient example of 
this, seen in research on couples who ‘live apart together’,779 is single men and 
women who have reached the stage in their lives where they want to become 
                                            
779 Sasha Roseneil, ‘On Not Living with a Partner: Unpicking Coupledom and Cohabitation’ 
(2006) 11 Sociological Research Online 1. 
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parents but have not met a partner. For these individuals, collaborative co-
parenting might seem an attractive way of raising a child and realising their desire 
to become parents. In addition to this, in her study on couples who ‘live apart 
together,’ Roseneil found heterosexual partners who were romantically involved 
but chose to raise children across two households as well as people who chose 
to cohabit and raise children but were not romantically involved.780  
Consequently, although the present study indicates that the legal regulation of 
collaborative co-parenting is of particular importance for gay and lesbian parents 
it is also relevant for heterosexual individuals who may, for whatever reason, 
chose to parent outside heteronormative standards. No longer can conjugality, 
cohabitation or coupledom be taken for granted in the context of parenting. The 
findings in this study, therefore, largely support and corroborate much of the 
theoretical framework outlined in the introductory chapter. Collaborative Co-
parenting can be seen as an instantiation of what Weston called ‘families of 
choice’781 in that these families are centred on an intentionally created parenting 
arrangement that operates outside traditional frameworks. In this way, the 
research could also be seen as validating Giddens’ suggestion that the very 
nature of same-sex relationships challenges the unquestioning acceptance of 
heteronormative assumptions within intimate relationships generally.782        
Intentionally creating a family and parenting with someone you are not in an 
intimate relationship with is a new challenge that family law is only beginning to 
deal with. It has the potential to alter our understanding of the family. Therefore, 
                                            
780 Ibid. 
781  Kath Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship (Columbia University Press 
1991). 
782 Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy : Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies 
(Stanford University Press 1992) 15. 
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legislators and courts need to consider the issues involved more fully so as to be 
able to achieve the fairness and certainty that family Law strives for, while also 
meeting the needs of collaborative co-parenting families. In this regard, another 
major conclusion of this thesis is that it is important for the law to take into account 
gay men’s emerging procreative consciousness as well as the need to protect the 
women-led homonuclear family. In order to do this, while I have suggested 
parenting solidarity agreements might be one way forward, more thought needs 
to be given to the purpose of, even the more taken-for-granted legal provisions, 
rather than accepting the underlying heteronormative assumptions about family 
form, which permeate this, and other, areas of family law.  Only in this way can 
the interests of all those involved in collaborative co-parenting be adequately 
taken into account within a legal framework premised on a diversity model of 
parenthood. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
(Parents) 
Intro 
 Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study and thank you for 
completing the online survey. 
 I’d like to start by reminding you of some of the information about taking 
part that was at the beginning of the survey if that’s ok. I wanted to 
emphasise the fact that you don't have to answer any questions that you 
are not comfortable with and that all your responses will be anonymised 
so you won't be identified at any stage. Are you happy with all of that? 
 In this study we are exploring the legal recognition of families such as 
yours where lesbian and gay individuals and couples are having children 
and both biological parents (and potentially their partners) are involved to 
some extent in the child’s life. We’re particularly interested in discussing 
who the law recognises as parents in these situations and the way the law 
facilitates or creates barriers to these arrangements. So I’ll start by asking 
you about social attitudes towards same-sex parenting generally, before 
moving on to talk a bit about your family. Finally I’ll ask you about legal 
recognition and I’ll ask you to comment on a hypothetical scenario as part 
of that. 
 Do you have any questions for me before we start? If you do have any 
questions as we go along, please don’t hesitate to ask them. 
 The final thing I’d like to check is, are you happy for me to record this 
interview so that I can write up your responses afterwards? 
 
Attitudes 
I’d like to start by asking you a very general question about social attitudes, which 
is: 
 To what extent, if at all, do you think society’s attitudes towards same-sex 
parents raising children have changed in recent years? 
o Do you feel there remains any differences in the way people think 
about same-sex parents and different-sex parents? (prompt if 
necessary: For example in terms of a child having both a male and 
female influence in his/her life) 
o Do you feel there is any difference in the way people think about a 
male couple as parents and a female couple as parents? (prompt if 
necessary: For example are women seen as more natural 
caregivers than men?) 
 How do you feel that being gay and social attitudes towards gay people 
having children impacted on your decisions about having children? 
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Your Family 
I’d like to move on to talk a little bit about your own situation if that’s alright. 
 Could you just talk me through the process you went through to have a 
child and how you came to decide to have a child in this way? 
o Did you conceive at a clinic or at home? 
o Who raised the idea of having a child in this way? 
o Why did you decide to have a child in this way rather than 
exploring other options such as surrogacy or adoption? 
o How important was it that your child was biologically related to 
either you or your partner? 
o How would you have felt about you and your partner raising a child 
alone compared to with a female couple? 
 Which factors did you feel were important that everyone needed to 
consider and agree upon before having a child in this way? 
o Did everyone else agree with this? How would it have influenced 
your decision to have a child if they did not agree? 
o Did you decide to have a written agreement and why/why not? 
 What role does each of the adults play in relation to your child’s life? 
o Where does the child live? 
o Who is responsible for caring for the child? 
o How often do you see the child? 
o What sort of complications have you faced/do you think you might 
face along the way in terms of managing the roles of each of the 
adults? 
o How have you dealt/will deal with these? 
o How would you resolve any conflict between the adults in relation 
to what is best for the child? 
 
Legal Recognition 
 How aware were you of the legal issues to do with having a child in this 
way when you decided to conceive and how aware of them are you now? 
o In what ways, if at all, did the law factor in to your decision about 
having a child in this way? 
o Did the fact that the law only recognises two legal parents 
discourage you from having a child in this way? 
o Do you happen to know who is recognised as your child’s legal 
parents, who is on the birth certificate and who has parental 
responsibility? 
 How important is it that you and your partner have a legally recognised 
relationship with your child and in what way would you want the law to 
recognise this? 
o Is it important to you that you and your partner are the child’s legal 
parent and recognised as being able to make decisions about your 
child’s healthcare and schooling etc and why? 
o What do you understand by the term ‘legal parent’? 
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o In terms of what is best for your child, who should be recognised as 
legal parents? 
 In your opinion, is there a sense that people who co-parent in this way are 
challenging the traditional family ideal for raising children and going 
beyond the limitation to two parents, which the law imposes? 
 In what ways would you want the law to be reformed, if at all, and what 
significance do you feel this would have for you and your family? 
 
I’d like to ask you now to comment on a hypothetical scenario which describes a 
particular type of parenting arrangement. 
Samantha and Christina, lesbian partners in their early 30s who live 
together but are not in a civil partnership, want to have a child but need 
donor sperm in order to do this. They approach their gay friend Mike and 
his civil partner Steve who also want a child. The four of them come to an 
informal agreement that the child will live with Samantha (the birth mother) 
and Christina but that Mike (the biological father) and Steve will have 
significant involvement in the child’s life (as, say, uncle-type figures). They 
arrange for insemination at home and 9 months later Paul is born. 
 Who should be considered Paul’s legal parents at birth? 
 Who should be entitled to make decisions about Paul’s schooling and 
health care? 
 How do you think a court should resolve a situation where Samantha and 
Christina want to limit Mike and Steve’s contact to once per month and 
Mike and Steve want to have weekly contact? 
o How important is what the adults agreed prior to the birth of the 
child? 
o How important is the relationship that develops between each adult 
and the child following birth? 
o What would be in the best interests of the child? 
 
Final Question 
If I could just ask you a very broad question to finish and that is: 
 What does being a parent mean to you? 
 
Thank you for answering all those questions. That was really helpful. 
If you happen to know anyone else in a similar situation who might be interested 
in taking part in the study, please do pass on the details of the study to them or 
you can send me their contact details. I’m always looking for more participants. 
Can I just ask whether you’d like me to keep in touch about the results of this 
study? 
Do you have any questions for me before we finish? 
Thank you very much for taking part in the study. I really appreciate you giving 
up your time. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide 
(Professionals) 
Introduction and Confirmation of Consent 
 Thank you for taking part in the project. 
 Hopefully you managed to have a look at the information about the project 
which I sent to you. I just wanted to emphasise the fact that you don't have 
to answer any questions that you are not comfortable with and all your 
responses will be anonymised so you won't be identified at any stage. And 
if you do have any questions at any point, please don’t hesitate to ask. Are 
you happy with all of that? Do you have any questions at this stage? 
 The final thing I’d like to check is, are you happy for me to record the 
interview so that I can write up your responses afterwards? 
 
I’ll just start by very briefly outlining the project and the types of questions I’d like 
to ask you. As you know, this study is about co-parenting within the LGBT 
community particularly focusing on the situation where individuals or couples are 
co-parenting with someone else whom they are not in a relationship with. There 
are four areas in particular I’d like to ask you about: firstly, the impact social 
attitudes have on the decisions these families make, your experience of 
alternative parenting arrangements, your sense about how co-parents feel about 
having and raising children in general, and finally the impact legal recognition 
has. Does that sound ok? 
 
Social Attitudes and Their Impact on LGBT Men and Women 
 I’d like to start by asking quite a general question about society’s attitudes 
towards same-sex parents raising children. Do you feel that social 
attitudes are changing in this respect? In what sort of ways do you feel this 
is occurring? 
o Do you feel there is any discrimination between same-sex parents 
as compared to different-sex parents? 
o Do you feel there is any discrimination amongst same-sex parents 
i.e. between lesbians and gay men in relation to having children? 
 In your experience, would you say that social attitudes towards gay people 
having children impact on their decision whether or not to have children? 
 
Your Experience of Alternative Parenting Arrangements 
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 I’d like to talk now about your experience of alternative parenting 
arrangements. Perhaps you could just talk me through the types of 
arrangements you have encountered and your involvement in them. 
o What sort of considerations do you feel need to be taken into 
account when considering co-parenting with someone you’re not in 
a relationship with? 
o What sort of complications do you think these families might face? 
o How do you think conflict between the three adults would be 
resolved in these families? 
o What role do you see written agreements playing in relation to these 
families? 
o Perhaps you could just describe how parenting operates in relation 
to families you are aware of that co-parent in this way? 
o What level of awareness do your clients tend to have about the 
law’s involvement in the type of family they want to create? 
 
Feelings About Having and Raising Children 
 I’d like to move on now to discuss how people in this situation might 
feel about having and raising children and also about how your 
experience has informed your own views. What is your sense about 
how these families feel about the desirability of having a child with a 
partner compared to having a child with two other co-parents and even 
with having a child as a single parent? 
 Do you have any indication of how these families feel about the desirability 
of raising a child who is living with a given parent full-time compared with 
raising a child who lives elsewhere part of the time? 
 Based on your experience, what factors tend to be important to these 
families when it comes to raising children? 
o To what extent is there agreement amongst the adults in these 
types of arrangements in relation to this? 
o Do you think it is in anyway important that a child have both male 
and female influences in its life? Do you feel that a co-parenting 
arrangement is a better way to achieve this than other ways same-
sex parents might try to include a role model of the opposite sex 
e.g. a relative or just relying on the child’s experiences at school 
etc? 
 Given the range of parenting arrangements you have encountered, what 
does being a parent mean to you? 
o Is it important for parents to be biologically related to their child? 
o Is it important for the adults in these arrangements to be legally 
recognised as the child’s parents? 
 
Your Views on Legal Recognition 
 I’d now like to look at the impact law has on parenting. Perhaps you 
could just start by outlining what sort of difficulties you feel the law presents 
to same-sex families who want to co-parent? 
 
 
371 
o Do you think the law in relation to surrogacy makes it more difficult 
for gay men to have children? 
 How important do you feel the status of legal parent and the acquisition of 
parental responsibility is for these families? 
o In your opinion, how does having parental responsibility compare 
to being a legal parent? 
o Do you think the law should respond differently to lesbian couples 
who are involving the biological father in the child’s life compared 
to a gay couple who are involving the biological mother in the child’s 
life? 
o Who should be considered the legal parents and who should have 
parental responsibility in an involved donor and involved surrogate 
situation? 
o Do you think the law should respond differently to these co-
parenting arrangements, on the one hand, compared to how it deals 
with a situation where a couple splits up, on the other? 
o Do you think that biology/genetic relatedness should be relevant in 
determining legal parenthood? 
o Do you think that the intention to have and raise a child should be 
relevant in determining legal parenthood? 
 In your experience, do you find the fact that the law only recognises two 
legal parents discourages people from engaging in a co-parenting 
arrangement with three people? 
 Would you say that people who co-parent in this way are challenging the 
traditional family ideal for raising children and going beyond the limitation 
to two parents, which the law imposes? 
 In what ways would you want the law to be reformed, if at all? 
o What significance do you feel reforming the law would have for 
these families? 
 
Those were the main questions I had for you. Do you have anything you’d like to 
add or ask me? Would you be happy for me to keep your contact details and 
perhaps contact you about future research? My final question is, do you know 
anyone else who might be interested in taking part and if so could you give me 
their contact details or pass on details of this study to them? Thank you very much 
for taking part in this study. 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form 
Thank you for your interest in this study. The following page contains further 
details about what taking part in the study will involve and asks whether you are 
happy to continue. The main part of the study will be a telephone interview lasting 
approximately 45 minutes at a time that is convenient for you. If you wish to 
participate in the study, after having consented to the information on the following 
page, please complete the rest of this brief online survey which will ask some 
details about you and your family. Please also remember to leave your name and 
contact details (such as telephone number and e-mail address) so that we can 
arrange the telephone interview. We appreciate you taking the time to find out 
more information about our project. If you would like to proceed further, please 
click continue. 
The Project 
The overall aim of the research project is to explore the attitudes that gay men 
have towards raising children and the legal framework that surrounds this. In 
particular, the study focuses on how gay men might seek to involve a biological 
parent, with whom they are not in an intimate relationship (e.g. a surrogate), in 
the lives of their children. Of particular interests is the way in which the law and 
other social norms act as constraints on the types of arrangements that are 
possible and desirable. 
The Researchers 
This research is being conducted by Philip Bremner (pdb203@exeter.ac.uk), a 
PhD student in the School of Law at the University of Exeter. It is funded by an 
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Economic and Social Research Council Doctoral Award. The project is being 
supervised by Anne Barlow (A.E.Barlow@exeter.ac.uk), who is Professor of 
Family Law and Policy. Please feel free to contact either Philip or Anne if you 
have queries about the project.  
The Participants  
This study is targeted at two groups of participants: 
1) Gay men who either do not currently have children or have children from 
a previous heterosexual relationship and; 
2) Gay men who have children either as single fathers or in the context of a 
same-sex relationship (e.g. through surrogacy or adoption) and anyone who is 
involved in co-parenting such children (e.g. the surrogate). 
If you fall into either of these two categories, please feel free to complete the 
following survey. If you do not fall into either of these categories but are still 
interested in contributing to the project in some way, please e-mail Philip at the 
e-mail address above. 
The Interviews 
After you have completed the following survey, a telephone interview will be 
arranged at a time that is convenient for you. During the interview you will be 
asked to expand upon your attitudes towards having children in general and in 
particular how you would feel about involving 
If you decide to participate in this project, please sign and return the consent form 
that was sent along with this information sheet. Once we have received this form, 
we will contact you about participating in a telephone interview at a time which is 
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convenient for you. This will be followed up by a joint interview with you and the 
other co-parents in your family. If you prefer, however, you may opt-out of this 
follow-up interview. 
The overall aim of the research project is to investigate how the law should 
respond to what the study terms ‘platonic co-parenting’. This is where two or more 
adults, one of whom is a sperm or egg donor or surrogate mother of the other 
adult(s)’s child  and where there is no intimate relationship with the 
donor/surrogeate, choose to raise children together. The project will use the data 
collected to discuss the implications of how parents, children and health care 
professionals view the family unit and the legal recognition of such families. 
How were the participants selected? 
The participants in this project are parents who are engaged in a platonic co-
parenting arrangement. This study was advertised through various support 
groups and agencies in order to recruit participants. You are receiving this 
information sheet because you expressed an interest in taking part in the project. 
Arrangements for Withdrawal of Participants 
Your participation in the project is entirely voluntary and you are entitled to 
withdraw from the project (either in writing or verbally) at any point, and are not 
required to give your reasons for so doing. Please be assured that you are 
completely free to decline to answer any question if you are not comfortable doing 
so. 
 
Arrangements to Ensure Confidentiality 
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The interviews will be transcribed and the information contained in the transcripts 
is kept anonymous so that your true identity and answers will not be attributed to 
you personally in any publication. The transcripts will be saved on a PC that will 
be password protected and stored in a locked room. 
Arrangements for Dissemination of Results 
Results will be written up in the form of a PhD thesis, parts of which may be 
published as articles within respected academic journals and presented in the 
form of conference papers. In all cases professional research ethics will be 
adhered to and appropriate confidentiality maintained; we will seek to provide a 
balanced and scholarly depiction of research findings. 
Arrangements for Provision of Results to Participants 
If you would like a summary of the outcome of the project please e-mail Philip 
and he will be happy to send this to you once the project is concluded. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this. If you do have any questions please 
do not hesitate to e-mail Philip.  
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The University of British Columbia 
   Office of Research Services 
   Behavioural Research 
Ethics Board 
   Suite 102, 6190 Agronomy Road, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3  
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 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: INSTITUTION / DEPARTMENT: UBC BREB 
NUMBER: 
Fiona Kelly  UBC/Law  H13-00073 
INSTITUTION(S) WHERE RESEARCH WILL BE CARRIED OUT: 
  
Institution Site 
UBC Vancouver (excludes UBC Hospital) 
Other locations where the research will be conducted: 
Although most of the interviews will be conducted via telephone with the research onsite at the UBC 
campus it may be appropriate to conduct face-to-face interviews at a mutually convenient location 
either on campus or off campus (e.g. coffee shop). 
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Susan B. Boyd   
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Appendix 4: Data Naming 
Convention 
The interview transcripts are named using the following convention: jurisdiction, 
interviewer initials, number of interview. For ease of reference, the tables below 
link the interview transcript name with the pseudonym used to identify that 
participant. 
UK Interviews 
UKPB1 Betty Prospective Parent 
UKPB2 Eliza Prospective Parent 
UKPB3 Lenny Prospective Parent 
UKPB4 Tammy Health Professional 
UKPB5 Gail Legal Professional 
UKPB6 Chris Parent 
UKPB7 Dan Legal Professional 
UKPB8 John Legal Professional 
UKPB9 Lizzie Legal Professional 
UKPB10 Naomi Legal Professional 
UKPB11 Delilah Parent 
UKPB12 Colin Parent 
Canadian Interviews 
CAPB1 Mary Legal Professional 
CAPB2 Kerry Legal Professional 
CAPB3 Frieda Parent 
CAPB4 David Legal Professional 
CAPB5 Belinda Legal Professional 
CAPB6 Angela Parent 
CAPB7 Lance Parent 
CAPB8 Ruth Parent 
CAPB9 Rob Parent 
CAPB10 Sally Parent 
CAPB11 Rachael Parent 
CAPB12 Zabrina Legal Professional 
CAPB13 Molly Activist 
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